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General Introduction
1. Subject of This Dissertation
I have always taken so much care not to spread any impious doctrine, that
even my little commentaries on Lucretius, which I wrote – I do not know
how – when I was still a boy, I did not save then; in fact I gave them to Vulcan,
as Plato did with his tragedies and elegies.1
Thus wrote Marsilio Ficino (1433–1499), in 1492, in a letter addressed to his friend
Martino Uranio. Ficino was among the first scholars who could read Lucretius’
De rerum natura after it had been rediscovered by Poggio Bracciolini in 1417. In his
youth, Ficino appears to have avidly read Lucretius’ poem and deeply engaged with
its philosophical content, given that his early works are full of references to De
rerum natura. Most probably in the same period, Ficino allegedly wrote his ‘little
commentaries’ on Lucretius, which he claims to have eventually decided to burn.
Ficino’s dramatic act has often been interpreted as a sign of an individual spiritual
crisis, but it is actually symptomatic of a general ambivalence toward Lucretius’ poem
in the late fifteenth century. Indeed, in that period – that is, in the first decades after
the rediscovery of De rerum natura – Lucretius’ poem had begun to be perceived as a
controversial text, whichwasworth reading, butwhose potentially explosivemessage
was not to be disseminated.
In his six-book Latin hexameter poem, which is devoted to the exposition of
Epicurean philosophy, Lucretius (ca. 94–50bce) explains that matter is ultimately
made of atoms, whichmove randomly in a void space, just as do the specks of dust in
a sunbeam. He furthermoremaintains that this world has not beenmade for the sake
of humans, that the universe is infinite, and that there exists a plurality of worlds. He
also deals with a variety of ethical themes, such as free will, love, death, the futility of
power and wealth, the origin of species, civilisation, and religion. Lucretius’ ultimate
goal is to free his readers from the fear of gods and death, which – according to him –
stands in the way of one’s happiness; to this end, he shows that gods do not care about
humans, that there is no survival after death, and therefore no punishment in Hades.
1 Ficino,Opera omnia, 933, Tanta mihi semper cura fuit non divulgare prophana, adeo ut neque commentariolis
in Lucretiummeis, quae puer adhuc, nescio quomodo, commentabar, deinde pepercerim, haec enim sicut et Plato
tragoedias elegiasque suas, Vulcano dedi.
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Lucretius’De rerumnatura is not only a great literary work, but also a vivid account
of a revolutionarydoctrine, thanks towhich the author aimed for amoral regeneration
for himself, for Memmius – his dedicatee – and possibly for his readers.
From the point of view of the Renaissance reader, however, Lucretius’ poem
contained several heretical ideas, which were at odds with the traditional system
of philosophical knowledge, which was mainly based on the Aristotelian corpus, and
with Christian teachings: these forbidden ideas were primarily the denial of the soul’s
immortality, the rejection of finalism, the denial of divine intervention in human
affairs, and the description of the natural world as a product of chance. Before the
rediscovery of his poem, Lucretius had been knownmainly through the fierce attacks
against him preserved in the works of the Church Fathers, especially Lactantius and
Jerome; the latter had notoriously presented Lucretius as a madman, who composed
hisDe rerum natura “between fits of madness”, and eventually committed suicide.2
Given this background, onemightwonderwhy anyRenaissance scholarwould bother
to read, let alone to explain and to spread the work of such an author. Why would
one take the risk of incurring the disapproval of contemporaries and ecclesiastical
censorship for writing a commentary on a book that was impious, lascivious, and
written by a madman?
And yet, despite its controversial and sometimes scandalous content – to which
Ficino’s repentant reaction, cited above, bears witness – several scholars did choose
to recover Lucretius’ text and to make it available to a larger audience by publishing
editions, commentaries, and paraphrases. In so doing, these scholars, while not
necessarily endorsing all of Lucretius’ ideas, ended up injecting them back into the
philosophical discourse.
The aim of this thesis is to find out 1) why Renaissance scholars chose to comment
on Lucretius’ poem, despite its unsavoury reputation, and 2) how they tackled
his atomistic matter theory. This will ultimately shed light on the role played
by Lucretius’ matter theory in the revival of atomism in the late sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries.
But before starting, I shall address some preliminary issues, in order to contextu-
alize the texts I will present: first I shall give a brief account of the concepts of atom
and atomism from antiquity to the Early Renaissance. Secondly, I shall deal with the
ancient andmedieval reception of Lucretius and tell the story of the rediscovery of De
2 Jerome, Chron. a. Abr. 1923 = 94bce (p. 149,20 ss. H.), Titus Lucretius poeta nascitur. Qui postea amatorio
poculo in furorem versus, cum aliquot libros per intervalla insaniae conscripsisset, quos postea Cicero emendavit,
propria se manu interfecit anno aetatis xliv.
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rerum natura in 1417. Thirdly, I shall address some problems that the commentary, as a
genre, may pose. Finally I will present the status quaestionis and provide an overview
of the chapters of this thesis.
1.1. Atoms and Atomism from Antiquity to the Early Renaissance
While the term ‘atom’ (from the Greek adjective ἄτομος, ‘uncut’, ‘uncuttable’) is of
ancient origin, ‘atomism’, as the name of a philosophical school of thought, was
only coined in the seventeenth century.3 The term ‘atomism’, however, is commonly
used not to designate a homogeneous philosophical current, but rather a large
variety of doctrines, all somehow based on the idea that the ultimate constituents
of matter are small, indivisible particles. This variety of views is particularly evident
in the Renaissance period, when such indivisible particles – sometimes labelled as
‘atoms’, but also as ‘corpuscles’ or ‘particles’ – are to be found in the works of many
philosophers and physicians, but are defined in so many ways that it is impossible to
view them as belonging to the same school of thought.
What did Renaissance thinkers have inmind when they came across the notion
of ‘atom’? In order to answer this question, we should first provide a brief outline of
themain philosophical currents that, from antiquity to the Early Renaissance, put
forward the idea of extended indivisibles as the basic constituents of matter.
Leucippus (5th century bce) and Democritus (5th–4th century bce) are generally
regarded as the first Greek atomists. They theorized that the two fundamental
constituents of the natural world are atoms (i.e., indivisible bodies) and void. These
atoms,which are ungenerated and indestructible,move about in an infinite void, and,
when they collide, combine into clusters andproduce compoundbodies.4Mostofwhat
Renaissance scholars knew about Leucippus and Democritus, however, derived from
Aristotle’s summaries of their views inhisworks,whicharenotoriouslyhostile to their
ideas, and from late antique commentaries. Aristotle in fact rejected the very idea of an
atom:howcan an extendedmagnitudepossibly resist further division? –hewondered,
and therefore insisted that the atoms proposed by Leucippus and Democritus, being
extended indivisibles, were self-refuting and therefore absurd entities.5
3 It is Ralph Cudworth who seems to have coined the term in 1678. See Ralph Cudworth, The True
Intellectual System of the Universe (London: Printed for Richard Royston, 1678).
4 On Leucippus and Democritus, see Cyril Bailey, The Greek Atomists and Epicurus (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1928), 64–214.
5 For Aristotle’s criticism of the ancient atomists, see especiallyMet. i 4 985b4–20; Phys. iv 6 213a28–213b
12; Cael. i 7 275b30–276a 18; gc i 8 324a25–326b 28 and i 10 327a30–328b 24.
4 general introduction
Epicurus (341–270bce) inherited Democritus’ atomism, but modified it in a
number of respects.6 Among other things, he objected to its rigidly deterministic
account of natural agency andpostulated aminimal ‘swerve’ in the parallel downward
motion of atoms, occurring at no fixed place or time.7Without the swerve atoms could
not collide with one another. The swerve is therefore necessary to understand the
generation of compound bodies and the formation of the worlds. But the swerve
theory also has an ethical dimension, because it grounds the possibility of free action.8
Even though the swerve theory cannot be found in any of Epicurus’ extant works,
it has been attributed to him by many sources. The most important Greek source
for Epicurus’ thought was Book x of Diogenes Laertius’ Lives of Eminent Philosophers,
which includes a biography of the philosopher, summaries of his ideas, a list of his
works, and three philosophical letters. In the Renaissance, Laertius’ Lives had been
translated fromGreek into Latin by Ambrogio Traversari in 1433.9Other Epicurean
fragments appeared in various sources, including Plutarch, Cicero, and Lactantius,
among others; but the most complete source of Epicurean philosophy was certainly
Lucretius’De rerum natura, which wasmade widely available after Poggio Bracciolini
found a copy of it in 1417.
Assessing whether Lucretius made any original contribution to his master’s
philosophy – and therefore whether he may be considered an independent source of
6 Even though Epicurus’ exact knowledge of Aristotle has been the subject of debate, it is quite
possible that part of the modifications were introduced in response to the challenges posed
by Aristotle’s criticisms of Democritus’ theory. On Epicurus’ answers to Aristotle’s criticisms
against Democritus’ atomic theory, see especially David Furley, “Aristotle’s Criticisms and Epi-
curus’ Answers”, in Two Studies in the Greek Atomists (Princeton: Princeton up, 1967), 111–130. In
general, on Epicurean atomism, see Pierre-Marie Morel, “Epicurean Atomism”, in The Cambridge
Companion to Epicureanism, ed. by J. Warren (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 65–
83.
7 According to Diogenes of Oenoanda, the swerve theory is aimed directly against Democritus. See
Diog. Oin. Fr. 54 Smith. An in-depth discussion of this topic can be found in chapter 4.
8 This implication is made clear by Lucretius 2.216–293 and Cicero, Fat. 21–25. On this topic, see
chapter 4.
9 On Traversari’s translation of Diogenes Laertius, see Tiziano Dorandi, “Diogène Laërce duMoyen
Age à la Renaissance”, in «Exempla docent»: les exemples des philosophes de l’Antiquité à la Renaissance.
Actes du colloque international 23–25 octobre 2003, Université de Neuchâtel, ed. by Thomas Ricklin (Paris:
Vrin, 2006), 35–48; Agostino Sottili, “Il Laerzio latino e greco e altri autografi di Ambrogio Traversari”,
in Vestigia. Studi in onore di Giuseppe Billanovich, vol. 2, ed. by Rino Avesani – Mirella Ferrari – Tino
Foffano – Giuseppe Frasso – Agostino Sottili (Rome: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1984), 699–745;
James Hankins and Ada Palmer, The Recovery of Ancient Philosophy in the Renaissance: A Brief Guide
(Florence: Olschki, 2008), 62–63.
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atomism – is not an easy task.10 It seems to me that, even though Lucretius might not
have introduced substantial changes to Epicurus’ atomic theory, his account can still
be shown to be innovative in various respects. For instance, instead of transliterating
the word ‘atom’ from the Greek or simply translating it with individua, as Cicero
had done, Lucretius presented his own set of Latin terms – such as semina rerum
or genitalia corpora – with which he emphasised not just the physical but also the
biological properties of Epicurus’ first principles.11As I shall demonstrate in this thesis,
very often Renaissance scholars interpreted these alternative Lucretian terms as an
indication that atoms were animated and endowed with a soul. What in Lucretius
may have been a mere metaphor, or possibly a deliberate choice to emphasise the
generative powers of the Epicurean atoms, Renaissance scholars often adapted to
suit the demands of Aristotelian, Platonic and Christian traditions, and led to some
innovative combinations of atomist notions and vitalistic theories.
Even though Leucippus, Democritus, Epicurus, and Lucretius are generally seen
as the ancient atomists par excellence, in antiquity another important but often
underestimated source of an atomistic account of matter was Plato’s Timaeus. In
Timaeus 55a–57d, Plato endorsed a type of geometrical atomism, presenting the four
elements as regular solids composed of plane indivisible figures, namely isosceles and
scalene right-angled triangles. According to this view, fire particles have the form
of a tetrahedron, air particles of an octahedron, water particles of an icosahedron,
earth particles of a cube, while the fifth geometrical solid is the dodecahedron.12
Nevertheless, given that in the Middle Ages and Early Renaissance the only Latin
translation of Plato’s Timaeus was that of Calcidius (4th century ce), which ended
at 53c, this theory became widely available only after Marsilio Ficino’s complete
translation of Plato’s works had been published in 1484.13
10 As for the the vexata quaestiowhether Lucretius relied on sources other than Epicurus and whether
he made any original contribution to his philosophy, see especially David Sedley, “Lucretius
the Fundamentalist”, in Lucretius and the Transformation of Greek Wisdom (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1998), 62–93.
11 Other innovative aspects of Lucretius’ atomism can be found in Beretta, La rivoluzione culturale,
133–165.
12 This theory is also briefly described in Arist. Cael. iii 8 307a.
13 Even so, although the section of the Timaeus in which Plato attributes polyhedra to the elements
had not been translated by Calcidius, there is evidence that it was not entirely unknown in the
medieval Latin world. See Irene Caiazzo, “The Four Elements in theWork of William of Conches”,
in Guillaume de Conches: Philosophie et Science au xiième siècle (Florence: sismel-Edizioni del Galluzzo,
2011), 3–66, 18.
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Despite the common scholarly view, the Middle Ages was a period of intense
reflections on indivisibles, not only in western Latin tradition, but also in the
Arabic and Jewish medieval philosophies.14 Within these traditions, different ver-
sions of ‘atomism’ were developed: physical theories of matter and time, but also
pure mathematical theories about the divisibility of the continuum. The main
dispute in medieval Arabic natural philosophy, for instance, opposed Aristotelian
hylomorphism to an ontology based on atoms and their properties. While the
former theory was adopted by the majority of Muslim philosophers following
Greek learning ( falsafa), an atomistic ontology was accepted, in the ninth and
tenth centuries, by many theologians of the kalām (called mutakallimūn), espe-
cially in Baghdad and Basra – then followed by the Jewish schools especially in
Egypt.15
A revival of atomism appeared also in the LatinWest, from the twelfth-century
school of Chartres to the fourteenth-century Christian theologians of Oxford and
Paris. These theories, however, were often very different from those of the ancient
atomists, since they often tried to render the atomistic ontology compatible with
Christian theology and therefore were usually embedded in a teleological account of
natural agency. Among the scholars who in the Middle Ages sympathized with an
atomistic account of matter, there is for instance William of Conches (ca. 1080–1154),
who, in hisDragmaticon philosophiae (1.6), claims that
When the Epicureans said that the world consists of atoms, they were correct.
But it must be regarded as a fable when they said that those atoms were
without beginning and flew to and fro separately through the great void, then
massed themselves into four great bodies. For nothing can be without
beginning and place except God.16
14 On this topic, see Robert, “Atomism”, 122–125. Especially on the fourteenth century, see Christophe
Grellard and Aurélien Robert (eds.), Atomism in LateMedieval Philosophy and Theology (Leiden: Brill,
2009).
15 Robert, “Atomism”, 122.
16 Transl. by Italo Ronca and Matthew Curr (slightly modified) inWilliam of Conches: A Dialogue on
Natural Philosophy (Dragmaticon Philosophiae), (Notre Dame in: Notre Dame Texts in Medieval
Culture, 1997), 16. Guillelmus de Conchis,Dragmaticon philosophiae, 1.6.8–9, In hoc vero quod dixerunt
Epicurei, mundum constare ex athomis, vere dixerunt. Sed quod dixerunt illas athomos sine principio fuisse et
divisas per magnum inane volitasse, deinde in quatuor magna corpora coactas fuisse, fabula est: non enim sine
principio et loco aliquid praeter Deum potest esse.
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William’s conflation of an Epicurean atomistic conception of matter and the idea of
divine creation in time is emblematic of this period and, later in the Renaissance, his
matter theorymay have exerted a significant influence on thinkers such asMarsilio
Ficino (see chapter 1).17 Subsequently, from the thirteenth century onwards, once the
Latin translations of Aristotle’sPhysics,OnGeneration andCorruption, andOntheHeavens
had become available, Leucippus and Democritus – whose theories, as maintained,
were knownmainly through Aristotle’s critical account – became themain source for
reflections on atomism.
Therefore, given that in the Renaissance Aristotle’s writings had become the
basis of the arts curriculum at all European universities, students were invariably
introduced to the atomas an erroneous concept. For this reason, onemight think that,
when in 1417 Lucretius’De rerum naturawas rediscovered, scholarsmust have expected
its contents to confirm the correctness of Aristotle’s negative judgment of the notion
of atoms, to which Lucretius subscribed. And yet, in many Renaissance works – and
notably in the first commentaries on Lucretius – we cannot detect anymajor criticism
of atomism per se, but rather of its implications, especially the negation of divine
providence and the immortality of the soul.18
Not only did many Renaissance scholars abstain from rejecting atomism as such,
but they also tended to harmonize and conflate it with the Platonic account or with
the Aristotelian-scholastic tradition. This feature is particularly conspicuous in the
first Renaissance commentaries on Lucretius, but can also be detected in other works
of that period. Take for instance Agostino Nifo’s commentary on Aristotle’s Physics
(1552), in which it is said that
Plato asserts that the bodies are made of plane figures, plane figures from
lines, lines from points. In addition, Epicurus, while sticking to this idea, adds
17 This connection between William of Conches and Ficino, with respect to Lucretius and his
atomism, has already been shown by Gentile, Ficino, Epicuro e Lucrezio, 119–135. On this topic,
see also Eugenio Garin, “Ricerche sull’Epicureismo del Quattrocento” in La cultura filosofica del
Rinascimento italiano (Florence: Sansoni, 1961), 84 and Gentile, “Il ritorno di Platone, dei platonici
e del “corpus” ermetico. Filosofia, teologia e astrologia nell’opera di Marsilio Ficino”, in C. Vasoli,
Le filosofie del Rinascimento, a cura di P.C. Pissavino (Milano: BrunoMondadori, 2002), 197–198, esp. 223
n. 22.
18 Even in the records of ecclesiastical jurisdiction from this period there are no investigations for
atomism as such. See Nicholas S. Davidson, “Lucretius, Atheism, and Irreligion in Renaissance and
Early Modern Venice”, in Lucretius and the EarlyModern, ed. by David Norbrook, Stephen Harrison,
and Philip Hardie (Oxford: Oxford up, 2016), 123–133, 129.
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that, in general, any continuum is made of indivisibles. Just as time [is made
of] the very present moments andmotion of small jerks.19
Here Nifo presents Epicurean atomism as perfectly compatible with the Platonic
account of matter. As I shall show shortly, a similar tendency can be also discerned
in the early Ficino, for whom Plato’s Timaeus and its medieval traditionmight have
played an important role in encouraging a positive attitude toward atomism and
possibly stimulated his early interest in Lucretius (see chapter 1).
1.2. The Ancient andMedieval Reception of Lucretius
There is little doubt that Lucretius’De rerum naturawas available to Roman intellec-
tuals immediately after the poet’s death.20 The earliest mention of Lucretius occurs
in Cicero’s letter AdQuintum Fratrem ii.10.3, in which the poet is praised for both his
genius and poetical skills.21 Later on, in the fourth century, Jerome was to argue that
it was precisely Cicero who corrected (emendavit)De rerumnatura after the poet’s death,
but this claim needs to be taken with a pinch of salt, given that it is not supported by
any other testimony. Besides, apart from this brief reference, Cicero, while dealing
extensively with the Epicurean doctrine, never explicitly mentioned Lucretius in his
philosophical treatises. Among contemporaries, echoes of Lucretius can also be found
in Catullus, who however never mentioned him by name andmost probably learned
of De rerum natura only after the poet’s death.22
Among the Roman poets, few decades after Lucretius’ death, implicit references
to De rerum natura can be found in the works of Virgil (georg. 2.489 and ecl. 6.31–34)
and Horace (Od. 1.34.1–12), while Ovid (am. i.15.23–24 and trist. 2,423–428) and, later
on, Statius (silv. ii.7.76) explicitly referred to Lucretius by name.23 Lucretius’ model is
19 See Agostino Nifo, Expositio super octo Aristotelis Stagiritae libros de physico auditu (Venice: Apud Iuntas,
1552), 199v. Plato autumat corpora fieri ex superficiebus, superficies ex lineis, lineas ex punctis. Praeterea Epicurus
huic adhaerens addit universaliter omne continuum fieri ex indivisibilibus, ut tempus ex ipsis nunc et motum ex
momentis. On this passage, see Susanna Gambino Longo, Savoir de la nature et poésie des choses. Lucrèce et
Epicure à la Renaissance italienne (Paris: Champion, 2004), 143–144.
20 For a comprehensive study of Lucretius’ reception among his contemporaries, in the first century
bce, see GeorgeHadzsits, Lucretius andHis Influence (New York: Longmans, Green and co., 1935), 28–61.
21 Cic. adQ. fr. ii.10.3 Lucreti poemata ut scribis ita sunt, multis luminibus ingeni, multae tamen artis.
22 On Cicero, see David Butterfield, The Early Textual History of Lucretius’De rerum natura (Cambridge:
Cambridge up, 2013), 1 n. 4 and 49 n. 15 (with bibliography); on Catullus, ibid. 48 n. 10 (with
bibliography).
23 See Ov. am. i.15.23–24, carmina sublimis tunc sunt peritura Lucreti, / exitio terras cum dabit una dies and Stat.
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particularly evident inManilius’Astronomica, a Latin didactic poem in five books about
astronomy and astrology, which can be regarded as a sort of “Stoic Anti-Lucrèce”.24
Among the prose authors, references to Lucretius can be found in the works
of Nepos (Att. 12.4), Vitruvius (ix.pr.17–18), and Velleius Paterculus (ii.36), who give
an overall positive judgement about the poet and his work. But direct quotations
of passages fromDe rerum natura were to appear only over one hundred years after
the poet’s death, in the works of Seneca the Younger (ca. 3/2bce–65ce), who knew
significant portions of the poem and could quote them by heart.25
After this initial period of reception, Lucretius’De rerum natura began to be cited
and referred to regularly and for a broad range of purposes by authors in antiquity.26
Quotations and references to Lucretius can be found in the Latin Church Fathers,
especially in Tertullian, Lactantius, Arnobius, Augustine, and Jerome. Among these
figures, Lactantiuswas theonewho launched the fiercest andmost concerted attackon
Lucretius and his Epicurean philosophy, and especially on his anti-providentialism,
rejection of an immortal soul, and atomism. He quoted Lucretius in thirty-one
instances in his Institutiones divinae, De ira and De opificio Dei, and his reaction to
Lucretius’ doctrine is usually markedly hostile.27 As we shall see especially in chapters
silv. ii.7.76, cedetMusa rudis ferocis Enni/ et docti furor arduus Lucreti. For the reception of Lucretius in
Virgil and Horace (among other authors), see especially Philip Hardie, Lucretian Receptions: History,
The Sublime, Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge up, 2009).
24 Butterfield, The Early Textual History, 48 n. 9. On this topic, see especially Josèphe-Henriette Abry,
“Présence de Lucrèce: les Astronomiques deManilius”, in Rémy Poignault (ed.), Présence de Lucrèce.
Actes du colloque tenu à Tours (3–5 décembre 1998) (Tours: Centre de recherches A. Piganiol, 1999),
111–128.
25 See Butterfield, The Early Textual History, 49 n. 19 with bibliography. Seneca quotes Lucr. 1.57 in Epp.
95.11, 1.304 in Epp. 106.8, 1.313 inQuaest. nat. ivb.3.4, 2.55–56 (= 3.87–88 = 4.35–36) in Epp. 110.6, 3.1034 in
Epp. 86.5, and 3.1068 in Tranq. an. 2.14.
26 For a detailed account and a richbibliography of the indirect tradition of Lucretius fromantiquity up
to the tenth century, see Butterfield, The Early Textual History, 46–101. Ancient testimonies regarding
Lucretius’ works and life are listed in the Appendix toMarco Beretta, La rivoluzione culturale di Lucrezio.
Filosofia e scienza nell’antica Roma (Rome: Carocci Editore, 2015), 265–275.
27 The bibliography on the reception of Epicureanismand Lucretius in theworks of theChurch Fathers
and especially in Lactantius is vast. Among other contributions, see Wolfgang Schmid, Epicuro e
l’epicureismo cristiano (Brescia: Paideia Editrice, 1984), 154–157; Howard Jones, The Epicurean Tradition
(London-New York: Routledge, 1989), esp. 94–116; Jochen Althoff, “Zur Epikurrezeption bei Laktanz”,
in Zur Rezeption der hellenistischen Philosophie in der Spätantike, ed. by Therese Fuhrer andMichael Erler
(Stuttgart: Steiner, 1999), 33–35; Ubaldo Pizzani, “La polemica antiepicurea in Lattanzio”, in Cultura
latina cristiana fra terzo e quinto secolo, Atti del convegno, Mantova, 5–7 Novembre 1998 (Florence:
C. Gallico, 2001), 171–203; Susanne Gatzemeier,Ut ait Lucretius: Die Lukrezrezeption in der lateinischen
Prosa bis Laktanz (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2013), 180–304.
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1 and 3, Lactantius’ testimony concerning Lucretius and his doctrine was to exert a
considerable influence on Renaissance authors.
In Late Antiquity, among other Virgilian commentators, Servius (4th–5th century
ce) quotes Lucretius most often.28 Servius presumed a strong Lucretian influence on
Virgil and referred to his Epicurean doctrine in several passages of his works (e.g. ad
Verg. Ecl. vi.31, ad Verg. Geo. iii. 293). However, it has been pointed out that Servius
had no direct access to a manuscript of Lucretius. Instead he was using the citations
he could find in many works of Virgilian scholarship and perhaps in other ancient
sources, such as Cicero.29
After 400ce, evidence of first-hand knowledge of Lucretius’ poem considerably
decreases, even though in Isidore of Seville (ca. 560–636), one can still find many
verbal reminiscences and adaptations of Lucretian theories, especially in his workDe
natura rerum and in his encyclopaedic twenty-book Etymologiae.30 It is highly possible
that Isidore had direct access to the Lucretian text, since he closely paraphrased
and explicitly cited many lines of De rerum natura that cannot be found in other
sources. Most of the quotations come from Book vi and relate to terrestrial or celestial
phenomena, which is the topic in which Isidore was most interested. A little later, a
quotation from Lucretius (6.868) can be found in the Venerable Bede’s (672/3–735)De
arte metrica. However, a corruption in the text shows that Bede most probably drew
this quotation from previous sources: it is therefore possible that he did not have
first-hand knowledge of Lucretius’ poem.31
Themost authoritative manuscripts of Lucretius (theOblongus andQuadratus)
date back to the Carolingian Age (8th–9th centuries ce), which demonstrates that,
in that period, Lucretius’ text was still available in continental Europe.32 Copies of
Lucretius are recorded in theninth century at themonasteries of Bobbio andMurbach,
28 For the presence of Lucretian citations in the Virgilian commentators, see Butterfield, The Early
Textual History, 70–74.
29 Butterfield, The Early Textual History, 71. On this topic, see Lucienne Deschamps, “Les citations de
Lucrèce dans le commentaire de Servius”, in Poignault, Présence de Lucrèce, 199–216 and Aldo Setaioli,
“Interpretazioni stoiche ed epicuree in Servio e la tradizione dell’esegesi filosofica delmito e dei poeti
a Roma (Comuto, Seneca, Filodemo) ii”, International Journal of the Classical Tradition 11.1 (Summer,
2004), 3–46, esp. 29–37.
30 See for instance Lucr. 5.1192 (in Etym. i.36.13), 5.1273–1274 (in Etym. xvi.20.1), 6.165–166 (in Etym. xiii.8.2),
6.538 (in De nat. rer. 41.1), 6.1128–1130 (in De nat. rer. 39.2). For a discussion of these quotations, see
Butterfield, The Early Textual History, 89–91.
31 See Butterfield, The Early Textual History, 26 n. 123.
32 O was probably produced in north-west Germany or north-east France, while Q was copied in
north-east France; see Butterfield, The Early Textual History, 7 and 9.
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and direct access to De rerum natura was also granted at St. Gallen to Ermenrich of
Ellwangen (ca. 817–874) and to the author of the Florilegium Sangallense, a collection of
verses in which Lucretius is cited twenty-eight times, alongside various other poets.33
But the writer who, in the ninth century, quoted Lucretius most often was Hrabanus
Maurus, especially in hisDe universo (842–846); there is however no doubt that all his
quotations were drawn from indirect sources, most probably from Isidore.34
From the late tenth century to Poggio’s rediscovery in 1417, there is no evidence of
a first-hand knowledge of, and direct access to, Lucretius’ poem.35 Therefore, even if
it has been argued – especially by Jean Philippe – thatDe rerum naturawas discussed
throughout the Middle Ages, there is little doubt that many scholars of the later
Middle Ages were acquainted only with a very limited number of Lucretian passages,
which they moreover only knew through indirect sources.36
1.3. The Rediscovery of Lucretius’ Poem
The story of the rediscovery of Lucretius is generally well-known.37 In 1417 the
renowned Italian book-hunter Poggio Bracciolini discovered a copy of De rerum natura
in an unidentified monastery pretty far (satis longinquus) from Constance.38 Poggio
had a copy of this manuscript made for him by a local scribe and then lent it to the
33 See Michael Reeve, “Lucretius in the Middle Ages and early Renaissance: Transmission and Scholar-
ship”, in The Cambridge Companion to Lucretius, edited by Stuart Gillespie, Philip Hardie (Cambridge:
Cambridge up, 2007), 206 and Butterfield, The Early Textual History, 93.
34 OnHrabanusMaurus see Philippe, Lucrèce dans la théologie chrétienne, 45–50.
35 See Butterfield, The Early Textual History, 46, 100, and Appendix ii n. 1.
36 In general, On the reception of Lucretius in the Middle Ages, see the pioneering studies by Jean
Philippe,Lucrècedans la théologie chrétiennedu iiieauxiiie siècle et spécialementdans les écolesCarolingiennes
(Paris: E. Leroux, etc., 1896) and Ettore Bignone, “Per la fortuna di Lucrezio e dell’epicureismo
nel medio evo”, Rivista di Filologia e d’Istruzione Classica 41 (1913), 230–262. More recently, see Reeve,
“Lucretius in theMiddle Ages”, 205–213.
37 Over the past few years, the story of the fifteenth-century recovery of a manuscript of Lucretius’De
rerum natura has attracted a great amount of attention. The most famous example of this renewed
attention to Lucretius’ fortune in the Renaissance is certainly Stephen Greenblatt’s The Swerve: How
theWorld BecameModern (New York: W.W. Norton, 2011), a popular book that won the Pulitzer Prize
for “General Non-Fiction” in 2012.
38 This information can be found in a letter written by Poggio to Francesco Barbaro in the late 1417 (or
beginning of 1418). This letter has been transcribed by Albert C. Clark in “The Literary Discoveries of
Poggio”, The Classical Review 13 (1899), 119–130, 125. Still, Poggio does not clarify the precise location of
themonastery where he found amanuscript of Lucretius: some scholars believe that it should be
identified with Fulda, others, like Gambino Longo, think of Murbach. See Gambino Longo, Savoir de
la nature, 20. On this topic see also Butterfield, The Early Textual History, 14 n. 47.
12 general introduction
book collector Niccolò Niccoli. But Niccoli kept Poggio’s copy in his library for more
than a decade. During that period, Poggio asked him, with increasing insistence, to
return his manuscript: “You have already kept Lucretius for twelve years” – Poggio
wrote in 1429; and the following year: “I want to read Lucretius […]; do you want
to keep him for another ten years?”39 WhenNiccoli had finally completed his copy
of the manuscript (the still extant Codex Laurentianus 35,30), the poem’s diffusion
started.40
Aswehave seen in the previous section, before Poggio’s rediscovery,De rerumnatura
had almost disappeared for about five hundred years and, during that period, its
contents had been knownmainly through indirect sources, which often condemned
Lucretius’ poem, especially because of its Epicureanism. This philosophical schoolwas
commonly understood to have been a philosophy that promoted a life of pleasure,
and opposed the ideas of the immortality of the soul and of Divine Providence.41
Moreover, thanks to the negative verdict of the Church Fathers, in theMiddle Ages
and Early Renaissance,De rerum naturawas traditionally perceived as a controversial
work, written by a madman.
39 Poggio Bracciolini, Lettere, i, ed. byHeleneHarth (Florence: Olschki, 1984), 89 (n. 34, 13 December 1429,
Tenuisti iam Lucretium duodecim annis) and 103 (n. 38, 27May 1430, Cupio legere Lucretium […] nunquid
etiam illum aliud decennium tenere velis?). See Alison Brown, “Lucretius and the Epicureans in the Social
and Political Context of Renaissance Florence”, I Tatti Studies in the Italian Renaissance 9 (2001), 11–62,
11.
40 On the fifteenth-century Florentine reception of Lucretius, see Alison Brown, The Return of Lucretius
to Renaissance Florence (Cambridge, ma-London: Harvard up, 2010). Even thoughmany of the earliest
manuscripts ofDe rerumnaturawere produced in Florence, this was not the only citywhere Lucretius
was read in the Renaissance. Other manuscripts were circulating in Rome, Naples, and the first
editions were published in the Venetian Republic. On the early circulation of De rerum natura
in Venice, see N.S. Davidson, “Lucretius”, 123–133. On the Neapolitan reception of Lucretius, see
especially Goddard, Epicureanism and Poetry of Lucretius in the Renaissance (Unpublished PhD diss.,
University of Cambridge, 1981). For an account of the broader circulation of manuscripts and printed
editions in Italy and across Europe, see Ada Palmer, Reading Lucretius in the Renaissance (Cambridge,
ma, London: Harvard University Press, 2014).
41 In the Middle Ages and Early Renaissance, besides the negative judgments on Epicurus and
Epicureanism, one can also find some more positive ones. It seems in fact that, already in the
Middle Ages, some authors drew a clear distinction between Epicurus and his followers, the
Epicureans. The first, despite his doctrinal errors, was known for his wisdom and ascetic lifestyle – in
particular thanks to Seneca’s Letters –, while his disciples were considered to havemisunderstood the
philosopher or simply to have followed the popular legend. On this topic, see Maria Rita Pagnoni,
“Prime note sulla tradizionemedievale ed umanistica di Epicuro”, Annali della Scuola normale superiore
di Pisa 4 (1974), 1443–1477; Howard Jones, The Epicurean Tradition, 117–141 and 142–165; Aurélien Robert,
“Epicure et les épicuriens auMoyen Âge”,Micrologus 21 (2013), 3–46.
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For these reasons, the Renaissance readers of Lucretius must have had a clear
perception of the heterodox content of theDe rerum natura, and while some of them
may have felt some admiration for Lucretius’ physical and ethical theories, others,
such as themature Ficino cited on our opening page, regarded the poem’s contents
with suspicion and outright hostility.42Nowonder thatmany of those who published
or commented on Lucretius, in order to avoid condemnation by their contemporaries,
distanced themselves publicly from the content of the poem, sometimes adopting
measures of self-censorship in their editions or comments. Valentina Prosperi, in her
bookDi soavi licor gli orli del vaso, calls suchmeasures a “dissimulatory code”.43 In the
first editions of theDe rerum natura, this device usually took the form of “warnings to
the reader”: that is to say that the editors, in the prefaces to their editions, warned the
reader against the contents of the poem, which – they insisted – had not to be taken
seriously. For example, in the preface to the first Aldine edition of Lucretius, which
was published in 1500, the editor Aldo Manuzio took great pains to emphasize the
gap that existed between the Epicurean theses and those of Christian theologians; he
subsequently recommends the reading of Lucretius “not because what he wrote is
true andwe have to believe in it […], but because he explained in a learned and elegant
manner, in poetic verse, the Epicurean doctrines.”44
Other examples of precautionary measures might be discerned in the first
exegetical works on Lucretius’ poem. For instance, Raphael Francus, who in 1504wrote
a Pharaphrasis of De rerum natura, despite his reputation as a philosophus Lucretianus,
did not publicly endorse Lucretius’ doctrine, but instead added to his paraphrase
an appendix in which he argues – though not very convincingly – in favour of the
immortality of the soul. Given that his objections against Lucretius are fairly hasty
42 See, among other testimonies, Aldo Manuzio’s preface to the 1500 Aldine edition: En igitur tibi
Lucretius, et poeta et philosophus quidemmaximus vel antiquorum iudicio, sed plenus mendaciorum. Nam
multo aliter sentit de Deo, de creatione rerum, quam Plato, quam caeteri Academici, quippe qui Epicuream
sectam secutus est. Quamobrem sunt qui ne legendum quidem illum censent Christianis hominibus, qui verum
Deum adorant, colunt, venerantur. See AldoManuzio editore. Dediche. Prefazioni. Note ai testi, introduzione
di Carlo Dionisotti, testo latino con traduzione e note a cura di Giovanni Orlandi, vol. 1 (Milan:
Il Polifilo, 1975), 152–153. More in general, on Epicureanism in the Early Renaissance, see Eugenio
Garin, “Ricerche sull’Epicureismo” and, more recently, Palmer, Reading Lucretius, 17–20.
43 See Valentina Prosperi,Di soavi licor gli orli del vaso. La fortuna di Lucrezio dall’Umanesimo alla Controri-
forma (Turin: Nino Aragno Editore, 2004), 97 and Ead., “Lucretius in the Italian Renaissance”, in The
Cambridge Companion to Lucretius, 214.
44 Non quod vera scripserat et credenda nobis – nam ab academicis etiam et peripateticis, nedum a theologis nostris
multum dissentit –, sed quia Epicureae sectae dogmata eleganter et docte mandavit carminibus … See Carlo
Dionisotti and Giovanni Orlandi (eds.), AldoManuzio editore, 33–34.
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and inaccurate, it has been argued that, rather than a real attempt to disprove his
doctrine, the Appendix should be interpreted as a precautionary measure to avoid
censorship (see chapter 2). Likewise, the first Renaissance commentator of Lucretius,
Johannes Baptista Pius, who, according to some sources, had been committed to
Epicureanism during his life, added at the beginning of his edition of De rerum
natura the statement, “I submit everything to the orthodox faith” (Omnia ortodoxe
fidei subijcio), thereby assuming a cautious position and confirming his loyalty to the
orthodoxy (see chapter 3).
Such precautionary measures were not superfluous. In 1517, that is, after the editio
princeps, published inBrescia in 1473, and the first commented editionbyPius (1511), the
diffusion of the poemwas such that Lucretius’ poemwas officially banned from the
secondary schools by the Florentine synod, the reason being that it was “a lascivious
and impious work” in which “every effort is used to demonstrate the mortality of the
soul.”45 This prohibition of course confirms the popularity of the text. Although this
measure was not as restrictive as those applied to works considered to be outright
heretical,De rerum naturawas not published again in Italy until 1647.46
Still, in this hostile context, Lucretius’ text managed to avoid censorship first in
1549, thanks to the intervention of the Cardinal Marcello Cervini, and then again, in
1557 – during the preparatory work on the first Index of Prohibited Books – thanks to the
Cardinal Michele Ghislieri, the future Pope Paul iv. In fact, in a letter to the Genoese
Inquisitor, Ghislieri argued that, if they were to prohibit Orlando Furioso and the
Decameron, they would immediately be laughed at, since nobody reads those books as
texts in which one has to believe, but as stories, and in the same way people still read
theworks by Lucian and Lucretius. As forMarcello Cervini,we know froma letter from
Giovambattista Busini to Benedetto Varchi that the cardinal did not wantDe rerum
natura to be banned.47 Probably thanks to these illustrious defenders of Lucretius, even
after the institutionalization of the Index in 1559 as an anti-Reformation measure,De
rerum natura escaped being listed. What censors successfully prevented, however, was
the publication of translations into the vernacular languages: they probably felt that
45 See Brown, The Return, 12. A facsimile of the editio princepswith an introduction has been recently
publishedbyMarcoBeretta. SeeDererumnatura, editioprinceps (1472–73), ed. byMarcoBeretta (Bologna:
Bononia University Press, 2016).
46 In this period the only exception is Frachetta’s Spositione, which is not an edition, but a paraphrase
of De rerum natura (see chapter 5).
47 “Qui sono state vietate e proibite a vendersi tutte le opere del nostroMachiavello, e vogliono fare
una scomunica a chi le tiene in casa […] Volevano vietare Lucrezio, ma il reverendissimo santa Croce
non ha voluto” See Prosperi,Di soavi licor, 99–101.
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if the poemwas only available in Latin, its audience would remain limited, and the
intelligentsia would recognize its impiousmadness. Ironically enough, Marchetti’s
translation of Lucretius’ poem (completed in 1669) was put on the Index as late as 1718,
when one would have presumed that the philosophical venom his work contained
had been diffused sufficiently to make such a prohibition entirely redundant.
However, as has been rightly noticed by Prosperi, while the “dissimulatory code”
ensured the poem’s continued circulation, it led to the conviction that there is really
rather little to tell about the sixteenth-century responses toDe rerum natura, and –
I would add – about the reception of Lucretius’ philosophy in general.48 In fact,
according to some scholars, Renaissance readers and especially commentators of
De rerum naturawere only interested in Lucretius’ poetry and his Latin style, but not
in the philosophical contents of his work. Catherine Wilson, for instance, claims
that “[s]cholarly commentary on the poem throughout the fifteenth and sixteenth
centuries was chiefly philological, with little attention given to its philosophical,
scientific, or political dimensions”.49
However, this assessment appears to be inaccurate when one looks more closely
at the fairly neglected early exegetical works on Lucretius. As I shall show in this
dissertation,whenwe look at the very first commentaries and paraphrases onDe rerum
natura, we find in fact an intense engagement precisely with Lucretius’ philosophy,
one that moreover, in some cases, outrivals any philological interest.
1.4. Commentary, Paraphrase, spositione: Variations within a Scholarly Genre
In this section I shall brieflymention threemain issues dealt in this dissertation: 1) the
reason why several Renaissance exegetes chose to explain Lucretius’De rerum natura;
2) the form they chose for their comments on Lucretius (commentary, paraphrase,
spositione); and 3) the extent towhich they expressed a value judgement on the contents
of his poem.
First, why did Renaissance scholars choose to comment on Lucretius’ poem? An
answer to this question should be primarily sought in the paratexts – especially
prefaces and dedicatory letters – to the commented editions of De rerum natura. In
48 See Prosperi, “Lucretius in the Italian Renaissance”, 214 n. 3, who refers to Luigi Alfonsi, “L’avventura
di Lucrezio nel mondo antico … e oltre”, in Gigon, Olof (ed.) Lucrèce. Entretiens sur l’Antiquité
Classique 24 (Geneva: Fondation Hardt, 1978), 271–321, who is silent on the sixteenth century in a
review of the reception of Lucretius.
49 Catherine Wilson, Epicureanism at the Origins ofModernity (Oxford: Oxford up, 2008), 17.
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each chapter of this dissertation, I shall analyse the individual reasons given by the
various commentators. Suffice it here to anticipate that themost commonmotives put
forward by Renaissance scholars to justify their choice of commenting on Lucretius
were 1) the quality of his poem; 2) the novelty of the text, which had only recently
been rediscovered and therefore provided an opportunity to embark on an enterprise
that had not been undertaken before; 3) the difficulty of the text, which could not be
fully understood unless it was supplemented by the explanations of a commentator.50
Interestingly enough, the latter is precisely what makes these commentaries and
paraphrases quite audacious enterprises. Without a commentary, a paraphrase, or a
translation, Lucretius’ difficult Latin text could have remained relatively unthreat-
ening, because only those who could make sense of the original text would have
attempted to read this work. It was thus precisely these exegetical texts that rendered
Lucretius’ poem available to awider audience, despite its controversial and sometimes
scandalous content. In so doing, while not endorsing many of Lucretius’ theories,
the exegetes of De rerum natura ended up reintroducing them into the contemporary
philosophical discourse.
As for the specific textual forms that were chosen to comment on Lucretius, we
shall encounter several different ones. Ficino, for instance, claimed to have written
commentariola, whichmost probably were not strictly speaking commentaries, but
rather essays or letters (see chapter 1). As for Francus’ and Frachetta’s so-called
paraphrases of Lucretius’ work, they are in truth nomere rewordings of the original
text, but genuine exegeses.51As for Pius andLambin, theybothwrotemore ‘traditional’
commentaries, characterized by the presence of a lemmata section in addition to the
source text that is being explained.
Another important aspect that I shall take into account in this dissertation is the
extent to which Renaissance commentators of Lucretius expressed a value judgement
on the contents of his poem; that is, the extent to which they aimed to simply clarify
50 As Ineke Sluiter has rightly suggested, there are two fundamental assumptions that a commentator
usually makes about its source-text, namely (a) that it is valuable and should be made widely
available and accessible, but (b) whatever is contained in the source-text is not fully understandable
and optimally effective unless it is supplemented by the explanations of the commentator. See Ineke
Sluiter, “The Dialectics of Genre: Some Aspects of Secondary Literature and Genre in Antiquity”, in
DepewM., Obbink D. (eds.),Matrices of Genre. Authors, Canons, and Society (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
up, 2000), 183–203.
51 According to Ineke Sluiter (“The Dialectics of Genre”, 191), “the paraphrastic mode adopted by some
commentators takes on an interesting dimension: it means that the teacher appropriates the voice
of ‘his’ author wholesale”.
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the original text, in keepingwith the author’s (presumed) own ideas, or rather adopted
a critical attitude, in order to show that the author was either wrong or right.52
An in-depth analysis of this problem will be given in the individual chapters.
Suffice it here to mention that while some commentators, like Lambin, endeavoured
to be as impartial as possible in commenting on the poem, others, like Frachetta, were
clearly biased. The latter, in fact, assumed that Aristotle’s philosophy represented the
truth and therefore assessed the correctness of Lucretius’ theories only in relation to
the Peripatetic standard.
2. The status quaestionis: Lucretius’ Matter Theory in the Renaissance
Over the past few decades, the Renaissance reception of Lucretius’De rerum natura has
attracted a great amount of attention. Apart from Stephen Greenblatt’s The Swerve,
a prize-wining narrative treatment of the manuscript’s rediscovery intended for
the general public, six monographs stand out. The first is Epicureanism and Poetry
of Lucretius in the Renaissance by Charlotte Goddard (unpublished diss., University
of Cambridge, 1991), which examines responses toDe rerum natura by Latin poets of
the Renaissance in Italy, in order to examine how they reacted to Lucretius in their
own verses. Secondly, there is Susanna Gambino Longo’s Savoir de la nature et poésie
des choses: Lucrèce et Épicure à la Renaissance italienne (2004), which studies the impact of
Epicureanism on Renaissance authors. Gambino Longo deals only marginally with
commentaries on Lucretius, but interestingly focuses on traces of Lucretian ideas in
commentaries on Aristotle.53 Thirdly, Valentina Prosperi’sDi soavi licor gli orli del vaso
(2004) deals especially with the reception of Lucretius in the Italian Quattrocento and
Cinquecento. Prosperi examines a large amount of previously ignored texts, which
definitely challenge and throw overboard the assumption that Lucretius exercised
little influence on Italian scholars, especially after the Reformation. Prosperi’s book
focuses especially on the reception of the “honey-pharmakon” topos – that is, of poetry
as a way of sweetening the bitter philosophicalmedicine (Lucr. 1.936–947) – as well as a
number of other questions of poetics. Fourthly, wemust mention Alison Brown’s The
Return of Lucretius to Renaissance Florence (2010), which focuses especially on Florentine
authors such as Ficino, Adriani, and Machiavelli. Interpreting their direct use of
Lucretius, Brown looks in particular at three main themes: fear of death, Lucretius’
52 On this opposition, see Ineke Sluiter, “The Dialectics of Genre”, 189–190.
53 Gambino Longo, Savoir de la nature, 36–45.
18 general introduction
“evolutionary primitivism”, and atomism, especially in connection with Epicurean
ethics and specifically with the theory of free will. Fifthly, Gerard Passannante’s The
Lucretian Renaissance: Philology and the Afterlife of Tradition (2011) explores the history of
the recovery and influence of Lucretius’s poem in early modern Europe. This work
straddles the domains of philology and book history, of Renaissance literature and
philosophy, from the pre-Socratics up to Newton. Finally, the recent monograph
by Ada Palmer, Reading Lucretius in the Renaissance (2014), intends to trace Lucretius’
influence after the rediscovery of De rerum natura in 1417 and to determine how his
poemmanaged to spread successfully in an intellectual setting that was generally
hostile to his ideas. To this end, Palmer adopts a new quantitative method, which
consists in analysing the marginalia of fifteenth- and sixteenth-century manuscripts
and printed editions, as well as other kinds of sources such as paratexts, letters,
introductions and biographies. Palmer’s book provides us with a useful tool and
an essential starting point for the study of the Renaissance reception of Lucretius
across Europe.
To this list one should add Marco Beretta’s La rivoluzione culturale di Lucrezio.
Filosofia e scienza nell’antica Roma (2015). While not dealing specifically with the
Renaissance responses to Lucretius – in fact only chapter 8 is devoted to Lucretius’
reception and especially to the editions of thepoemfromthe fifteenth to the twentieth
centuries – this work makes a valuable contribution to the Lucretian scholarship,
because it focuses on the philosophical and scientific relevance of Lucretius’ didactic
poem, showing that De rerum natura should not merely be considered a literary
product. The same author, in 2016, also published a facsimile edition of the editio
princeps (1472–1473) of Lucretius’ De rerum natura, which contains an introductory
chapter on the first Renaissance circulation and reception of the poem.
The reader of this thesis might therefore wonder: yet another book on the
reception of Lucretius in the Renaissance? Yes, indeed. But the present workmoves in
a different direction from the previous studies just mentioned. First of all, it takes
into account only one specific kind of text, that is to say, all the extant exegetical works
on Lucretius, from the rediscovery of the poem in the fifteenth century up to the end
of the sixteenth century. Although these Renaissance commentaries on Lucretius
are dealt with in several of the abovementionedmonographs and a number of other
articles, no comprehensive study has so far been devoted to these texts.
Secondly, instead of following the circulation of Lucretius’ text across Europe, as
Palmer has done, or looking at the general reception of Lucretius’ work in a particular
geographical area, as in Brown’s or Goddard’s studies, my dissertation focuses on
the reception of one particular aspect of Lucretius’ doctrine, namely his atomism.
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Scholars investigating the reception of Lucretius’ philosophy in the Renaissance have
in fact mainly focused on his ethical theories, while the few who have taken into
account the impact of his natural philosophy have often limited their research to
Girolamo Fracastoro (1478–1553) or Giordano Bruno (1548–1600), and thenmoved on to
the seventeenth century.54
For this reason, I have decided to take a step back, look at the first exegetes of
De rerum natura, and consider how they interpreted Lucretius’ atoms. The main
research question I hope to answer in this dissertation is thus: How did Renaissance
commentators onDe rerum natura respond to Lucretius’ atomistic matter theory? Did
they, for instance, simply explain his atomistic doctrine in the context of Epicurus’
philosophy, or did they provide personal interpretations of it? An answer to this
question will help us to clarify how Renaissance scholars understood the Epicurean
matter theory and might also contribute to a better understanding of the role played
by Lucretius in the revival of atomism in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
The texts I have taken into account were published in Italy, France, and the
Low Countries (Antwerp), and they represent the totality of the extant exegetical
works published on Lucretius up to the end of the sixteenth century: Raphael
Francus’ paraphrase (1504), Johannes Baptista Pius’ commentary (1511), Denys Lambin’s
commented editions (1563/64 and 1570), Obertus Gifanius’ annotated edition (1565/66),
and Girolamo Frachetta’s Spositione (1589).55 I have not devoted an entire chapter to
Gifanius’ annotated edition, because it does not contain a separate lemmata section,
but only brief marginal notes, which exclusively concern linguistic and philological
issues and therefore are not relevant to the topic treated in this dissertation. In the
fourth chapter, however, I have focused on some passages in the paratexts of his
edition which are useful in shedding light on his interpretation of Lucretius’ matter
theory.
How does this dissertation fit into the picture sketched by previous scholars who
dealt with the Renaissance reception of Lucretius? It is hoped that the present study
manages to offer an important contribution to the Lucretian scholarship, first of all
because the texts that I have analysed (i.e., the exegetical works on Lucretius) have so
far not been subjected to close examination. Secondly, becausemywork completes the
picture previously sketched by other scholars, such as Brown,whohad focusedmainly
54 See, for instance, Monte Johnson and Catherine Wilson, “Lucretius and the History of Science”, in
Gillespie & Hardie (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Lucretius, 131–148, and Wilson, Epicureanism,
52–70.
55 See Cosmo Gordon, A Bibliography of Lucretius (London: Rupert Hart-Davis, 1962), 71–87 and 228–229.
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on the Renaissance reception of Lucretius’ ethical theories, while my dissertation
is centred on his natural philosophy, and notably his atomism.56 My findings also
correct the view sketched by other scholars, like Wilson, according to whom the first
commentaries onDe rerum naturawere chiefly philological, with little attention given
to its philosophical dimension. I shall instead demonstrate that the first exegetes of
De rerum natura showed and intense engagement precisely with Lucretius’ natural
philosophy.
Furthermore, my research goes in the same direction and completes the picture
sketched by Ada Palmer in her Reading Lucretius in the Renaissance. In keeping with
Palmer’s interpretation, my aim is in fact not to tell the story of the triumph of
atomism, but to showhow Lucretius’ scientific theories, and especially atomism,were
recovered and re-injected into the scientific discourse bymen who were not atomists
and sometimes not even natural philosophers. Palmer also distinguishes two stages in
the reception of De rerum natura: initially, scholars put more effort into repairing and
explaining the text.Only once thepoemhadbeen edited and explicated, scholars could
start “digesting” its contents, and – I would add – providing theoretically innovative
interpretations of Lucretius’ philosophy, andnotably hismatter theory.57 I believe that
the work of the fifteenth- and sixteenth-century commentators ofDe rerum natura,
to which this dissertation is devoted, represents an essential step in this process:
Lucretius’ Latin language and philosophical concepts needed in fact to be explained
in order to be fully understood and properly “digested”.
Finally, my dissertationmakes a contribution to the history of atomism, which
usually considered the novel interest in ancient atomism to have emerged only
towards the end of the sixteenth century. In my dissertation, I shall show that
not only did the early exegetes of De rerum natura engage with Lucretius’ matter
theory, but also that they did not perceive his atomism as a scandalous topic. In
fact, in the texts I shall analyse, we cannot find anywhere an explicit condemnation
of Lucretius’ matter theory as such. The tendency of these commentators is rather
to merge, harmonize and re-contextualize Lucretius’ Epicurean atomism within
other frameworks, such as the Empedoclean four element theory, Plato’s geometrical
atomism, and especially Aristotle’s hylomorphism. In this regard, it is certainly
conspicuous, for instance, that, by taking Lucretius’ term for the Epicurean atoms,
56 Rather than taking into account the natural philosophical implications of atomism, Brown (The
Return of Lucretius, vii) examines it mostly because of its ethical implications, as a “theory of fortune
and chance in life”.
57 Palmer, Reading Lucretius, 233.
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semina rerum, as an indication that these corpuscles were animated and endowed
with a form, some of these commentators – especially Ficino and Pius – put forward
an interpretation of Lucretius’ atomism as vitalist. These authors seem therefore to
anticipate in important ways some later theories, such as Bruno’s ensouled atoms or
Sennert’s atomi-cum-forma.58
3. Overview of the Chapters of This Dissertation
Each chapter of this dissertation is devoted to a different Renaissance author who
wrote an exegetical work on Lucretius.
As stated before, according to his own narrative, Marsilio Ficino wrote “small
commentaries” on Lucretius, but later burned them; for this reason, the first chapter
of this thesis will be devoted to him. In this chapter, I shall trace Ficino’s early
engagement with Lucretius’ matter theory and argue that it might have been his
positive attitude toward atomism that stimulated his early interest in Lucretius. I
shall then show that, even though Ficinomight have in fact commented on Lucretius’
poem – as he claims – rather than a commentary, what he actually wrote was probably
more similar to short notes or letters. Some of these explanatory texts might actually
be identified with a number of extant letters, which therefore can give us a clue as to
the content of Ficino’s ‘lost’ commentariola. Moreover, in this chapter, I shall focus on
Ficino’s early works so as to document his engagement with Lucretius’ philosophy
and particularly with his physical doctrines. The last section will be devoted to his
later works, especially his Theologia Platonica. I shall show that, even though Ficino’s
attitude toward Lucretius gradually changed, eventually turning into a complete
rejection of the latter’s doctrines, explicit and implicit references toDe rerum natura
can be found even in his later works, in which he still considers Lucretius’ matter
theory as an undeniable alternative to his own doctrine.
58 On Bruno’s ensouled atoms, seeHilary Gatti, “Giordano Bruno’s Soul-Powered Atoms: FromAncient
Sources Towards Modern Science”, in Late medieval and early modern corpuscular matter theories, ed.
by C.H. Lüthy, J.E. Murdoch, andW.R. Newman, (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 133–162. On Sennert’s atomi-
cum-forma see EmilyMichael, “Sennert’s Sea Change: Atoms and Causes” in Late medieval and early
modern corpuscular matter theories, ed. by C.H. Lüthy, J.E. Murdoch, andW.R. Newman, (Leiden: Brill,
2001), 331–361, esp. 350–351 and Hiro Hirai, “Mysteries of Living Corpuscles: Atomism and the Origin
of Life in Sennert, Gassendi and Kircher”, in Early Modern Medicine and Natural Philosophy, ed. by
Distelzweig, P., Goldberg, B., Ragland, E.R. (Dordrecht: Springer, 2015), 255–269.
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Chapters 2–5 all have a similar structure: after a brief biographyof the author/com-
mentator, and an examination of themain paratexts, I shall analyse some passages –
often dealing with book i and ii of De rerum natura – in which the exegete comments
on Lucretius’ matter theory, in order to evaluate how he tackled the issue of atom-
ism.
The second chapter is devoted to Raphael Francus’ Paraphrasis in Lucretium cum
appendice de animi immortalitate, published in Bologna, 1504. Despite what has been
claimed in the scarce scholarly literature on this figure, Francus’ Paraphrasis reveals
an intense engagement with Lucretius’ philosophical and physical doctrines, while
not paying the least attention to the poetic and philological aspects of the poem. This
approach flies in the face of the general assumption that the earliest commentaries
on theDe rerum naturaweremainly philologically inclined, with little attention given
to the poem’s philosophical and scientific content. Even though, in this initial phase
of reception, one cannot detect any explicit approval of Lucretius’ matter theories,
one can already encounter in Francus’ paraphrase some themes that were to recur in
the tradition of Lucretian exegetes in the Renaissance: there is, first, the Aristotelian
denial of the actual divisibility of spatial magnitudes ad infinitum, an argument which
is here used to endorse Lucretius’ atomism.We encounter, second, the criticism,which
is already found in the late Ficino, to the effect that atoms, conceived as mere chunks
of matter, would not be capable by themselves of performing any activity, least of all
of creating things, because they lack some kind of virtue or quality.
The third chapter is devoted to Johannes Baptista Pius’ commentary, published
in Bologna in 1511. As far as Lucretius’ matter theory is concerned, Pius interprets
it in two ways: 1) he sometimes identifies Lucretius’ first principles with the four
Empedoclean elements, even though, in De rerum natura, Lucretius had explicitly
rejected the idea that air, fire, water and earth can be conceived as the ultimate
constituents of matter (1.705–829). In the face of this, Pius assumes that the ele-
ments themselves should possess almost atomic properties: they must be con-
ceived as simple, very subtle, and ‘pure’, that is, not combined with the properties
of the other elements. 2) Mixing the Aristotelian tradition with Marsilio Ficino’s
vitalism, Pius also describes Lucretius’ semina rerum as endowed with a power of
generation (gignendi potentia) and as bearers of the substantial form of things.
Already in Lucretius’ very poem, the atoms, while most of the time described as
inanimate, are repeatedly endowed with dynamic generative powers. Pius empha-
sizes and recontextualizes this concept in an Aristotelian framework, thereby tak-
ing a further step towards the conception of atoms as living and ensouled enti-
ties.
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The fourth chapter is devoted to Denys Lambin’s commented editions (1563
and 1570), both published in Paris, and to Obertus Gifanius’ annotated edition
(Antwerp 1565–1566). In general, Lambinmaintains a fairly equidistant attitude, hardly
expressing any value judgment on Lucretius’ text. Yet, reading between the lines of his
commentary, one can detect traces of Lambin’s personal attitude toward Lucretius’
(natural) philosophy. In commenting on Lucretius’ physical theories, he adopts a
two-fold strategy: 1) he repeatedly highlights the differences between Lucretius and
Epicurus, blaming the latter for themost controversial ideas contained in the poem; 2)
when it is possible, he tries to harmonize Lucretius’ argumentswithin theAristotelian
tradition, in order to make themmore acceptable. In the paratexts, Lambin’s attitude
toward Lucretius’ poem is not easy to determine: at times, it looks as if he makes a
clear-cut distinction between the poem’s content and its form, at other times, he puts
the emphasis on the poem’s educational value, insisting especially on the usefulness
of its scientific content.
A similar interest in Lucretius’ Epicurean natural philosophy can also be found
in Gifanius’ annotated edition. Even though Gifanius’ marginal notes concern
exclusively linguistic and philological issues, most of the paratexts of this edition
focus on Epicurean natural philosophy and on atomism, a theory that, despite the
mainstream disapproval of it, Gifanius does not condemn.
The fifth chapter is devoted to Girolamo Frachetta’s Spositione di tutta l’opera di
Lucretio, published in Venice in 1589. This work is remarkable as it is the first text that
aimed to explain the content ofDe rerum natura in the vernacular, in a period in which
translating Lucretius’ text was seen as a risky undertaking. As far as Lucretius’ matter
theory is concerned, in principle Frachetta does not reject the idea of atoms: he in fact
compares them to Aristotle’s primematter (only occasionally to the four elements).
However, one must emphasise that the only point where Frachetta actually accepts
the idea of atoms is at the most abstract level of defining them as a substratum. As a
consequence, all the activities that atoms are supposed to perform (i.e., composing
bodies and defining sensations) are rejected. Moreover, Frachetta assimilates both
atoms and void with Aristotle’s primematter: he therefore seems to deny Lucretius’
physical dualism, turning his Epicurean universe into a sort of single whole made of
one extendedmatter.
This dissertation also contains an Appendix, which is devoted to a philological
problem. In De rerum natura 2.257–258, the manuscripts oqu have voluptas ending
line 257 and voluntas the following verse. Many scholars have followed Lambin’s
suggestion of interchanging voluptas and voluntas. In the Appendix, I argue that the
reading voluntas in line 257 had circulated as a correctionmuch earlier than Lambin’s
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editions (1563, 1570), since it is already found in Pius’ commentary (1511); Pius, in turn,
probably had accepted the reading fromMichele Marullo. Furthermore, I will argue
that Pius’ commentary already implied swapping voluptas and voluntas. The Appendix
concludes by proposing an improved apparatus toDe rerum natura 2.257–258.
chapter 1
The Earliest Renaissance ‘Commentary’
on Lucretius: Marsilio Ficino
Introduction
As seen in the introduction, according to his own narrative, Ficino wrote “small
commentaries” on Lucretius, but later burned them; for this reason, wemust start
our discussion of the earliest Renaissance commentators onDe rerum naturawith a
chapter devoted to him.1
In the first part of this chapter, I will trace Ficino’s early engagement with
Lucretius’ matter theory. I shall analyse a text which has so far not been closely
examined: a small philosophical note, found in codex Riccardianus 581, where Ficino
seems to sympathize with an atomistic account of matter, while combining it with
the four-element theory. I will argue that it might have been this positive attitude
toward atomism that stimulated Ficino’s early interest in Lucretius.
In the second section, I shall examine the anecdote according to which Ficino
burned the “small commentaries” that he had written on Lucretius’ poem. I will
show that, even though Ficinomight have in fact commented on Lucretius’ poem,
the anecdote is probably just a further elaboration of a topos, quite common since
antiquity, of philosophers burning their own or other philosophers’ books, as a sign
of rejection of their own old ideas or of someone else’s doctrine. At the same time, I
will show that, rather than a commentary, what Ficino actually wrote was probably
more similar to short notes or letters, some of whichmight still be extant and can
give us a clue as to the content of Ficino’s ‘lost’ commentariola.
In the third part of this chapter, I shall focus on Ficino’s early works so as to
document his engagement with Lucretius’ philosophy and particularly with his
1 There are only few articles entirely devoted to the relation between Ficino and Lucretius; see
Giuseppina Boccuto, “La presenza di Lucrezio negli scritti filosofici di Marsilio Ficino” Atene e Roma
32 (1987), 152–166; James G. Snyder, “Marsilio Ficino’s Critique of the Lucretian Alternative”, Journal of
the History of Ideas 72/2 (2011), 165–181; Sebastiano Gentile, Ficino, Epicuro, Lucrezio and James Hankins,
Ficino’s Critique of Lucretius, in James Hankins – Fabrizio Meroi, The Rebirth of Platonic Theology in
Renaissance Italy. Proceedings of a Conference in Honor of Michael J.B. Allen, Florence, 26–27 April 2007
(Florence: Olschki, 2013), 119–135.
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physical doctrines. I will argue that, in his early works, not only does Ficino show a
very positive attitude toward Lucretius, but also a pronounced tendency to combine
the latter’s matter theory with those of Aristotle and Plato. This tendency becomes
evenmore evident in Ficino’s commentary on Plato’s Philebus, which I shall discuss in
the fourth part of this chapter.
In the fifth section, I shall focus on Ficino’s later works, especially on his The-
ologia Platonica. Even though Ficino’s attitude toward Lucretius gradually changed,
eventually turning into a complete rejection of the latter’s doctrines, explicit and
implicit references toDe rerum natura can be found even in his later works, in which
he still considers Lucretius’ matter theory as an undeniable alternative to his own
doctrine.2
1. The Codex Riccardianus 581: Ficino’s Early Interest in Atomism
Marsilio Ficino (1433–1499) was born in Figline Valdarno, close to Florence. The precise
course of his early education is uncertain, but, after learning the basics of Latin
grammar in Figline, between 1451–1458 he studied mainly under the guidance of
Niccolò Tignosi da Foligno, who was a physician and Aristotelian philosopher at the
Florentine studio.3
Although he had enjoyed a traditional education, mainly based on Aristotelian
Scholasticism, Ficino’s interest in Platonismand other philosophies developed already
at an early stage of his career. In 1454, when he was only twenty-one years old, Ficino
transcribed Calcidius’ (partial) translation of, and commentary on, Plato’s Timaeus, to
which he added many marginal notes.4 That Ficino, at this stage of his career, was
already interested inmatter theories is shownby the fact that, in his copy of Calcidius,
2 See Snyder, “Marsilio Ficino’s Critique”, 166.
3 Since Ficino is one of themost prominent philosophers of the Renaissance, I shall not go into the
details of his biography. For a complete biography of Ficino, see Raymond Marcel, Marsile Ficin
(1433–1499) (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1958); for an account of Ficino’s early career see Arthur Field,
TheOrigins of the Platonic Academy (Princeton: Princeton up, 1988), esp. Chapter 6 and 7, and James
Hankins, Plato in the Italian Renaissance, vol. 1 (Leiden: Brill, 1990), 269–359. In general, see also “Ficino,
Marsilio” by Cesare Vasoli inDizionario Biografico degli Italiani, vol. 47 (1997), also available on-line:
http://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/marsilio-ficino_(Dizionario-Biografico).
4 James Hankins, “The Study of the Timaeus in Early Renaissance Italy”, inNatural Particulars: Nature
and the Disciplines in Renaissance Europe, by Antony Grafton and Nancy G. Siraisi (eds.) (Cambridge,
Mas., mit Press, 1999), 84.
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the part to which his annotations suggest that he devotedmost of his attention is the
long section at the end, onmatter and elemental theory. In his marginal notes, Ficino
listed the opinions of ancient philosophers on the nature of matter and primary
elements, gatheringmost of the information fromDiogenes Laertius and Calcidius
himself.5
That the young Ficino, of allmatter theories, was especially interested in atomism
is proven by another source: the codex Riccardianus 581, which contains Cicero’s
SomniumScipioniswithMacrobius’ commentary. It hasbeen shownthat this document
surely pertained to Ficino, who also added to it several corrections and marginal
notes.6 In one of the blank pages at the beginning of the manuscript (f. 1r), Ficino
wrote a small philosophical text, inwhich he describes the first principles in atomistic
terms:
Principles are those which constitute the other things themselves from
nothing. The principles of bodies are bodies; in fact, if they were incorporeal,
they would not exist, because everything that exists is a body. [These] bodies
are not divisible, because that which is divisible is made of something else.
Therefore, the bodies, principles of all things, are indivisible. These [bodies]
are infinite in number, certainly because they cannot be counted. The world
is made of mixtures. These [mixtures], since they are made of four elements,
are not principles. The four elements [aremade of] their halves, therefore they
[are] not principles. […] For this reason, you will not find the principles, if you
do not divide the elements down to all the minimal [bodies] of which they
are made; it is in fact possible to postulate minimal particles of fire, air, water,
earth – as it is said in the first [book] of the Physics [i 5, 188a 27–28] – which,
because they are not divided into other fires, airs, waters, earths, are not made
of other things. […] The principles of all things are therefore particles of fire,
air, water, earth, innumerable, which can all be reduced to minimal parts, yet
5 The manuscript in question is Milan, Biblioteca Ambrosiana ms s 14 sup. The section regarding
the placita philosophorum onmatter and elements (f. 90v–91r) has been transcribed in Hankins “The
Study of the Timaeus”, 85 and Appendix 2d, p. 111.
6 Themanuscript and the notes have been attributed to Ficino by Giovan Battista Alberti in “Marsilio
Ficino e il codice Riccardiano 581”, Rinascimento 10 (1970), 187–193. Alberti also dates themanuscript to
the thirteenth or fourteenth century, but it is not surewhen exactly Ficino addedhismarginal notes.
Gentile, however, has argued that, already in 1457, Ficino was reading and annotatingMacrobius in
the Riccardianus 581, when he wrote his epistleDe divino furore. See Sebastiano Gentile, “Inmargine
all’epistolaDe divino furore di Marsilio Ficino”, Rinascimento 23 (1983), 33–77, 58.
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to the four kinds of elements. Therefore, with respect to the kind of principles,
the world is [made] of four, with respect to the number [of principles] from
innumerable.7
In describing these first principles, Ficino explicitly refers to Aristotle’s first book of
Physics; the passage is possibly the one in which it is said that the first principles must
not be derived from one another nor from anything else, while everything has to be
derived from them.8
However, the first principles Ficino describes in this passage are not Aristotelian,
but share some characteristics with the Democritean and Epicurean atoms: they are
corporeal, not divisible and innumerable. At first, Ficino describes them as ‘infinite in
number’ (Haec sunt infinita numero, scilicet quia numerari non possunt), but, then, hastens
to explain that they are ‘infinite’ simply because they cannot be counted. While the
latter notion could have beenmade compatible with the Aristotelian and Platonic
view of a singleworld, the literal reading of ‘infinite’ would lead to the Epicurean view
of innumerable worlds. According to Ficino, these indivisible particles also belong
to the four elements: he therefore combines atomismwith the four-element theory,
postulating infinite indivisible particles of fire, water, earth and air.
This very peculiar matter theory is the starting point of a syncretic cosmogonical
account, in which Ficino mixes Empedoclean, Aristotelian, Platonic and Lucretian
elements. He first explains that the particles of the four elements are eternal: they
have not been created by anything else, nor did these created themselves, since they
existed ab aeterno. Before the creation of the world, particles of fire, water, air and
earth were all mixed and kept moving in the vast space.9 Since themotions of these
7 Principia sunt quae consituunt alia ipsa ex nullis. Principia corporum corpora sunt; si enim sint incorporea
non essent, cum omne quod est sit corpus. Corpora dividua non sunt, quia quod dividuum est ex alio constat.
Sunt ergo individua corpora principia omnium. Haec sunt infinita numero, scilicet quia numerari non possunt.
Mundus ex mistis constat. Haec cum ex elementis quattuor sint, non sunt principia. Elementa quattuor ex suis
medietatibus, non ergo principia […]. Ideo non invenies principia nisi dividas elementa in omnia minima ex
quibus constant; est enim dare particulas ignis, aeris, aquae, terrae minimas, ut primo phisicorum dicitur, quae
quia in alios ignes, aeras, aquas, terras non dividuntur, non constituuntur ex aliis. […] Principia ergo omnium
rerum sunt particulae ignis, aeris, aquae, terrae, innumerabiles, quae omnes in minimas partes ad quattuor
tamen elementorumgenera reducuntur.Mundus ergo quantumad genus principiorum ex quattuor est, quantum
ad numerum ex innumeris. Quoted in Alberti, “Marsilio Ficino”, 188.
8 See Arist. Phys. i 5 188a 27–28, δεῖ γὰρ τὰς ἀρχὰς μήτε ἐξ ἀλλήλων εἶναι μήτε ἐξ ἄλλων, καὶ ἐκ τούτων
πάντα.
9 Mundus aliquando est factus et antequam esset particulae illae erant etternaliter; nec enim ex se facte fuissent,
nec erat aliud ex quo fierent. Erant ergo etternae, non [[tamen]] ante mundum erant coniunctae, quia mundus
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particles were contrary to each other, as fire particles tended tomove upwards, and
water and earth particles downwards, they all keptmixing together in the turmoil
of the original chaos.10 The world arose only when similar particles (i.e., those of the
same elements) started coming together, creating homogeneous bodies: the earth
appeared in themiddle, the fire particles occupied the upper part, while water and air
remained between the two. The fire particles, because of their natural predisposition,
arranged themselves into a circle. Then, the earth particles, striving toward the lowest
part, which is themiddle, formed a round body, and so did themiddle elements, water
and air. The particles of fire, since they had eight kinds of lightness, created eight
heavens, while stars were constituted by atoms that for their nature were brighter
than the others (nonnulli atomi ex natura sui erant lucidiores aliis). Finally, the heavens
startedmoving in circles: thanks to this movement, themutual transformation of
the elements maintains the shape of the cosmos, determining the procreation of
things down here.11 Importantly, not only Ficino explicitly refers to atoms, but he
does not include any God or Demiurge in his account, only particles moving, almost
randomly, and yet driven by a natural intention, which seems to suggest a statement
of teleology (ita quasi casu, sed tamen intentione naturali).
fuisset antea; illae enim per coniunctionemmundum efficiunt. Erant discretae in vasto quodam spatio, quod
totum occupabant totae, ita ut toti igni tota terra coextensa esse{n}t, toti terrae tota aqua et aer. Particulae igitur
ignis non erant invicem continuatae, nec aeris, nec aquae, neque terrae invicem, sed cuiuslibet elementorum
discretae invicem erant, contigue tamen partibus alterius elementi et permistae. See Alberti, “Marsilio Ficino”,
188.
10 Ideo, cum partes terrae quae igni mixtae sursum erant declinarent, deorsum trahebant ignem secum; cum igni{s}
sursum trahebant terram et aquam, atque ita intendentes se explicare se confundebant. Sed tamen cum ignis
sursum elevabatur, licet secum elevaret terrae particulas, semper tamen plures deorsum remanebant, quia nexus
naturalis vincit violentum. Cum terra deorsum vergebat, plures ignis partes sursum remanebant quam illae
quae trahebantur a terra. Itaque quanto magis in dies procedebat huius cahos (sic) exagitatio, tanto maior
fiebat discretio partium etheroge⟨ne⟩arum et unio omogenearum, quia partes terrae magis ab igni emaculatae
sese contingere incipiebant. See Alberti, “Marsilio Ficino”, 188. On the original chaos (then ordered by
the Demiurge), see especially Plato, Timaeus 52d–53c.
11 Similia vero se tangentia corpus continuum efficiunt. Quare incipiebat paulatim aliqua in parte spatii apparere
terra, scilicet in medio, in suprema vero ignis, in mediis aer et aqua. Ignis enim particulae eliquatae ab aliis sese
nectebant naturali appetitu et faciebant unum continuum rotundum, […]Hoc agebant undequaque ita quasi
casu, sed tamen intentione naturali, celeste corpus efficerent. Terrae partes, quia aeque vergebant ad infimum
quod medium est undequaeque, rotondum effecerunt. Ita de mediis elementis. Nec unum dumtaxat caelum,
sed 8 fecerunt, quoniam partes ignis 8 gradus habuerunt levitatis, […] Inter partes caeli sunt stellae, partes
scilicet luminosae, quia nonnulli atomi ex natura sui erant lucidiores aliis, qui simul copulati stellam effecerunt.
Volvitur autem in circulum ipsum caelum, quia circuli natura est ut in circulum feratur. Post ex huius caeli motu,
figura ac lumine reguntur alterationes elementorum inter se et procreantur omnia. See Alberti, “Marsilio
Ficino”, 188–189.
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Even though the sources of this cosmogonical account are various, the passage
bears a striking resemblance to Lucretius’ cosmogony in 5.432–508. These are the
common features between Lucretius’ and Ficino’s accounts: 1) the denial of the
creation ex nihilo, as the first principles are said to have existed ab aeterno; 2) the
original chaos of the primary bodies; 3) the union of the similar (similia vero se tangentia
corpus continuum efficiunt = Lucr. 5.443–444, paresque cum paribus iungi res); 4) the coming
together of the particles of earth in the lowest regions, that is, in the center (ad infimum
quodmedium est = Lucr. 5.451, in medio atque imas); 5) the generation of the heaven(s),
in the upper part, from a light fiery element. The main steps of the origin of the
cosmos are therefore the same in Lucretius’ and in Ficino’s accounts; but, while in
the latter it is made clear that the earth particles created a spherical body (terrae partes
… rotundum effecerunt), the earth’s sphericity has often been rejected in connection
with Epicureanism, because Lucretius’ denial of a centrifocal cosmology (1.1052 ff.)
seems to imply a flat earth. Frederik Bakker, however, has recently demonstrated that,
although this account seems incompatible with other passages of De rerum natura,
at least in his cosmogonical account, Lucretius adopts a centrifocal model, with a
spherical earth at the bottom, that is, in themiddle of the universe.12 Therefore, the
two accounts agree on this point as well. The aspect of Ficino’s cosmology that surely
disagrees the most with Lucretius’ is the description of the eight moving celestial
spheres, which is closer to the Platonic and Aristotelian account of the cosmos, which
was the prevailing view in theMiddle Ages and the Renaissance.
Apart from the above-mentioned passage in Lucretius, Ficino’s text bears resem-
blanceswith other ancient sources, such as Empedocles’ fragments,whichheprobably
knew through indirect quotations, Diogenes Laertius, or (Pseudo-)Plutarch, among
others.13 For this reason, it is not easy to identify the precise sources used by Ficino to
develop this extremely syncretistic cosmological account, in which Empedocles’ four
elements, the Aristotelian celestial spheres and Epicurus’ atoms coexist. At the end of
his note, he claims:
It seems that the same opinion had been held by Empedocles, Democritus,
Leucippus, Epicurus, Anaxagoras, and Plato with respect to that chaos, which
is here said to consist of innumerable atoms of the four elements.14
12 See Frederik Bakker, EpicureanMeteorology (Leiden: Brill, 2016), 223–235.
13 See especially Ps.-Plut. Plac. 1.4; Emped. (Diels b. 27 and 37); Diog. Laert. 9.31 (on Leucippus); and even
Cic.De fin, 1.6.20, who refers to the atomorum turbulenta concursio.
14 Eadem opinio videtur Empedoclis, Democriti, Leucippi, Epicuri, Anaxagorae, Platonis, quantum ad illud chaos
quod hic dictum est fuisse ex innumeris athomis 4 elementorum. Quoted in Alberti, “Marsilio Ficino”, 189.
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In stating this, Ficino’s aim was probably to show that there was a substantial
agreement among the philosophers with respect to the genesis of the universe from
a primordial chaos, which – according to him – arose from the atoms of the four
elements.
As seen in the general introduction, trying to harmonize Plato’s viewwith that
of the atomists does not sound so bizarre, when one considers that, in Timaeus 55a–
57d, he himself endorses a type of geometrical atomism, presenting the four elements
as regular solids composed out of plane indivisible figures, namely isosceles and
scalene right-angled triangles.15 But did Ficino know this theory? Since Calcidius’
Latin translation of the Timaeus ends at 53c, Ficino could not read the section in
which Plato expounds the element theory before 1456, when he presumably started
to learn Greek.16 Even so, Irene Caiazzo has shown that, although the section of the
Timaeus (55a–57d) in which Plato attributes polyhedra to the elements had not been
translated by Calcidius, it was not entirely unknown in themedieval Latin world, and
therefore in the Renaissance.17 In fact, an account of this theory can be found inDe
caelo (iii 8, 307a4–13), where Aristotle explains the difference between Democritus’ and
Leucippus’ atoms, which are solid bodies, and Plato’s elementary constituents, which
are planes, preferring the former opinion to the latter. Moreover, this theory gave rise
to differing interpretations among authors of Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages,
15 Ficino was to explain this theory in detail in his commentary on the Timaeus (in the relevant chapter
Quomodo Physica constent ex Mathematicis ac elementis et mixtis). Here, however, he interprets the
triangle-theory merely as a sort of Pythaogorean-inspiredmetaphor:Neminem vero turbet, quod Plato
Pythagoreorummore mathematicis physica componere videatur. Non enim intelligi vult naturalia corpora ex
figuris et numeris tanquam ex elementis et partibus, sed tanquam ex terminis quadam resolutione componi: quod
videlicet naturalia in illa quasi priora ac veluti terminos resolantur […] Sed haec ferme omnia Pythagorico more
sub oscuris metaphoris involvuntur. SeeMarsilii Ficini florentini, insignis philosophi platonici, medici, atque
theologi clarissimi, opera, & quae hactenus extitere, & quae in lucem nunc primum prodiere omnia (Basileae,
1576), 1464r–v.
16 In 1456, Ficinowrote his very firstwork, the Institutiones ad Platonicamdisciplinam, which is not extant,
but has been identified by Kristeller with his early commentary on the Timaeus. In an epistle to
Filippo Valori, Ficino admits that this first version of the Institutioneswas not based on the original
Greek text of Plato, but only on Latin sources. Onlywhen he had heeded the advise of by Landino and
Cosimo de’ Medici to learn Greek, could he finally read Plato’s original text and gradually improve
his Institutiones by adding the following books that were missing (Platonem deinde Platonicosque Greco
aggressus, insitutiones illas paulatim libris sequentibus emendavi). See Marsilio Ficino,Opera omnia, 2 voll.,
(Basel: ex officina Henricpetrina, 1576), 929; Paul Oskar Kristeller, Supplementum Ficinianum, 2 voll,
(Florence: Leo S. Olschki, 1937), cxx and clxiii; and Hankins, “The study of the Timaeus”, 84 and
n. 35 pp. 116–117.
17 See Irene Caiazzo, “The Four Elements”, 18.
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including Macrobius – whose text Ficino was reading and annotating precisely in
the Riccardianus 581 –, Calcidius, andWilliam of Conches.18 Unfortunately, without
knowing the precise date in which Ficino’s note was written, it is hard to tell whether
his Platonic source was Plato himself or another text.
Nevertheless, there is at least one aspect in Ficino’s matter theory that might lead
us to think that his source was not actually Plato, but his medieval commentator,
William of Conches. The atoms described by Ficino bear in fact a striking resemblance
withWilliam’smatter theory, while displaying some differences with Plato’s.19 Plato’s
minimal bodies are in fact simple triangles, which when combined together form
the four elements, while Ficino’s principles, despite being indivisible, already are
the four elements. In like manner, William distinguished between elementa and
elementata: the latter refers to the elements as apprehended by sense perception (i.e.,
seen andperceived in their impure state,mixedwithother elements),while the former
refers to the elements in their pure state.20 In the great dialogue of his maturity, the
Dragmaticon philosophiae, William describes these elementa as simple and minimal
particles, beyond which one cannot go in the decomposition of bodies.21 Yet, these
particles possess the same qualities as the four elements: some particles that are
hot and dry are called fire, those that are cold and dry are called earth, the cold and
wet ones are water, and the hot and wet ones air.22 Thematter theory presented by
Ficino in the short note quoted above turns out to be remarkably similar to that
of William of Conches. As seen in the introduction to this dissertation, in the same
work, only few pages later, William goes so far as to explain that the Epicureans
were right to think that the world is made up of atoms. And yet, they were wrong in
considering them to be without a beginning, scattered throughout the void before
18 See Calcidius, Commentarius in Timaeum, 13–22 and Macrobius, Commentarii in Somnium Scipionis,
1.6.22–24; and, in general, see Caiazzo, “The Four Elements”, 3–66.
19 For a detailed account of William’s conception of the four elements, see Caiazzo, “The Four
Elements”, 3–66. It has been shown that, already in 1457, Ficino surely knew William’s works,
especially his Glosae super Platonem. See Sebastiano Gentile, In margine all’epistola, 125.
20 see Caiazzo, “The Four Elements”, 3.
21 Guillelmus de Conchis,Dragmaticon philosophiae, 1.6.2, (p): […]Omne namque corpus terminum habet
et finem. Sunt igitur in unoquoque corpore quaedam quae ita componunt ipsum, quod ex partibus non
componuntur. Haec sunt ad constitutionem prima, ad resolutionem postrema.
22 Guillelmus de Conchis, Dragmaticon philosophiae, 1.6.6, Sunt igitur in unoquoque corpore minima,
quae simul iuncta unum magnum constituunt; haec a nobis dicuntur elementa. Huic sententiae concordat
Constantinus, ubi ait: “Elementum est simpla et minima corporis particula”. Harum particularum quaedam
sunt calidae et siccae, quae proprie ignis dicuntur; quaedam frigidae et siccae, hae sunt terra; quaedam frigidae
et humidae, et hae proprie dicuntur aqua; quaedam calidae et humidae, sed hae proprie aer vocantur
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they were clustered together to form the four elements. In fact, nothing except God
exists without a beginning, and these particles were created by Him at the same time
as the bodies they constitute. Thus, while partially accepting Epicurean atomism,
William of Conches inserts it within a temporal, finalistic and creationist model,
rendering it compatible with Christian orthodoxy.
But did Ficino read William’s (partial) defense of Epicurean atomism? And, if
so, did this somehow influence his early interest and positive attitude toward this
doctrine? I would consider this a reasonable option. Moreover, Ficino’s positive
attitude toward atomism – a theory that, according to him, was commonly accepted
among many philosophers, including Plato – is surely a good starting point to
understand why he soon engaged with Lucretius’ philosophy, as we shall see in the
next sections.
2. Ficino’s ‘Commentaries’ on Lucretius
As his early works clearly show, in his youth, Ficino demonstrated an intense
interest in Lucretius’ philosophy. According to his own testimony, it is in this period,
when he was ‘still a boy’, that he wrote ‘small commentaries’ onDe rerum natura.23
Unfortunately – as we have seen in our general introduction – it would seem that,
later in his life, Ficino changed his mind about Lucretius and therefore decided to
burn his own commentaries, just as Plato had done his tragedies and elegies.
This anecdote seems to find confirmation in a letter written some years earlier, in
1485, by the Hungarian humanist Ioannes Pannonius to Ficino:
Before all this, you – inasmuch as you were still young – light-heartedly
promoted an ancient philosopher, or rather a poet, whom later, relying on
a better judgment, you suppressed and – as I hear –, with all your might,
destroyed; and that has not been the work of divine providence, since you
yourself, made more cautious by your age, rightly considered that he was to
be condemned.24
23 Kristeller dates the commentariola to 1457: “Commentaria autem Lucretiana sub finem anni 1457
composita esse inde apparet”. See Paul Oskar Kristeller, Supplementum Ficinianum, vol. 1 (Firenze: Leo
S. Olschki, 1937), clxiii.
24 […] ante haec omnia antiquum quendam philosophum sive poetam, utpote adhuc adolescens leviter propagasti,
quem deinde meliori fretus consilio suppressisti et (ut audio) pro viribus extinxisti, neque fuerat illud divinae
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The story of the burning of the commentariola on Lucretius sounds very fascinating,
and it has been widely accepted as true. Still, there are some reasons for doubting
its veracity. In what follows, I shall argue that 1) there are good reasons to suspect
that Ficino did not really burn his ‘commentaries’ on Lucretius; this anecdote
might be yet another elaboration of a topos of philosophers burning their own
or other philosophers’ books, as a sign of rejection of their own old ideas or of
someone else’s doctrine. 2) Rather than a commentary, what Ficino actually wrote
was probably more similar to short notes or letters, some of which might still be
extant, and therefore can give us a clue as to the content of Ficino’s allegedly lost
commentariola.
The very fact that Ficino explicitly compares himself to Plato burninghis tragedies
and elegies shouldmake uswary.25 It was in fact common practice, in Antiquity and in
Ficino’s times, to engage in comparisonsbetweenphilosophers andauthors ingeneral,
in order to suggest some sort of continuity of thinking. At the same time, stories of a
philosopher’s conversion after the burning of his own or other philosophers’ writings
are definitely a topos in ancient biography, which means that they are not always
true.26
Besides, according to another anecdote, Plato not only burnt his own verses and
tragedies, but alsowanted to collectDemocritus’works in order to burn themaswell.27
The parallel between Plato burning Democritus and Ficino burning his commentary
on Lucretius is too good to be entirely true. Therefore, one should at least suspect
that the anecdote might have been fabricated by Ficino, whose aim was to compare
himself to Plato, and to the latter’s dismissal of Democritean atomism.
providentiaemunus, quod ipse aetate prudentior factusmerito iudicasti damnandum. Quoted inKlara Pajorin,
“Ioannes Pannonius e la sua lettera aMarsilio Ficino”,Verbum.Analectaneolatina 1 (1999), 60–69, esp. 69.
25 The anecdote of Plato burning his own poetry was circulating since antiquity and can be found
in many sources, even though there are some discrepancies between the different accounts.
Nevertheless, there is no evidence that Plato wrote any poetry in his youth. On this topic, see
Alice Swift Riginos, Platonica. The Anecdotes concerning the Life andWritings of Plato (Leiden: Brill, 1976),
43–48.
26 On this topic, see Riginos, Platonica, 47 n. 33, 167 and Ava Chitwood, Death by Philosophy. The
Biographical Tradition in the Life and Death of the Archaic Philosophers Empedocles, Heraclitus, and
Democritus (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2004), 100–101: “… although few books, if
any, were actually burned, the biographers give us a wealth of philosophers reputedly driven to this
extreme: Aristotle wanted to burn Plato’s works, Protagoras wanted to burn Plato’s and Democritus’
work, and the Athenians wanted to burn his”.
27 See Riginos, Platonica, 166–167.
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The story of Plato burning Democritus’ works was quite well known in the
Renaissance, since it can can be found, among other sources, in the biography of
Democritus in Diogenes Laertius’ Lives of Eminent Philosophers. Most probably Ficino
knew this passage through Traversari’s Latin translation of Laertius, which was first
printed around 1472, but widely circulated since 1433. The text reads as follows:
Moreover, Aristoxenus in his commentaries (commentaria) about the physical
world [affirms] that Plato wished to burn all the commentaries (commentaria)
of Democritus that he could collect, but that this was prohibited by Amyclas
and Clinias the Pythagoreans, who said that there was no use. In fact, those
books were already in the hands of many. And this is inferred from the fact
that Plato, whilementioning almost all the ancient philosophers, nevermakes
any reference to Democritus, not even in those passages in which it would
have been necessary to contradict him in something, well aware and cautious,
as may be understood, not to seem to engage in a battle against the best of the
philosophers.28
An interesting aspect of Traversari’s translation is that he uses the word commentaria
to translate Laertius’ συγγράμματα. The Greek συγγράμμαmeans “writing” and
indicates especially a prose work, a treatise, and is often used to indicate a systematic
work, often opposed to ὑπομνήματα “(explanatory) notes”, which, interestingly, is
the word used by Laertius to refer to Aristoxenus’Historical Notes (ἐν τοῖς Ἱστορικοῖς
ὑπομνήμασι). Traversari uses the same term commentaria to indicate both Aristoxenus’
andDemocritus’ writings, while the Greek text reports two different words. The Latin
word commentariumwas often used, mostly in its plural form, to indicate a book on
any subject, but especially on a historical theme, which is merely sketched out, or
written without care. This definition probably suits Aristoxenus’Historical Notes, but
definitely not Democritus’ writings (συγγράμματα).29 It looks as if Traversari had
28 See Vitae et sententiae philosophorum. Tr: Ambrosius Traversarius. Ed: Benedictus Brognolus (Venice:
Locatelli, Boneto, 1490), f. 92v, Porro Aristoxenus in naturalibus commentariis PlatonemDemocriti commen-
taria quaeque colligere potuit voluisse comburere. Verum ab Amycla et Clinia Pythagoricis fuisse prohibitum
nihil id referre dicentibus. Iam enim eos libros apud plaerosque servari. Quod item ex eo colligitur, quod cum
antiquos ferme omnis memoraverit sapientes Plato Democriti nusquam mentionem ullam fecerit, ne in eis
quidem locis ubi illi quidpiam contradicendum erat, sciens et prudens, ut intelligi datur, ne contra optimum
philosophorum certamen inisse videretur.
29 dl, Life of Democritus, 9.7.40,Ἀριστόξενος δ’ ἐν τοῖς Ἱστορικοῖς ὑπομνήμασί φησι Πλάτωνα θελῆσαι
συμφλέξαι τὰ Δημοκρίτου συγγράμματα, ὁπόσα ἐδυνήθη συναγαγεῖν,Ἀμύκλαν δὲ καὶ Κλεινίαν
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used the word commentaria improperly to translate Laertius’ συγγράμματα and that
Ficino borrowed it, using the diminutive form (commentariola) for his own jottings. If
Traversari’s translation of Laertius is indeed the source, this would further reinforce
the hypothesis that Ficino had in mind a literary model, more than a real episode,
when he claimed to have burned his commentariola on Lucretius.
While, on the one hand, one may reasonably suspect that Ficino did not actually
burn his commentariola onDe rerum natura, on the other, there is no good reason to
doubt that he indeed commented on a number of Lucretian passages. First, because
he himself claims to have written such a text, and then to have later burned it. Why
would he claim to have got rid of something which never existed, and which he
himself had fabricated? Secondly, many of his contemporaries were aware of the
existence of texts in which Ficino sympathized with Lucretius’ theories. Thirdly, his
early works are packed full of quotation and references toDe rerum natura, so that the
fact that he had written some sort of text in which he commented on a number of
Lucretian passages is, if not certain, at least quite plausible.
But, if Ficino indeed wrote commentariola on Lucretius’ poem, what kind of text
were they? Michael Reeve has noticed that commentariola in this context could mean
‘essays’, rather than commentaries, and this hypothesis has been recently endorsed by
Guido Milanese.30 Milanese has pointed out that Cicero also refers to hisDe inventione
as commentariola nostra (De orat. 1.5), while Quintilian (Inst. 1.5) called by the name of
commentariola his short notes that he had written for students. He however concludes
that, if Ficino had written ‘essays’ instead of a commentary, they should at least have
had the form of ‘notes to the text’, with the purpose of explaining some difficult
passages of Lucretius’ poem.
As mentioned repeatedly by now, there is no certainty that Ficino wrote actual
commentaries on Lucretius, buthemighthavebeen the author of some letterswritten
in the style of Lucretius. In an undated letter to Angelo Poliziano, he claims:
Some letters are being passed around under my name which are written in
the style of Aristippus, and to some extent in that of Lucretius, rather than of
τοὺς Πυθαγορικοὺς κωλῦσαι αὐτόν, ὡς οὐδὲν ὄφελος: παρὰ πολλοῖς γὰρ εἶναι ἤδη τὰ βιβλία.
καὶ δῆλον δέ: πάντων γὰρ σχεδὸν τῶν ἀρχαίων μεμνημένος ὁ Πλάτων οὐδαμοῦ Δημοκρίτου
διαμνημονεύει, ἀλλ’ οὐδ’ ἔνθ’ ἀντειπεῖν τι αὐτῷ δέοι, δῆλον ⟨ὅτι⟩ εἰδὼς ὡς πρὸς τὸν ἄριστον αὐτῷ
τῶν φιλοσόφων ⟨ὁ ἀγὼν⟩ ἔσοιτο.
30 GuidoMilanese, “Italian Commentaries on Lucretius”, in Classical Commentaries: Explorations in a
Scholarly Genre, by Christina Shuttleworth Kraus and Christopher Stray (eds.) (Oxford: Oxford up,
2016), 195–215, 196–197, and Reeve, “Lucretius in theMiddle Ages”, 210.
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Plato. If they are mine, Angelo, they are not like that: and if they are like that,
they are definitely not mine, but fabricated by my detractors; for everyone
knows, I have followed the divine Plato frommy youth.31
What if Ficino’s commentariolawere in fact letters? And, if so, can Ficino’s outright
rejection of these texts be somehow considered a symbolic ‘burning of his commentar-
iola’?
The textual evidence seems to support this thesis: it appears in fact that, around
1457–1458, Ficino wrote a number of epistles and epistle-treatises, such asDe voluptate,
Tractatus de Deo et anima vulgaris, and Epistula De quatuor sectis philosophorum, which
are full of quotations from De rerum natura and references to Lucretius’ Epicurean
philosophy, so that they might even be considered as an abridged version of Ficino’s
‘lost’ commentariola, which, in this case, would not be completely lost. I shall analyze
these texts in the next section.
3. Early Works and Letters
3.1. Letters
We have already seen some evidences to the effect that, during his youth, Ficino was
much taken by Lucretius. In the second half of the 1450s, his knowledge ofDe rerum
natura increased considerably. References to Lucretius can be found in some letters
written in 1457–1458.32 All these epistles can be found in the codex Landi 50 of the
Piacenza Library, together with other more extensive works, such as the Epistula De
voluptate and the Epistula De quatuor sectis philosophorum.33
According to RaymondMarcel, these letters should be considered as “éléments
des commentariola”, that is, sections from what Ficino referred to as commentar-
iola in Lucretium. In fact, not only were they regarded by Ficino himself as real
31 SeeMarsilio Ficino, The Letters ofMarsilio Ficino, vol. 1, transl. by Language Department of the London
School of Economic Science (London: Shepheard-Walwyn, 1975), 55–56.
32 See Kristeller, Supplementum, ii, 81–87. An accurate analysis of these letters can be found in Raymond
Marcel inMarsile Ficin, 224–232 and Ubaldo Pizzani, “Lucrezio nell’umanesimo italiano e nei giudizi
dei primi commentatori d’oltralpe” in Luisa Rotondi Secchi Tarugi (ed.), Rapporti e scambi tra
umanesimo italiano ed umanesimo europeo (Milano: Nuovi Orizzonti, 2001), 515–538. References to some
of these letters can be also found in Brown, The return, 17–18.
33 See Kristeller, Supplementum, i, xxxix.
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treatises, but they also fit the definition of commentariolum, since the author often
apologizes for their shortness.34
In chronological order, the earliest of these letters is that addressed to Michele
Mercati, which is dated 15th of October 1457. Mercati was a monk, a teacher, and one
of Ficino’s earliest and closest friends, who had asked him for a brief explanation
of Lucretius’ philosophy. In this letter, Ficino chose to focus especially on “what
that philosopher thought about human things”, since – he writes – he had already
explained Lucretius’ principles of nature andmotions of the soul in another epistle,
which unfortunately is no longer extant.35 Then, Ficino quotes a passage in Lucretius
in order to justify the shortness of his arguments:
But for a keen-scented mind, these little tracks are enough to enable you to
recognize the others for yourself. For as hounds very often find by their scent
the leaf-hidden resting-place of the mountain-ranging quarry, when once
they have hit upon certain traces of its path, so will you be able for yourself
to see one thing after another in suchmatters as these, and to penetrate all
unseen hiding-places, and draw forth the truth from them.36
What follows is Ficino’s explanation of Lucretius’ moral philosophy, even though,
surprisingly, his main source is clearly notDe rerum natura. Ficino explains to Mercati
thatNature,mother and grave of all, sells her sons to threemasters.37The idea of Earth
orNature as both genetrix and sepulchre is a recurrent topos in classical literature, and
is also found in Lucretius, book 5 lines 258–260.38 However, the metaphor of the three
34 Marcel,Marsile Ficin, 225: “d’une part nous savons, en effet, que Ficin n’hésite pas à donner un titre à
ses lettres et à les mentionner comme si elles étaient de véritables traités, et d’ autre part le caractère
qui doit correspondre à la notion de commentariolum apparaît nettement dans le contexte de ces
lettres où l’ auteur s’ excuse souvent d’ être si bref …”.
35 Kristeller, Supplementum, ii, 81, Accipe nunc optime miMichael quod a me diuturno desiderio requirebas,
perbrevequoddaminLucretii philosophiamargumentum,quo illapotissimumquede rebushumanis philosophus
ille sensit intelligas. Eius namque de naturae principiis animaeque motibus opinionem alia quadam epistola, ut
te non latet, absolvimus.
36 Lucr. 1.402–409, verum animo satis haec vestigia parva sagaci/ sunt, per quae possis cognoscere cetera tute./
Namque canes ut montivagae persaepe ferai/ naribus inveniunt intectas fronde quietes,/ cum semel institerunt
vestigia certa viai,/ sic alid ex alio per te tute ipse videre/ talibus in rebus poteris caecasque latebras/ insinuare
omnis et verum protrahere inde.
37 See Kristeller, Supplementum, ii, 81,Genetrix una eademque omnium commune sepulcrumnatos omnes statim
genitos vendit.
38 Lucr. 5.258–260, … et quoniam dubio procul esse videtur/ omniparens eadem rerum commune sepulcrum,/ ergo
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masters to whom the genetrix sells her sons cannot be found anywhere in Lucretius’
poem. Ficino explains that, of these three masters, one is good-natured, the second is
cruel, the third is insane, and all of them are insatiable. Any life is a kind of servitude,
but fortunate is he who serves the good-natured master, while the other two are
miserable. Nature can therefore be mother or stepmother, depending on the master
to whom she assigns each one of us. Ultimately, life is servitude, but real happiness
resides in freedom.39 Ficino’s main source here is clearly not Lucretius, and even the
theorydoesnot soundveryEpicurean. Yet, the same image is found in another epistle –
which is addressed to Pietro de’ Pazzi – where it is attributed to the Epicurean Silenus
(Sillenus Epicureus), about whom unfortunately Ficino gives no further information.40
In another epistle, dated 29th of November 1457 and addressed to Antonio Serafico,
who asked Ficino what the Democriteans and Epicureans thought about men’s
highest good, Ficino replies: “everybody particularly wishes peace and tranquillity”.41
He then quotes a passage from Lucretius (2.18–21), referring to that author as “the
most illustrious among the Epicurean philosophers” (Lucretius ille noster Epicureorum
philosophorum clarissimus). Given that “friends grant tranquillity, while enemies take
it away”, in the rest of the epistle Ficino discusses ways to pursue this state of peace
and tranquillity through a careful choice of our friends. Although friendship is very
much a recurrent topic among the Epicureans, Lucretius never actually discusses it at
length in his poem. Once more, Ficino’s source for the Epicurean theme of friendship
is likely to have been another text, possibly CiceroDe finibus, 1.65–70. The letter ends,
however, with a quotation from Lucretius concerning the Epicurean highest good
(6.24–28).
Ficino refers to Lucretius also in another letter, written on the 4th of January 1458
and addressed to an anonymous recipient. In it, Ficino explains that the first elements
fromwhich the body is composed are four in number: fire, air, water, and earth. To
them correspond four humours, yellow bile, blood, phlegm, and black bile, and four
terra tibi libatur et aucta recrescit, which means that whatever is produced from the earth is eventually
returned to the earth. For other similar passages, see Bailey ad loc.
39 See Kristeller, Supplementum, ii, 81, Tres vero domini sunt qui emunt, mitis unus, acer alter, amens postremus,
inexplebiles universi. […] Beatum est id quod est liberum. Qui servit nemo beatus. Fortunatus tamen qui miti
domino servit, miser qui acri, miserrimus qui amenti. […] Unius dumtaxat natura mater est, duorum vero
noverca. Omnis ergo vita servitus est. Cum vero prima nascendi sorte servi cuncti simus, plurimum tamen
interest, quali quisque domino serviat …
40 Kristeller, Supplementum, ii, 84–85, nam cum ad servitutem nati cuncti simus, plurimum tamen interest, ut
Sillenus Epicureus philosophus inquit, quali quisque domino serviat.
41 Kristeller, Supplementum, ii, 82.
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complexions, choleric, sanguine, phlegmatic, andmelancholic.42 But, if he had to list
each individual nature of bodies – Ficino declares – his explanation would have had to
be much longer. In this regard, he quotes Lucretius (3. 314–318), who, while discussing
these same topics, says:
And in many other respects one must think that the various natures of men
differ, and that the habits that follow from them, of which I cannot now set
forth the hidden causes, nor find names enough for all the shapes assumed by
the first-beginnings, fromwhich arises this variety in things.43
In case he wants to knowmore about this topic, Ficino encourages the addressee of
this letter to look at his (now lost) bookDe phisionomia, of which the letter is just a
summary.
It is interesting that Ficino matches his traditional account of the doctrine of
the four humours and complexions with Lucretius’ text. While he explicitly states
that Lucretius deals with this topic (cum de his dissereret), he does not mention that the
account inDe rerum natura is completely different from the one he has just presented.
In fact, just before the passage quoted by Ficino, Lucretius explains that the three
elements in the soul correspond to three different temperaments: heat is prominent
in anger, wind in fear and air in repose. This account might recall the traditional
theory of elements, humours and complexions, according to which to each of the four
elements is associated to a temperament, but Ficino appears to have mixed up the
two accounts, confusing Lucretius’ three elements of the soul with the Aristotelian
four elements and the Galenic four temperaments.
Moreover, Ficino’s quotation presents somemistakes, perhaps due to the fact that
he was quoting Lucretius frommemory. The first line is unmetrical: Ficino swapped
the positions of inque and rebus, which now cannot be part of an hexameter anymore.
Then he used the relative pronoun in the feminine form, as if it referred only to
naturas, while it should agree with the nearest noun, that ismores. Ficino’s text also
42 Kristeller, Supplementum, ii, 86–87, … quattuor esse scito prima corporum elementa, ignem, aera, aquam,
terram. Ex his humanum corpus conflatum est. Verum in eo ipso ignis collera dicitur, aer sanguis, aqua flevema,
terramelancolia. Sanguis autemnonalionomineapudnos significatur, collera vero et flevemaetmelancoliagreca
sunt, latine autem dicuntur bilis, pituita, atra bilis. Quibus conficitur ut quattuor sint hominum complexiones,
collerica videlicet sanguinea flevematica melancolica.
43 See Lucr. 3. 314–318 as quoted in Ficino’s letter inque rebus aliis multis differre putandum est/ naturas
hominum varias moresque sequaces;/ quarum ego nunc nequeo caecas exponere causas,/ nec reperire figurarum
tot nomina quot sunt/ principiis, unde haec oritur variantia rerum.
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has putandum est instead of the transmitted necessest. Although quoting frommemory
was not uncommon among Renaissance scholars, there are no other indications, at
least in the texts I have analysed, that this was Ficino’s usual practice.
It remains unclear howeverwhether Ficino’s wrong interpretation is just amatter
of badmemory, or whether he instead consciously distorted Lucretius’ doctrine in
order to assimilate it to an Aristotelian (and Galenic) account. Since some other texts
written in the same period pose the same problem, as we will see shortly, it is more
likely that the latter interpretation is correct one.
3.2. De voluptate
On the 29th–30th of December 1457, Ficino completed in Figline a long treatise, De
voluptate, the last two chapters of which (xvii–xviii) are devoted to the Epicurean
philosophy and are full of references to Lucretius.44
After having explained the notion of pleasure according to Plato and Aristotle,
right at the beginning of the seventeenth chapter, Ficino finally broaches the theme of
Epicureanism.He explains that, according toEpicurus, there are twokinds of pleasure:
a kinetic pleasure or a pleasure in motion (in motu), and a static pleasure or a pleasure
in a state of rest (in statu). Even though this account has usually been attributed to
Epicurus, even by modern scholars, Ficino’s source here is Cicero’s dialogueDe finibus
bonorum et malorum, in which the Epicurean spokesman, Torquatus, formulates this
theory.45 The same idea can also be found in the Life of Epicurus contained in Diogenes
Laertius’ Lives of Eminent Philosophers, which Ficino knew in Traversari’s translation.
The text there reads as follows:
Freedom from disturbance and absence of pain are enduring pleasures (con-
stantes … voluptates), while joy (gaudium) and delight (laetitia) are regarded as
activities in motion.46
44 Among Ficino’s early works, De voluptate is probably one of the most studied; see, for instance,
Boccuto, “La presenza”, 154–157; Ferdinando Gabotto, “L’Epicureismo di Marsilio Ficino”, Rivista di
filosofia scientifica 10 (1891), 430–439; Brown, The Return, 18–20.
45 See for instance, Cic., Fin. 1.37; 2.9, 16, 31 et passim. Even though this statement has often been
considered truly Epicurean, recently Boris Nikolsky in his article “Epicurus on Pleasure”, Phronesis
46.4 (Nov., 2001), 440–465 has doubted the veracity of this statement.
46 Namque perturbationis dolorisque vacatio constantes sunt voluptates. Gaudium vero ac laeticia actio secundum
motu videntur. In Vitae et sententiae philosophorum. Tr: Ambrosius Traversarius. Ed: Benedictus
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In line with this interpretation, Ficino argues that pleasure throughmotion is
divided into two: onewhich pertains to themind,whichhe calls gaudium, and another
one, called laetitia, which arises from the senses.
It is in order to clarify how this pleasure throughmotion can arise from the senses
that Ficino gives a brief sketch of Epicurean atomism:
They (sc. Epicurei) state that the first-beginnings of all things [are] certain
minuscule and completely indivisible corpuscles, which, for this reason,
namely that they cannot be divided, they call atoms. These differ from each
other in size and figure so that these seeds are bigger, others are smaller,
these are round and smooth, those are curved, hooked and rough; all these fly
through the immeasurable void with continuousmotions, they touch each
other, and clinging together through accidental encounters, they compose
whatever is in the nature of things.47
What follows is an exposition of the atomic shapes, according to the Epicureans, and
of their effects on perception.48 Ficino provides a detailed account of themechanism
of perception at an atomistic level, explaining how the particles that possess different
shapes act differently on the soul atoms, creating pleasant or unpleasant sensations.49
The reader might be surprised by Ficino’s vivid and colorful description of
Lucretius’ account of sensation: he explains that, when the soul-atoms, which are
small, round and smooth, meet other particles which are similar to them, they
pleasantly adhere to them, firmly connect, and sweetly embrace each other; from
Brognolus (Venice: Locatelli, Boneto, 1490), f. 111r. See also d.l. 10.136, ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀταραξία καὶ ἀπονία
καταστηματικαί εἰσιν ἡδοναί: ἡ δὲ χαρὰ καὶ ἡ εὐφροσύνη κατὰ κίνησιν ἐνεργείᾳ βλέπονται.
47 f. 1009, Rerum aiunt quae sunt omnium primordia corpuscula quaedamminima, ac penitus individua, quas
ob eam causam, quod insecabiles sint ἀτόμους nuncupant, easque magnitudine inter se ac figura differre ut
haec quidem semina maiora sint, alia minutiora, haec rotunda leviaque, illa curva et hamata et aspera, haec
omnia immensum per inane perpetuis motibus volitare, contingere sese, ac fortuitis concursionibus cohaerentia,
quaecumque in rerum natura sunt constituere …
48 As pointed out by Long and Sedley in The Hellenistic Philosophers. Vol. 1. Translations of the Principal
Sources with Philosophical Commentary (Cambridge: Cambridge up, 1987), 122, differently from
Lucretius, Epicurus never identified pleasure or pain withmovements of atoms. For this reason,
most probably Ficinos’s source in this passage is Lucretius’ text, even though he does not state it
explicitly.
49 See Lucr. 2.398–443. In general, on atomic shapes and sensation see, Lucr. 2.398–477, 963–972; on senses
and sensation see 4.26–378 (on vision); 4. 524–614 (on hearing); 4.615–672 (on taste); 4.673–721 (on
smell). On this passage see also Brown, The Return, 19.
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this movement, pleasure through motion arises.50 By contrast, bodies which are
composed by rough, weighty and big atoms provoke an unpleasant sensation, because
their particles pass with extreme difficulty through the holes of the body and soul.51
These rough and hooked atoms prick the body and sharply bite the soul, whose
primordia are horrified, escape and contract themselves quickly. From this dispersion
and contraction the pain throughmotion arises.52 Finally, there is also a third kind
of bodies: those formed by atoms that are neither light and round, nor altogether
hooked and rough. These atoms neither soothe nor disperse the mind atoms, but
they rather tickle them, and therefore also produce some sort of pleasure.53 Ficino also
adds to his account some quotes from Lucretius (2.402–407; 2.962–965; 2.427–431), and
refers to him as “Lucretius, the noble Epicurean” (Lucretius Epicureus nobilis). All in all,
in this little treatise, Ficino expresses his admiration for the poet.
All these passages suggest that, by the end of 1457, Ficino not only held Lucretius
in high esteem, but that he now also possessed a good familiarity with his poem. Even
from a lexical point of view, his acquaintance with Lucretius’ atomistic terminology
is evident, as he integrates certain Lucretian words into his vocabulary: for example,
he speaks of primordia, semina, corpuscula, which are the terms used by Lucretius to
refer to atoms. Equally, Ficino’s expression per inane and the verb volitare seem to be
taken directly fromDe rerumnatura.54 Finally, the fact that Ficino begins his analysis of
50 f. 1009,Quapropter ea quibus anima contexta est semina, cum lenibus hisce blandisque corpuscolis attinguntur,
assentiuntur illa quidemdulci huic commotioni, seseque in ea, quae sensibus acmeatibus hausta sunt corpuscula,
maxima quaedam aviditate diffundunt, iucunde adhaerent, firmiter copulantur, suavissime complectuntur,
eamque ipsam assensionem, effusionem, coniunctionem, complexionemque, voluptatem in motu positam
arbitrantur.
51 f. 1009, … qui vero aspera sunt et hamata mordent quodammodo animam acriter corpusque compungunt.
52 f. 1009,Contra vero accidit cum tertium illud corporumgenus, quod asperis ponderosisque seminibus constructum
est, sensibus admovetur, quod enim grandia sunt, quibus constant elementa, difficile corporis atque animae
foraminibus intrudunt, et vi quadam animae corpuscula pulsant, perrumpuntque, ac distrahunt, quod vero
aspera sunt, & humata, mordent quodammodo animam acriter, corpusque compungunt, talia quidem esse
consent absinthium, fel, colores, sonos, odoresque molestos, caetera denique omnia, quae asperitate aliqua,
et amaritudine sensus contingunt, horum quippe seminibus animae primordia concita distrahuntur, horrent
diffugiunt, ac sese celeriter contrahunt, eiusmodi dispersionem, contractionemque, dolorem secundummotum
definiunt.
53 f. 1010,Neque vero silentio praeterundum puto, quod inter ea, quae penitus levia, rotundaque sunt, et ea insuper,
quae adunca omnino, et aspera medium quoddam genus corporum interponitur. Idque his constat atomis, quae
nec rotunda penitus, nec inflexae, aduncae sunt, sed angulis quibusdam exiguis, ac mollibus eminent, cuius
generis vina quaedam, ac poma, quae agresti, et acri, atque (ut aiunt) acuto sapore modice temperata sunt, esse
volunt. Haec autem nec leniunt animum, neque dissipant, nihiloque magis languescere cogunt, verum leviter ac
modice pungunt et quasi titillant, voluptatemque efficiunt.
54 For per inane, see Lucr. 2.83, 116, 217, 226; 3. 17, 27 etc. For volitare, see Lucr. 1. 952; 2, 380; 2, 1055 etc.
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Epicureanpleasurewith such adetailed explanationof howatoms and their shapes act
on the senses and the soul is symptomatic of his intense engagement with Lucretius’
matter theory.
3.3. Tractatus de Deo et anima vulgaris
Another interesting text, which has however so far not been closely examined, is
the Tractatus de Deo et anima vulgaris, which is written in Italian in the form of a
letter to Francesco Capponi and is dated 24th of January 1458 (1457 according to the
Florentine calendar).55 Right at the beginning of this letter, Ficino explains that this
work originated from a conversation, which had taken place during the summer of
1457, between Ficino himself and Francesco Capponi. Ficino had then been in Campoli
(Tuscany), close to a small river, reading a book by Plato, most probably the Timaeus.
Since Capponi had asked himwhat the bookwas about, Ficino replied that it regarded
the divine and human natures. But Capponi’s curiosity was not yet satisfied, so that
Ficino started to discuss the different positions taken by ancient philosophers with
regard to the divinity and the human soul.56 This little treatise, which reports their
conversation, is thus presented in the form of an historical review.
After having briefly discussed the opinions of Diagoras and Protagoras, Ficino,
clustering together all ancient atomists, first addresses their conception of the
divinity.
Leucippus, Democritus, Epicurus, Hermarchus, Menoeceus, Aristippus,
Metrodorus and Lucretius admit that God exists, but in such a quiet and
stable condition that he is not concerned with nor is interested in anything
besides himself.57 Among them, Epicurus and Lucretius maintain that there
are innumerable worlds, each of them outside of the others, and composed of
various and similar shapes. God is outside of them, and of a human sort and
55 Kristeller, Supplementum, ii, 128–158.
56 Kristeller, Supplementum, ii, 129, Essendo la state preterita a Campoli, villa di Giovanni Canigiani, uomo
di somma prudentia et amatore de’ philosaphi, mi trovasti un dì appresso d’un fiumicello all’ombra con uno
libro di Platone nostro el quale tractava della divina et umana natura. Allora io da te dimandato ti risposi, di
che materia Platone in detto libro tractassi, et dicendomi tu che cosa è questa divina et umana natura, credo ti
ricordi che ti dissi: le cose che tu non sai non è di bisogno dame appari …
57 The inclusion of Aristippus, the founder of the Cyrenaic sect, among the atomists is puzzling: Ficino
must have thought that, since the Cyrenaics were hedonists, just as the Epicureans, they must have
been atomists as well.
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form. He does not consist of any elementary nature, but of a matter that is so
muchmore subtle and pure than the others, just as the celestial splendour
outrivals the dark earth. Therefore Epicurus often used to say that God was
not a body, but a quasi-body, very refined, blessed and everlasting.58
First of all, one has to point out that the word ‘God’ (Iddio) might sound inappropriate
in this context, since Ficino speaks in the singular, as if the atomists had been
monotheistic. However, it is also true that he resorts to this term quite frequently in
theTractatus to refer generically to any divine entity, in this case to the Epicurean gods.
Ficino claims that, according to Epicurus and Lucretius, God, meaning the gods,
1) have their abodes outside the cosmoi, 2) possess human aspect and form, 3) are
not formed from any elemental nature, but from very subtle and pure matter, 4)
are not body, but, at best, a very refined quasi-body, 5) are blessed and everlasting.
From this passage, onemay conjecture that Ficino’s main source is neither Epicurus
nor Lucretius, but the speech of Velleius, the proponent of the Epicurean view in
Cicero’s dialogueDe natura deorum.59 In fact, Velleius not only refers to the concept of
intermundia, that is, the space between the cosmoiwhere the Epicurean gods reside (1),
but he also describes the Epicurean gods as blessed and immortal creatures (5), who
possess human shape (2) and whose form is not a body, but a quasi-body, resembling
bodily substance only in appearence (4).60
Even though nowhere in Cicero’sDe natura deorum a clear statement concerning
the nature of the Epicurean gods can be found, Ficino explains that, according to
Epicurus and Lucretius, they are not formed of any elemental nature, but of a very
subtle and pure matter.61 While in Epicurus’ extant writings there is no mention of
58 Kristeller, Supplementum, ii, 129–130, Leucippo,Democrito, Epicuro,Hermarco,Menece, Aristippo,Metrodoro
e Lucrezio concessero essere Iddio, ma in tale quiete e stato posto, che non intenda né curi fuori di se cosa alcuna.
De’ quali Epicuro e Lucretio disputano, essere mondi l’uno fuori dell’altro innumerabili, di varie et di simili
figure composti, fuori de’quali sia Iddio, di spetie e forma umana, non costituto di natura elementale alcuna, ma
di materia tanto più che l’altre sottile e pura, quanto el celeste splendore la terra tenebrosa avanza. Et però spesso
soleva dire l’Epicuro, non essere corpo Iddio, ma quasi corpo tenuissimo, beatissimo e sempiterno.
59 Cic. nd 1.43–56.
60 Cic. nd, 1.48–49,Quoniamque deos beatissimos esse constat, beatus autem esse sine virtute nemo potest nec
virtus sine ratione constare nec ratio usquam inesse nisi in hominis figura, hominis esse specie deos confitendum
est. Nec tamen ea species corpus est sed quasi corpus, nec habet sanguinem sed quasi sanguinem. Cotta, the
proponent of the Stoic view in Cicero’s dialogue, harshly criticizes the ambiguous expression quasi-
body, defining it as “jargon” (dumeta).
61 The nature of the Epicurean gods is indeed matter of debate: according to the ‘idealist’ view,
championed by Long and Sedley, the gods does not exist as solid bodies, but as mere streams of
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such a theory, Lucretius similarly maintained that gods – just as any other thing –
are atomic compounds, but made of a texture far more subtle (tenuis) than anything
else.62 Although there is thus a correspondence with Lucretius’ account, Ficino here
does not refer to atoms, nor does he clarify what kind of matter is that fromwhich
the Epicurean gods are formed. He only points out that they are not formed from any
elemental nature, that is, they are notmade of the four elements, and that theirmatter
is “so much more subtle and pure than the others, just as the celestial splendour
outrivals the dark earth”. But what kind of matter is this? In order to answer this
question, one should look further, to another passage in which Ficino explains the
composition of mind and soul according to Epicurus and Lucretius:
Epicurus, Metrodorus, Hermarchus, Menoeceus and the Roman Lucretius
similarly assert that the atoms are the principle and the origin of anything
that is born; and the soul [is composed of] those atoms that create fire, air,
water and earth, that are constituted in extreme subtlety and perfection, and
this [soul] is dispersed throughout the body.Moreover, in the heart, they place
a generation of atoms that are somuchmore subtle than those fromwhich the
soul is made, as the soul is more subtle than the body, and these atoms of the
heart are of such a nature that they cannot compose any of the four elements,
because of their extreme subtlety and thinness, so that they constitute a fifth
nature and essence beyond those that are counted among the four elements.
From this [fifth nature] mind, intellect and reason are born in the location
of the heart, which rules over any other part. And similarly they believe that
the gods, who reside beyond the burning walls of the heavens, are of the same
essence.63
images and thought constructs. While according to themore traditional ‘realist’ interpretation,
supported byMansfeld and Konstan, for instance, the gods are real atomic compounds. See Cyril
Bailey, The Greek atomists and Epicurus (New York: Russell & Russell, 1964), 441–467; Long and Sedley,
The Hellenistic Philosophers, 144–149; JaapMansfeld, “Aspects of Epicurean Theology”,Mnemosyne 46. 2
(1993), 172–210; Jeffrey Purinton, “Epicurus on theNature of Gods”,Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy,
vol. 21, (Oxford: Oxford up, 2001).
62 See Lucr. 5. 148–149, tenuis enim natura deum longeque remota / sensibus ab nostris animi vix mente videtur.
Other ancient sources confirm this theory, see for example Aetius 1.7.37 = Ps.-Plut. Plac. 882a,
Επίκουρος ἀνθρωποειδεῖς μὲν τοὺς θεοὺς λόγῳ δὲ πάντας θεωρητοὺς διὰ τὴν λεπτομέρειαν
τῆς τῶν εἰδώλων φύσεως.
63 Kristeller, Supplementum, ii, 144, Epicuro Metrodoro Hermarco Menece et Lucretio Romano similmente
disputano gli atomi essere principio et origine d’ogni cosa nata et l’anima di quegli atomi che creano foco aria
acqua et terra in extrema subtilità e perfectione constituti, et questa è per tutto il corpo sparsa. Di poi nel cuore
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In this passage, Ficino explains the composition of the soul according to the
Epicureans in atomistic terms. That his main source is Lucretius is evident from the
language he uses: the expression ardenti mura celesti (burning walls of the heavens),
for instance, clearly recalls the flammantia moenia mundi (flaming walls of our world)
in Lucr. book 1 line 73.
What is striking, however, is the fact that Ficino, in his account, makes a clear
distinction between the soul, which is spread throughout the body and is composed
of the same atoms that create the four elements, and themind, which is located in the
heart and arises fromwhat he calls a “fifth nature and essence” (una natura et essentia
quinta). This fifth nature, according to Ficino, is made of atoms that are muchmore
subtle and light than those of the soul.64 While the distinction between mind and
soul, as well as their locations, matches the original Lucretian account (3.136–144), the
difference between the two kinds of matter by which they are composed is an original
addition by Ficino. By contrast, Lucretius believes that mind and soul are similar in
structure and nature.65
The origin of this misunderstanding should be sought in a passage in the third
book of De rerum natura, where Lucretius speaks of the fourth, unnamed element in
the soul (not the fifth, as maintained by Ficino).66 According to Lucretius, the soul,
which is spread throughout the body, is made up of wind, heat and air, but, since
these first three elements are not enough to create sensation or thought, there is a
fourth unnamed nature, which is quicker and rarer in texture and is composed of
atoms that are smaller and smoother than the others. When we come into contact
with an external stimulus, these very thin atoms are set in motion first, then they
transmit their motion to the heat-atoms, then to the wind-atoms, then to the air-
atoms and finally, these sense-givingmotions are distributed through the limbs.67
pongono una generatione d’atomi tanto più sottili che quegli di che è l’anima facta quanto l’anima più sottile
è ch’el corpo, et questi atomi cordiali non sono di tal natura che possino alcuno de’quattro elementi comporre
per cagione di strema loro subtilità et acume, sicché fanno una natura et essentia quinta oltre a quelle che tra’
quattro elementi sono connumerate, della quale sia nata la mente, intellecto et ragione nella sede del cuore sopra
ogn’altra parte regnante. Et di questa essentia similmente stimano essere gli Dii i quali fuori dall’ardenti mura
celesti consistono.
64 On the contrary, Lucretius maintained that bothmind and soul are formed by very small atoms:
2.216–217, ergo animam totam perparvis esse necessest/ seminibus, nexam per venas viscera nervos…; 2.228–230,
quare etiam atque etiammentis naturam animaeque/ scire licet perquam pauxillis esse creatam/ seminibus,
quoniam fugiens nil ponderis aufert.
65 See Lucr. 3. 136–137, and Bailey, ad loc.
66 See Lucr. 3.231–287.
67 On this fourth nature, see Lucretius 3.231–287.
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According to Lucretius, the atoms that constitute the fourth nature, and which are
indeed muchmore subtle and smooth than anything else, constitute both the mind
and soul.68
Therefore, Ficino makes at least three mistakes in his interpretation: 1) according
to Lucretius, animus and anima are not of a different nature, and therefore they are
not made up of different kinds of matter; 2) anima as well as animus are composed
of all four soul-elements; 3) nowhere in his poem does Lucretius say that animus is
composed of a fifth nature, beyond the four elements. Themost likely explanation
of this misunderstandings is that Ficino confused Lucretius’ theory with one that is
attributed to Aristotle and is found in Cicero’s Tusculanae disputationes. According to
that theory, there is indeed a fifth substance, in addition to the four elements, from
which the mind arises:
Aristotle, who far exceeds all others – Plato I always except – both in intellect
and in exactness, having embraced the four well-known kinds of principles,
fromwhich all things arise, believes that there is a certain fifthnature (quintam
quandamnaturam) fromwhich comesmind. For thinking, foreseeing, learning,
teaching, discovering something, and many more things, remembering,
loving, hating, desiring, fearing, suffering, and being joyful, these and similar
(things) he thinks cannot be present in any of those four kinds. He therefore
introduces a fifth kind which lacks a name, and thus he calls the reasoning
soul itself by a new name endelecheia, as a sort of continuous and perennial
motion.69
68 Even though it is quite clear from Lucretius’ text that animus and anima are wholly alike in material
composition and that they only differ in place and function, also some nineteenth century German
scholars have suggested that the fourth, unnamed element should either be identical with the
animus, or with an element that only occurs in animus. For an account of these theories and a very
convincing refutation, see Carlo Giussani, “Psicologia Epicurea”, in Studi Lucreziani (Torino: Loescher,
1896), 183–217 and Bailey, The Greek Atomists, 580–587.
69 Cic.Tusc.Disput. 1. 10. 22, Aristoteles, longe omnibus Platonem semper excipio praestans et ingenio et diligentia,
cum quattuor nota illa genera principiorum esset complexus, e quibus omnia orerentur, quintam quandam
naturam censet esse, e qua sit mens; cogitare enim et providere et discere et docere et invenire aliquid et tammulta
[alia] meminisse, amare, odisse, cupere, timere, angi, laetari, haec et similia eorum in horum quattuor generum
inesse nullo putat; quintum genus adhibet vacans nomine et sic ipsum animum endelecheian appellat novo
nomine quasi quandam continuatammotionem et perennem. Cicero asserts that Aristotle derivedmind
from the fifth element also in other passages, such as Tusc. Disput. 1. 17. 41; 1. 26. 65; Ac. 1.7.26; 1.2.39;
Fin. 4.5.12.
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In this passage, Cicero attributes to Aristotle the view that mens is composed
of a certain fifth nature, which is responsible for the rational functions (thought,
foresight, learning etc.) of themind. He points out that none of these activities can be
present in the ordinary four elements; for this reason Aristotle added a fifth nature.
Interestingly, Cicero uses the expression quintam quandam naturam which is very
similar to the expression found in Lucretius’ text to define the soul’s fourth nature,
that is, quarta […] quaedam natura (3.241).
Also because of the similarity with Lucretius’ text, Cicero’s account was prob-
ably present in Ficino’s mind when he wrote that, according to the Epicureans,
there is a “fifth nature and essence beyond those that are included among the four
elements, from which the mind, intellect and reason are born”. But, Epicureaniz-
ing this Aristotelian idea, Ficino tried to give an atomistic account of this theory,
explaining that this fifth nature is composed of atoms, which are generated in
the heart and are more subtle and lighter than those by which the soul is com-
posed.
Anotherpossible sourceof Ficino’s accountmighthavebeenapassage inPlutarch’s
Adversus Colotem. There, presenting the Epicurean view, Plutarch writes:
For that by which it [sc. the soul] judges, remembers, loves, hates, in a word,
that what is prudent and rational, they say [sc. the Epicureans], is made of
some nameless quality.70
Both in Cicero and Plutarch, the rational functions of the soul such as remembering,
loving and hating, are connected to a certain unnamed substance of the soul. The
textual similarity between the two passages might have been enough to make Ficino
believe that, after all, Lucretius’ fourth substance was the same as Aristotle’s fifth
nature. This interpretation is of course incorrect: also Bailey, who acknowledges that
the idea of the ‘fourth nature’ was most probably suggested to Epicurus by Aristotle’s
‘fifth element’ in the soul, admits that “it [i.e., the fourth nature] is in no sense, like
the ‘fifth element’, supra-material in nature – it is purely atomic but more subtle
than anything known to sensation”.71
70 See Plut. Adv. Col. 20 1118d: τὸ γὰρ ᾧ κρίνει καὶ μνημονεύει καὶ φιλεῖ καὶ μισεῖ, καὶ ὅλως τὸ φρόνιμον
καὶ λογιστικὸν ἔκ τινός, φησιν, ἀκατονομάστου ποιότητος ἐπιγίνεσθαι. See also Aetius 4.3.11 (=
Ps.-Plut. Placita 4.3.11).
71 See Bailey, Cyril (ed.), Titi Lucreti Cari de rerum natura libri sex, edited, with Prolegomena, Critical Apparatus,
Translation and Commentary, 3 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1947), 1027.
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Wehave seen that, at the endof thepassagequoted, Ficino claims that, according to
theEpicureans, gods are of the same essence as animus, that is, that they are constituted
by this fifthnature. This answers ourpreviousquestion: theEpicureangods, according
to Ficino, are composed of the same fifth nature that also constitutes the human
rational soul. Once more, although this account cannot be found anywhere in the
Epicurean sources, it is perfectly in line with what, according to Cicero, Aristotle
had taught. In fact, in another passage of his Tusculanae disputationes, Cicero states
that, according to Aristotle, this fifth substance is that of which both gods and
human rational souls consist.72 Since this Aristotelian fifth substance has been usually
identified with ether, which composes the upper world from themoon upwards to
the first heaven, it is maybe less surprising that Ficino describes it as something that
has a celestial nature, “so much more subtle and pure than the others, just as the
celestial splendour outrivals the dark earth”.73 This hypothesis finds a confirmation
in Lucretius’ fifth book, where the ‘fiery ether’ is indeed described as the “lightest and
most fluid” among the elements; at the same time, however, it is not conceived as an
element which constitutes the human soul.74
3.4. Epistula De quatuor sectis philosophorum
Most probably in the same period, Ficino wrote the undated Epistula De quatuor sectis
philosophorum,whichheaddressed toClementeFortini.75 In this letter, Ficino compares
the view of the Platonists, Aristotelians, Stoics and Epicureans on God, world, human
mind and highest good. The very fact that, in the Epistula, he devotedmore space to
Epicureanism than to the other philosophical schools might be indicative of an early
‘Lucretian’ period.
72 Cic. Tusc. Disput. 1. 26. 65, sin autem est quinta quaedamnatura, ab Aristotele inducta primum, haec et deorum
est et animorum. For a discussion of Aristotle’s statements with regard to the Deity, ether, soul and
mind, see M. Tulli Ciceronis TusculanarumDisputationum Libri Quinque, by ThomasWilson Dougan
(Cambridge: Cambridge up, 1905), 240–241.
73 The passage has some affinity with Cic., Tusc. Disput. 1. 17. 41, si vero aut numerus quidam est animus
[…], aut quinta non nominata magis quam non intellecta natura, multo etiam integriora ac puriora sunt, ut a
terra longissime se ecferant, in which perfection and purity of the fifth element is closely related with
the distance from earth. For the identification of the fifth element with the ether, see, for instance,
Geoffrey E.R. Lloyd, The Growth and Structure of his Thought, (Cambridge: Cambridge up, 1973), 133–139.
74 Lucr. 5.498–502, inde mare, inde aer, inde aether ignifer ipse/ corporibus liquidis sunt omnia pura relicta,/ et
leviora aliis alia, et liquidissimus aether/ atque levissimus aerias super influit auras …
75 On this letter see Brown, The Return, 20–21.
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In this text, Ficino returns to the subject of thenature of God,whichhehad already
discussed in the Tractatus. Once more, Ficino transforms the Greco-Latin pantheon
into a monotheistic God, possibly under the influence of Plato’s demiurge. Referring
once again to Cicero’sDe natura deorum, he affirms that, according to the Epicureans,
God is a living entity which possesses human aspects, despite not being a body, but a
quasi-body.76He explains, in fact, that His power and purity is so superior to everyone
else’s that, compared to the others, He looks almost as if He were incorporeal.77
Ficino goes on to describe the condition of peace and tranquility that pertains to
the Epicurean divinity, and finally adds a quotation from Lucretius (2.646–651), who
is presented as themost noble Epicurean (Epicureus nobilissimus). Then, Ficino turns to
the atomistic theory:
They (the Epicureans) believe that the first-beginnings of all things [are]
corpuscles, of such small size that they cannot be seen or divided. These, being
infinite, fly [volitare] through the void [per inane] and throughan immeasurable
space with perpetual motions and, finally, assembled through accidental
encounters, they create both the world itself and all things that are contained;
once separated, however, they destroy this, and create another anew. […] [They
think that] our soul is composed of fire, air, wind and, in addition, of that
nature of which God consists. Lucretius himself expresses this in these verses
(Lucr. 3, 269ss.).78
Once more, the familiarity with Lucretius’ text is evident not only through direct
citations, but also from a lexical point of view: both the Lucretian expression per inane
and the verb volitare seem to be taken directly fromDe rerum natura.
76 Cic. nd, 1.48–49.
77 Kristeller, Supplementum, ii, 9, Verum fingere illum videtur animal quoddammagnumatque ingens, humana
imagine preditum, adeo tenue ac splendidum ut vereatur illud corporeum appellare. Quapropter dicere solent
Epicurei non corpus sed quasi corpus esse Deum, ac si dixerint: etsi corpus sit Deus, ceteris tamen corporibus
tantum potestate prestat et puritate, ut ad cetera comparatum incorporeum videatur.
78 Kristeller, Supplementum, ii, 10, Primordia rerum que sunt omnium putant hi (sc. Epicurei) corpuscula adeo
minuta ut, nec cerni, nec dividi possint. Hec infinita per inane ac locum immensum perpetuis motibus volitare
et tandem fortuitis concursionibus congregata et mundum ipsum et que in eo sunt cuncta conficere, dissoluta
vero hoc quidem interimere, illud denuo procreare. Inane quidem ac spatium esse immensum, in hoc mundos
innumeros, alios quidem huic nostro similes, dissimiles alios; hos item fieri, illos solvi, perpetuisque vicibus
deficere mundos et refici. Animum nostrum ex igni, aere vento ac insuper natura illa ex qua sit Deus constare.
Hoc idem ipse Lucretius his versibus exprimit (Lucr. 3, 269ss.).
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In this passage, Ficino partially corrects his previous account, acknowledging that
the Epicurean soul is made up of three main substances, fire, air and wind. At the
same time, however, he still implicitly associates the Lucretian, fourth, unnamed
element of the soul with the Aristotelian fifth nature, of which both God and human
souls consist. This interpretation is, as we have seen above, not entirely accurate, but
again it shows how Ficino read Lucretius with Aristotelian eyes.
From the passages found in the Tractatus and the Epistula, it is clear that Ficino
interpreted Lucretius’ philosophy in the light of Aristotle or Plato. But, is Ficino’s
apparently ‘inaccurate’ interpretation of Lucretius the result of a misunderstanding,
or rather a specific strategy,which stem fromhiswish tomake Lucretiusmore Platonic
or Aristotelian? I believe that the latter option is the most probable.
After all, by introducing the fifth element andmaking a clear distinction between
thematter of the Divinity and the soul, on the one hand, and that of the terrestrial
bodies, on the other, Ficino neutralizes – so to speak – part of the revolutionary
force of Lucretius’ philosophy. This revolutionary force had its core principle in the
unification of the heavenly and sublunary world within the same physical model,
fromwhich follows the idea according to which the laws that control the terrestrial
worldmust be the same as those that govern the celestial bodies. By conceiving the
whole universe, including the gods and the soul, as made of same kind of matter,
namely atoms and void, Lucretius had not only offered an alternative model to the
traditional and dichotomous Aristotelian system – which distinguished between
heavenly and terrestrial worlds –, but he had also managed to replace the latter’s
finalistic cosmology with amodel of the universe which usually relied exclusively on
material and efficient causality. It might be that, precisely for this reason, by applying
Aristotle’s model to Lucretius, Ficino aimed to make sure that the revolutionary force
of his philosophy could remain somehow inoffensive.
4. The Commentary on Plato’s Philebus
In 1469, Ficino once again explicitly referred to Lucretius, at the beginning of his
commentary on Plato’s Philebus. In this passage, when discussing the need for finality
in generation and in natural change, Ficino quotes Lucretius’ claim that nothing can
arise out of nothing, because otherwise anything could arise out of anything (else):
Again, the body’s power either produces somethingby chance or by anecessary
intentionof itsnature. It isnotby chance, because anyonebodywouldproduce
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all possible effects and so anythingwould result from anything. Thingswould
not need a definite seed [certo … semine] and the argument [discussed] by
Lucretius would come to pass: “if things were made from nothing, every
genus could be born from everything; nothing would need a seed. First, men
could arise from the sea and the genus of fishes from the land and birds could
burst from the sky”. And surely what happens by chance rarely happens,
and it happens not just in one way but in various ways. But we see certain
appropriate effects coming from individual things – from a fixed seed [certo
semine], at the established time, in the usual order and way, in a set sequence,
with the samemiddle terms and the same rational principle andmost of the
time. So, as the corporeal power produces the effect from a necessary intention
of the nature, it intends the effect in the proper way and what it intends it
desires by natural instinct.79
In this passage, the reference toDe rerum natura is explicit in the verbatim quotation;
but even when Ficino does not quote Lucretius, he is actually paraphrasing his text,
notably when he refers to “certain peculiar things” coming from “a particular seed”,
“at the established time”. Nevertheless, the finalistic context in which Ficino inserts
the quotation is of course far from Lucretian and much closer to some passages in
Aristotle.80 But how could Ficino integrate Lucretius’ concept of semina rerum in a
context that is completely incompatible with his philosophy? It seems that, in this
passage, Ficino grasped and enhanced a very specific aspect of Lucretius’matter theory,
namely the organizing and generative power of his seminal atoms, which is evident
in the following passage of De rerum natura:
Nam si de nihilo fierent, ex omnibus rebus
160 omne genus nasci posset, nil semine egeret.
79 Translation by M.G.B. Allen (modified). See Ficino, Commentaria in Philebum, 1.1, Item corporis vis
aut casu in opus incidit aut necessaria quadam intentione naturae. Non casu, quia in quaecumque opera
quodcumque corpus incurreret, atque ita quaelibet a quibuslibet fierent, neque certo res semine indigerent et
illud Lucretii eveniret. Nam si de nihilo fierent ex omnibus rebus omne genus nasci posset; nihil semine egeret, e
mari primum homines, e terra possit oriri squamigerum genus et volucres erumpere coelo. Et profecto quod casu
fit raro contingit, nec uno dumtaxat modo sed variis provenit. Videmus autem propria quaedam a singulis, certo
semine, instituto tempore, solito ordine modoque, digesta serie, iisdemmediis, eadem ratione et ut plurimum
fieri. Ergo cum necessaria quadam intentione naturae corporea vis effectum producat, proprie illum intendit et
quod intendit naturali instinctu appetit.
80 See especially Phys. 2. 196b 10–197a 35 and 199a 3–199b 33.
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e mare primum homines, e terra posset oriri
squamigerum genus et volucres erumpere caelo;
armenta atque aliae pecudes, genus omne ferarum,
incerto partu culta ac deserta tenerent.
165 nec fructus idem arboribus constare solerent,
sed mutarentur, ferre omnes omnia possent.
quippe ubi non essent genitalia corpora cuique,
qui posset mater rebus consistere certa?
at nunc seminibus quia certis quaeque creantur,
170 inde enascitur atque oras in luminis exit,
materies ubi inest cuiusque et corpora prima;
atque hac re nequeunt ex omnibus omnia gigni,
quod certis in rebus inest secreta facultas.
Praeterea cur vere rosam, frumenta calore,
175 vites autumno fundi suadente videmus,
si non, certa suo quia tempore semina rerum
cum confluxerunt, patefit quod cumque creatur,
dum tempestates adsunt et vivida tellus
tuto res teneras effert in luminis oras?
180 quod si de nihilo fierent, subito exorerentur
incerto spatio atque alienis partibus anni,
quippe ubi nulla forent primordia, quae genitali
concilio possent arceri tempore iniquo.
Nec porro augendis rebus spatio foret usus
185 seminis ad coitum, si e nilo crescere possent;
nam fierent iuvenes subito ex infantibus parvis
e terraque exorta repente arbusta salirent.
quorum nil fieri manifestum est, omnia quando
paulatim crescunt, ut par est semine certo,
190 crescentesque genus servant; ut noscere possis
quicque sua de materia grandescere alique.
Lucr. 1.159–191
For if things came out of nothing, all kinds of things could be produced from
all things, nothing would want a seed. Firstly, men could arise from the sea,
from the earth scaly tribes, andbirds couldhatch from the sky; cattle and other
farm animals and every kind of wild creature would fill desert and cultivated
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land alike,withno certainty as to birth.Norwould trees be constant inbearing
the same fruit, but theywould interchange: allwould be able to bear all. Seeing
that there would be no bodies apt to generate each kind, how could there be
a constant unchangingmother for things? But as it is, because every kind is
produced from fixed seeds, the source of everything that is born and comes
forth into the borders of light is that in which is the material of it and its first
bodies; and therefore it is impossible that all things be born from all things,
because in particular things resides a distinct power.
Besides, why dowe see the rose put forth in spring, corn in the heat, grapes
under persuasion of autumn, unless because each created thing discloses
itself when at their own time the fixed seeds of thingshave streamed together,
while the due seasons are present and the lively earth safely brings out things
young and tender into the borders of light? But if they came from nothing,
suddenly they would arise at uncertain intervals and at unsuitable times of
the year; naturally, for there would be no first-beginnings to be restrained
from generative union by the unfavourable season.
Nor furthermore would time be needed for the growth of things, for seeds
to collect, if they could grow from nothing; for youths would be made on a
sudden from small infants, and trees would leap forth suddenly arising out
of the earth. But manifestly none of these things takes place, since all things
grow little by little, as is proper, from a fixed seed, and in growing preserve
their kind; so that youmay infer that every kind grows and is nourished from
its own proper material.81
According to Lucretius, a given organism can only grow from the appropriate seeds.
Now, semina – as is well-known – is one of Lucretius’ favorite terms for the atoms. In
his didactic poem, it is used instead of atomi, a term that Lucretius never used. The
polyvalence of semina, however, opens upmany possibilities for interpretation, as the
sameword – even inDe rerum natura itself – of course also simply designates biological
seeds. In the passage just quoted, however, Lucretius undoubtedly refers to atoms,
as David Sedley has argued, explaining that “the biological regularities which are
evident at themacroscopic level depend on fixed semina at themicroscopic level”.82
81 Unless stated otherwise, all translations ofDe rerumnatura areW.H.D. Rouse’s, fromMartin Ferguson
Smith, Lucretius. De RerumNatura.With an English Translation byW.H.D. Rouse (Cambridge, ma and
London: Harvard up, 1992).
82 Sedley, Lucretius, 194.
56 chapter 1
Therefore, in this passage, Lucretius puts the emphasis on what has been called the
‘dynamic generative powers’ of atoms, a procreative meaning that is contained in
the very word semina.83 So, at least in this passage, Lucretius goes beyond a purely
materialist view of composition by endowing his atoms with “almost miraculous
creative powers”.84
It turns out that Ficinodidnot remain indifferent to this interpretativepossibility,
which provided an excellent argument in favor of his own finalistic view of nature,
which inmost other respects was very far from Lucretius’ usual description of natural
agency. In fact, Lucretius himself, on this point, seems to contradict himself, because
sometimes he presents the semina rerum as merely figured shapes of matter moving
mechanically, while, in 1.159–191, he seems to endorse a more vitalistic matter theory.
We have seen that, in this passage, Lucretius uses semina to refer to atoms. But
what exactly are these ‘seeds’, according to Ficino? Even though, throughout his
career, Ficino changed his view on this subject continuously, at least at this stage in
his thinking he defined semina as one of the four divine species through which God
orders the world:85
He [sc. God] arranges everything by distinct grades, in a fixed number and
ordered series, and imparts to each according to its natural capacity ormerited
worth. He determines matter with form, nature with seeds, the soul with
reasons, the intelligence with ideas, and, finally, all things with Himself.86
Ficinomaintains that there are four substances (or hypostases), apart from God: the
Divine Intelligence, the World-Soul, Nature and matter.87 The intermediary between
83 Sedley, Lucretius, 38. On the analogy between atoms and seeds in Lucretius, see Pieter Herman
Schrijvers, “Le regard sur l’ invisible. Etude sur l’ emploi de l’ analogie dans l’œuvre de Lucrèce”, in
D.J. Furley (ed.), Lucrèce (Vandoeuvres and Geneva: Fondation Hardt, 1977), 77–114.
84 Sedley, Lucretius, 197. On the same concept of atoms as ‘generative principles’ in the Epicurean
context, see Morel, “Epicurean Atomism”, 78. More broadly, in the atomistic tradition starting from
Democritus onwards, see Lloyd, Polarity, 248–249.
85 For a detailed discussion of Ficino’s concept of seeds, see Hiro Hirai, “Concepts of Seeds and Nature
in theWork of Marsilio Ficino”, inMarsilio Ficino: His Theology, His Philosophy, His Legacy, ed. Michael
J.B. Allen and Valery Rees (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 257–284.
86 Transl. byMichael J.B. Allen. See Commentaria in Philebum, 36 (ed. Allen, 362),Omnia distinctis gradibus,
certo in numero, ordinata serie sigerit, et cuique pro naturae capacitate vel meriti dignitate impertit. Terminat
materiam forma, natura seminibus, animam rationibus, mentem ideis, se ipso denique omnia.
87 He held a similar view in Plato’s Symposium (1468–1469), for instance, Commentarium in Convivium
Platonis 2.3 (ed. Marcel, 149). On this topic, see Michael J.B. Allen, “Ficino’s Theory of the Five Sub-
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these four substances are four divine species: ideas, reasons, seeds and forms. Ideas are
therefore the intermediary betweenGod and theDivine Intelligence, reasons between
intelligence and theWorld-Soul, seeds between theWorld-Soul and nature, and forms
between nature andmatter. The difference between Lucretius’ and Ficino’s concepts
of seeds in the passages that we have quoted is evident: Lucretius uses semina to refer
to atoms, while Ficino considers them asmetaphysical entities, a sort of formative
principle through which God shapes nature. Moreover, according to Ficino, all the
species, including seeds, are strictly dependent on God, while, for Lucretius, atoms do
not of course depend on a superior entity.
To sum up, according to Ficino, a seed is not an atom, as in Lucretius, but an
incorporeal entity, provided with an enlivening power. This notion seems to be far
from Lucretian. And yet it seems that it may have been Lucretius’ very text that
inspired this idea. According to that reading, Ficino would have merely strengthened
the procreative implications hidden in Lucretius’ concept of semina rerum, while re-
contextualizing it in an Christian and Platonic context.
5. Theologia Platonica
The anecdote about Ficino burning his commentariola on Lucretius, with which this
chapter began, whether true or not, shows that, after his youthful interest, later in
his life, Ficino started to perceive the appeal of Lucretius’ poem as dangerous, coming
to view his philosophy as a serious threat to his own Christian Platonism. As we have
seen before, in an undated letter to Poliziano, Ficino distanced himself from Lucretius
and claimed that he had followed “the divine Plato” from his youth.88 Scholars have
concluded that Ficino’s attitude towards Lucretius underwent a radical change: his
initial curiosity, which clearly contained an element of esteem, turned into a critical
attitude and finally into a complete denial of Lucretius’ doctrine. However, as this
section will show, a careful reading of Ficino’s last texts seems to indicate instead that
the reading of De rerum natura exerted a long-term influence on Ficino’s thought and
that his relationship to Lucretius must therefore be considered to have been more
than just a juvenile flirt.89
stances and the Neoplatonists’ Parmenides”, in Plato’s Third Eye. Studies inMarsilio Ficino’s Metaphysics
and its Sources (Aldershot, Hampshire and Brookfield, vt: Variorum, 1995).
88 Ficino, Letters, 55–56.
89 Kristeller and Hankins are also of the same opinion, see Kristeller, Eight Philosophers of the Italian
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The passage in Lucretius, which he quoted in his commentary on Plato’s Philebus,
appears to have exerted a longstanding attraction for Ficino, who refers to it again
in his Theologia Platonica, which he composed in 1469–1474. In that work, it becomes
obvious that Ficino’s attitude toward Lucretius had meanwhile drastically changed:
in fact, he now devotes many passages to a refutation of the latter’s doctrines, and
even subscribes to the ancient allegation that this poet became insane because of
an excess of black bile and that he committed suicide, stabbing himself with a
sword (Th. Plat. 14, 10).90 But, despite the dramatic change in Ficino’s attitude toward
Lucretius, far from ignoring him, he now reverts his strategy: while relying on
the same passage fromDe rerum natura, he turns Lucretius’ own argument against
Lucretius himself.
In the end all the world’s parts come together to form for the whole world
a unique harmonious beauty fromwhich nothing can be subtracted and to
which nothing can be added. If you (sc. Lucretius) had to provide for trees and
animals using all your wisdom, would you have done it differently? No, not
differently, butnot aswell. Awisdomgreater thanyoursdesigned these things,
otherwise day after day you would be seeing things everywhere with missing
limbs or organs: dogs born from horse semen, figs from apples, human limbs
attached to lions, humans with the limbs of asses, stars falling, and stones
ascending. But in reality because the individual parts of theworld, havingbeen
born from fixed seeds [certis seminibus] and endowed with distinctive shapes,
seek and seek again specific goals – seek them by the most direct route, at the
appropriate times and arrangements, and in a manner both very beautiful
and ideally suited – it follows that they are moved in the same way as those
things enacted by human skill and design.91
Renaissance (Stanford: Stanford up, 1964), 39: “During an early period of his development, he was
impressed by the Epicureanism of Lucretius, and a trace of this influence persisted throughout
his life” and Hankins, “Ficino’s critique …”, 154: “to judge from the amount of time he devoted to
refuting him, Ficino evidently believed the threat posed to his Christian Platonism by Lucretius
was even greater than the threat from Averroism and Alexandrinism […]. Is this just compensation
for Ficino’s own youthful flirtation with Lucretius and Epicureanism, or did Lucretius have a far
deeper impact on fifteenth century thought than anyone has previously guessed?”.
90 On this topic see especially Snyder, “Marsilio Ficino’s Critique”, 165–181.
91 Transl. byMichael J.B. Allen with JohnWarden (modified). See Ficino, Th. Plat. 2, 13, Tandem partes
mundi cunctae ad unum quemdam totius mundi decorum ita concurrunt, ut nihil subtrahi possit, nihil addi. An
si tu (sc. Lucretius) omni consilio fuisses arboribus et animalibus provisurus, aliter providisses? Non aliter sed
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While not stating it explicitly, Ficino here refers to the same passage of De rerum
natura he had quoted in his commentary on Plato’s Philebus (Lucr. 1.159–191), as well as
to Lucretius’ description of the infancy of the earth in 5.783–924. Especially the lexical
correspondence with the former passage is undeniable:
at nunc seminibus quia certis quaeque creantur,
inde enascitur atque oras in luminis exit
Lucr. 1.169–170
Nunc vero quia singulae mundi partes certis seminibus ortae
Fic. Theol. Plat. 2.13
Similarly, Ficino’s congrua tempora – the ‘appropriate moments’ when the individual
parts of the world arise from particular seeds – echo Lucretius’ suus tempus (1.176),
which refers to the proper time when the seeds of things stream together.92Moreover,
Ficino’s argumentation is very similar to that found in Lucretius. In both, for example,
the argument proceeds with a reductio ad absurdum: if everything was not produced
from fixed seeds, then anything could arise from anything.93 The examples provided
in the two texts are, of course, different, but the reasoning is the same:
men could arise from the sea, from the earth scaly tribes, and birds could
hatch from the sky; cattle and other farm animals and every kind of wild
creature would fill desert and cultivated land alike, with no certainty as to
birth. Nor would trees be constant in bearing the same fruit, but they would
interchange: all would be able to bear all.
Lucr. 1.161–167
neque tam bene. Consilium igitur consilio tuo melius haec disponit, alioquin videres quotidie quam plurimis
tammembra quaedam sua quam instrumenta ubique deesse. Item ex equi semine nasci canes, ficus ex malis,
et membra hominis annexa leonibus, hominibus asinorum, cadere stellas, ascendere lapides. Nunc vero quia
singulae mundi partes certis seminibus ortae, distinctis figuris praeditae, recta via, congruis temporibus et
ordinibus pulcherrime et commodissime certos petunt terminos atque repetunt, consequens est ut eodemmodo
moveantur, quo et illa quae arte et consilio moventur humano.
92 On this parallelism, see Boccuto, “La presenza”, 159.
93 The whole finalistic attack on Lucretius is very close to Aristotle’s attack on Empedocles in Phys. ii 8,
esp. 199b13–14.
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dogs were born from horse semen, figs from apples, human limbs attached to
lions, humans with the limbs of asses, stars falling, and stones ascending.94
Fic. Theol. Plat. 2.13
The main difference between the two texts lies clearly in their aim: Lucretius is
trying to demonstrate the proposition that nothing can ever be generated out of
nothing, while Ficino is using the same argument in order to strengthen his claim
in favour of Divine Providence, an idea which is of course not compatible with
Lucretius’ philosophy. Ficino, therefore, reverses Lucretius’ perspective in favor of a
providentialistic and finalistic view,which, however, hehad in earlier years recognized
inDe rerum natura as well.
By using Lucretius’ argument in order to disprove Lucretius’ philosophy, Ficino
points to a contradiction: if all the parts of the harmonious universe are brought into
being by specific seeds, according to laws that are established in advance, how could
everything arise from the random collision of atoms? The same objection to Lucretius
had been already expressed by Lactantius:
From this is clear that nothing is produced from the atoms since every single
thing has its own peculiar and fixed nature, its own seed, its own law given
from the beginning. Finally, Lucretius, as though forgetting the atoms which
he was propounding, by which he was confuting those who say that all
things are made from nothing, made use of these very arguments which
were powerful against himself. For he said: “if things come from nothing, any
kind might be born of anything; nothing would require a seed”. And then
later: “it must be considered, therefore, that nothing can come from nothing
since things have need of seed so that each may be fashioned and led out into
the gentle realm of air”. Who would think that he possessed a brain when he
said such things as these and did not see that they were contradictory? That
nothing is made from atoms is clear from this, that the seed of each thing is
fixed, unless we will believe by chance that the nature of fire and of water is
from atoms.95
94 This passagemay also be influenced by Lucr. 2.700–729, in which Lucretius speaks about creatures
half-animal half-human, especially in connection with seeds.
95 Transl. byM.F. McDonald. See. Lact.De ira, 10.15–17,Unde apparet nihil ex atomis fieri, quandoquidem
unaquaeque res habet propriam certamque naturam, suum semen, suam legem ab exordio datam.Denique
Lucretius, quasi oblitus atomorum quos adserebat, quo redargueret eos qui dicunt ex nihilo fieri omnia, his
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It is quite possible that Lactantius’ condemnation played a role in shaping Ficino’s
criticism of Lucretius: while, in Philebus, Ficino still considered Lucretius’ concept of
semina rerum compatible with Plato and his own philosophy, in Theologia Platonica,
he revises his position. Like Lactantius, Ficino now points to an inconsistency in
Lucretius’ text, but, while the former explicitly attacks Lucretius, Ficino adopts a
more subtle strategy, turning Lucretius’ own argument against Lucretius himself.
In Theologia Platonica, there are also passages in which Ficino explicitly attacks the
atomistic theory. Here is an example in which Ficino insists on the idea that matter
without form cannot perform any action:
So if bodies appear to act in any way, they do not do so by virtue of their own
mass, as the Democriteans, Cyrenaics and Epicureans supposed, but through
some force and quality implanted in them.96
Atoms, conceived as mere chunks of matter, are not capable by themselves of
performing any activity, they need “something else”, some force or quality. This was
indeedone of themost commoncriticismsdirected toward the atomists: if everything,
including the soul, is made up of void space and inanimate atoms, how is it possible
that there are living things?
Although, in Theologia Platonica, Ficino harshly criticizes Lucretius and the
atomists, some echoes of hisDe rerum natura, and especially his theory of semina rerum,
can be still found in this work.
Yet certain definite things have to come from certain definite seeds [ex certis
quibusdam seminibus], and what passes from potency into act has to be brought
into this act by a cause that already contains such an act within itself, or one
that is equivalent or more eminent […]. All these points signify that present
everywhere through earth and water in an artful and vital nature are the
spiritual and life-giving seeds of everything. These seeds can generate of
argumentis usus est quae contra ipsum ualerent. Sic enim dixit: [Lucr 1.159–160] item postea: [Lucr 1.205–207].
Quis hunc putet habuisse cerebrum, cum haec diceret nec uideret sibi esse contraria? Nihil enim per atomos fieri
exinde apparet, quod semen cuiusque rei certum est, nisi forte ignis et aquae naturam ex atomis esse credemus.
96 Ficino, Theol. Plat. 1.2.4, Si quid igitur agere corpora videantur, non ex ipsa sui mole, ut Democritii, Cyrenaici,
Epicurei putaverunt, sed ex aliqua vi et qualitate illis insita operantur. As seen before, the inclusion of
the Cyrenaics among the atomists (Democriteans and Epicureans) might be due to the fact that
they were hedonists, just as the Epicureans; Ficino might have therefore concluded that they were
atomists as well.
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themselves wherever corporeal seeds are missing; they can nourish seeds that
have been left behind by animals; and from one withered grape pip, whose
nature is single and lowly, they can bring forth the vine in all its variety, order,
and value toman, namely with their varied, rational, and splendid powers.
The same vital nature draws out from the depths of matter, where corporeal
substances do not penetrate, the substantial forms of the elements. Moreover,
it takes the elemental qualities, which of themselves can only burn and freeze
and so on, and adds to them the precious variety of colours and shapes and
the vigour of life.97
In this passage, Ficino describes a nature that is full of vitality and contains in itself
“the spiritual and life-giving seeds of everything”. These seeds draw from the depths
of matter the substantial forms of the elements. A very peculiar aspect of Ficino’s
philosophy is of course his syncretism: so, while the expression ex certis […] seminibus
evokes certain Lucretian passages, Ficino now links his notion of seeds primarily to
the Aristotelian concepts of matter and form, as well as to the Stoic and Augustinian
idea of seminal reasons.98
Conclusions
Despite the widespread assumption that the earliest readers of De rerum naturawere
merely interested in Lucretius’ poetry and ethics, with little attention to the poem’s
97 Transl. byMichael J.B. Allenwith JohnWarden (modified), see Ficino,Th. Plat. 4.1.7,Oportet tamen certa
quedam ex certis quibusdam seminibus exoriri, et quae ex potentia in actum transeunt, per causam quamdam in
actum perduci talem, quae ipsa iam in se talem vel aequalem vel praestantiorem habeat actum. Neque sufficere
putandum est, si universalis remotaque causa tantum sit praestantior, alioquin imperfectissimae quaeque apud
nos causae possent in virtute caelestium perfectissima quaeque producere. Haec omnia significant adesse ubique
per terram et aquam in natura quadam artificiosa vitalique spiritalia et vivifica semina omnium, quae ipsa per
se gignant ubicumque semina corporalia desunt, semina rursus derelicta ab animalibus foveant, atque ex putrido
vinaceo semine, cuius et una et vilis natura est, variam ordinatam pretiosamque generent vitem, viribus videlicet
suis variis, rationalibus, pretiosis. Eadem natura vitalis substantiales elementorum formas e fundo materiae
ipsius educit, quo non penetrant substantiae corporales; elementales insuper qualitates, quae per se urerent solum
frigefacerentque et similia, ad colorum figurarumque speciossimam ducit varietatem vitaeque vigorem.
98 At the beginning of the Theologia Platonica (1.6), Ficino claims that there is a «formless primematter,
where certain seeds of forms lie hidden and ferment»; these seeds are «rudiments of good forms»
( formarum bonarum inchoationes). As Hiro Hirai has pointed out, “Ficino’s ‘primary matter’ (materia
prima) is formless and contains within itself the ‘seeds of forms’ which have the power to multiply”.
See Hirai, Seeds, 267. For the idea of rationes seminales, see for example Augustine, Gen. Ad litt. 6–8.
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scientific content, the case of Ficino shows exactly the contrary. As I have tried to
document, this eminent fifteenth-century reader ofDe rerum natura demonstrated a
great interest in Lucretius’ natural philosophy, and notably in his atomistic matter
theory.
In the first section of this chapter, I have shown that Ficino’s positive attitude
toward atomismgoeshand inhandwithhis early engagementwithPlato, theTimaeus,
and possibly its medieval commentator, William of Conches. In a small philosophical
note, found in codex Riccardianus 581, Ficino sympathizes with an atomistic account
of matter, combining it with the four-element theory. He there explains the genesis
of the universe from a primordial chaos, which, in his view, consisted of innumerable
indivisible atoms of fire, water, earth and air. Then, he attributes this theory to a
number of philosophers, including Plato. I have argued that Ficino’s positive attitude
toward atomismmight explain his early engagement with Lucretius’ philosophy.
Ficino’s attitude toward Lucretius was not static, but changed over time. His
interest in Lucretius developed when he was still very young: in his early works,
Ficino holds Lucretius in high esteem and demonstrates to be acquainted with his
philosophy. He even adopts a positive attitude toward his matter theory, and his
physical doctrines in general. The fact that, in some of these works, Ficino interprets
certain Lucretian theories in the light of the Aristotelian traditionmakes us wonder
whether his ‘inaccurate’ interpretation is just amatter of carelessness, or rather stems
from his wish to make certain aspects of Lucretius’ philosophy look more acceptable.
There is then an intermediate stage, represented by the Philebus, in which Ficino
found Lucretius’ notion of semina rerum compatible with his own vitalistic view of
nature and seeds. It seems in fact that, in this text, Ficino resorted to Lucretius’ concept
of semina rerum, strengthened its procreative implications, and re-contextualized it,
in accordance with the Christian-Platonic finalism.
In the last stage, which is represented by the Theologia Platonica, Ficino recognized
the substantial incompatibility betweenLucretius’matter theory andhis ownconcept
of seeds. Hemost probably realized that Lucretius’ ontology was ‘incomplete’, and,
precisely for this reason, while evoking his concept of seeds, he felt the necessity to add
some incorporeal principle, an active quality or power, in order to explain adequately
the nature of things. Even so, while explicitly refutingmany of Lucretius’ theories,
Ficino kept referring to his doctrine very frequently, often considering it as a valid
alternative to his own ideas.
It turns out that, for Ficino, the problemwas not atomism itself – a theory that
even Platowould endorse –, but specifically Lucretius’ Epicurean atomism, with all its
implications, first of all the denial of finalism, Divine Providence and the immortality
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of the soul. Having become acquainted with atomism through Platonic sources, he
must initially have thought that Lucretius’ matter theory was after all compatible
with his own view of natural agency. Only when he fully realized that, in fact, the
implications hidden in Lucretius’ Epicurean atomismwere incompatible with his
ownphilosophy, did he decide to commit his commentariola to the flames, symbolically
or actually.
chapter 2
Raphael Francus’ Paraphrasis in Lucretium
cum appendice de animi immortalitate (1504)
Introduction
Printed in Bologna in 1504, Raphael Francus’ Paraphrasis in Lucretium cum appendice de
animi immortalitate can be considered the first extant printed attempt at interpreting
Lucretius’ De rerum natura, after its rediscovery in 1417. For the comprehension of
Lucretius’ early reception in the Renaissance, Francus’ Paraphrasis is a particularly
relevant case study because, besides providing us with the earliest Renaissance
explanation of De rerum natura, it is also a pertinent first example of a specific attempt
to insert Lucretius’ doctrine into the philosophical debates of Francus’ own time.
As seen in the general introduction, according to some scholars, the first com-
mentaries on Lucretius’De rerum naturawere chiefly philological, with little attention
given to its philosophical and scientific contents. However, this assessment seems
certainly mistaken for Francus’ Paraphrasis, which focuses only on the philosophical
contents of the poem, with no attention given to its philological and poetical aspects.
The first section of this chapter contains a brief biography of Francus, followed
by a section in which I shall present the structure of the Paraphrasis and examine the
content of the paratexts (epistula gratulatoria, dedication and appendix). In the last
section, I shall analyse some of the passages in which Francus deals with Lucretius’
matter theory, in order to evaluate how he approached the issue of atomism.
1. Life and Circumstances
Information about Francus’ life is lacking and sometimes contradictory.1 To begin
with, there are many variants of his name, which makes it difficult at times to
1 About Francus’ life, see Sergio Bertelli, “Noterellemachiavelliane. Ancora su Lucrezio eMachiavelli”,
Rivista Storica Italiana 76 (1964): 774–790, 783; Dennis E. Rhodes, “Raphael Franciscus equals Raphael
Francus, florentinus”, Gutemberg-Jahrbuch 55 (1980): 79–81; Armando Verde, Lo studio fiorentino,
vol. ii, 376–377; iii/2, 848–849; iv, 1458–1460; Id., “Dottorati a Firenze e a Pisa 1505–1528”, in Xenia
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reconstruct his life and identify his works. In some Latin texts, he is called Raphael
Francus, in some others, Raphael Franciscus, while Italian variants of his name are
RaffaeleFranco,RaffaeleFranchi, orRaffaeleFranceschi.Hewas also knownas ‘il Celatone’,
a nickname that might come from the Latin celatus (perfect participle of celo), ‘one
who is concealed’.2
Raphael Francus was probably born around 1477 in Florence, as the son of Donato
di ser Francesco d’Antonio Franceschi. He studied both in Florence and Bologna:
according to some documents, in December 1499 andMay 1500, he was in Florence,
involved in public dispute together with other students.3 He later moved to Bologna,
where, once he had finished his studies in 1504, he published his Paraphrasis in
Lucretium, which was probably his first work.4
Interestingly, it is precisely in Bologna that, seven years later, Johannes Baptista
Pius was to write the first systematic commentary on Lucretius, which was to be
published by Hieronymus Baptista de Benedictis, the son of Joannes Antonius, who
in turn had edited Francus’ work.5 This direct Bologna connection between the first
two Lucretian publications is certainly conspicuous: since Francus was a student in
Bologna when Pius was teaching in the same city, it is possible that they met each
other and talked about their projects, that is to say, respectively a paraphrase and a
commentary on Lucretius.
Once he went back to Florence, Francus began to teach first at the Florentine
studio, then in Pisa. Here, in 1509–1511, he was professor of logic andmoral philosophy.
Then, in 1515–1518 and in 1523–1526, he taught natural philosophy alone, while in
1518–1523 he was professor of both natural philosophy andmoral philosophy.6
medii aevi historiam illustrantia oblata Thomae Kaeppeli o. p., ed by R. Creytens – P. Kiinzle, (Roma:
Edizioni di storia e letteratura, 1978), 607–785, 767 and 782; Ubaldo Pizzani, “Dimensione cristiana
dell’umanesimo emessaggio lucreziano: la Paraphrasis in Lucretium di Raphael Francus”, in Validità
perenne dell’Umanesimo, ed. by G. Tarugi, (Florence: Leo S. Olschki, 1986): 313–333, 323 (in particular
n. 43); and finally Brown, The Return, 58 and 101–102.
2 ‘Celatone’ might also refer to a particular kind of helmet. This is also the reason why, later on, the
same name was to designate a device invented by Galileo Galilei to observe Jupiter’s moons. This
device had the form of a piece of headgear with a telescope taking the place of an eyehole.
3 See Verde, Lo studio fiorentino, iii/2, 848–849, Insieme ad altri due studenti è arguente in una pubblica disputa.
4 In a letter dated 18 March 1504 and addressed to his friend Alessio Lapaccini, Francus writes: Spero
che infra due mesi si potrà stampare quela paraphrasi sopra Lucretio; see Verde, “Lo Studio fiorentino”, iii/
2, 848–849.
5 See Bertelli 1964, “Noterelle machiavelliane”, 783 andMarco Beretta, “Gli scienziati e l’edizione del
De rerum natura”, in Lucrezio: La natura e la scienza ed. byM. Beretta and F. Citti (Florence: Olschki,
2008), 177–224, 179.
6 See David A. Lines, Aristotle’s Ethics in the Italian Renaissance the Universities and the Problem of Moral
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Besides the Paraphrasis in Lucretium, Francus also published a Verificatio universalis in
regulas Aristotelis de motu non recedens a communi mathematicorum doctrina; this work was
published in Florence, in 1516, by Bernardo Zucchetta together with another work by
the same Francus entitled Solutio obiectorum contra suam positionem: quae est velocitatem
in motu attendi penes excessum proportionummouentium supra mobilia.
The date of his death is uncertain: according to Verde, he died in 1524, while Lines
maintains that in 1526 he was still teaching at Pisa.7
2. The Paraphrase
Differently fromwhat the title would suggest, Francus’ work is a genuine exegesis
more than a mere paraphrase.8 While Francus’ Pharaphrasis does summarize the
contents of books i–iii of De rerum natura, it also contains a number of digressions, in
which its author explains and reflects on themostdifficult passages of thepoem. In the
process, Francus, in fact, often compares Lucretius’ doctrine with other philosophies,
especially with Aristotelianism, which, at the time, constituted the official school
philosophy.
Although Francus’ original project almost certainly included at least the para-
phrase of De rerum natura’s fourth book, he decided to stop after the third.9 There
might be several reasons why Francus decided to focus only on the first three books of
De rerum natura: 1) he was mainly interested in general physics, as would also appear
from the topic of his other publications; 2) hewanted to create himself an opportunity
Education (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 243n, 427. To be precise, in 1518–1523, Francus taught philosophia
extraordinaria et philosophia moralis in diebus festivis. Italian universities rolls listed in fact four kinds
of professorships: ordinary (ordinarius), extraordinary (extraordinarius), holiday (dies festivi), and
university (i.e., student) lectureships (lecturae universitatis). While ordinary professors taught in
the ordinary teaching days, holiday professors taught on the holidays. See Paul F. Gendler, The
Universities of the Italian Renaissance (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002),
144–145.
7 See Verde, “Dottorati a Firenze”, 782 and Lines, Aristotle’s Ethics, 243n, 427.
8 See Prosperi, “Lucretius in the Italian Renaissance”, 215 and Verde, “Lo Studio fiorentino 1473–1503”,
iv, 1459.
9 In two passages he says that he will discuss the simulacra in the paraphrase of the fourth book of
theDe rerum natura, which, actually, he never wrote: see f. 10v Nam cunctis de rebus iugiter imagines et
simulachra diffluere quarto volumine commonstrabimus; f. 18r–v Fluere enim quovis a colore simulacra non solo
epicurei, verum etiam peripatetici opinantur, at sententia eo discrepant, quod alteri spiritales existimant, alteri
vero corporeas effingunt. Quemadmodum quarto volumine adstruemus.
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to discuss the nature of the human soul, whose status and nature stood in those days
at the center of a major controversy (see below); 3) he simply ran out of time, patience,
or money: the very fact that he had planned to write on book iv, but in the end he did
not, suggests that he deviated from his original plan.
Surprisingly,when explainingDe rerumnatura, Francus passes over themore poetic
sections, such as theHymntoVenusor the eulogies of Epicurus, in order todeal imme-
diately with Lucretius’ ontology, physic and psychology. This choice is particularly
significant; indeed, that Francus’ paraphrase involves only the philosophical contents
of the De rerum natura flies in the face of the assumption – mentioned earlier and
in our general introduction – that the first commentaries on Lucretius were chiefly
philological, with little attention given to its philosophical and scientific contents.
2.1. The epistula gratulatoria: Philosophy or Eloquence?
The copy of the Pharaphrasiswhich I used for my analysis belongs to the Biblioteca
Nazionale di Firenze; this exemplar, before the dedication, bears an epistula gratulatoria
by Johannes PetrusMaclavellus, who defines himself Florentinus canonum auditor, a
student of canonical law.10
Johannes PetrusMaclavellus was a son of Battista di Buoninsegna and a distant
relative of Machiavelli.11Right at the beginning of the letter, he congratulates Francus
for his endeavour and praises Lucretius’ work:
Dearest Raphael, I confess I have a huge debt to the gods, for the fact that
they have brought to light under your guidance – you, a star so auspicious,
gleaming and shiny – the previously unknown poem of Lucretius, about
the first beginnings of the things and the organization of nature. In fact, I
congratulate you for this service, and I rejoice.12
10 However, as Bertelli has pointed out, it is quite likely that two versions of the same work were
circulating: one containing, at the very beginning, an epistula gratulatoria byGuido Postumo Silvestri,
which is lost; the other including the one by Johannes Petrus Maclavellus. See Bertelli, “Noterelle
machiavelliane”, 782. On this topic and especially on these personalities, see Bertelli, “Noterelle
machiavelliane”, 782 and 784; Verde, “Dottorati a Firenze”, ii, 782; Pizzani, “Dimensione cristiana”,
321 and 322 n. 43; Brown, The return, 102.
11 See Verde, “Dottorati a Firenze”, ii, 782. OnMachiavelli and Lucretius, see Brown, The Return, 68–87.
12 f. 1v, Fateor me diis debere plurimum suavissime Raphael eo quod tam fausto tam claro et eleganti syde⟨re⟩ te
duce Lucretii poema penitus ante reconditum de rerum primordiis et naturali institutione in lucem prodidere.
Merito enim tibi gratulor et mihi gaudeo.
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Maclavellus first recognizes that Francus’ work is the first valiant attempt to
explain and render accessible Lucretius’ difficult text,whichwas previously unknown.
Then he praises Francus’ eloquence and style, refuting the opinion of those who
believe that one cannot talk elegantly about philosophy.13 This same topic occurs also
later, in Francus’ dedicatory epistle to Tommaso Soderini, in which he despises those
whowrite about philosophywithout care, so that, with their inconvenient, rough and
confusedwords,make those concepts that shouldbe easy to grasp extremelydifficult.14
The controversy between philosophy and rhetoric, to which this accusation belong,
dates back to the Greeks and was a recurrent topos even in Francus’ time. Suffice it
here tomention Pico dellaMirandola’s and Ermolao Barbaro’s famous correspondence
on this topic, in which Lucretius’ poemwas taken as an example of a good style put to
the service of bad philosophy.15
2.2. The Dedication, or Rather, Why the ParaphrasisDeserves to be Read
Francus dedicates his work to Tommaso Soderini – the nephew of Pier Soderini,
the gonfaloniere perpetuo of Florence – the same person to whom, six years later, the
humanist Petrus Candidus was to dedicate his Florentine edition of Lucretius.
In the dedication of the Paraphrasis, Francus, in a somewhat indirect way, strives to
justify his work. First, he reports an anecdote from Plato’s Timaeus, which he probably
knew through Ficino’s commentary on thiswork: the anecdote tells that the Athenian
Solon was reproached by the Egyptian priests, who said that Greeks were always
children, and that there was not such a thing as an old Greek person. Solon, having
asked the reason for this puzzling remark, was told that all Greek were young in soul,
because they did not possess a single belief that was ancient or derived from an old
13 f. 1v,Unde multorum frustratur opinio qui de eiusmodi concinne loqui impossibile arbitrantur.
14 f. 3v, … imprimis cavendum invigilandumque est ne forte (quod vulgo accidit) in illorum deliquium atque
delirium incidamus, qui philosophica scribentes id non temere curare videntur, ut quae facilia et cuius bono
ingenio obvia forent, suis praeposteris, inaeruditis incomptisque verbis difficillima reddant.
15 See Pico della Mirandola – Ermolao Barbaro, Filosofia o eloquenza?, ed. by F. Bausi (Naples: Liguori,
2008), 60–63,Dicet Lucretius rerum principia atomos et vacuum, Deum corporeum, rerum nostrarum inscium,
temere omnia fortuito occursu corposulorum ferri; sed haec Latine dicet et eleganter. Dicet Ioannes [Scotus] quae
natura constant sua materia specieque constitui, esse Deum separatammentem, cognoscentem omnia, omnibus
consulentem […] At dicet insulse, ruditer, non Latinis verbis. Quaeso, quis in dubium revocet uter poeta melior,
uter philosophus? Extra omnem est controversiam tam rectius Scotum philosophari qua ille loquitur ornatius.
Sed vide quid differant: huic os insipidum, illi mens desipiens. Hic grammaticorum, ne poetarum dicam, decreta
nescit; ille Dei atque naturae. Hic, infantissimus dicendo, sentit ea quae laudari dicendo satis non possunt; ille,
fando eloquentissimus, eloquitur nefanda.
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tradition. Francus in turn defends the ancient Greeks, explaining that he took them
as an example, because they always had a high regard for the philosophy of their
fathers, even when their doctrines were wrong:16
The philosophy of the fathers was so much held in regard, that the best men
considered of great value even wrong theories devised by them, because in
these something remarkable was always hidden. They also thought that it
was not useless at all to know how to weaken the mistaken opinions of others
bymeans of reason, and then to relate and discuss them elegantly and neatly.17
The idea that even erroneous ancient theories contained a kernel of truth led Francus,
according to his own testimony, to read in his spare time (per otium lectitavimus)
Lucretius’ poem repeatedly and to compose a paraphrase of the first three books
of it.
At the end of his dedication, Francus declares that the paraphrase of Lucretius
is being published some years after its composition, because he had first written it
“just for reflection and exercise” (meditationis exercitiique gratia). But then, some of his
friends had urged him to publish it, arguing that it would be useful for those who
wanted to understand Lucretius’ poem.18
In a nutshell, Francus suggests that his Lucretian commentary is first of all a
pious gesture towards the doctrina patrum, and that even if it should contain wrong
theories, its analysis will nonetheless have intellectual benefits for anybody who will
read it.
16 f. 3r, Solonem atheniensem scribit Plato (ut non ignores Thoma Soderine) ad aegyptiorum sacerdotibus, apud
quos tunc temporis discendi studio erat, una cum caeteris atticis obiurgatione pulsatum quod graeci homines
iuvenes semper viverent nec quisquam ex illis senex reperiretur. Cuius quidem causampercunctatus Solon accepit,
quod scilicet animus eis foret usquequaque adolescens, quippe quem nulla antiquitatis cognitio nullaquae prisca
et cana scientia excoleret. See Plato, Timaeus 22b4.
17 f. 3r,Usque adeo patrum doctrina in honore habita est, ut etiam perperam ab illis excogitata optimus quisque
plurimi fecerit, quippe quia in his praeclarumaliquod et eximium semper delitesceret. Idque omnino haud inutile
opinati sunt, nosse videlicet aliorum errata ratione labefacere, et laute, concinne, venuste eleganterque referre
atque disserere.
18 f. 3r–4v, Paraphrasim, quam solius meditationis exercitiique gratia communivimus ceu inchoatam et cessantem
citoque interituram indignamve qui in luminis oras prodiret iampridem in tenebris perpetuo exilio relegaramus.
Verum diutius ab amicis rogatus sum, ut ipsam, qualiscumque futura sit, invulgarem; aiunt enim his qui
Lucretium intelligendum adibunt non fore incommoda. Note well the phrase «in luminis oras», which is
recurrent in several of Lucretius’ passages.
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2.3. Francus’ Appendix and the Debate on the Immortality of the Soul
That Francus was clearly aware of the heterodox content of Lucretius’ book iii is
shown by his addition of a separate Appendix de animi immortalitate. In this appendix,
he first presents the Platonic theory of the soul, then Aristotle’s, and finally he replies
to Lucretius’ doctrine – which he defines as “Lucretian jests” (Lucretiana cavilla) – of
the mortality of the soul.
Right at the outset of theAppendix, Francuswrites: “It seems thatwewill give value
to our work, if we will reject the harmful and weak opinion of the Epicureans about
the soul”.19 Even though this statement seems to suggest that the Appendix has to be
regarded as an open condemnation of Lucretius’ theories, Francus hastens to add that
his dissertation is intentionally incomplete and inconclusive: “And if I presented this
[sc. the confutation of Lucretius’ doctrine] in amanner that is by nomeans diligent
and complete, I did this intentionally; in fact the innermost secrets of physiology
cannot be revealed and disclosed to those who are not initiated in questions of natural
philosophy”.20 At the same time, there is certainly a disproportion between the first
two parts of the Appendixwhich contain a detailed analysis of Plato’s and Aristotle’s
doctrines of the soul, and the last one, in which Francus hastily confutes Lucretius’
theories.21 This might possibly indicate that Francus was interested in elucidating
the positions of Aristotle and, especially, of Plato, more than in refuting Lucretius’
doctrine.
In keeping with this interpretation, Ubaldo Pizzani has noticed that, reading
Francus’ responsio ad Lucretii argumenta, one has the impression that his objections
are fairly hasty and inaccurate.22 It is for this reason that one might suspect that,
rather than a real attempt to disprove Lucretius’ doctrine, the Appendix should be
interpreted as a precautionarymeasure to avoid censorship. Similarly, Armando Verde
has believed to see right through the underlying logic of this refutation, and has gone
as far as to affirm that Francus not only had no intention of disproving Lucretius,
but also that he was in his heart a real Lucretian, who however preferred to follow
the Catholic orthodoxy and defend the immortality of the soul in public, while
19 f. 27r, Operae praecium facturi videmur si nocuam et becillam (sic) Epicureorum de anima sententiam
repudiaverimus.
20 f. 27 r,Quod si exquisitissime id et absolutissimeminime praestiterimus, consulto et data opera facimus; non
enim possunt intima phisiologiae penetralia his, qui in naturalibus haud initiati sunt […] penitus aperiri atque
commostrari.
21 For an analysis of this section, see Pizzani, “Dimensione cristiana”, 329–333.
22 See Pizzani, “Dimensione cristiana”, 331–333.
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waiting for a broader consensus for Lucretius’ scientific explanations to come about.23
But was this really the case?
In order to decide this issue, one has to compare what Francus writes in his para-
phrase with the few historical documents concerning his life. The few scholars who
have bothered to look at the Paraphrasis have suggested that it reveals a deep affinity
between Francus and Lucretius, and that Francus’ disagreement with Lucretius’ the-
ories is much weaker than he wanted his readers to believe.24 Such a reading receives
some backing from historical documents: indeed it seems as if, in his own time,
Francus was reputed to be a philosophus Lucretianus.25 After his death, in 1524, Giovam-
battista Pelotti, notary of the Florentine studio, writing to the director of the same
institution, FrancescoDelNero, admitted that “without a doubt, we have received the
very difficult task to put in the right track that restless mind [sc. Francus], which no
one could heal”.26 In the same letter, Pelotti speculated that Francus, after his death,
had been received at the gates of Tartarus by Pluto, who was very glad of his coming,
and that Epicurus and Lucretius, among other philosophers, greeted him, saying: “At
last, you have come!”27
Indeed, it would appear that Francus was a bit of an enfant terrible: he had caused
trouble inPisawhere, according tohis own testimony,hehad fuelled an intensedebate
on the immortality of the soul. In a letter of 1517 to FrancescoDelNero, Francuswrites:
This year, I havebeen involved innumerousdisputes and fights. For this, I have
clarified somemysterious and hidden issues about the nature of the soul, but I
still have to explain some of them […]. In fact, I dared to defendThemistius and
Alexander of Aphrodisias against Averroes, and, with no small risk, I protected
them from the false accusations and the unfavourable judgments, now in
private dispute, where frequently it was necessary to fight violently with the
23 See Verde, Lo Studio fiorentino, iv/3, 1460.
24 See Pizzani, “Dimensione cristiana”, 333; Reeve, “Lucretius in theMiddle Ages”, 212; and Prosperi,
“Lucretius in the Italian Renaissance”, 215.
25 See the letter of Giovambattista Pelotti, notary of the Studio fiorentino, to the director Francesco Del
Nero in Verde, “Il secondo periodo dello studio fiorentino”, 128 n. 35, where Pelotti refers to il Celatone,
namely Francus, as “our Lucretian philosopher” (ob mortem… viri d. Celatoni filosophi lucretiani).
26 Procul dubio provinciam difficillimam accepimus ad dirigendam illam inquietammentem quam nullus sanare
potuit; quoted in Verde, “Il secondo periodo”, 118.
27 Audivimus quam primum eius anima se contulit ad tartareas ianuas, Pluto ille princeps inferum de eius adventu
multo gaudio affectus fuit. Epicurus, Lucretius et plurimi philosophi obviaverunt et dicentes: venisti tandem…,
quoted in Verde, “Il secondo periodo”, 128 n. 35; see also Brown, “The Return”, 102.
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most illustrious men of our Gymnasium, then again, by all means, in the
public discussions, led by the respect for ancient Peripatetics, certainly with a
lot of effort, but perhaps with no less advantage. However, it is convenient
that you learned these things from others, so that I cannot be accused of
arrogance and insolence, while I strive to be cleansed of the accusation of
negligence. At the Gymnasium, things would be going well, if only a Perettus
[sc. Pomponazzi] or a Suessanus [sc. Nifo] were here.28
This letter reflects a local episode in the grand dispute about the immortality of the
soul, which between the fifteenth and the sixteenth century was kindled, among
other things, by the publication of the Latin translations of Aristotle’s commentators,
specifically of Themistius’ Paraphrasis of Aristotle’s De Anima by Ermolao Barbaro
(1481) and of Alexander of Aphrodisias’Enarratio de Anima by Girolamo Donato (1495).29
Since, in his letter, Francusmaintains that he “dared to defend Themistius and
Alexander of Aphrodisias against Averroes”, Alison Brown concluded that “since
Alexander of Aphrodisias could be assimilated to Lucretius, this might suggest that
he [sc. Francus] was arguing as a Lucretian”.30 Although this idea might sound very
attractive, as itwould support the claim that Francuswas indeed a Lucretianus, I believe
that the passage should be interpreted differently. Francus in fact maintains that he
protected Themistius and Alexander “from the false accusations and the unfavourable
judgments” brought against them by Averroes. Averroes had attached to Alexander
the label of a natural-philosophical materialist and presented him as the exemplary
exponent of the mortality of the soul.31 As for Themistius, Averroes had pointed to
28 Maximis in comptentionibus ac certaminibus hoc anno versati sumus. Ad hoc archana et recondita de animae
natura partim a nobis aperta sunt partim deinceps aperienda […]. Verum ausi sumus Themistii Alexandrique
Aphrodissei partes adversus Averroem tueri, et quidem bono periculo tum familiari disceptatione, ubi frequenter
cummaximis nostri Gymnasii viris fuit acriter dimicandum, tumvero publica disputatione, observantia veterum
peripatheticorum ducti, illos a calumnis atque importunitatibus asseruimus, magno quidem cum labore nec
minori fortasse cum fructu. Sed haec ex aliis vos accepisse decet. Ne dum negligentia purgari nitor in arrogantiae
aut insolentiae crimen incidam. Res Gymnasii optime se haberent modo aliquis Perettus aut Suessanus adforet.
Quoted in Verde, Lo Studio fiorentino, ii, 376–377 and Verde, “Il secondo periodo”, 124 n. 18. See also
Verde, Lo Studio fiorentino, iv/3, 1459–1460.
29 Francus explicitly refers to the Ermolao Barbaro’s translation of Themistius in the Appendix (f. 33r–v).
30 Brown, The Return, 77.
31 See Kessler, Eckhard, “Alexander of Aphrodisias and His Doctrine of the Soul: 1400 Years of Lasting
Significance”, Early Science andMedicine 16 (2011), 1–93, esp. 10–18. See also Gabriel Théry, Alexandre
d’Aphrodise: Aperçu sur l’ influence de sa noétique, Bibliothèque thomiste 7 (Kain-Paris: Le Saulchoir, 1926),
46; Nardi, Saggi, 368–369; Jean-Baptiste Brenet, “Alexandre d’Aphrodise ou le matérialiste malgré
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him as the direct source of his own doctrine of a single and separate intellect for all
human beings, which, in a different way, could also lead to the denial of the soul’s
immortality. In turn, Aquinas, in the Tractatus de unitate intellectus, had discredited
Averroes’ interpretations of both Themistius and Alexander, by showing that their
positions were much closer to his, that is, in favour of the soul’s immortality.32 At
Francus’ time, scholars could finally read Themistius’ Paraphrasis of De Anima and
Alexander’s Enarratio de Anima in Latin translation and decide who had given the
correct interpretation, Averroes or Aquinas.
For this reason, the fact that Francus claims to have defended Alexander against
Averroes does notnecessarilymean thathehimself supported themortality of the soul
on the basis of Lucretius, but rather that he defended the Greek commentator against
a false accusation. After all, before Francus, Nicoletto Vernia had already upbraided
Averroes for presenting Alexander as a proponent of the mortality of the soul, while
Pico della Mirandola had turned the Greek commentator into the protagonist of a
philosophical doctrine of the soul’s immortality: in his Conclusiones, Picomaintains
that, according to Alexander, “the rational soul is immortal”.33 Interestingly, in the
part of the Appendix devoted to the Perypatheticae rationes, Francus often refers to
lui: La question de l’ engendrement de l’ intellect revue et corrigée par Averroès”, in P.J.J.M. Bakker
(ed.), Averroes’ Natural Philosophy and its Reception in the LatinWest, (Louvain: Leuven University Press,
1995), 37–67.
32 According to Aquinas, both the agent and passive intellects have to be conceived as faculties of the
human soul, while the Averroists maintained that the agent intellect is not a faculty of the human
soul, but, rather, a separate entity, thanks to which human beings engage in what we call thinking.
The proof for immortality and incorruptibility, which would result from an activity that does not
employ a corporeal organ, would therefore apply only to this separate entity, not to each human
soul. Contrary to Aquinas, Latin-Averroists consequently denied the immortality of the human
soul. See Aquinas, Tractatus de unitate intellectus contra Averroistas, 2.55:Quod autem Alexander intellectum
possibilem posuerit esse formam corporis, etiam ipse Averroes confitetur, quamvis (ut arbitror) perverse verba
Alexandri acceperit, sicut et verba Themistii praeter eius intellectum assumit. Nam quod dicit, Alexandrum
dixisse intellectum possibilem non esse aliud quam preparationem que est in natura humana ad intellectum
agentem et ad intelligibilia: hanc preparationem nichil aliud intellexit quam potentiam intellectivam que est
in anima ad intelligibilia. Et ideo dixit eam non esse virtutem in corpore quia talis potentia non habet organum
corporale, et non ex ea ratione, ut Averroys impugnat, secundum quod nulla preparatio est virtus in corpore. On
this topic, see Nardi, Saggi, 366.
33 See, Pico della Mirandola, Conclusiones 32, wrote Conclusio secundum Alexandrum i “Anima rationalis est
immortalis”. See also Nardi, Saggi, 369 and Edward P. Mahoney, “Nicoletto Vernia and Agostino Nifo
on Alexander of Aphrodisias: An Unnoticed Dispute”, Rivista di Storia della Filosofia 23.3 (1968), 268–
296 and id., Aristotle and Some LateMedieval and Renaissance Philosophers, in The Impact of Aristotelianism
onModern Philosophy, by Riccardo Pozzo (ed.) (Washington, dc: Catholic University of America Press,
2004), 1–34, 9.
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Themistius and Alexander, and, in line with Vernia’s and Pico’s interpretation, he
claims that “even Alexander of Aphrodisias admitted that part of our soul is eternal,
incapable of suffering, and separable”.34
To sum up, Francus’ attitude towards Lucretius is not easy to determine: even
though he was reputed to be a Lucretianus, he did not publically endorse Lucretius’
doctrines. At the same time, however, his attempt to disprove Lucretius’ theory of the
soul’s mortality in his Appendix seems – whether intentionally or not – really weak.
For this reason, the Appendix has been viewed by some scholars as a precautionary
measure, but it is also plausible to conjecture that he added it simply because he
wanted to create for himself an opportunity to clarify his position on the topic of the
immortality of the soul.
3. Francus on Lucretius’ Matter Theory
In general, when reading the Paraphrasis, it is hard to distinguish Francus’ per-
sonal beliefs from the mere paraphrase of Lucretius’ text. Scattered here and there
throughout the paraphrase, there are, however, some brief passages in which Francus
elucidates Lucretius’ explanations or adds his own reflections on the text. By analyzing
some of these passages in this section, I will evaluate how he approached Lucretius’
matter theory.
3.1. Nothing Can Arise out of Nothing
In order to discuss the first-beginnings and causes of things, Lucretius starts
by refuting the opinion of those who affirm that things are created out of
nothing and rush into nothing.35
With these words, Francus begins his paraphrase, and he starts at verse 1.159, passing
over theHymn to Venus and the first eulogy of Epicurus, in order to deal immediately
with Lucretius’ ontology and physics. The passage with which Francus chooses to
34 f. 34r,Namque et Alexander Aphrodiseus nostrae animae partem sempiternam, impatibilem et separabilem
concessit.
35 f. 5r,De rerum primordiis et causis acturus Lucretius refellere prius aggreditur illorum sententiam, qui ⟨e⟩ nihilo
res creari, quique in nihilum proruere autumant.
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begin his paraphrase is that in which Lucretius explains that nothing can arise out
of nothing, and that a given organism requires its appropriate seeds to grow. It
is significant that Francus decided to begin his paraphrase from this passage and
skip the more poetic sections at the beginning of the poem: he clearly considered
Lucretius’ philosophy more relevant than his poetry. By doing so, he also passed
over the controversial and anti-providential line 158 “everything is done without
the working of gods” (et quo quaeque modo fiant opera sine divom), probably in order
to avoid discussing this thorny issue right at the beginning. It might also not be a
coincidence that the passage with which Francus decides to begin his paraphrase is
the same that had previously exerted a great fascination on Ficino (see chapter 1), with
whose thought – as we will see shortly – Francus was very much acquainted.
Having explained Lucretius’ ex nihilo nihil principle, Francus offers his first
digression, inwhichhe compares Lucretius’ opinionwith those of the Peripatetics and
the theologians. According to Francus, both groupsmaintain – against Lucretius –
that a creation ex nihilo is actually possible. As for the first group, Francus equates the
Aristotelian concept of matter/form or potentiality/actuality to that of a creation ex
nihilo:
The Peripatetics themselves, observing the succession and reciprocation of
forms, assert that in some way a being is created from not being. For example,
when a statue of Jupiter is to be produced from melted bronze, first of all
the bronze-making apparatus is provided and executed, which is surely
necessary to make a statue of this kind, and, once this has been applied and
administered, the result is immediately a statue of Jupiter or Mercury. In the
same way, when a living being is created, the very soul is produced from the
potency of matter. So it happens that, fromwhat is not at all a living being
in act (of this kind is the sperm and the seminal liquid), a living nature and
kind is created. Therefore it is proven that from not being arises that what
is.36
36 f. 5v–6r, Itaque Perypatetici ipsi formarum successionem reciprocationemque advertentes quoquomodo de non
ente ens procreari asserunt; exempli gratia: quom ex aere iovis statua conflanda est, adhibetur administraturque
in primis apparatus, qui quidem pro huiusmodi signo condendo necessarius est, quo adhibito administratoque
resultat quam primum Iovis seu Mercurii statua. Eodem modo quum progignitur animans anima ipsa de
materiae potestate exigitur. Ita fit ut de eo quod animans actuminime est (quod genus est sperma seminariumque
virus) procreetur animantis natura et species. Ergo ex non ente id quod est fieri convincitur.
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Invoking the famous example of the bronze statue (see, for instance, Phys. i 6
191a8–9), Francus compares the Aristotelian process from potentiality to actuality to a
creation out of nothing. In fact, in the creation of a living being, the soul, which is the
form of the body, is drawn out from the potency of matter, which “as Trismegistus
affirms, is not nothing, but is close to nothing” – as Francus remarks.37 A similar
observation is also found in Ficino’s Theologia Platonica, which here is clearly Francus’
source. The Ficinian passage reads:
Here we should recall that matter (and I am quoting the views of Mercurius
Trismegistus and Timaeus) is without form. It is not nothing, but it is next
to nothing, being primarily and to an unlimited extent that which is acted
upon.38
Given thatAristotle had actuallymaintained that therewasnogeneration exnihilo, the
interpretation presented by Francus cannot be considered the common Aristotelian
view, but it is closer to the Neoplatonic and Ficinian positions on this topic.
In the second instance, Francus presents the opinion of the Christian theologians,
who were of course in favour of a creation ex nihilo, because, according to them, in
the beginning God createdmatter from nothing.39 But then, explains Francus, even
the Christian theologians do not doubt that, over time (i.e., after the creation of the
universe) all species have been generated in the ‘natural’ way (naturali more), that is,
they are drawn from the potentiality of matter, just as the Peripatetics maintained.40
This procedure holds for all natural species apart from the human species, which
requires the generation of individual intellectual souls by God. As for Lucretius’
Epicurean view, Francus merely states that, contrary to what the Peripatetics and
37 f. 6r, Pari ratione quum corrumpitur animal, anima inherensque forma aboletur penitus in nihilumque migrat.
Verum subiectum quoddam primum atque incolume omni in genitura abolituque remanet, quod ceu Protheus
apudOrpheum varios induit ornatus ac formas. Quodque, ut Tresmegistus inquit non nihil est, nihilo tamen
proximum.
38 Transl. byM.J.B. Allen & J.Warden. See Ficino, Theol. Plat. 1.3.15,Nunc autemmeminisse oportetmateriam
ipsam, utMercurius Trimegistus Timaeusque putant, esse informe, non nihil, nihilo proximum, quod primo
finiteque sit patiens. Ficinomight refer to Plato’s idea of receptacle of becoming in Timaeus 49a–52b;
Hermes Trismegistus’ Asclepius 14–15 and other Neoplatonic sources, such as Augustine, Confessions
12.6 and Proclus, Elements of Theology prop. 72. See Pizzani, “Dimensione cristiana”, 326 n. 51.
39 f. 6r, Caeterum theologi nostri a mundi genesi deum ipsum immortalem optimummaximum tammateriam
quammateriales formas materiaque abiunctas ex nihilo penitus, idest citra subiectum, simul procreasse.
40 f. 6r, Deinceps vero progressus temporis species cunctas unis exceptis intellectivis animis naturali more et ut
perypatetici existimant generari, id est de materia potentia educi, minime inficiantur.
78 chapter 2
Christian theologians maintain, nothing is generated or corrupted, except perhaps
what is accidental or added to the things.41 But Francus does not pass any value
judgement on this discrepant view.
Interestingly, on this point, Francus dissociates Aristotle from Lucretius, when he
could in fact have easily harmonized their doctrines. But, probably, hismain goal here
is just to show that the Peripatetics and the Christian theologians agree in denying a
generation ex nihilo, and that their views can easily complement each other.
3.2. The ‘Full’ and the Void
Asmentioned before, the paraphrase contains several digressions, which are explicitly
labeled as digressio. Francus does not however limit himself to expressing his point of
view in these sections only. On the contrary, he often criticizes or confirms Lucretius’
assumptions by means of brief remarks that are scattered all over the paraphrase.
After his first digression, he claims, for instance:
The Epicureans posited the full and the empty as principles of natural things.
But the full, which is perceived by the senses, cannot be the first and original
principle, for it does not remain immune from separation and loss. But, in fact,
some eternal, indivisible and invisible bodies produce things by conjunction
and addition, while by disjunction and subtraction, they tear them apart.42
Now, the identification of plenum and vacuum as principles of natural things is not
properly Epicurean. Both Epicurus and Lucretius had distinguished between bodies
(σώματα, corpora) and void (κενόν, inane), rather than between ‘the full’ and ‘the void’.
It is likely that, rather than Lucretius, Francus’ source for this passage was Aristotle’s
Metaphysics: in fact, Aristotle attributed to Leucippus and Democritus the idea that
the first principles are the full and the void. Francus seems to have applied this idea to
the Epicureans as well, just as other authors before him had already done.43Of course,
41 f. 6r, At vero apud epycureos, sicuti iam asseruimus, nihil generatur corrumpiturve, nisi forte eventus et rerum
appendix.
42 f. 6r–v,Naturalium rerum principia plenum et vacuum epycurei posuerunt. Caeterum plenum, quod sensibus
usurpatur, primum atque originale principium esse nequit, namque discidii dispendiique non constat immune.
At vero corpora quaedam sempiterna, individua invisiliaque concilio atque aditu res conflant, discidio vero et
abitu dirimunt.
43 See Aristot. Met. 1.985b4–5,Λεύκιππος δὲ καὶ ὁ ἑταῖρος αὐτοῦ Δημόκριτος στοιχεῖα μὲν τὸ πλῆρες
καὶ τὸ κενὸν εἶναί φασι and, for instance, Albertus Magnus, InMet., lib. 1 cap. 15, Leucippus vero et
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this tenet is easily refuted, because, as Francus points out, the full is not immune from
separation and loss, so it cannot be considered the first principle of natural things.
But then, Francus, somehow defending Lucretius from this accusation, points out
that the Latin poet believed instead that there are primary bodies, which are eternal,
indivisible and invisible.
In general, it is conspicuous that, in the majority of cases, Francus’ reading
of Lucretius is fairly faithful to the text. When it comes to discussing the first
principles, for instance, Francus does not offer a personal reinterpretation, nor does
he strive to harmonize Lucretius’ view with that of other philosophers, such as
Aristotle or Empedocles, as other commentators after him were to do. He simply
explains:
The simple [bodies] are those that are not composed by other bodies, and, for
this reason, are called first bodies (corpora prima), atoms (athomi), elements
(elementa), generative principles (genitalia), seeds (semina), first-beginnings of
things (rerum primordia), original matter (originalis materies).44
Also Francus’ account of the concept of void is fairly close to Lucretius’ text. In this
section, contrary to what he usually does, Francus provides a detailed account of some
of the examples to which Lucretius resorts, in order to demonstrate the existence of
the void: the density of matter, the movement of fish in the water, the void space
which is filled up with air after two bodies suddenly had been separated (f. Lucr.
1.358 ff. = f. 6v; Lucr. 1.370 ff. = f. 7r; Lucr. 1.384 = f. 7r). Francus, who some years later was
to become professor of natural philosophy, seems quite fascinated by and interested
in these phenomena and Lucretius’ scientific explanations of them. At the end of the
paragraph, he hastily concludes:
Indeed, Lucretius provides these and other reasons of this kind, which,
however, are very easily refuted by the Peripatetics.45
amicus eius Democritus, et ipsi Epicurei Philosophi existentes, dicunt prima elementa existentium esse plenum
et inane sive vacuum; quorum plenum est ens, et vacuum sive inane non ens.
44 f. 8v, Simplicia sunt quae nullis conflantur corporibus, atque ideo corpora prima, athomi, elementa, genitalia,
semina, rerum primordia, originalis materies nuncupantur.
45 f. 7v, Has quidem et alias hoc genus rationes communit Lucretius, quae tamen a Perypateticis facillime
dissolvantur.
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Even though the Peripatetics would indeed reject Lucretius’ theory, Francus does
not really provide any argument to defend the Aristotelian point of view or refute
Lucretius’. It is indeed conspicuous that the short sentences he commonly uses to
discredit Lucretius are fairly stereotypical: they might in fact be part of a strategy
aimed atmaking acceptable Francus’ other unacceptable attempt to explain Lucretius’
heterodox philosophy. It is also possible, however, that the commentator wasmore
interested in explaining Lucretius’ philosophical text than in expressing any value
judgements on it.
3.3. The Infinite
As is well known, Epicurus and Lucretius could not accept matter as infinitely
divisible, so they postulated the existence of indivisible parts, namely the atoms;
Lucretius explains this theory in 1.483–634. One of Lucretius’ arguments in favor of
this theory is that things cannot be divided to infinity, because if infinite division
were possible, the smallest thing would be equal to the sum of things, since they
would both consist of infinite parts (Lucr. 1.615–635). Francus comments:
And I additionally construe this in the followingmanner: for a shorter and
more exact reasoning, let the biggest and highest thing be called a; while
the tiniest and smallest thing be called b, then we proceed like this: what
contains infinite parts that are capable of existing separately, this, without
doubt, is considered infinitely large in act. Since, then, both a and b contain
infinitely many parts of that kind, indeed each [of them] is proven infinitely
large. But if by chance anyone should object to our argument and put forward
as the reason of the inequality the fact that clearly the parts of which a
is composed are bigger than those of which b [is composed], even though
whichever set of parts is infinite, certainly reality suddenly overturns even
this. For, we will take at least one from the small parts of b, thence we
will add another one and, in this way, we will produce a body, thereafter
we will add another and yet another in succession to infinity. So it will
happen that b is proven (to be) of infinite magnitude, because it always
increases with an addition, however small, and because all its infinitely
many parts, each of which is of some quantity, are present at the same
time. For the rest, this opinion only opposes and disagrees with Anaxagoras
and those who compose things of infinite parts which exist separately. Yet,
according to the Peripatetics, natural bodies aremade up of a finite number of
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parts, capable of existing separately in act, but of an infinite number of parts
(existing only) in potency, or (rather) non-existent.46
In this passage, Francus aims to support the Lucretian idea that, if thingswere actually
made of infinitely many parts, all things would have to be equally huge. He therefore
resorts to the Aristotelian distinction between infinite in potency and in actuality.
According to Aristotle, no extended body can in actuality be divided infinitely; it is
however indefinitely divisible, that is, it could potentially be divided ad infinitum,
but this potentiality is not one that will ever completely actualized.47 Once again,
Francus equates Aristotle’s potential being with not being, as he did when discussing
the creation ex nihilo. Then, by associating this Aristotelian idea with the Lucretian
claim that things cannot be divided to infinity, Francus harmonizes the two theories,
making the reader believe that their positions were much more compatible than
they really were. At the same time, Francus, beside harmonizing Aristotle’s view
with Lucretius’, applies the latter’s criticism only to Anaxagoras, who reportedly
thought that things were actually composed of infinite parts (see, for instance, Lucr.
1.844).
Interestingly, Aristotle’s explanation in denying the actual divisibility of spatial
magnitudes ad infinitumwas to become one of the preferred arguments used by those
commentators who wanted to make Lucretius’ atomismmore acceptable. Indeed, we
will see that a very similar argument in defense of Lucretius’ atomismwas also to be
found in Frachetta’s Spositione (see chapter 5).
46 f. 9v–10r,Quod ita adstruimus: vocitetur, brevioris exactiorisque ratiocinationis gratia, maxima quaeppiam
et suprema res a. b vero minutissima ac minima, tunc ita pergimus. Quod infinitas seorsum idoneas existere
partes continet, id nimirum actu infinit(t)um habetur. Quum igitur tam a quam b infinibles (sic) illius modi
portiones cohibeat, profecto utrumque infinitum convincitur. Quod si forte aliquis nostro occurrat argumento
causamque inaequalitatis inmediumafferat, quia scilicet partes quibusa componitur grandiores sint quam illae
quibus b, tametsi quaelibet sint infinitae. Verum enimvero vel hoc de subito proruit. Namminimum quandam
ex b portiunculis sumptitabimus, inde alteram adiungemus corpusque aliquod hoc pacto conflabimus, inde
aliam atque aliam deinceps in infinitum adiicemus. Ita fiet ut infinibilis b probetur magnitudinis, cum semper
adiectione quantulacumque etiam adcrescat, cumque infinitae omnes suae partes, quarum quaelibet aliquanta
est, simul adsint.Caeterumhaec ratio solummodoAnaxagorae hisque, qui infinitis seorsum existentibus partibus
res componunt, adversatur et pugnat. Verum apud Perypateticos finitis actu portionibus seorsum existere idoneis,
infinitis vero potentia seu inexistentibus naturalia corpora conficiuntur.
47 See Aristotle, Phys. iii 6 206a16–18 and generat. et corrupt. i 318a20–23.
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3.4. AtomicMotion
The first part of Lucretius’ second book is devoted to atomicmotion. Francus explains
that, according to Lucretius, there are three kinds of motions: 1) natural motion,
which is proper of those atoms that strive to reach the center of the earth; 2) violent
motion, through which things aim to the upper parts; and 3) a motion that is neither
natural nor violent, namely the swerve, thanks to which the atoms deviate a little
from their trajectory.48
Even though Francus is here allegedly explaining Lucretius, he borrows from
Aristotle the distinction between natural and violent motion (Phys. viii 4 254b12–13);
at the same time, however, he conceives themovement downwards as natural, and
upwards as unnatural, while, according to Aristotle, upwardmotion is in many cases
also natural, being for example characteristic of fire and air. For Aristotle, unnatural
motion takes place when something is moved from the outside, and not naturally
from within. Despite his reference to the Aristotelian natural/violent distinction,
Francus does thus not apply it in an Aristotelian way, but uses it directionally:
downwards corresponds to natural, upwards to unnatural.
This is also one of the few instances inwhichFrancus’ interpretation is not entirely
true to the text. In fact, he explains that the natural motion of the atoms has to be
towards the center (meditullium); this idea is of course not compatible with Lucretius’
account, who nowhere in his poem states that atomsmove toward the center: they
just fall in one direction, that is, along parallel lines, as the Epicureans believe.49
Instead, Francus’ account works only in an Aristotelian cosmology, in which the
heavy elements (i.e., earth and water), are attracted toward the center of the universe,
and consequently the earth lies at this center (De caelo ii 14, 296b 13). On the contrary,
according to theEpicureans, theuniverse, being infinite, cannothave a center. Francus
must have known that this idea could not be Lucretian, since, commenting on the
final passage of book 1, he hadmade clear that Lucretius criticized those who believed
inmotion toward the center.50 So why does he now claim that Lucretius’ atoms have a
natural motion toward the center?
48 f. 16r, Itaque cum triplex sit athomorum delatio: naturalis, scilicet quae res meditullium capessunt, violenta,
quae superiora petitur rursusque illa, quae neque naturalis neque violenta habentur, cuiusmodi est declinatio
illa, qui athomi a proprio itinere parum per exorbitant.
49 This is nowhere explicitly stated, but can be inferred from certain passages, see Bakker, Epicurean
Meteorology, 214–216.
50 f. 14r, Illud postremo diffitendum negandumque est, et ceu non vulgare incommodum fugiendum, quod a
perypateticis asseri solet, in centrum ac meditullium cuncta suopte ingenio ferri.
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An ancient parallel to this misunderstanding could be the following passage in
Simplicius (In Arist. De caelo i 8, 277b 1 = 267.30–268.4 Heiberg):
Ταύτης δὲ γεγόνασι τῆς δόξης μετ’ αὐτὸν Στράτων τε καὶ Ἐπίκουρος πᾶν
σῶμα βαρύτητα ἔχειν νομίζοντες καὶ πρὸς τὸ μέσον φέρεσθαι, τῷ δὲ τὰ
βαρύτερα ὑφιζάνειν τὰ ἧττον βαρέα ὑπ’ ἐκείνων ἐκθλίβεσθαι βίᾳ πρὸς τὸ
ἄνω,ὥστε, εἴ τις ὑφεῖλε τὴν γῆν, ἐλθεῖν ἂν τὸ ὕδωρ εἰς τὸ κέντρον, καὶ εἴ τις
τὸ ὕδωρ, τὸν ἀέρα, καὶ εἰ τὸν ἀέρα, τὸ πῦρ.
This opinion was later adopted by Strato and Epicurus, who assumed that
every body has weight and moves toward the center, but that, due to the fact
that the heavier ones settle down, the less heavy are extruded upwards by force,
so that, if one were to remove the earth from below, the water would reach to
the center, and if one removed the water, the air would, and if one removed
the air, the fire.51
Here, just as in Francus’ text, Simplicius not only ascribes to Epicurus a theory of
centripetal downwardmotion, but he also defines the opposite upwardmovement as
violent. Of course, there is no certainty that Francus knew this passage in Simplicius:
he might have drawn upon another source which contained the same idea. In any
case, just as in Simplicius’ report, the centrifocal account in Francus’ text is probably
due to the combination of Lucretius’ viewswith Aristotle’s, who equated ‘downwards’
with ‘towards the center’.
3.5. The Generative Power of Atoms
One of the few instances in which Francus seems very critical toward Lucretius is
when he comments on the passage concerning the theory of infinite worlds (2.1023–
1104). On this occasion, he explicitly refers to Ficino’s Theologia Platonica:
[Marsilio Ficino] in his [Platonic] Theology very rightly showed that every
function and movement has to be ascribed to some virtue and quality
superadded to the body, or superior to the body itself. In fact, by its own
nature a body impedes an actionmore than causing it. And thus, by nomeans
51 Transl. by Bakker, EpicureanMeteorology, 212–213.
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can the corpuscles that these [sc. Democritus, Epicurus and Lucretius] describe
be first-beginnings of things. Therefore they could not build this or other
worlds, seeing that they are devoid of motion.52
Even though Francus’ aim is to disprove that Lucretius’ atoms could be capable of
creating infinite worlds, the argument he uses is not primarily against multiple
worlds, but against any atom-based cosmogony. Even if there were only one world,
he here argues, it could not have been formed by atoms.
The passage inTheologia Platonica towhich Francus is referring to ismost probably
theone in the first book (1.2.4), inwhichFicino insists on the idea that atoms, conceived
as mere chunks of matter, are not capable by themselves of performing any activity,
least of all to create things; in order to do so, they need ‘something else’, some kind of
virtue or quality (see chapter 1).
This objection would turn out to be one of the most common points of criticism
directed towards the atomists: if everything, including the soul, is made up of void
space and inanimate atoms, how is it possible that there exist living things in the
world?
3.6. Dialoguing with Ancient and Contemporary Philosophers
As we have seen in the previous sections, Francus’ paraphrase contains a complex net
of citations and references to passages taken from illustrious philosophers, so much
so that it is hard to discern his own convictions.
Everywhere one notices the influence of Marsilio Ficino, to whom Francus
explicitly refers in two passages. The first of them, which we have encountered
before, occurs in an argument to the effect that matter cannot perform anymotion
or other activity without the presence of form, so that the atoms to which Epicurus
and Lucretius refer could not have been genuine ‘first-beginnings of things’ (rerum
primordia); because of their lack of motion, they would not have been able to bring
about this world, let alone infinite worlds. In the second passage, which concerns
Aristoxenus’ concept of the harmony of the soul, Francus merely suggests that those
52 f. 20r, [Marsilius Ficinus] sua in Theologia pulcherrime commonstravit functionem omnem ac motum in
virtutem quondam et speciem corpori super additam seu corpore ipso praestantiorem referri debere. Nam suopte
ingenio corpus actionem potius impedit quam concinnet. Itaque nullatenus, quae corpuscula isti effingunt rerum
primordia esse queunt. Igitur non hunc non alios mundos adstruere potuerunt quandoquidemmotus expertia
sint.
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who “desire to know these topics more in detail and fully” (f. 22r, haec exquisitius et in
plenum nosse avent) should consult Ficino’s commentary on Plato’s Timaeus. More
in general, Francus’ debt to Ficino lies in the fact that he places Lucretius in an
historiographical panorama which does not only include Aristotle, Plato, Averroes
or Alexander of Aphrodisias, but also the prisci philosophi et theologi, including the
Presocratics, Hermes Trismegistus, Orpheus and the ancient Egyptians.
One would be hard put to find anywhere in the paraphrase an explicit endorse-
ment of Lucretius’ theories. Francus’ account, though clear and well-informed, is
generally neutral, and often simply points out the differences between Lucretius’
theories and those of various other respected philosophers. He would say, for exam-
ple: “However, the Lucretian considerations have nothing to do with Aristotle, who
removed fromnature both the void and the infinite”.53Occasionally, Francus explicitly
disapproves of Lucretius’ theories, even though it is conspicuous that when he does
so, the short sentences he uses are fairly stereotypical, as we have pointed out before.
He often limits himself to saying that it would not be difficult to reject Lucretius’
opinions, but he actually rebuts them only in very few cases.54 The following argu-
ment is a typical example of this procedure: “In fact, nature is not ruled by the providence
of the gods, as Lucretius, Epicurus, Democritus and Leucippus think, and, of course,
they add arguments of such nature that I would not want to fight with them, since
it would not be difficult at all to overcome them and prevail”.55 As in the passage
just quoted, Francus’ criticism does often not involve Lucretius alone, but also the
Epicureans in general, and the Greek atomists, Democritus and Leucippus.
As seen before, on some occasions, however, we find Francus using a different
strategy for explaining Lucretius’ philosophy. Instead of highlighting the contrast
between Lucretius and Aristotle, he sometimes, quite unexpectedly, uses the latter
to clarify the former.56 Here is a typical example: “But, for the moment, from the
various arguments that the Peripatetics fortify, we shall here use only one that is as
53 f. 14r, Verum lucretianae ratiocinationes nihil quicquam Aristotelem attingunt, quippe qui tam vacuum quam
infinitum de natura exemerit.
54 See also f. 19v,His quidem rationibus persuasi Democritus, Epicurus atque Lucretius […]; quibus rationibus
obviam ire, eorumque placita proruere haud impendio arduum est.
55 f. 15r–v, Neque enim deorum providentia natura regitur, ut Lucretius, Epicurus, Democritus et Leucippus
existimant, atque huiusmodi quidem rationes communiunt, ut ego cum his dimicare nolim, quippe quos vincere
ac superare nullum sane negocium sit.
56 See also f. 18r,Quod autem luminis ictu gignantur colores, non solum Epicurei, sed ex Peripatetici nonnnulli
opinati sunt pluribus persuasi rationibus; «Fluere enim quovis a colore simulacra non solum Epicurei, verum
etiam Peripatetici ….
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well-known as it is valid, in order to make Lucretius’ principles more illustrious and
certain, by using and administering the Aristotelian light”.57
In sum, then, Francus’ attitude towards Lucretius is not easy to determine, but it
is certainly not exclusively negative. Very often, as in the passage just quoted, instead
of siding openly with Lucretius, he lets other philosophers speak, and – even though
he was reputed to be a Lucretianus – he did not explicitly endorse any of Lucretius’
theories.
Conclusions
Undoubtedly, Francus’ paraphrase constitutes an important step in the history of the
reception of Lucretius’ poem and doctrine. What is important about this work? First
of all, it represents the earliest published reaction to Lucretius in the Renaissance.
Second, it makes a valiant attempt to explain and render accessible Lucretius’ difficult
text, which needed to be understood before it could be either accepted or refuted.
Indeed, it is conspicuous how seriously Francus takes Lucretius’ philosophy. Third,
Francus provides muchmore than amere summary of Lucretius’ first three books,
as he tries to insert his thought into the philosophical debates of his own time and
places him in a historiographical panorama, in keeping with Ficino’s method.
In this initial phase of reception we still cannot detect a personal re-elaboration
or any explicit approval of Lucretius’ matter theories, but we have encountered
some themes that are recurrent in the exegetical tradition of Lucretius’ text in the
Renaissance: 1) the Aristotelian argument, which denies the actual divisibility of
spatial magnitudes ad infinitum, is here used to endorse Lucretius’ atomism; 2) the
criticism, which is already found in Ficino, to the effect that atoms, conceived asmere
chunks of matter, would not be capable by themselves of performing any activity,
least of all of creating things, because they lack some kind of virtue or quality.
Moreover, as stressed in the introduction to this chapter, although the common
idea is that the earliest commentaries on theDe rerum naturawere mainly philologi-
cally inclined, with little attention given to the poem’s philosophical and scientific
content, the case of Francus shows exactly the contrary. Francus’Paraphrasis reveals an
intense engagement with Lucretius’ philosophical and physical doctrines (his matter
57 f. 12v–13r, Sed nos in presentia e pluribus rationibus, quas Perypatetici communiunt unicamdumtaxat nonminus
vulgatam quam validam adducemus quo Lucretii placita aristotelicam lucem adhibentes administrantesque
illustriora atque firmiora reddamus».
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theory, his doctrine of the infinite, his view of the soul), while not paying the least
attention to the poetic and philological aspects of the poem.
Wehave encountered anumber of salient features of Francus’work.Whatmakes it
particularly intriguing andworthyof greater attention is thathe introducedLucretius
into the contemporary debates about the philosophical proofs of the immortality of
the soul and into the historiographical reconstructions of the history of philosophy,
which were triggered by Ficino’s translations and exegetical works.
It cannot be just a coincidence that seven years later, the Bologna publisher of
Francus’ Paraphrasiswas to print also the first Renaissance commentary on Lucretius,
namely that of Johannes Baptista Pius, which was subsequently republished in Paris.
It is indeed in Bologna that the public reception of Lucretius’ philosophy began. As
far as the Renaissance reception of Lucretius is concerned, themajority of the scholars
havemainly been interested in the Florentine or Neapolitanmilieu, but given that
the earliest printed exegeses of Lucretius were published in Bologna, the time has
come to shift the focus of scholarly attention to that city.

chapter 3
Johannes Baptista Pius’ Commentary
onDe rerum natura (1511)
Introduction
The annotated edition of De rerum natura by Johannes Baptista Pius can be regarded
as the first attempt at providing a systematic exegesis of Lucretius’ poem in the
Renaissance. Pius’ commentary was first published in Bologna in 1511 by Hieronymus
Baptista de Benedictis, and subsequently reprinted in 1514 in France by Josse Badius
and Jean Petit (also known as Ascensius et Parvus) with a short introductory letter by
the French editor Nicolaus Beraldus. Formore than fifty years, Pius’ edition remained
the only commentary on Lucretius, until it was substituted by Lambinus’ annotated
editions of 1563/64 and 1570 (see chapter 4).
As Pius stated frequently in his various works, in order to explain a classical text
properly, philology and philosophy should cooperate: for this purpose, Lucretius’
philosophical poem constitutes for Pius an ideal test case.1 In keeping with this idea,
in his commentary, Pius examines Lucretius’ poem in detail, from the point of view
of both content and form. He alternates philological and grammatical observations –
such as the analysis of the different variants of a term, or the explanation of some
particularwords –withphilosophical notes, inwhichhe routinely compares Epicurus’
and Lucretius’ thought with ancient and Christian philosophical traditions. A large
exegetical apparatus surrounds the poem’s verses, sometimes filling entire pages.
As the amount of information provided on each topic is vast, Pius’ commentary
1 In the “Adnotationes posteriores”, Pius – invoking Quintilianus – says that it is unseemly that
grammar (i.e., philology) lacks philosophy’s knowledge: cum tamen grammaticam carere philosophiae
cognitione dedeceat; see Pius, “Adnotationes posteriores”, in Guter Janus, Lampas, sive fax artium
liberalium, vol. 1 (Frankfurt: E. Collegio Paltheniano, sumtibus Ionae Rhodii, 1602), 397. A similar
statement can be found also in the introduction to Pius’ commentary on Lucretius (see fol. 1r); see Del
Nero, “Filosofia e teologia nel commento di Giovan Battista Pio a Lucrezio”, Interpres 6 (1985–1986),
156–199, 156, and Id., “Giovan Battista Pio tra grammatica e filosofia: dai primi scritti al commento
lucreziano del 1511”, in Sapere è/e potere. Discipline, dispute e professioni nell’Universitàmedievale emoderna.
Il caso bolognese a confronto. Forme e oggetti della disputa sulle arti, ed. by L. Avellini (Bologna: Istituto
per la Storia di Bologna, 1990), 243–257.
90 chapter 3
constitutes for us an important source for the assessment of the impact of Lucretius’
philosophy, and especially atomism, during the Renaissance. In fact, reading the
commentary, we may obtain an impression of how a humanist, with an Aristotelian
or Scholastic background andmindset, read and interpreted Lucretius’ thought, and
how he would try to insert it in the history of philosophy.
The first section of this chapter contains a brief biography of Pius. In the second
part, I shall examine the paratexts which precede the commentary: the dedicatory
letter, the interpretatio and the expositio, where Pius explains Lucretius’ philosophy,
focusing especially on his concept of first principles. The third section focuses on some
passages of the commentary, in which Pius deals with Lucretius’ atoms andmatter
theory. Finally, the last section is devoted to the French edition of Pius’ commentary,
and focuses especially on the introductory letter by the editor.
1. Life and Circumstances
The information about Pius’ early life and career is contradictory.2 Most probably he
was born in Bologna, given that he usually defines himself ‘Bononiensis’, and the year
of his birth should fall somewhere in the early 1470s.3
In Bologna, he was a pupil of Filippo Beroaldo the Elder, Bartolomeo Bianchini,
and Antonio Urceo Codro. Most probably, he also studied natural philosophy under
the guidance of Alessandro Achillini. In 1494, he got his doctorate degree and then
started teaching rhetoric and poetry in Bologna.4 In 1496, Isabella d’Este recruited him
2 Information about Pius’ biography can be found in Giovanni Fantuzzi, Notizie degli scrittori
bolognesi, vii, (Bologna: Stamperia di San Tommaso D’Aquino, 1789), 31–40; Valerio Del Nero, “Note
sulla vita di Giovan Battista Pio (con alcune lettere inedite)”, Rinascimento 21 (1981), 247–263; and
Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani, Vol. 84 (2015), also available on-line: http://www.treccani.it/
enciclopedia/giovanni-battista-pio_(Dizionario-Biografico). In general, about Pius’ commentary,
see Ezio Raimondi, “Il primo commento umanistico a Lucrezio”, in Politica e commedia: dal Beroaldo
alMachiavelli (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1972), 101–140.
3 In his commented edition of Lucretius (f. 216v), he claims to have started writing his commentary
on Plautus in 1497, when he was 24: this means that he would be born in 1473. But then, in his
Annotamenta (1505, f. m6v), he asserts to have started teaching publicly at the age of 19, and we know
through Dallari that he began his career as a teacher of rhetoric in Bologna in 1494–1495. This would
post-date his date of birth at 1475. See Umberto Dallari, I rotuli dei lettori legisti e artisti dello studio
Bolognese dal 1384 al 1799, 4 vols. (Bologna: Regia tip. dei Fratelli Merlani, 1888–1924), i, 157.
4 SeeGiovanniN. Pasquali Alidosi, I dottori bolognesi di teologia, filosofia,medicina e d’arti liberali.Dall’anno
1000 per tutto marzo del 1623 (Bologna, 1623), 95.
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as a tutor, so that he went to Mantua, where he published the Adnotationes posteriores
(1496), an anthology of philological notes. In 1497 hemoved toMilan to teach: there,
he published annotated editions of Fulgentius (1498), Sidonius (1498), and Plautus
(1500). He leftMilan in 1500 andwent back to Bologna, where he resumed his teaching.
However, in 1506–1507, after the downfall of the Bentivoglio family, he had to move to
Bergamo, where he was involved in a controversy regarding his edition of Plautus (see
below). Being on good terms with Pope Julius ii, who had just conquered Bologna,
he moved back to his hometown. In the ensuing productive years, he published a
number of poetry collections and the commentary on Lucretius (1511). Because of
the notoriety gained thanks to the publication of De rerum natura, he was invited,
in 1512, to teach in Rome, but there he got embroiled in controversies because of
his pompous and flamboyant Latin style; because of that, he was even ridiculed in
some satirical pamphlets. So he went once more back to Bologna, where he resumed
teaching rhetoric and poetry. In these years he published other editions of classical
authors, such as Columella (1520) and Valerius Flaccus (1523).5 Finally, in 1526 he was
invited to teach humanities in Lucca where there was an open position. He remained
in Lucca until 1437, when he moved back to Bologna for a couple of years until he
was invited by Pope Paul iii to teach in Rome once again. The list of the university
professors at the Sapienza university last mentions Pius in 1542, but we do not know
whether he died in that year or later. On Pius’ epitaph, in the church of Sant’Eustachio
(Rome), which now has been removed, it was written that he died when he was 84,
while, according to his funeral oration, he died in Rome at the age of 75.6
Pius’ funeral orationwaswritten by his colleague at the Sapienza, LeonardoMarso,
but then pronounced in the church of Sant’Eustachio, by one of Marso’s students,
Cesare Armando (or Arnando).7 What is relevant for our purpose, however, is the fact
that, in his oration, Marso explicitly mentions Pius’ engagement with Epicureanism:
But he [sc. Pius], not some half-educatedman, was deeply engaged with the
opinion of the stupid Epicureans [and yet] was very studious of the Christian
religion, more than anybody would believe. He fought with heretics with
5 Columellae de cultu ortorum, Bononiae 1520; C. Valerii Flacci Argonautica. Io. Bapt. Pii carmen ex quarto
Argonauticon Apollonii (Venetiis 1523).
6 Pius’ epitaph has been transcribed in Vincenzo Forcella, Iscrizioni delle chiese e d’altri edificii di Roma, ii,
(Roma: Tipografia dei fratelli Bencini, 1873), 394, while his funeral oration has been published in
James W. Nelson Novoa, “Leonardo Marso d’Avezzano’sOratio on the death of Giovanni Battista
Pio”, Bruniana & Campanelliana 16.1 (2010), 247–253, 250–253.
7 Novoa, “LeonardoMarso”, 249.
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all his might, ⟨as they say⟩, and not with the incenses of the ancients, but,
having confessed his faults to the priest with living voice, each year he strove
strenuously to purify his soul.8
Marso does not specify to what extent Pius was committed to Epicureanism, since
his main goal here is to show that, even so, he was a good Christian, who eventually
confessed his faults and repented.
Apart from Marso’s testimony, the only evidence that Pius actually engaged
with Epicureanism is the fact that he commented on Lucretius. But was this a good
reason tomake him a partisan of Epicureanism? In order to decide on this issue, we
should first consider when and why Pius started to take an interest in Lucretius; and
secondly, whether he, explicitly or implicitly, endorsed any Epicurean doctrine in his
commentary onDe rerum natura.
At the timewhen Piuswrote his commentary, Lucretius’ textwas probably already
widely circulating in the Bolognese milieu. Already in 1505, Pius’ teacher, Philippus
Beroaldo theElder, inhisOpusculumde terraemotu etpestilentia, had referred toLucretius
several times, showing a certain familiarity with the poem.
Unquestionably, Pius already knew Lucretius’De rerum natura in 1501, when he
wrote his eight-folio Praelectio in Titum Lucretium et Svetonium Tranquillum, which is
probably the written text of a lecture he gave in Bologna. Although in the praelectio
there is only one explicit reference to Lucretius, positively described as ‘the first among
the poets’, this text proves Pius’ precocious interest in his poem, of which already four
editions had been published – one in Brescia (1471/73), one in Verona (1486), and two
in Venice (1495 and 1500).9
Nevertheless, the reason that led Pius to compose a voluminous commentary on
Lucretius is not explicitly stated anywhere in the text or in the paratexts; it is possible
however to collect information from external sources: some episodes concerning Pius’
life provide hints about themotivation that pushed him to undertake this project. As
wehavementionedbefore, Piushadpreviously edited a commented editionof Plautus,
which was printed inMilan in 1500. This edition had then been systematically and
8 Sed hic plumbeorum Epicureorum opinioni, nec quivis mediocriter eruditus, inhaerebat Christianae religionis
supra quam credibile cuiquam sit studiosissimus erat. Cum haereticis velis, equisque ⟨ut dicitur⟩ decertabat,
nec Antiquorum suffimentis, sed viva voce cum sacerdote confessus admissa, singulis annis animam purgare
enixissime studebat. See Novoa, “LeonardoMarso”, 252.
9 Praelectio f. 1r,Primushic animusdeus inhumano corpore hospitans ausus autoreManlio oculos alieno immittere
caelo, indidemque deus effectus, uti Lucretio poetarum antistiti in uno eo placuisse video.
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ruthlessly criticized by the grammarian Giovan Francesco Boccardo, called Pylades,
whose own edition of Plautus was to be published posthumously in 1506. Two years
later, in 1508, an Apologia in Plautum, was published in Bologna by Pius’ pupil, Achille
Bocchi, who aimed to defend his teacher. Pius, however, had to regain credibility and
the consensus eruditorum, so to speak, and the only way to do this was to undertake an
ambitious project, such as the commentary on Lucretius.10 This probable motivation
is particularly evident in the dedicatory letter and in the paratexts that preface his
edition: there, Pius frequently praises the novelty of his enterprise, which no one
before him could have accomplished. In pitching his work, Pius also attempts to
convince the reader that Lucretius’ work is very difficult, worth reading and only
suitable for fine minds.
Last but not least, as we have seen before, it can hardly be a coincidence that only a
few years earlier, in Bologna, the Paraphrasis in Lucretium by Raphael Francus had been
published by the same publisher that now also edited Pius’ commentary. It is more




Pius’ commentary is dedicated to Georgius Cassovius, or Georg Szakmary, bishop of
Fünfkirchen (Pècs, Hungary) from 1506 to 1523, to whom Pius recommends reading
through Lucretius’ text, which, thanks to Pius himself, had now been restored to its
original form (f. π4v, Lucretium iam vindice Pio formae suae restitutum pellege).11
10 On this controversy, see Raimondi, “Il primo commento”, 112–113; Carlo Dionisotti, Gli umanisti e il
volgare tra Quattro e Cinquecento (Florence: Le Monnier, 1968), 84–87; AnnaMaranini, “Dispute tra vivi
emorti: Plauto tra Bocchi, Pio e Pilade”,Giornale italiano di filologia 53 (2001), 315–330; Simone Signaroli,
“Plauto nel cimento della filologia umanistica: Brescia, Bologna e la tipografia dei Britannici”, in
Viaggi di testi e di libri. Libri e lettori a Brescia tra Medioevo e età moderna, ed by. V. Grohovaz (Udine:
Istituto storico del libro antico: Forum, 2011).
11 Pius probably knew Georg Szakmary personally, since the bishop was the uncle of Pius’ first son’s
godfather, Laurentius Besztercei (Bistricius). On Szakmary, see G. Van Gulik – C. Eubel,Hierarchia
catholicaMedii aevi, sive Summorum Pontificum, s. r. e. Cardinalium, ecclesiarum antistitum series; Vol. 3:
Saeculum xvi ab anno 1503 complectens (Münster: sumptibus et typis Librariae regensbergianae, 1910),
280.
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In the dedicatory letter, Pius highlights the exceptional nature of his own work,
while criticizing some know-it-alls (scioli) who, before him, had tried to comment on
Lucretius’ poemwithout success. As far as their senseless and fantastic commentaries
are concerned, Pius says that he lets them pass: his self-esteem seems not have
suffered.12 Unfortunately, we have no clue as to whom these ‘know-it-alls’ might
be: apart from Ficino’s lost commentariola and Francus’ paraphrase, I am not aware of
any other attempt to comment on Lucretius before Pius.
The letter containsmany flatteries to the dedicatee and displays of Pius’ erudition
by relating ancient references to Georg Szakmary’s homeland, the ancient Pannonia,
the current Hungary.13 Moreover, Pius never misses a chance to mention the novelty
and the difficulty of the text he is commenting on, which could not be fully
understood unless it was supplemented by an explanation.14
In the dedicatory letter, Pius does not warn the reader of the heterodox content
of Lucretius’ poem. However, while not explicitly condemning the philosophical
theses presented in theDe rerum natura, at the end of the letter, Pius adds, in Gothic
characters, the statement “I submit everything to the orthodox faith” (Omnia ortodoxe
fidei subijcio): at least here, he assumes a cautious position, confirming his loyalty
to the orthodoxy. Interestingly enough, Michael Reeve observes that a copy of Pius’
commentary kept at Cambridge (cul Adv. 25.6) has notes of a reader, perhapsMario
Maffei, who, under Omnia ortodoxe fidei subijcio, wrote: “everything then has to be
revised” (Omnia ergo retractanda). For this reader – and probably for many others – the
heterodox contents of Lucretius’ poemwere not so easy to digest.15
12 f. π4r,Multi qui ante nos Lucretium attentarunt, fulgur ex pelvi minitantes, echinatam demum doctrinam
aversati, canes nilotici facti sunt, et desperatione suborta rhipsaspides. Non desunt quidam scioli, quibus etiam
alabastra ungenti plena putent, qui buccis tumentibus, librato vestigio, labiis demorsis, oculo suspenso, cuncta
cavillantur et incessunt, subduntque fetores suos et affannias, quibus ut harpyiae cuncta foedant. Horum
perdelira commentitiaque commenta sino praeterfluere, nec ideome acmea pilominus amo, quando ut Theognis
ait, neque pluvius Iupiter omnibus placet. The passage collects a congeries of proverbs, taken for the
most part from the Aldine edition of Erasmus’ Adagia (1508). On this passage, see Raimondi, Il primo
commento, 123.
13 On this letter, see Palmer, Reading Lucretius, 160.
14 f. π4r, Totus Lucretius nodosus, mendosus, impervius et uti graeco inolevit adagio totus fuit echinus asper.
15 Michael Reeve, “Lucretius in theMiddle Ages”, 212.
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2.2. Interpretatio: Lucretius’ Vita and the Philological Reconstruction of the Text
After the dedicatory letter follows the Interpretatio, in which Pius, quoting Servius (ad
Verg. Aen. i, 1–3), declares that in order to explain a work properly one should take into
account the following aspects: the biography of the author, the title, the quality of the
poetry, the purpose of writing, the number of books, the order and the content.16 To
this end, Pius includes a brief biography of Lucretius, which, throughmany sources,
goes over the main episodes of his life, including its most juicy details: the anecdote
of the love potion, his madness and suicide.
Indeed, let us consider themain points of this biography.17 First of all, Pius quotes
Jerome’s passage in contra Rufinum, where he counts the commentaries on Lucretius
and Plautus among the fundamental texts for contemporary education. No one
should therefore charge him, Pius, with rashness, if he had commented on Plautus
in the past and now turned to the most difficult Lucretius. With this statement,
Pius justifies both his controversial commentary on Plautus and his new one on
Lucretius.18
In the following paragraph, Pius resorts to many quotations taken from classical
authors and Christian writers, in order to provide a complete picture of Lucretius’
vita. First, he infers (coniicio) that Lucretius was Roman and, quoting a passage from
Jerome’s expanded translation of Eusebius’ Chronicon, argues that many testimonies
agree on the fact that Lucretius was mad.19
This seems to be confirmed by very many testimonies of poets, who praise
Lucretius’ madness, it maybe said in Greek: ὡς γὰρ μαινομένοι οἱ ποιηταὶ,
that is “in a sense, poets become similar to madmen”.20
16 See Solaro, Lucrezio, 44 and Palmer, Reading Lucretius, 157.
17 An extensive analysis of this passage can be found in Palmer, Reading Lucretius, 155–161.
18 f. Air, Hieronimus Libro Contra Rufinum primo (Hier. Adv. Ruf . 1.16) scribit se vidisse commentarios in
Lucretium et Plautum. Nemome igitur temeritatis arguat, qui et Plautum iampridem sum interpretatus, et
nunc cum Lucretio auctorum difficillimo congredior.
19 Hier. Chron. a. Abr. 1923–1924.Olympiade centesima septuagesima prima Titus Lucretius poeta nascitur, qui
postea amatorio poculo in furorem versus, cum aliquot libros per intervalla insaniae conscripsisset, quod postea
emendavit Cicero, propria se manu confodit anno aetatis quadragesimo tertio, quod evenit Gn. Pompeio magno
M. Licinio Crasso consulibus.
20 f. Air,Hoc testimonia vatum quamplurima comprobare videntur furorem lucretianum laudantium, licet dicatur
a graecis ὡς γὰρ μαινομένοι οἱ ποιηταὶ quodammodo videlicet poetas insanientibus evadere similes. The
correct verb is incorrectly accented: it should be μαινόμενοι.
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Pius, quotingDemocritus (fr. 17–18d-k) inGreek, thuspresents Lucretius as apoet-
prophet, whose bad reputation is the consequence of the difficulty of his divinely
inspired poetry.21 Then, referring to many other authorities, Pius gives an overall
positive portrayal of Lucretius.22 Finally, he returns to the topic of madness, quoting
Statius (silv. 2,7,76) and Lactantius (De ira 10,17):
Papinius [Statius] seems to imply that Lucretius was poisoned and insane
because of a love philtre when in the Silvae he says so: “and the lofty madness
of wise Lucretius”, to which, as I think, Lactantius alluded with these words
in his bookDe ira: “Who would think that he possessed a brain when he said
these things”.23
This passage in Lactantius, which is one of the most renowned within the anti-
Epicurean tradition, appears in brighter lightwhen placed in connectionwith Statius’
quotation. Indeed, referring to Lucretius’ insanity as the divine madness of a poet,
Pius, somehow, turns Lactantius’ insult into a praise.24 After that, Pius emphasizes
that Lactantius was alone (Unus Lactantius) in calling Lucretius a thoroughly insane
poet for having praised Epicurus, a mouse, as if he had been a lion.25 Clearly, Pius
wants to minimize Lactantius’ criticism by presenting his negative judgment as an
isolated case.
The praise of Lucretius culminates in a quotation from Virgil (georg. 2.489), to
the effect that Lucretius, in his work, had aimed to free the mind from the clouds
of ignorance. This quotation is followed by the precise statement that the poet’s
intention is to pursue the common benefit.26
21 For this interpretation, see Palmer, Reading Lucretius, 156.
22 Donat. Vita Verg. 6; Ov. Am. 1,15, 23–24 and 42–43; Ov. Trist. 2, 425–426 and 43–44; Quint. Inst. 10, 1, 87
and 48–49; Plato Soph. 254a ex interpretationeMarsilii Ficini; Tac.Dial. 23,2; Manil. 3, 39–42; Quint.
Inst. 1,4,4.
23 f. Air, Videtur Papinius potionatum et amatorio delirantem Lucretium significare cum sic inquit in silvis: «Et
docti furor arduus Lucreti», cui rei, ut sentio, Lactantius allusit iis in libro de ira dei positis: «Quis hunc putet
habuisse cerebrum cum haec diceret».
24 Palmer, Reading Lucretius, 156.
25 f. Air,Unus Lactantius insanissimum poetam vocat quod Epicurum ut murem leonis laudibus ornavit.
26 f. Air–v, In hoc opera intendit mentem nebulis inscitiae circumfusam liberare et ad illam felicitatem inducere,
quamMaro pollicetur ita canens: “Felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas. Atque metus omneis et inexorabile
fatum subiecit pedibus, strepitumque Acherontis avari”. Nititur pro viribus religionum hoc est superstitionum
nodis animos exolvere, ut nihil timeant, cupiant nihil, quod sit citra decorum. Intentio sane vatis est communis
utilitas.
johannes baptista pius’ commentary on de rerumnatura (1511) 97
As the reader will soon notice, Pius’ interpretatio – as well as the comment itself – is
structured as a constant dialogue with ancient and contemporary authors, in a dense
network of citations that appears to leave hardly any room for his own judgment.
As a consequence, at a first reading, Pius’ attitude toward the text that he presents
remains quite elusive: by quoting others, he hardly takes a clear stand on the contents
of Lucretius’ poem, leaving the task of judging the text to the reader. However,
although Pius seems to be objective and equidistant in presenting his sources, by
paying attention to his choice of specific texts and the way he presents these, as in the
case of Lactantius, it is yet possible to capture his own point of view on the topics he
deals with.
In the last paragraph of the interpretatio, Pius gives us an account of how he
reconstructed Lucretius’ Latin text:
I collated, not without hard work and long vigils, the codex of the Venetian
Ermolao, that of the Roman Pomponio and another, not entirely despicable,
which is stored inMantua in a suburban library and belonged to a learned
manof the distinguished Strozzi family. I have also taken into account another
copy – a printed one, but still thoroughly examined – of Philippo Beroaldo,
oncemy tutor, nowmy colleague.Nor did I neglect the specimen ownedby the
Bolognese scholar Codrus, which was copied for me by Bartolomeo Bianchini,
a man of refined eloquence, and that of the poetMarullo,27which he corrected
withmiraculous industry: not unwillingly Severus, a monk from Piacenza, a
great connoisseur of Greek and Latin, a true champion of theMuses, offered
it to me.28 From these [codices], just as Zeuxis from four different bodies, I
furnished Lucretiuswith a shapeunique and, inmyopinion, beyond reproach:
[codices] which, without a poet of the first rank in wisdom, would certainly
not have turned out to be full of erudition.29
27 The role of Michele Marullo in the transmission of Lucretius’ text, and the identification of his
corrections are very complex issues. Marullo never published his own edition of theDe rerum natura,
but it seems that his emendations to the text of Lucretius were well known in the Florentine
humanist circles. After publishing hisHymni naturales – where familiarity with theDe rerum natura
is quite evident – Marullo died in 1500, leaving his notes and emendations to Petrus Candidus, who
used it for the Juntine edition of 1512.
28 This is the Cistercianmonk Severo Varino from Piacenza; see Bertelli, “Noterelle machiavelliane”,
780 n. 22.
29 f. Aiv, Contulimus non sine aerumnis vigiliisque diutinis codicem veneti Hermolai, et Pomponi romani,
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In this passage, Pius lists the codices that he collated in order to reconstruct
Lucretius’ text: a copy used by Ermolao Barbaro, one used by Pomponio Leto, one
formerly owned by the Strozzi family in Mantua, a printed copy owned by Pius’
teacher, Beroaldo the Elder, a manuscript owned by the Bolognese scholar Antonius
Urceus Codrus and one used by Michele Marullo, which probably contained his
corrections to the text. Still, Munro, in his 1886 critical edition, recognized the heavy
dependence of Pius’ text on the first Aldine edition published in 1500 and edited by
Avancius, to whom Pius does not give any credit. At the same time, onemay notice
several discrepancies in Pius’ edition between his own re-established Lucretian text
and the words he used as entries in the commentary. For example, at 1.66, we read
graius in the text and gnarus in the commentary. This problem has been addressed by
Maria Carmela Tagliente’s article G.B. Pio e il testo di Lucrezio, in which she concluded
that Pius did not use only the copy of the first Aldine edition, but two copies: one for
text and the other for the entries, both containing distinct errors due to incorrect
transcription.30
2.3. Expositio in Lucretium: Lucretius andHis Philosophy
Where does Pius place Lucretius and his philosophy? An interesting answer to this
question can be found in the Expositio, where, first of all, Pius establishes a connection
between Lucretius and Empedocles:
In order to grasp the poem of Lucretius completely and entirely, it is useful
to know, in general and in its individual aspects, the doctrine of Empedocles,
whom Lucretius the poet, illuminated in various ways by the light of his
genius, follows in a greatmany aspects; andnot only does he repeatedly follow,
codicemque non omnino malum, qui servatur Mantuae in biblioteca quadam suburbana, qui fuit viri non
indocti gentis clarissimae Strotiorum.Non defuit Philippi Beroaldi praeceptoris quondammei, nunc collegae,
impressus quidem, sed tamen perpense examinatus. Codri quoque grammatici Bononiensis, cuius copia mihi per
BartholomeumBlanchinum virum eloquii excultissimi facta est, Marullique poetae industria mira castigatum
non defuit exemplar severo Monaco Placentino graece latinaeque perdocto musarum athleta non gravatim
offerente, ex quibus sicuti Zeusis, ex quatuor diversis corporibus unam, et ut arbitror, integerrimam formam
Lucretio praestitimus; qui sine sapientiae primario poeta sapientes prorsus evadere nequivissent. On this
passage, see Bertelli, “Noterelle machiavelliane”, 780.
30 See T. Lucreti Cari De rerum natura libri sex, ed. By H.A.J. Munro (London-Cambridge, 18864), 5 and
Maria Carmela Tagliente, “G. B. Pio e il testo di Lucrezio”, Res publica litterarum 6 (1983), 337–345. For
an analysis of this passage, see Palmer, Reading Lucretius, 158.
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sedulously, the doctrine of the philosopher from Agrigento, but he alsomakes
use of verses that recall the character and the spirit of Empedocles.31
After this introduction, there follows a detailed exposition of Empedocles’ philosophy:
Pius mentions his doctrine of the four elements – fire, water, air and earth – which
are moved by two opposing forces, love and strife. Then, hementions Empedocles’
opinion on the soul, conceived as blood that resides in the body, a theory which is also
mentioned by Lucretius in his poem (3.43–44).32
It is worth pointing out that connecting Lucretiuswith Empedocles was anything
but uncommon among Renaissance scholars, but it was often limited to the poetic
sphere; Pius, instead, pointedly remarked on the debt that Lucretius’ philosophy
had to Empedocles.33 Linking the two was certainly a safe move, after all, contrary
to what had happened to Epicureanism, Empedocles and notably his doctrine of
the four elements had enjoyed a great fortune from Aristotle onwards and up to
the seventeenth century and even beyond. Therefore, it seems that, by emphasizing
the association of Lucretius with Empedocles, Pius endeavored to render Lucretius’
atomismmore acceptable. More specifically – as maintained by Valerio Del Nero – by
comparing Lucretius to Empedocles, Pius tried tomitigate, through the Empedoclean
physical pluralism, the essence of Lucretian atomism, which, on the contrary, is based
on a unique principle of reality, namely the atoms.34
31 f. 1v, Ad absolutam et integram cognitionem poematis lucretiani expedit summatim carptimque dignoscere
Empedoclis dogmata, quem litus variis ingenii luminibus Lucretius poeta sectatur in plurimis, qui nedum sedulo
sectam Agrigentini philosophi identitem sequitur, sed et carminibus utitur Empedoclis flatum spiritumque
referentibus. The relation between Lucretius and Empedocles has been extensively examined inmany
studies; among the most recent contributions see Sedley, Lucretius, 1–34 and id., “Lucretius and the
NewEmpedocles”, 1–12; Piazzi, Lucrezio e i Presocratici and Ead., “Atomismo e polemica”, 22–25; Garani,
Empedocles Redivivus: Poetry and Analogy in Lucretius, (London/New York: Routledge, 2007); James
Warren’s “Lucretius and Greek Philosophy” andMonica Gale’s “Lucretius and Previous Poetic Tradi-
tions” in Cambridge Companion to Lucretius, 19–32 and 59–75. Finally, see FrancescoMontarese, Lucretius
and his Sources: A Study of Lucretius, De rerum natura i 635–920, (Berlin-Boston: De Gruyter, 2012), 212–235.
32 f. 1v, Animam ut prodidit Aristoteles putat esse sanguinem, quod et Lucretius noster iis imitatur. See Arist.
An. i 2 405b1–5, where the reference to those who say that the soul is blood is meant to include
Empedocles as well; see frag. 105 d, 317 k αἷμα γὰρ ἀνθρώποις περικάρδιόν ἐστι νόημα.
33 See for example the first introductory epistle to the 1500 Aldine edition, in which AldusManutius
recommends reading Lucretius quia Epicureae sectae dogmata eleganter et docte mandavit carminibus,
imitatus Empedoclem, qui primus apud Graecos praecepta sapientiae versibus tradidit. See Aldo Manuzio
editore. Dediche. Prefazioni. Note ai testi, 2 vols., introd. by Carlo Dionisotti (Milano: Il Polifilo, 1975),
vol. 1, 33–34.
34 Del Nero, “Filosofia e teologia”, 168.
100 chapter 3
But, at the end of this paragraph, Pius does link Lucretius’ philosophy to Epicurus,
first by referring to their shared atomism:
Nevertheless, in most respects, Lucretius follows Epicurus, who thought that
the elements and the other things of this kind consist of atoms, that is to say
of small, very small principles, which he used to call ‘atoms’, that is indivisible
[bodies], to which the Latin Homer [sc. Virgil] gives his approval in the Bucolics
like this: “how through themighty void the seeds were driven of earth, air,
ocean, and of liquid fire, how all that is from these beginnings grew, and the
young world itself took solid shape”.35
The quotation is a passage in Virgil (ecl. 6.31–34), in which Silenus explains how the
world was made according to the doctrine of Epicurus. Quoting this passage, Pius
seems to suggest that even a well-accepted author like Virgil supported the atomistic
theory.
At this stage, Pius feels that he has to provide a comparison between the philoso-
phy of Empedocles and that of Epicurus:
But Iwant towarn you of this, that Epicurus andEmpedocles think differently
about the principles of things, since Empedocles posits the four elements
as first-beginnings, as well as the Sphairos, that is God, according to what
Themistius says in the first book of the Physics. Empedocles also believed
that there were two other principles, strife and love, mutually incompatible,
according to the same Themistius, in the second book of the Physics. Instead
Epicurus [posits] only two principles: namely body and void.36
35 f. 2r, Sequitur tamen Lucretius in plurimis Epicurum, qui atomis hoc est minutiis, minutissimis videlicet
principiis, quas atomos hoc est insectiles dictitat, elementa et id genus reliqua consistere voluit cui in buccolico
ludicro suffragatur latinus Homerus sic: “Namque canebat uti magnum per inane coacta/ semina terrarumque
animaequemarisque fuissent/ et liquidi simul ignis; ut his exordia primis/ omnia, et ipse tenermundi concreuerit
orbis”. For Virgil’s passage, I have used J.B. Greenough’s translation.
36 f. 2r, Sed hoc admonitum te volo Epicurum et Empedoclemde principiis rerumdisserentes non concinere, quoniam
Empedocles quatuor elementa rerum primordia ponit et sphaerum idest deum auctore Themistio libro primo
physicorum. Idem odium et amorem principia duo esse credidit inter se capitalia auctore eodem Themistio
secundo physicorum. Duo tantum Epicurus, corpus videlicet et inane. Sphairos is the termwith which Pius
transcribes the Empedoclean σφαῖρος, that is the initial stage in the formation of the cosmos. See
Themistii In Aristotelis Physica Paraphrasis, ed. H. Schenkl (Berlin: Reimer, 1900), 13 (124, 26–27) and 42
(167, 20–22).
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Having remarked on the differences between the doctrines of Lucretius’ main
two philosophical ancestors, Pius describes the nature of Epicurus’ atomistic physics
by quoting passages from Servius, Seneca and Eusebius.37 His analysis is careful and
meticulous. Using a sort of Ringkomposition, it ends with a renewed comparison with
Empedocles. This time, too, the focus is on the difference between the Empedoclean
and Epicurean conceptions of first principles.
Empedocles of Agrigento, however, posits the four elements as principles:
namely fire, air, water and earth. He also posits two forces, friendship and
discord; while friendship unites, discord divides. But they [sc. the atomists]
call the space, inwhich the atoms are, void. And so, they think that, from these
two principles [sc. atoms and void], those four are generated: fire, air, water,
earth, and from these the others, so that those two principles are elementary,
but these four, which are syntheta, i.e., composed from the other two, give rise
to all other things. Therefore, with regard to the principles of things, Epicurus
and Empedocles have different opinions.38
In the end, however, Pius tries to harmonize the doctrines of Empedocles and
Epicurus, maintaining that, according to the atomists, the four elements are an
intermediate stage between atoms and compounds. Although this interpretationmay
receive some backing from a few passages inDe rerum natura (e.g. 1.820–821, 5.235–237),
it is not the usual interpretation of Lucretius’ figured atoms. With his idiosyncratic
interpretation, Pius seems to be trying to harmonize Lucretius’ controversial atomism
with the well-accepted theory of the four elements.39
37 Serv. ecl. 6.31; Sen. ben. 4.19.3; Euseb. Præp. ev. 14.14 [= Ps-Plutarch, plac, 1.3 = Aetius i.3.18]. In this last
passage, a comparison between Democritean and Epicurean atomism is established: Commentarii,
fol. 2r:Democritus, quem Epicurus sequitur, principium rerum asserit corpuscula quaedamminutissima, quas
atomos appellat ratione cognoscibiles solidas non generabiles nec corruptibiles, omni fractura superiores, quae
alterari non possunt. Has in vacuo et per vacuummoveri asserit, quod infinitum esse opinatur. Atomos quoque
ipsas infinitas numero dicit, quibus accidunt magnitudo et figura secundum Democritum. Epicurus autem
pondus etiamadiecit.Non enimmovebuntur inquit nisi pondere deferantur. Figuras vero atomorumnec infinitas
et eiusmodi esse asserunt ut frangi non possint.
38 f. 2r, Empedocles vero agrigentinus quatuor elementa, ignem videlicet, aerem, aquam et terram principia ponit.
Duas etiam virtutes amicitiam atque litem; et amicitiam quidem coniungere, litem vero distinguere. Inane vero
dicunt spacium in quo sunt atomi. De his itaque duobus principiis volunt quatuor ista procreari: ignem, aerem,
aquam, terram, et ex iis caetera, ut illa duo elementa sint, haec vero quatuor syntheta idest composita ex aliis
duobus prestent originem aliis omnibus rebus. In principiis ergo rerum Epicurus et Empedocles diversa sentiunt.
39 According to Giussani (T. Lucreti Cari De Rerum Natura, 77) and Bailey (Titi Lucreti Cari de rerum
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More in general, as seenbefore, Piuswas certainly not the first tonotice the parallel
with the philosopher from Agrigento. What is new of his interpretation is that he
tried to establish Lucretius’ double indebtedness to Epicurus andEmpedocles alike, by
means of a comparison between the doctrines of the two philosophers. As we will see
shortly, this alleged double dependence provides the key to Pius’ reading of Lucretius’
first principles.
It is in the next section of the expositio that the similarities between Lucretius’
thought and that of Epicurus are made finally explicit. In order to emphasize this
connection, Pius quotes a passage from Lactantius and another one from Jerome, two
testimonies that are usually unfavorable to the Epicurean doctrine:
But since it belongs to Lucretius’ poem to know the doctrine of Epicurus,
because, according to Lactantius inDe opificio, all of Lucretius’ crazy theories
originate from Epicurus, a view with which Jerome agrees in Contra Rufinum,
saying: “If there were space enough, I could relate the thoughts of Lucretius,
which agree with Epicurus”, I will also deal with this topic, as briefly as I can.40
The passage in Lactantius – which was well-known in the anti-Epicurean tradition –
can be interpreted in two ways: either all of Lucretius’ theories are crazy Epicurean
ideas (deliramenta), or else, Lucretius talks nonsense (delirat) only when he follows
Epicurus. As we will see shortly, it is likely that Pius was more inclined to accepting
the latter interpretation, and to blame primarily Epicurus for those of Lucretius’
theories that he also considered crazy.
The linkbetweenEpicurus and Lucretius is highlighted especially in the following
passage, where Pius summarizes some of the principles of Epicurean physics and
emphasizes their substantial affinity with Lucretius’ thought:
natura libri sex, 729 and 740), Epicurus and Lucretius considered the four elements as intermediate
entities between atoms and compound. ButMontarese rightly suggests that this idea is not that
straightforward: “Lucretiusmay conceivably have thought that Empedocles was right in seeing that
the four elements were important on some levels, even if they were not what matter was ultimately
made out of. Such a suggestion would be muchmore convincing if it could be shown that the four
elements had an important role in Epicurus’ doctrine”. See Montarese, Lucretius, 229. Of the same
opinion as Giussani and Bailey is also Garani, Empedocles redivivus, 14.
40 f. 2r, Sed quoniam ad poema Lucretianum pertinet Epicuri dogma scire, quoniam auctore Lactantio libro de
opificio (Lact. opif . 6,1) Epicuri sunt omnia quae delirat Lucretius, cuiHieronymus adstipulatur contra Rufinum
(Hier. Adv. Ruf . 29.1) iis: «Si esset locus possem tibi vel Lucreti opiniones iuxta Epicurum dicere»; breviter, ut
potero, id quoque attingam.
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First, Epicurus – withwhom also Lucretius agrees, and rightly so – thinks that
nothing comes fromwhat is not. [He also thinks] that the principles of things
are atoms, which move continuously. He says, however, that the atoms do
not possess any intrinsic quality, beyond shape, size and weight. Finally, that
an atom is never perceived by the sense organs, since atoms do not assume
any quality besides those named above, he proves, thus, that every quality
changes, while the atoms remain unchanged. The atoms are ⟨in⟩visible, and
it is not possible to explain how they could be seen. The atoms are transported
with equal speed through the vacuum. The soul is made up of atoms which
are extremely light and totally round, and, being formed by the aggregation of
these bodies, the soul is corporeal. The incorporeal per se we cannot conceive,
with the exception of the vacuum. In addition, the vacuum can neither do,
nor suffer anything. From these, worlds have been generated, of which, like
Democritus, Epicurus assumes an infinity; they are corruptible, since their
parts change, and do not have a single form. For some have the appearance
of a sphere, others that of an egg, others receive another shape. Moreover, he
seems to claim that souls are mortal, since he declares the loss of the senses
after death; and the idea that the souls will suffer punishments for the present
life seems fanciful to him.41
Pius’ main source for this section is the Epistula ad Herodotum, which is contained
in the tenth book of Diogenes Laertius.42 As seen before, at Pius’ time, this epistle
attracted wide attention, mainly thanks to the translation into Latin of Laertius’
entire work by Ambrogio Traversari in 1433.43
41 f. 2r, Primum credit Epicurus, cui et Lucretius adstipulatur et id recte, nihil fieri ex eo quod non est. Atomos
principia rerum, quae et iugiter moventur. Ait autem intrinsecus neque ullam circa atomos inesse qualitatem
praeter figurametmagnitudinemet gravitatem.Deniquenumquamatomus sensuvisa est quodatominullamab
illis predictis qualitatem suscipiant, ita probat quod scilicet qualitas omnis immutatur atomis nihil immutatis.
Visibiles atomi sunt nec quomodo videantur ratio reddi potest. Invehuntur atomi aequa celeritate per inane.
Ex atomis anima compacta levissimis atque rotondissimis, ex quibus corporibus anima contexta corporea est.
Incorporeum autem per se intelligere non possumus praeter vacuum. Porro vacuum neque facere aliquid neque
pati potest. Hinc genitosmundos, quorum infinitatem opinatur utDemocritus, qui corruptibiles sunt cum partes
eorummutentur, qui unam formam non habent. Alios namque spherae, alios ovi praeferre speciem, aliosque
aliam formam admittere. Videturque mortales animas asserere quod ab interitu privationem sensus affirmat:
videturque fabulosum hoc putare quod vitae praesentis poenas animos luant. Most probably just before
“visibiles” a negation is implied or missing.
42 Pius’ account covers almost the entire letter, included the scholia.
43 See Goddard, Epicureanism, 25.
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In the following and last passage of this section, Pius focuses on Epicurus, whom
he presents in a quite contradictory manner, as someone who is “now a Stoic, now
addicted to pleasure, now a Cato, now a Sardanapalus, now shabby and thin, now
crowned with garlands and a bon vivant”.44 According to Charlotte Goddard, in this
passage Pius “seems confused by the diversity of opinion about Epicurean philosophy,
and by the incompatibility of the various remarks”.45 But this could also be a strategy
for telling us that we should take everything bad we have heard about Epicurus with
a pinch of salt, and certainly not literally. Moreover, what is conspicuous – certainly
when we consider the title of this paragraph, Castus Epicurus – is Pius’ tendency to
redeem the figure of Epicurus, by underlining the difficulty of his philosophy and the
inconsistency of the judgments that have been passed on him. Eventually, Pius even
speculates that, if Cicero had tried to understand the Epicurean idea of pleasure, he
would probably have accepted it.46 In this passage, Pius re-uses some topoi which had
been recurrent in the patristic andmedieval literature, where, besides the negative
judgments on Epicurus and Epicureanism, one also finds somemore positive ones.
In fact, it seems that there was already in the Middle Ages a clear distinction between
Epicurus and his followers, the Epicureans. The first – despite the doctrinal errors –
was known for his wisdom and ascetic lifestyle, while his disciples were considered to
havemisunderstood the philosopher or simply to have followed the popular legend.47
In general, in this first section, the attitude of Pius toward Lucretius, Epicurus and
their philosophy is quite clearly ambiguous. Sometimes, it seems that Pius follows
the common negative view, at other times, however, he strives to find amediation
between Lucretius and other ancient doctrines. At other times yet, it seems that Pius
44 f. 2v: Amplius arduum esse et forsan impossibile sententias Epicureas recte tradere: quemmodo stoicum, modo
voluptarium conspicio, modo Catonem, modo Sardanapalum, modo hispidum et macilentum, modo coronatum
et comessatorem; quemM. Tullius credit in horas mutare clavum, nisi, quod Laertius Diogenes retur, invidia
plurimum castissimo philosopho nonnulla preter fidem ascripserit, quae sua non erant, uti ita contemnendus
et explodendus videretur e philosophorum coetu atque decuria. Apud Senecammorbo compugnat Epicurus, et
stoicae rigiditatis aemulus in ipsis Orci faucibus et limine mortis epistolas dictat, quae adeo ab Epicuro vulgato
hoc est unguentato et temulento discrepant, ut putem esse citra fidem si venerius et scortator a plerisque omnibus
habetur: quorum auctoritatem sequtus Cicero saepicule vellicat et sugillat Epicurum tanquam voluptarium et
mulierum amoribus ancillantem.
45 See Goddard, Epicureanism, 213.
46 f. 2v,Quod si Cicero mentis oculos non invidiae collimasset atque direxisset ad amasiam Epicuri voluptatem,
libentes ad illam divertisset. Comperisset enim eam statum esse animi sedatum atque tranquillum, cuius
pabulum erat scrutatio secretorumnaturae ex cuius contemplatione voluptas oritur omnemvoluptatem excedens.
47 On this topic, see Maria Rita Pagnoni, “Prime note”, 1443–1477; Jones, The Epicurean Tradition, 117–141
and 142–165; Aurélien Robert, “Epicure et les épicuriens”, 3–46.
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wants to point out the difference between Epicurus and Lucretius, sometimes by
linking the thought of the latter to that of other philosophers, such as Empedocles.
However, also in the commentary, Pius hardly ever expresses his own opinion, as his
main concern seems to be a ‘mere’ interpretation of the text; to this end, he resorts to
historical and philological erudition. Inevitably though, his choice of specific texts
guides the reader’s judgment in the interpretation of Lucretius’ poem. While one
might think that Piuswants to leave the reader free to interpret and judge the sources,
the suspicion remains that his main concernmay have been tomaintain a cautious
attitude towards arguments that were still doctrinally dangerous to deal with. This
ambiguous, but at the same time critical attitude is also frequently expressed in the
commentary itself, of which, in the next section, some crucial passages concerning
Lucretius’ atomismwill be analysed.
3. Pius on Lucretius’ Matter Theory
3.1. Atoms or Elements?
As has been pointed out by David Sedley, in his proem to book i (lines 54–61), Lucretius
introduces his own alternative set of terms for ‘atom’, a word that he himself never
uses.48 These terms are: rerum primordia,materies, genitalia corpora, semina rerum, corpora
prima.
Nam tibi de summa caeli ratione deumque
55 disserere incipiam et rerum primordia pandam,
unde omnis natura creet res, auctet alatque,
quove eadem rursum natura perempta resolvat,
quae nosmateriem et genitalia corpora rebus
reddunda in ratione vocare et semina rerum
60 appellare suemus et haec eadem usurpare
corpora prima, quod ex illis sunt omnia primis.
For I shall begin to discourse to you upon themost high system of heaven and
of the gods, and I shall disclose the first-beginnings of things, from which
48 Sedley, Lucretius, 38.
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naturemakes all things and increases and nourishes them, and into which
the same nature again reduces themwhen dissolved – which, in discussing
philosophy, we are accustomed to callmatter, and bodies that generate things,
and seeds of things, and to entitle the same first bodies, because from them as
first elements all things are.
First,we shouldmention that primordia, semina,materies, genitalia corpora, corporaprima,
but also principia and elementa, by themselves, do not actually designate atoms. They
jointly refer to a concept that is only gradually developed in the course of Lucretius’
first book and onwards. InDe rerum natura 1.635–920, for example, Lucretius can still
use these same words to refer to Heraclitus’ fire, Empedocles’ four elements and
Anaxagoras’ ‘homoeomeria’. Only after these alternative theories have been rejected,
they can be univocally identified with the atoms. But, as we look in vain for the word
‘atom’ itself in the poem, the link between these terms and the ‘atom’ of Democritus
or Epicurus cannot have immediately been obvious to the humanist reader. We can
witness this lack of initial precision as Pius comments on all of Lucretius’ alternative
terms, beginning with primordia:
Primordia. Principles. I will explain how the elements and the principles of
natural things obtained their own nature. Unde (whence). From the four
principles, even though Epicurus thinks from one, namely from the atoms.49
Since, by itself, the term primordia could refer to any kind of principle or element, and
certainly not specifically to atoms, Pius glosses Lucretius’ primordia, ‘first-beginnings’,
as principia, ‘principles’, and explains this term by referring to the four Empedoclean
(and Aristotelian) elements.50 He then contrasts this view with Epicurus’ doctrine,
49 f. 9v, Primordia. Principia. Enarrabo quo pacto elementa et rerum naturalium principia naturam suam sortita
sunt. Unde. A quatuor principiis, cum ab uno hoc est atomis censeat Epicurus.
50 Pierre Grimal has suggested that, in Lucretius’ text, the two terms (primordia and principia) cannot be
synonyms: primordia designates unequivocally the atoms, while principia indicates a particular stage
of matter that is intermediate between primordia and the sensible objects, a sort of atomic aggregate
comparable precisely with the four Empedoclean elements. However, as Bailey (pp. 140 and 606–
607) and Sedley rightly observe, these terms are synonyms which very conveniently supplement
each other’s non-metrical forms, as principia, primordiorum and primordiiswill not scan. See Pierre
Grimal, “Elementa, primordia, principia dans le poème de Lucrèce”, inMélanges de philosophie, de
littérature et d’ histoire ancienne offerts à Pierre Boyancé (Rome: Collection de l’École française de Rome,
1974), 357–366; Sedley, Lucretius, 195 n. 9.
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according towhich the atoms are considered to be first principles. In the end, however,
he does not clarify fromwhom Lucretius has taken his concept of primordia, leaving
the question open. Thus, according to Pius, in this first instance, the term principia,
also used by Lucretius to designate the atoms, overlaps with the concept of principia,
understood as the four elements.51
Then, when he tackles the second term, materies, Pius does so in a prevalently
Aristotelianmanner:
Materiem […] The philosophers say that matter is a pure principle, in the sense
of body, and that form [is a pure principle] in the sense of soul; appropriately
the poet begins from the principles. In fact, on Aristotle’s advice, in the first
[book] of the Physics, “we think that we know a thing, then, when we are
acquainted with its causes and principles down to its (first) elements”. The
Peripatetic [philosopher] affirms that nature’s principles are three, namely
matter, form and privation. Thematter is not known if not by analogy to the
form. The matter, together with the form, is the cause of all things, that take
place beneath the subject (sub subiecto). […] No wonder if our Lucretius, first of
all, deals with the principles. For, he has heard Aristotle, in the first [book] of
the Physics, say as follows: “it is necessary for those who research into nature
that they, in the first place, observe and discuss those things that pertain to
the principles”.52
In the passage from De rerum natura to which Pius refers here, the Lucretian noun
materies is nowadays usually taken to designate nothing else but the atoms, but Pius
clearly interprets it in the light of Aristotle’s hylomorphism.53 His interpretation
51 See also f. 31v, Primordia rerum. Principia, quatuor videlicet elementa.
52 f. 9v,Materiem. Promateriam. Philosophimateriam dicunt esse purum principium ut corpus, formamut anima;
recte a principiis auspicatur poeta. Nam auctore Aristotele primo Physicorum «tunc arbitramur unumquodque
cognoscere cum causas et principia cognoscimus usque ad elementa» [Arist. Phys. i 1, 184a12–14]. Peripateticus
autumat tria esse principia naturae, materiam scilicet, formam et privationem.Materia non cognoscitur nisi per
analogiam ad formam. [See. Arist., Phys. i 7, 191a8–11 and S. Thomas, In Phys., i, lect. 13, n. 118].Materia
cum forma est causa rerum omnium, quae fiunt sub subiecto. […]Nec mirum sit si Lucretius noster ante omnia
de principiis agit. Audivit enim sic loquentem Aristotelem libro primo Physicorum: necessarium est naturae
studiosis in primis ea ut videant atque discutiant, quae ad principia pertinent.
53 The same interpretation can be found in other passages, such as Pius’ comment on Lucr. 1.221. See
f. 21r, Aeterno semine. Principio, materia que est aetherna, nunquam deficit, semper aliam formam recipit. Hoc
voluit Aristoteles significare libro physicorum iimateria non habet privari omni forma. Ordo codicis hic est.
Nullius exitium patitur natura videri quoniam quaeque constant aetherno semine.
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is however not restricted to the Aristotelian view: he explicitly states that, in order
to throw light on Lucretius, it is important to know what the Peripatetics and the
Platonists together with the others thought about this topic.54 Therefore, in the lines
that follow, quoting a passage fromwhat he thinks is Themistius’ text in Hermolaus
Barbarus’ Latin translation, Pius also refers to other Greek philosophers, such as
Thales, Anaximander, Parmenides and Anaxagoras.55 These are considered Lucretius’
predecessors, since they also investigated the structure of Nature. Finally, Pius’
comparison returns to Plato and Aristotle, the latter having reduced the multiplicity
of principles to form and matter, the former having resolved them into plane
surfaces (superficies).56 The text quoted by Pius pertains to Hermolaus Barbarus’ Latin
translation of Themistius’ paraphrase of Aristotle’s Physics. In reality, however, it
stems from Simplicius’ preface, which was incorporated by Barbarus under the name
of Themistius. As Charles Schmitt has pointed out, the problem arose because a
number ofmanuscripts of Themistius’ paraphrase of the Physics contained Simplicius’
preface.57 By quoting this passage, Pius underlines themeaningfulness and richness
of Lucretius’ philosophical view and inserts his thought into a historic-philosophical
context.
The third expression put forward by Lucretius to refer to the atoms is genitalia
corpora, ‘bodies that generate things’. Pius comments:
Genitalia corpora. The elements and principles of things are named carefully
and correctly ‘bodies that generate things’, because fromthemtheother things
are created. It is true that they supply first beginnings and principles to the
natural things, but they cannot be rightly called ‘bodies’ – if not bymeans of
the figure of speech [called] catachresis, i.e., the improper use of a word – nor, in
fact, are the (real) first elements contaminated and impure, I mean those from
which everything is born, for instance, neither does fire, as a first element,
54 f. 9v, Sed quoniamad lucemLucretio afferendampertinet scire quid peripatetici et cum caeteris platonici senserint
inferam iis nostris verba Themistii libro primo suae paraphraseos.
55 The parallel with the Pre-Socratics occurs frequently in Pius’ commentary, see for example f. 32r–v.
56 f. 10r,Nam cum illi homiomaerias hoc est similes particulas vel unum ex quatuor elementis vel plura vel omnia
rerum esse principia censuissent vel insectilia usque corpora pervenissent, Aristoteles et homiomaerias et quatuor
elementa dissolvit, atque ipsam corporalem naturam in formammateriamque diduxit, quemadmodum et ante
Aristotelem Plato et ante Platonem Timaeus pythagoricus fecerant arbitrati proxima principia esse quatuor
elementa et ante elementa superficies.
57 See Charles B. Schmitt, Gianfrancesco Pico DellaMirandola (1469–1533) andHis Critique of Aristotle (The
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1967), 64 n. 40.
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burns, but, as John (Duns) Scotus maintains, it ‘fires’, nor is the earth dry or
wet, but [each] is pure and simple, and likewise the other two elements that
follow them.58
According to Pius, the genitalia corpora, understood as the four elements, are to be
taken to be pure and abstract principles, not real corporeal bodies.59The idea that there
are true and pure elements, of which the elements we see are composed, was already
widespread in Antiquity and Middle Ages, and might stem from Plato’s Timaeus.
According to this theory, there would be elements in their pure state – that is, not
combined with the properties of the other elements – and elements as apprehended
by sense perception – that is, seen and perceived in an impure state, mixed with other
elements.60
In the Timaeus, Plato explains that the four elements do not have an unchanging
character: we observe, for instance, things “which we now call ‘water’ becoming by
condensation, as we believe, stones and earth; and again, this same substance, by
dissolving and dilating, becoming breath and air …”.61 For this reason, ‘fire’, ‘air’,
‘water’ and ‘earth’ are names of qualities, rather than substances: “we should speak
of fire, not as ‘this’, but as ‘what is of such and such quality’ ”.62 The result is that,
according to Plato, the four elements, as we know them, are denied the status of
permanent thingswith anunchanging character.63 Later on, interpreting this passage,
Calcidius had explained that ignis should therefore be called igneum, terra should be
58 f. 10r, Genitalia corpora. Elementa et principia rerum conquisite recteque corpora genitalia dicuntur, quo-
niam ex illis caetera gignuntur. Illa certe dant primordia et principia naturalibus rebus, nec recte corpora
vocari possunt nisi per figura catacresin hoc est abusionem, nec vero elementa prima feculenta sunt et impura,
illa dico ex quibus omnia nascuntur, verbigratia ignis primum elementum non adurit, sed ut ait Ioannes
Scotus ignit, nec terra est sicca aut humecta, sed pura et simplex cum caeteris duobus sequentibus elemen-
tis.
59 A similar statement can be found in f. 37r, Ignis enim quem videmus non est verus ignis, sed naturam
elementi refert ut auctor est Apuleius noster. Ille vero est purus ignis qui est in concavo orbis lunae, cuius natura
ut igniat non ut urat ut Scoti dogmatistae credunt.
60 On this topic, see Irene Caiazzo, “The four elements”, esp. 15–17, 37–40.
61 Transl. by W.R.M. Lamb. Plat. Tim. 49b–c, πρῶτον μέν, ὃ δὴ νῦν ὕδωρ ὠνομάκαμεν, πηγνύμενον ὡς
δοκοῦμεν λίθους καὶ γῆν γιγνόμενον ὁρῶμεν, τηκόμενον δὲ καὶ διακρινόμενον αὖ ταὐτὸν τοῦτο
πνεῦμα καὶ ἀέρα …
62 Transl. by W.R.M. Lamb. Plat. Tim. 49d, … ὡς πῦρ, μὴ τοῦτο ἀλλὰ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἑκάστοτε προσ-
αγορεύειν πῦρ, μηδὲ ὕδωρ τοῦτο ἀλλὰ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀεί, μηδὲ ἄλλο ποτὲ μηδὲν ὥς τινα ἔχον
βεβαιότητα.
63 See Francis MacDonald Cornford, Plato’s cosmology: the Timaeus of Plato (London: Routledge, 2014), 180.
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called terreum, and so on.64 Then, he had distinguished between igneum and ignis purus,
which is the species, the non-corporeal idea of sensible fire.65
Nevertheless, the view that the ordinary elements, being composite bodies, are
mixtures of the pure elements, which in nature are never found in an isolated state, is
also Aristotelian. Aristotle, inDe generatione et corruptione (ii 1 328b26–3 331a 6), explains
that fire, air,water, and earth arenot really elements, because they canbe analysed into
more fundamental constituents. Strictly speaking, their primary qualities (hot and
cold, dry and wet) and prime matter are the real elements, that is, eternal elementary
conditions of generation and corruption.66 Even though he does not reveal his exact
source, Pius might have drawn upon both the Platonic and Aristotelian traditions
when he interprets Lucretius’ first beginnings as the four elements, conceived as pure
and non-corporeal entities.67
Then, relying on scholastic sources, specifically on Scotus, Pius notices that, when
fire is conceived as pure, it must have a pure effect as well. What is the pure effect of
fire? It cannot just be ‘to burn’ (adurere), butmust be something profoundly connected
to its own essence, that is, ‘to fire’ (ignire).68 The same thing applies to the other
elements.
64 Calcidius, Commentarius in Timaeum, 326, non est ignis censendus, sed igneum quiddam.
65 Calcidius, Commentarius in Timaeum, 272, ignis porro purus et ceterae sincerae intellegibilesque substantiae
species sunt exemplaria corporum, ideae cognominatae. Echoes of this theory can be also found in later
authors, such as Adelard of Bath (1080–1152), who, in hisQuaestiones naturales, claims: “I agree that
plants are born from earth, but not from pure earth; rather, from mixed earth – in the kind of
mixture that contains in each of its parts […] all four elements with their qualities. For in such a
way do those four simple elements compose this one body of the world that, although they exist
as components in each composed object, they never appear to the senses as they are; but we assign
to the composed thing the erroneous label of the name of one of its simple elements […]. These
composite things thatwe perceivewith the senses are not the elements themselves, but they are from
the elements themselves. Therefore as the Philosopher says, they should not be called earth, water,
air or fire, but the earthy, the watery, the airy, and the fiery (Plato, Timaeus, trans. Calcidius, 49d)”.
Transl. by C. Burnett. Adelard of Bath, quaest. nat. 1, ed. Burnett, 93. See also William of Conches’s
Glosae super Boetium, iii, m. 9, ed. Nauta, 163, and Glosae super Platonem, 163, ed. Jeauneau, 296–297.
66 See Aristotle.OnComing-to-Be andPassing-Away (DeGeneratione etCorruptione), ed. byHaroldH. Joachim
(Oxford: Oxford up, 1922), 189, and Timothy J. Crowley, “Aristotle’s So-Called Elements”, Phronesis
53.3 (2008), 223–242, 224.
67 The fact that Pius’ interpretation relies on both Plato and Aristotle is revealed in the passage that
follows: f. 10r, Plato alteram terram in aethere posuit verum simplex et purum elementum. Aristoteles ignem in
concavo orbis lunae …
68 Pius here might refer to a passage in Scotus’ commentary on Peter Lombard’s Sentences, bk 2, dist. 1,
quaest. 1, Si ponatur ignem habere duos effectus ordinatos, scilicet calefacere et ignire, si essentialius se habeat
ignis ad utrumque quam ignire ad calefacere, quamvis ignire presupponat calefacere, si ponatur per impossibile
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However, by putting forward this interpretation, Pius distances himself once
again from the original passage: now, he is actually commenting on the four-element
theory, rather than on Lucretius’ principles. Thence, Pius’ hesitation to call Lucretius’
genitalia corpora ‘bodies’, perhaps informed by his reading of some Platonic and
Aristotelian sources, is a personal philosophical concern that has nothing to do
with the original text he is commenting on. On the contrary, to Lucretius, as to
Epicurus, atoms are the bodies par excellence and are hence rightly called ‘bodies that
generate things’, because they are pure body, whereas compound bodies always have
an admixture of void.
Finally, at the end of this passage, Pius writes:
But Aristotle, in the third book of De [caelo et]mundo, says that “the elements
[are] the first bodies, from which the other bodies are created”, as you can
learn from him. Led by this reasoning, Lucretius calls the elements ‘bodies
that generate things’, because, evidently, from these first bodies the other
bodies are generated. Aristotle does not posit the elements as principles of
things, but those three: matter, form and privation.69
As the discussion on this topic continues, we will notice how often Pius’s evident
starting point for interpreting Lucretius is Aristotle: he simply assumes that Lucretius
was acquaintedwithAristotle’sworks and even speculates that henamedhis elements
corporagenitalia, ‘bodies that generate things’, because of Aristotle’s reasoning that “the
elements [are] the first bodies (prima corpora), fromwhich the other bodies are created”.
Whether deliberately or not, by reading Lucretius from an Aristotelian perspective,
Pius reduces the philosophical distinctiveness of the former and thereby renders it
more understandable and acceptable to his readers.
ignemnon posse calefacere, non propter hoc negandum est ipsum ignemnon posse ignire, et ideo obligans seipsum
ad tenendum antecedens, non est obligatus ad tenendum consequens. Non enim teneret ista consequentia si ignis
non posset calefacere, igitur nec ignire, nisi per hanc propositionem affirmativam intellectam ‘potens ignire,
potest calefacere’, quae destruitur ex positione, ubi ponitur ratio perfecta ipsius igni.
69 f. 10r, Sed Aristoteles lib. iii de mundo elementa prima corpora dicit ex quibus fiunt alia corpora [Arist.
Cael. iii 3 302a 12 & 30–31], ut ab eo discere possis. Qua ratione ductus Lucretius elementa corpora genitalia
vocat, quoniam scilicet ex illis primis corporibus caetera corpora generantur. Aristoteles elementa principia
rerum non ponit, sed illa tria. Materiam, formam, privationem. Valerio Del Nero (Filosofia e teologia,
175) erroneously attributes the passage from Aristotle to the pseudo-Aristotelian De mundo. In
reality, this passage comes from the third book of De caelo (et mundo), see Hamesse, Les Auctoritates,
p. 166.
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The fourthword used by Lucretius to denote atoms is semina, ‘seeds’. Commenting
on the first occurrence of this word (Lucr. 1.59), Pius writes:
Semina. Principles. First beginnings. In fact, as the plants are born from a seed
in the vegetable things, in the same way from these seeds, so to speak, the
other natural bodies are created.70
As is evident from these words, Pius explains seeds (semina) as principles (principia)
and first beginnings (primordia). What is striking about Pius’ initial explanation of
semina is his emphasis on its living nature, and on the fact that the semen contains
within itself the potentiality for growth. At least in this passage, he clearly draws a
parallel between the biological level of the plants, on the one hand, and the physical
level of the natural bodies, on the other, without evenmentioning that Lucretiusmay
here refer to atoms. Indeed, for a Renaissance reader, the concept of seminawas not
univocal.With the exception of Epicureanism, semina had always been viewed as quite
distinct entities from purely material atoms.71 Only much later, when he reaches
the passage where Lucretius is asserting the atomic doctrine against Anaxagoras’
view, according to which all things are hidden in all things (Lucr. 1.895), does Pius
explicitly identify the analogy between semina and atoms, which he now presents as
first principles:
Verum semina. Atoms, which are seeds of everything, lurk as first principles in
bodies that are composite and able to contain the aforementioned void.72
Then, commentingon lines 60–61 and especially on the expression ‘to term first bodies’
(usurpare corpora prima), Pius writes:
70 f. 10v, Semina. Principia. Primordia. Nam quemadmodum ex semine in rebus vegetatis plantae nascuntur,
perinde ex his tamquam seminibus caetera corpora naturalia creantur.
71 The concept of semina in the Renaissance has been thoroughly examined by Hiro Hirai in Le concept
de semence dans les théories de la matière à la Renaissance: DeMarsile Ficin à Pierre Gassendi (Turnhout:
Brepols, 2005). On this topic see also Antonio Clericuzio, Elements, Principles and Corpuscles: A Study
of Atomism and Chemistry in the Seventeenth Century (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000),
13–20.
72 f. 44v, Verum semina. Atomi quae sunt omnium rerum semina latent quidem tanquam prima principia in
compositis corporibus et inanis supradicti capacibus.
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We do not speak in accordance with the prescription of the philosophical
standard, whenwe call the principles of things and the elements ‘first bodies’,
but we use [this name] incorrectly, led by this reasoning, that they supply
principles to the other things, (and) for this reason we name the elements
‘first bodies’. This he adopted from Aristotle, in the third book of De [caelo et]
mundo.73
Pius now states that he is referring to the principles of things (principia rerum) and
the four elements (air, earth, fire and water) improperly as being ‘first bodies’ (corpora
prima), since they are in reality more abstract and pure than bodies. He says that he
uses this name improperly, just because those elements supply principles to the other
things. He justifies his interpretation by referring to a passage from Aristotle’sDe
caelo (et mundo), which is probably the same as that invoked in his earlier comment
on the concept of genitalia corpora (De caelo, iii 3 302a 12: Elementa sunt prima corpora ex
quibus constant alia corpora). The reason why Pius now seems puzzled is that Lucretius,
in this passage, is referring to atoms, something concrete and bodily, while his
interpretations relymainly on a particular Platonic or Aristotelian tradition forwhich
the ‘true’ elements were not real bodies, but merely the species of the sensible, mixed
and heterogeneous bodies.
Even though Pius primarily links Lucretius’ first principleswith the Empedoclean
(and Aristotelian) four elements, he does not reject the parallel with Epicurus’
atomism altogether: it seems rather that he believed these theories to be perfectly
compatible. For instance, when he later comments on the passage in which the four-
elements theory is explicitly rejected (1.778–781), he acknowledges that Lucretius’ first
principles could actually be atoms.
At primordia. […] we regard as principle certain extremely small corpuscles,
endowed with multiple shapes […], and we will call them atoms, with which
nature forged the sky, the earth and the sea, being added or removed.74
73 f. 10v,Usurpare corpora prima. Non ad praescriptum philosophicae normae loquimur cum principia rerum et
elementa vocamus corpora prima, sed abutimur ducti hac ratione, quod illa dant principia caeteris corporibus,
ex hac causa prima corpora vocamus elementa. Hoc sumpsit ex Aristotele libro iii de mundo.
74 f. 41r, At primordia. […] nos principia facimus quedam tenuissima corpuscula multiplicibus figuris praedita,
[…] et appellabimus atomos, quibus natura caelum, terram, mare fabrefecit, quibusdam additis aut remo-
tis.
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Atoms therefore first created sky, earth and sea, which may be considered the
worldly manifestations of the four elements, and then the other bodies. As he had
already noticed in his Expositio, Pius remarks on the fact that, according to Lucretius,
the four elements, even though they are not different in substance from any other
atomic combination, must represent the first stage in the creation of the world.
Therefore, even though Epicurus and Empedocles “think differently about the first
principles”, as he states, their doctrines are not incompatible. In fact, immediately
after having explained the primordia as atoms, Pius turns back to the four-element
interpretation:
De numero.75 One should implicitly understand that, among those principles,
there is no one which alternately fights against the others and impedes
generation. In fact, if the elements were not very subtle, fire would fight
against water and one of the two would succumb. But, since they are simple,
they cannot exert adverse forces strongly, because of their smallness.76
In this passage, Lucretius is specifically arguing against Empedocles in showing
that he went astray by regarding the four elements as first-beginnings. Among
other things, he points out that the four elements are destructive to one another,
so, if they retained their character in composites, they could not produce anything,
because each element in the combination of this discordant heap would hinder the
creation of all things (1.778–780). Having to face the explicit condemnation of the
four-element theory, in order to make sense of this passage, Pius now assumes that
these ‘pure’ elements must possess almost atomic properties: they must be simple
and very subtle.
To conclude, in commenting on the first book of De rerum natura, Pius sometimes
identifies Lucretius’ principles with the four elements, conceived in their ‘pure’
state, sometimes with Epicurus’ atoms. He seems not particularly bothered by the
fact that Lucretius himself rejected the four-element theory (1.705–829) and clearly
showed that the four elements cannot bewhatmatter is ultimatelymade out of.Most
75 In 1.780, Pius reads de numero, instead of emineat, which the most widely accepted reading inmodern
editions.
76 f. 41r,De numero. Subintelligatur sit ne ex numero illorum principiorum sit aliquid quod invicem repugnet et
generatione impediat. Nam elementa nisi essent tenuissima ignis aquae repugnaret et alterum succumberet. Sed
cum sint simplicia valde non possunt exercere vires ob tenuitatem adversatrices.
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probably, according to Pius, this contradiction must stem from Lucretius himself,
who sometimes follows Empedocles, but at other times Epicurus:
Besides, Lucretius is Empedoclean, even though not always. Sometimes he is
Epicurean, sometimes he is not, such as in the invocation to Venus: in different
passages he follows different opinions.77
Later in the commentary, he goes as far as to assert that
The opinion of Empedocles is that everything consist of atoms, corpuscles
which do not admit division.78
Most probably, in this passage, Pius had a slip of the pen and wrote ‘Empedocles’
instead of ‘Epicurus’. But it is indeed curious that, after having taken great pains to
render Lucretius’ Epicurean atomismmore Empedoclean, Pius ends up, intentionally
or not, turning Empedocles into Epicurus.
3.2. Atoms are the ‘Seeds of Things’ Endowed with the Power of Generation
Some interesting clues as to Pius’ understanding of Lucretius’ atoms can also be found
in the comment on the passage where Lucretius claims that nothing can arise out of
nothing (1.159–191). According to the Roman poet, a given organism can only grow
from appropriate and fixed seeds (certa semina); in fact, it is impossible that all things
are born from all things, because in particular things resides a distinct faculty (secreta
facultas). As we have already seen before (see chapter 1), in this passage, Lucretius
establishes the organizing and generative power of his seminal atoms, and seems
to go beyond a purely materialist view of composition by endowing his atoms with
“almost miraculous creative powers”, in Sedley’s words.79
Commenting on this passage, Pius interprets the expression secreta facultas as
“Secreta. Separate, distinct. Facultas. Capacity to generate (gignendi potentia)”.80 The
77 f. 3v, Amplius empedocleus est Lucretius quamvis non semper. Quandoque epicureus, quandoque non, ut in
Veneris invocatione: diversis locis diversas secutus est opiniones.
78 f. 61r,Opinio Empedoclis est ex atomis omnia consistere corpusculis sectionem non admittentibus, quae uncorum
nexuum et hamorum speciem praeseferunt.
79 Sedley, Lucretius, 197.
80 f. 19v, Secreta. Seiuncta, separata. Facultas. Gignendi potentia.
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seconddefinition is quite relevant: in fact, thenounpotentia cannotbe foundanywhere
in Lucretius, but is crucial to the scholastic tradition, where it translates Aristotle’s
δύναμις as ‘potentiality’.81 Analysing facultas in terms of potentia, Pius reveals once
again his Aristotelian bias: hemakes clear not only that Lucretius’ semina are endowed
with a generative power – as Lucretius’ himself seems to say – but also that in them
resides a potentiality to develop into some actuality. Importantly, in his commentary
on Plato’s Symposium, Ficino had similarly identifiedNatura, which is full of seeds,
with potentia generandi. In Ficino’s view, however, it is Love that compels these seeds
to germinate, and draws out the powers of each fromwithin itself.82 In Pius’ reading
of Lucretius, in contrast, the seeds themselves possess this power.
In the same fashion, Pius defines semina as “the causes that bring to the things
their own essence”.83 He thereby suggests that the seeds are the bearers of the things’
essence, notmere chunks ofmatter that create the bodies by theirmutual aggregation
and disaggregation. Once again the conception of semina as an informing principle
had been already formulated by Ficino, who, differently from Lucretius, conceived the
seeds as something immaterial closest to the Stoic and Augustinian idea of seminal
reasons rather than to Lucretius’ atoms (see chapter 1).
At the end of Pius’ commentary on this passage, we find an interesting remark,
to the effect that the way Lactantius used some of these verses against Lucretius was
‘forced’ (κατὰ βίαιον).84 As we have already seen in the chapter on Ficino, Lactantius,
inDe ira 10.15–17, had identified what, in his opinion, was a contradiction between
this passage of De rerum natura and Lucretius’ overall philosophy:
From this is clear that nothing is produced from the atoms since every single
thing has its own peculiar and fixed nature, its own seed, its own law given
from the beginning. Finally, Lucretius, as though forgetting the atoms which
he was propounding, by which he was confuting those who say that all
things are made from nothing, made use of these very arguments which
were powerful against himself. For he said: “if things come from nothing, any
81 Galen’s use of δύναμις, translated into the Latin facultas, was also very common amongmedieval
and Renaissance natural philosophers and physicians.
82 It is almost certain that Pius had read at least some of Ficino’s works, since he refers to him explicitly
in f. 95r.
83 f. 19v, Semina rerum. Causae quae rebus esse suum afferunt.
84 f. 20v, Hos versus contra Lucretium κατὰ βιαίον vertit Lactantius libro de ira dei Leucippum Athomorum
satorem oppugnans sic. The exact expression in Pius’ text is κατὰ βιαίον, which is incorrectly accented,
but it can be easily corrected in κατὰ βίαιον.
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kind might be born of anything; nothing would require a seed”. And then
later: “it must be considered, therefore, that nothing can come from nothing
since things have need of seed so that each may be fashioned and led out into
the gentle realm of air”. Who would think that he possessed a brain when he
said such things as these and did not see that they were contradictory? That
nothing is made from atoms is clear from this, that the seed of each thing is
fixed, unless we will believe by chance that the nature of fire and of water is
from atoms.85
Lactantius’ criticism presumes that the concept of semen and that of atom are not
identical, as in fact they are in the Lucretian passage he quotes. In Lactantius’ view,
atoms are conceived just as material and structural elements, while semina are causal
principles. So, Lactantius discerns a contradiction in Lucretius, who believes in atoms
but then speaks about semina. But, if we understand the dubious expression κατὰ
βίαιον correctly, Pius is not of the same opinion as Lactantius: he thinks that there
is no contradiction to be found in this passage. Pius acknowledges that Lucretius is
here referring to atoms and he knows that, for the Epicureans, atoms generated fire,
air, water, earth, and from these the others bodies are generated, “so that those two
principles [sc. atoms and void] are elementary, these four [sc. elementa], on the contrary,
syntheta”, as he states in the Expositio (f. 2r).86 Moreover, Pius acknowledges that,
according to Lucretius, the same atoms are also endowed with a secreta facultas that
allows them to create specific things, even without depending on divine providence.
Lactantius found a contradiction in Lucretius because, on the one hand, he did not
take into account the fact that his atoms are not merely identical chunks of matter,
on the other hand, he did not consider that they are, like seeds, endowedwith a power
of generation.
Incidentally, this is not the first time that Pius minimizes this criticism by
Lactantius: he had quoted part of the same passage (“who would think that he
possessed a brainwhenhe said such things”) inhisExpositio, where, connecting itwith
Statius’ quote (“the loftymadness of wise Lucretius”), he had turned Lactantius’ insult
into praise, presenting Lucretius’ insanity as a poet’s divinely inspiredmadness. In
that passage, Pius, in a sense, did to Lactantius what Lactantius had done to Lucretius:
he turned his words κατὰ βίαιον against himself.
85 Transl. by M.F. McDonald.
86 That Pius understands Lucretius’ semina as atoms is made clear in several passages: he explains, for
instance, Semina rerum as ‘atomos et principia’ in f. 80v and Seminibus as Atomis in f. 95v.
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3.3. Atoms are Endowed with Form
When Pius arrives at the passage in which Lucretius presents the causes of atomic
motion and the swerve (Lucr. 2.216–293), at line 284, he comments:
Quare in seminibus. Lucretius has already argued that the bodies are moved
from an intrinsic force that produces the motion. Now, he says that the same
thing happens to the principles, which aremoved by an internal cause, i.e.,
their own form, if we trust Aristotle. In seminibus. In the causes of things and
in the principles.87
In this passage, at first, Pius suggests that atoms are moved by an intrinsic force that
is inherent to their nature and produces theirmotion. Then, hemoves from a physical
to a metaphysical level, suggesting that an Aristotelian kind of form resides in the
atoms and is the cause of their motion. Later on, he clarifies this idea:
The principles are moved by a hidden cause, in no other way than we are
dragged andmoved by an innate, internal form.88
Pius explains Lucretius’ first principles not as merely material and structural ele-
ments, and as parts of a purely mechanical explanation, but as bearers of form. While
Lucretius simplymaintains that the swerve is the cause of free will (voluntas) in living
beings, Pius interprets this passage as if atoms themselves were provided with some
kind of internal will, which he identifies with Aristotle’s concept of form. If atoms are
bearers of form, this means that they have a causal, formal principle in them, which
makes them develop according to their specific nature.89
Finally, commenting on a passage in book 2, on the possible creation of other
worlds elsewhere in the universe (Lucr. 2.1072), Pius writes:
87 f. 58v, Quare in seminibus. Disseruit iam Lucretius a vi intrinseca corpora moveri gignente motum. Nunc
idem accidere principiis inquit, quae moventur ab interiori causa hoc est a forma sua si credimus Aristoteli. In
seminibus. In causis rerum et principiis expone.
88 f. 58v, Principia a causa latente moventur non secus ac nos ab innata interiori forma trahimur et agimur.
89 This combination of atoms with Aristotelian forms would become the distinguishing feature of
Daniel Sennert’s mature work, around 1620s–1630s. On this topic, see Emily Michael, “Sennert’s Sea
Change”, 350–351.
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Quae. [Their own] nature and natural impetus moves the seeds of things.
Lucretius wants to hint that the seeds are not moved by Nature, that is God,
but by a natural instinct and impulse, that is to say inherent to the nature of
those principles.90
Pius thus clearly supports the idea of a spontaneous action of the atoms as the cause of
change, given that they are endowed with a natural impulse that is inherent in their
nature. With this interpretation, Pius enhances a very specific aspect of Lucretius’
philosophy, namely the organizing and generative power of the seminal atoms. At
the same time, he provides a link between the Aristotelizing scholastic doctrine of
substantial forms and Lucretius’ conception of atoms.
Therefore, it appears to be evident that Lucretius’ atoms, defined as semina rerum,
were from the very beginning understood by Pius to bemore thanmere Democritean
chunks of matter. As has already been demonstrated here and in chapter 1, the
emergence of a vitalistic notion of atoms in the early sixteenth century was clearly
inspired by certain passages in Lucretius’ own text. This explains why the same
interpretative tendency can be traced not only in Pius’ commentary, but also in other
Renaissance works, such as in Ficino’s Philebus.
To sumup,more clearly thanmany other Renaissance commentators andmodern
interpreters of De rerum natura, Pius grasped the ambiguity and polyvalence of
Lucretius’ concept of semina rerum, chose to enhance the generative and vitalistic power
of his ‘seeds’ and re-contextualized and adapted them to the demands of Christian
and Scholastic traditions.
3.4. Seminamorbi: Lucretius’ Account of Diseases between Atomism andHumourism
Aswehave seen in the previous paragraph, our tendency to look at Lucretius’ atomistic
doctrine as a purely mechanistic theory overshadowsmany important aspects of his
thought.Not only does Lucretius’ conceptionof semina rerum, ‘seeds of things’, indicate
that, in certain parts of his poem, he entertained a vitalistic notion of atoms, but – as
we will see shortly – he even resorted to ‘eclectic’ explanations of various diseases and
contagion, by drawing upon both atomism and humourism.
Inher recent book,ReadingLucretius in theRenaissance, AdaPalmer, afterhaving ana-
lyzed themarginalia of manuscripts and printed editions of Lucretius, has pointed out
90 f. 81r,Quae.Natura et naturalis impetus.Mouet semina rerum.Non anatura hoc est a deo vult innuere Lucretius
seminamoueri sed ab instinctu et impressione naturali hoc est insita naturae illorum principiorum.
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thatmany Renaissance readers ofDe rerumnatura showed a specific interest inmedical
issues, especially in Lucretius’ description of the Athenian plague.91MoreoverDe rerum
naturawas themost frequently reprinted plague text in the sixteenth century. But
there are also many other interesting passages inDe rerum natura, in which Lucretius
discusses in detail various diseases of body andmind. As previous studies by Jackie
Pigeaud and Fabio Tutrone have shown, Lucretius had an ‘eclectic’ attitude to phys-
iology, notably because of his combination of atomism and humourism, mechanism
and vitalism.92 This same attitude can be encountered also in his account of diseases,
in which one can find explanations based both on atoms and humours. In book three
ofDe rerum natura (3.487–525), for instance, among the proofs of the soul’s mortality,
Lucretius claims that, since the soul – like the body – experiences many diseases, it
should be mortal. In this passage, Lucretius takes the opportunity to describe an
epileptic fit, providing an explanation of the disease primarily in terms of humours.
Quin etiam subito vi morbi saepe coactus
ante oculos aliquis nostros, ut fulminis ictu,
concidit et spumas agit, ingemit et tremit artus,
490 desipit, extentat nervos, torquetur, anhelat
inconstanter, et in iactandomembra fatigat,
ni mirum quia vis morbi distracta per artus
turbat agens animam, spumans [ut] in aequore salso
ventorum validis fervescunt viribus undae.
[…]
Inde ubi iammorbi reflexit causa, reditque
in latebras acer corrupti corporis umor,
tum quasi vaccillans primum consurgit et omnis
505 paulatim redit in sensus animamque receptat.
haec igitur tantis ubi morbis corpore in ipso
iactentur miserisque modis distracta laborent,
cur eadem credis sine corpore in aere aperto
91 Palmer, Reading Lucretius, 59.
92 Jackie Pigeaud, “La physiologie de Lucrece” Revue des Etudes Latines 58 (1980), 176–200 and Fabio
Tutrone, “Between Atoms andHumours. Lucretius’ Didactic Poetry as aModel of Integrated and
Bifocal Physiology”, in M. Horstmanshoff, H. King, & C. Zittel (edd.), Blood, Sweat and Tears. The
Changing Concepts of Physiology from Antiquity into EarlyModern Europe (Leiden – Boston: Brill, 2012),
83–102.
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cum validis ventis aetatem degere posse?
Moreover,wehave often seen someone constrainedona suddenby the violence
of disease, who, as if struck by a thunderbolt, falls to the ground, foams at the
mouth, groans and shudders, raves, grows rigid, twists, pants irregularly,
out-wearies himself with contortions; assuredly because the spirit, torn
asunder by the violence of the disease throughout the frame, is in turmoil
and foams, just as in the salt sea the waves boil under the mighty strength
of the winds. […]
Next, when the cause of the disease has already turned back, and the
corroding humour of the diseased body has returned to its secrets haunts,
then first, staggering as it were, the man rises, and by degrees comes back to
his full senses and receives back his spirit. Since, therefore, themind and spirit
are tossed about by so great diseases in the very body itself, and are miserably
torn asunder and distressed, why do you believe that the samewithout a body,
in the open air, amidst mighty winds, are able to live?
Making Lucretius’ reference to bodily humours look even more Galenic, Pius, in
his commentary at line 503, replaces acer with ater, reading ater humor, instead of
acer humor. This ‘misunderstanding’ gives him the opportunity to comment on
black bile, melancholia, as the cause of epilepsy (f. 103r). He explains that, when a
whitish humour, blended with black bile, pervades the veins and reaches the head, it
there debilitates themost divine part of the human soul and triggers epilepsy. The
explanation provided by Pius is actually a quotation taken from Apuleius’ Apologia
sive pro se de magia libri, in which Apuleius, in turn, paraphrases Plato’s account of
epilepsy in the Timaeus.93 Pius must have found this text very enlightening for his
interpretation of Lucretius’ account of epilepsy and other diseases, given that even
earlier in the commentary (f. 102v), he had provided a long quotation taken from the
same passage, in which Apuleius – paraphrasing Plato – explains the three causes of
diseases, which are:
1. excess, defect or misplacement of primary bodies;94
93 See Apul. apol. 49–50, where one can find references to Plato, Tim. 35a, 69d–71, 82a–86b. See also comm.
ad loc. Apulei Apologia sive pro se de magia liber, with introd. and comm. by H.E. Butler and A.S. Owen
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1914), 110–113.
94 Apul. apol. 49, 6–9 and Plato, Tim. 82a,b.
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2. diseases of the secondary tissues;95
3. diseases due to breath, phlegm and bile: in this last category, Plato counts epilepsy
(morbus comitialis).96
In this Timaean passage, Plato combines a theory of the humours (3) with an
explanation based on primary bodies (1), namely earth, fire, water and air, that is, on
the four elements. In Apuleius’ paraphrase of Plato, the term used to designate these
elements is primordia, ‘first-beginnings’, the same word that is usually employed by
Lucretius as a technical term for ‘atoms’. It is not clear whether Pius realized that
Lucretius’ eclectic explanation, based as it was on atoms and humours, might have
been incompatible with Plato, who does not resort to atoms to explain the causes of
the diseases. It is certainly possible that he intentionally refrained from clarifying this
point: after all, he was perhaps more concerned with incorporating Lucretius’ theory
into a more accepted framework, in this case Plato’s philosophy. Still, a comparison
withPlatomighthavebeenparticularly illuminating for anunderstandingof another
passage fromDe rerum natura (Lucr. 4. 664–667):
Quippe ubi cui febris bili superante coorta est
aut alia ratione aliquast vis excita morbi,
perturbatur ibi iam totum corpus, et omnes
commutantur ibi positurae pricipiorum.
For when fever arises in anyone, from overflow of bile, or when the energy of
some disease is excited in another way, then the whole body is thrown into a
riot and all the positions of the first-beginnings are changed about
Again, in this passage, Lucretius resorts to an ‘eclectic’ explanation of sickness, which
is based both on humours (bilis) and on principia. Now, since Pius often interprets
Lucretius’ principia as the four elements, conceived in their ‘pure’ state, of course the
comparison with Plato turns out to be particularly enlightening, since Lucretius’
account of diseases could fit totally in with his explanation of the causes of diseases.
95 Apul. apol. 49, 10–13 and Plato, Tim. 82b–84c.
96 Apul. apol. 49, 13–15 and Plato, Tim. 84c.
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4. The 1514 Edition: Lucretius Goes to France
As stated before, Pius’ edition was reprinted in Paris in 1514 by Josse Badius and
Jean Petit (also known as Ascensius et Parvus), with a short introductory letter by the
French editor Nicolaus Beraldus (1470–1555).97 The fact that Pius’ commentary was
reprinted within three years after its first publication surely means that he had quite
an extensive audience. Pius’ annotated editionwas the first to cross the Italian border,
and it landed on French soil. In his introductory epistle, which was addressed to a
friend of his, François Deloynes, Beraldus praises Pius’ commentary and strongly
recommends reading the poem of Lucretius.98
Besides, I believe that Lucretius himself – although he dreamed foolishly,
together with his Epicurus, about atoms, void and nothing – should be read
carefully, not only because of the signs of ancient wisdom, which are clearly
visible in him, but also because of the most pleasant knowledge of things,
worthy of a free man, and so far capable of fulfilling the best part of a man
and leading him step by step to practical andmoral virtues.99
It is evident that Beraldus not only appreciated De rerum natura from the point of
view of its form, but he praised Lucretius’ Epicurean ethics and admired the fact
that the poemmight lead to a moral improvement. It is not implausible to assume
that this positive assessment was inspired by the overall judgment implied by Pius
in his commentary. However, in contrast to Pius, Beraldus clearly expressed his
97 About Beraldus, see Casimir-Alexandre Fusil, “La Renaissance de Lucrèce au xvie siècle en France”,
Revue du Seizième Siècle 15 (1928), 134–150, 138. and Simone Fraisse, L’ influence de Lucrèce en France au
seizième siècle (Paris: A.G. Nizet, 1962), 36. Fusil describes Bérault as a “savant Orléanais, jurisconsulte
et humaniste, qui, après avoir enseigné les Lettres à Orléans, aux environs de 1500, vint travailler
à Paris». A friend of Erasmus, but enemy of the Sorbonne and its theologians, according to Fusil,
Bérault «est une intéressante figure du commencement du xvie siècle: c’est un des humanistes qui
travaillèrent ardemment à l’ enseignement du latin et du grec, et qui contribuèrent de toutes leurs
forces à la renaissance littéraire. Il est aussi un de ces érudits qui, vers 1530, n’ont pas encore pris parti
entre la Réforme et le catholicisme, mais qui sont hostiles à la tyrannie scolastique” (pp. 138–139).
98 About Deloynes see Fusil, “La Renaissance de Lucrèce”, 139. About the introductory letter to the
French edition, see Fraisse, L’ influence de Lucrèce, pp. 35 f.; Gambino Longo, Savoir de la nature, 41;
Palmer, Reading Lucretius, 160.
99 f. Aiv, Lucretium porro ipsum, quamquam de atomis, inani nihiloque quaedam cumEpicuro suo somniaverit,
non modo propter doctae vetustatis quae in eo visuntur vestigia diligentissime legendum puto, sed propter
iucundissimam rerum cognitionem dignam homine libero, atque adeo meliorem hominis partem perficientem et
ad activas moralesque virtutes sensim perducentem.
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disagreement with the principles of Epicurean physics (atoms, void, nothing), about
which Lucretius also dreamed foolishly (somniaverit). In the French edition, then, the
appreciation of Lucretius’ poem from the point of view of ethics goes hand in hand
with a condemnation of atomism, which, in this case, was immediately associated
with Epicurus. As we shall see in the next chapter, the French professor Denys
Lambin was to express precisely the same concept. “The fault belongs to Epicurus,
not Lucretius”, claims Lambin in the dedicatory epistle to his own prestigious
commentary, implying that all Lucretius’ theories that seemed crazy are to be ascribed
to Epicurus only. Blaming Epicurus and separating Lucretius from his master’s ideas
made it easier to accept his philosophy (see chapter 4).
Conclusions
Thanks to its early publication date and the amount of information it provided, Pius’
commentary undoubtedly constitutes an important case to illustrate the impact of
Lucretius’ philosophy in the early sixteenth century.
Even though, in his funeral oration, Pius is presented as a sympathizer of
Epicureanism, in his commentary, he does not explicitly endorse any of Lucretius’
theories. At the same time, however, Pius never rejects Lucretius’ doctrines, and,
reading between the lines of his work, his overall judgement on the poem and its
doctrines seems quite positive.
First of all, our reading of Pius’ commentary has shown that, in order to provide
a complete framework of the impact that Lucretius’ natural philosophy had on
Renaissance thinkers, we must put it in relation with other doctrines, such as those
of Empedocles, Plato, and Aristotle. Pius often reinterprets Lucretius’ atomism in the
light of the Platonic andAristotelian tradition, somuch so that sometimes his concept
of atom – frequently defined as principia or semina – acquires some new connotations.
Specifically, as far as Lucretius’ matter theory is concerned, Pius interprets it in
two ways: 1) he sometimes merges Lucretius’ atomismwith the Empedoclean four-
element theory, even though, in De rerum natura, Lucretius had explicitly rejected
idea that air, fire, water and earth can be conceived as the ultimate constituents
of matter (1.705–829). Having to face this explicit rejection, Pius assumes that the
elements themselves should possess almost atomic properties: theymust be conceived
as simple, very subtle, and ‘pure’, that is, not combined with the properties of the
other elements. This interpretation of the four elements as ‘pure’, simple andminimal
particles, beyond which one cannot go in the decomposition of bodies, can be traced
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back to Plato’s Timaeus and to its medieval tradition, while a similar explanation can
also be also found in Aristotle and in some scholastic texts. 2) Mixing the Aristotelian
tradition withMarsilio Ficino’s vitalism, Pius also describes Lucretius’ semina rerum
as endowed with a power of generation (gignendi potentia) and as bearers of the
substantial form of things. Already in Lucretius’ poem, the atoms, while most of the
timedescribed as inanimate, are repeatedly endowedwithdynamicgenerativepowers.
Pius emphasizes and recontextualizes this concept in an Aristotelian framework,
thereby taking the first step towards the conception of atoms as living and ensouled
entities.
More in general, the tendency to view Lucretius as a pure materialist gives us
only a partial view of his thought and quite possibly a false view altogether. In fact,
just as his conception of atoms in certain passages of the poem, so also his account
of diseases relies on a variety theories. It turns out that, maybe surprisingly to us,
Lucretius himself not only sympathizes with a vitalistic notion of atoms, but, at
the same time, provides an account of diseases which is mainly based on humours.
Pius might have found Lucretius’ account of diseases as a further confirmation that
most of his theories, after all, were compatible with those of other more accepted
philosophers, such as Plato, in this case.
Last but not least, one wonders whether there is a connection between Ficino,
who ‘burned’ his commentariola on Lucretius, Francus, who was reputed to be a
Lucretianus, and Pius, who was accused of having engaged with Epicureanism. It
appears that, toward the end of the fifteenth and the beginning of the sixteenth
century, commenting on Lucretius was perceived as quite controversial. Historical
documents show that both Ficino and Pius seem to have struggled with a feeling of
guilt for having commented on Lucretius and having engaged with his Epicurean
philosophy, while, probably for the same reason, Francus had been ‘sent to hell’ by
his contemporaries.
As we have mentioned in our general introduction, only five years after the
publication of Pius’ commentary, Lucretius’ poem was officially banned from the
secondary schools by the Florentine synod, and at least until the end of the century
no other commented edition of the poem was to be published in Italy. Our next
chapter will therefore move to north-west, so as to take into account the reception of
Lucretius’ poem in France, where Denys Lambin published his editions.

chapter 4
Lucretius in France and in the Low Countries:
Lambin’s Commentary (1563/64 and 1570)
and Gifanius’ Annotated Edition (1555/56)
Introduction
As we have mentioned in the previous chapter, it was in 1514, as Pius’ edition of
De rerum natura was reprinted in Paris, that Lucretius made his first appearance in
Renaissance France. In his enthusiastic introductory letter, the French editor, Nicolas
Beraldus, claimed that the restoration of Lucretius’ text by Pius radically changed the
readers’ attitude towardDe rerumnatura: those who had initially shrank back from the
poem, would now read it avidly.1 Unfortunately, there is almost no direct testimony
to confirm that French scholars started to take an interest in Lucretius immediately
after the release of the 1514 edition. In fact, at least for the first half of the sixteenth
century, it is hard to find any explicit reference to Lucretius in the works of French
scholars.2 For this reason, one might reasonably conclude that, in this period, the
interest in Lucretius was limited to a small number of scholars, all somehow related
to Beraldus.3 Even though Andrea Navagero’s 1515 Aldine edition had been reprinted
in Lyons in 1534 and then in Paris in 1539, it is only toward themiddle of the century
that Lucretius’ poem becamemore widely known in France. Echoes ofDe rerum natura
appeared in a number of poems by Jacques Peletier duMans (Œuvres poétiques, 1547)
1 Pius (1514) f. Aiv,Qua re factum ut qui antehac ab eius scriptis ceu morosis nimium et, ut eorum ipsorum verbo
utar, putidulis non aliter quam ab infami aliqua ac pestilente domo abhorruerant novam hanc in Lucretium
interpretationem, Lucretiumque ipsum avide nunc legant et amplectantur, ingenue fatentes Pio praeter variam
reconditamque doctrinam nec stili candorem facultatemque deesse. According to Gerard Passannante,
Beraldus is probably thinking of Poliziano and Ficino when he speaks of those who first run from
the plague of Lucretius. I find however this suggestion quite bizarre, given that both scholars
had died approximately twenty years before, and therefore they cannot be the same who later
could read Lucretius and appreciate Pius’ learning and style. See Gerard Passannante, The Lucretian
Renaissance: Philology and the Afterlife of Tradition (Chicago, London: University of Chicago Press, 2011),
72.
2 For Lucretius’ influence in France in the first half of the sixteenth century, see Fraisse, L’ influence de
Lucrèce, 29–51.
3 Fusil, “La Renaissance de Lucrèce”, 139.
128 chapter 4
and Pierre de Ronsard (Odes, 1550), likewisemembers of the poetic school LaPléiade (see
below).4 About a decade later, Denys Lambin, a French scholar and Ronsard’s friend,
published his first commentary on Lucretius’De rerum natura.
For more than fifty years, Pius’ commentary on Lucretius remained thus the only
one that was available, until it was substituted by Lambin’s annotated editions of
1563 and 1570.5 As we will see shortly, one of Lambin’s main goals was to restoreDe
rerum natura from a philological point of view, but he also added a set of notes to
the text, which he himself called breves, in order to explain Lucretius’ Latin poem.6
Lambin’s commentary differs from Pius’ in various respects: it is more focused on the
philological reconstruction of Lucretius’ text than that of his Bolognese predecessor,
and the notes contained in it are also briefer and more succinct, so that one can
hardly find any digressions. As a result, from an exegetical point of view, Lambin’s
commentary appears to bemore ‘user-friendly’ than Pius’. The latter has consequently
been overshadowed by Lambin and is often neglected by modern scholars, mainly
because of its flamboyant Latin style and lengthy digressions. By contrast, Lambin is
often regarded as the most influential sixteenth-century editor of Lucretius, and his
philological corrections are still taken into consideration by scholars and quoted in
modern editions.
One of the distinctive features of Lambin’s commented edition is its tendency to
redeem Lucretius, in order to facilitate the further divulgation of the poem. To this
end, Lambin frequently highlights the differences between Lucretius and Epicurus,
blaming the latter for the most controversial ideas contained in the poem. The other
side of the same strategy is to harmonize Lucretius’ arguments with Aristotle’s, or
those of other accepted authors, so as to render themmore acceptable. This twofold
strategy is evident especially in the introductory letters, but can also be detected in
the commentary.
In this chapter, I shall first give a short account of Lambin’s life. Iwill then examine
the paratexts that precede the commentary: the introductory letter to Charles ix,
the letter to the reader, the letters to the patrons, the second letter to the reader, and
Lucretius’ vita. Then I will discuss some key passages from Lambin’s commentary on
books i and ii ofDe rerumnatura, in order to shed light onhowhe approaches Lucretius’
4 Fraisse, L’ influence de Lucrèce, 71.
5 Given that, apart fromminor changes, the differences among the two editions are limited to the
paratexts (see below), from now on we will generally refer to Lambin’s commentary in the singular
form, as if it was only one.
6 f. i2r, Scholia praeterea, seu breveis commentarios addidi …, see Gordon, A Bibliography of Lucretius, 79.
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atomismandnatural philosophy. The last sectionwill be devoted toObertusGifanius’
annotated edition of Lucretius (1565/66), which Lambin harshly criticizes in his 1570
commentary.
Given that Gifanius’ annotated edition does not contain a separate lemmata
section, but only brief marginal notes, which exclusively concern linguistic and
philological issues, I shall not devote an entire chapter to it. In this chapter’s last
section, however, I shall focus on some passages in the paratexts of this edition which
will shed light on Gifanius’ interpretation of Lucretius’ matter theory.
1. Life and Circumstances
Denys Lambin was a French humanist of rather humble origin: he was born probably
in 1519 inMontreuil-sur-Mer in Picardy; his father, Nicolas Lambin, was a locksmith.7
During his youth, Lambin received the tonsure and began his studies in Amiens.
Then, at the age of fifteen, he went to Paris, where he attended courses at the Collège
du Cardinal Lemoine, one of the most prestigious schools in that period, the same in
which also many other illustrious scholars – including Nicolaus Beraldus, the French
editor of Pius’ edition – had studied.
In 1545, Lambin started teaching at the University of Toulouse, where Adrianus
Turnebus, one of the dedicatees of his commentary, was professor. Later, Lambin
became tutor in Latin and Greek to the Bishop of Béziers, Lorenzo Strozzi. Through
him, hemet the Cardinal François de Tournon who, within a couple of years, was to
become his patron. Together with the cardinal, Lambin stayed in Rome for four years,
in 1549–1553. In the entourage of the cardinal, he had the opportunity of meeting
many distinguished scholars, including Protestants such as Henri Estienne.8 From
7 There is some uncertainty about Lambin’s date of birth, see Linton C. Stevens, “Denis Lambin:
Humanist, Courtier, Philologist, and Lecteur Royal”, Studies in the Renaissance, 9 (1962), 234–241 and
Mary Morrison, “Another Book from Ronsard’s Library: a Presentation Copy of Lambin’s Lucretius”,
Bibliothèque d’Humanisme et Renaissance, 25, 3 (1963), 561–566.
8 Interestingly, Henri Estienne’s father, Robert i Estienne, had published in 1536 a book of sentences,
whichwas re-edited in 1540, inwhich also somepassages of Lucretius’ poemwere included. Although
these passages are only eight andmost of all concern themoral content of the poem, this book proves
that, toward themiddle of the century, Lucretius was already read, at least among a certain élite of
scholars. See Robert Estienne (ed.), Sententiae et proverbia ex Plauto, Terentio, Virgilio, Ovidio, Hoatio,
Juvenale, Persio, Lucano, Seneca, Lucretio, Martiale, Sillio Italico, Stathio, Valerio Flacco, Catullo, Propertio,
Tibullo, Claudiano, (Paris: ex officina Roberti Stephani, 1536), 144–145. See Fusil, “La Renaissance de
Lucrèce”, 147.
130 chapter 4
1555 to 1560, Lambinwent back to Italy and travelled toRome, Venice and Lucca, among
other places. During his two stays in Italy, he had the opportunity to collate various
manuscripts – also of Lucretius – in the Vatican library and elsewhere.9
His acquaintance with the cardinal secured Lambin the chair of Latin and later
of Greek at the Collège Royal, starting from 1561: he thus became lecteur royal. Here
he used to read and comment Greek and Latin authors, so that the editorial activity
of this period was probably the result of his lectures.10 In fact, in the same year, he
prepared the editions of Horace, and three years later (1563/64), Lambin published his
first commentary on Lucretius, which was followed in 1565 by a pocket edition.11
In 1565, the same year in which Lambin’s pocket edition was printed, Obertus
Gifanius (Hubert Van Giffen), a Dutch jurist, published his own Lucretius edition
clearly in competition with that of the French editor.12 However, Gifanius had clearly
stolen Lambin’s own ideas in many passages, but only devoted to his predecessor an
offhand praise at the beginning of his epistle to the reader.13 In turn, Lambin, in his
9 See JohnE. Sandys,AHistory ofClassical Scholarship.FromtheRevival of Learning to theEndof theEighteenth
Century, vol. ii, (Cambridge: Cambridge up, 1908), 189–191.
10 See Thomas Pope Blount, Censura celebriorum authorum sive tractatus in quo varia virorum doctorum
de clarissimis cujusque seculi scriptoribus judicia traduntur (Genevae: apud Samuele de Tournes, 1694),
716:Dionysius Lambinus […]Musis tamen serenis & faventibus natus, ab earum dulci commercio quaesitas
multiplicis eruditionis opes tunc potissimum discendi cupidae juventuti explicuit, cum ex Italia reversus, ubi
plures annos in Francisci Turnonii Cardinalis comitatu vixerat, optimos quosque Graecae Latinaeque linguae
auctores Luteti in Schola Regia sive praelegendo, sive commentando explanaret. Unde manarunt illi uberes in
Lucretium, Horatium, Plautum Commentarii, qui vice variarum lectionum esse possint.
11 As Gordon (A Bibliography of Lucretius, 82) notices, “France adopted the New Style calendar on 1st
January 1563/4 and as Lambinus’ dedicatory epistle to Charles ix is dated November 1563, it is clear
enough that the new year began during the course of the impression”.
12 Obertus Gifanius (Hubert Van Giffen) was a Dutch lawyer, born in Buren in 1534. He studied
philology and Law in Leuven, Paris and Orleans, where he obtained his doctorate in 1567. He later
became professor of Logic, Ethics and Institutiones Justinianeae in Strasbourg. Then he moved to
Altdorf, Ingolstadt, and finally to Prague, where he was invited to become part of the Reichshofrat.
He died in Prague in 1604. See Carl Sebastian Zeidler, Vitae professorum iuris, qui in academia Altdorffina
inde ab eius iactis fundamentis vixerunt ex monumentis fide dignis descriptae, 1 (Nuremberg: Monath, 1770),
37–63.
13 See Gifanius (1565), unnumbered page, TandemDionysius Lambinus libros manu descriptos complures
felicissime nactus adiutus etiam doctiss. virorum, in iis praecipue Adriani Turnebi, et Ioh. Etiam Aurati opera,
ipse incredibili diligentia et eruditione praeditus, a pluribus iisque turpissimismendis Lucretium liberavit. Mary
Morrison (Another Book…, 565, especially note 2) observes that a copy of Gifanius’ edition of Lucretius
(Antwerp, 1566), kept at the Bibliotèque Nationale de Paris (b.n. Rés., p. Yc344), is that which Lambin
must have used to prepare his 1570 commentary. The text is full of emendations and occasionally
carries somemore emotional reactions such as, asine, which indicates some stupidity on Gifanius’
part, or ego, which indicates a theft.
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1570 edition, added a new epistle to the reader inwhich he strongly criticizedGifanius,
whom he described as a most wicked, audacious and impudent man (iniustissimus,
audacissimus, impudentissimus), a most dishonest thief (improbissimus fur), who had
improperly arrogated Lambin’s ideas to himself.14
Among the other remarkable works written by Lambin, we should at least
mention a Latin translation of Aristotle’s Ethics (1558), which was a suggestion of
the Cardinal de Tournon, but also reflects his own interest in Aristotle, of whom he
also translated the Politics (1567). Among the Latin authors, Lambin also produced
an edition of Horace (1561), one of Cicero (1566), one of Cornelius Nepos (1569), and a
commentary on Plautus’ plays.15
Lambin died prematurely in 1572, but the circumstances of his death remain
unclear. According to some sources, Lambin died shortly after having learned of
the assassination of his friend Peter Ramus (Pierre de la Ramée) during the St.
Bartholomew’s Daymassacre.16
2. Lambin’s Editions of De rerum natura (1563/64 and 1570)
Lambin’s 1563/64 edition is a quarto paper book containing 292 leaves, published in
Paris by Guillaume and Philippe Rouille. Lambin prefaces his commentary with a
long dedicatory letter to King Charles ix and an epistle to the reader. He also dedicates
each of the six books of De rerum natura to a different patron: Henri de Mesmes, Pierre
Ronsard, Germain Vaillant de Guellis, Marc-Antoine deMuret, Adrien Turnèbe, Jean
Dorat, addressing an epistle to each.17
The 1570 edition is also a quarto paper book in folio; this one however contains
404 leaves, that is over 100 more than the 1563/64 edition. In this new edition, Lambin
added some new paratexts (a second epistle to the reader, Lucretius’ vita, a separate
section devoted to Memmius, and an index quaestionum) and a small number of notes.
But the main reason why this second edition is so much longer than the first one is
that the entire layout is different, since more space is left between the entries.
14 (1570) f. c2r. Unless stated otherwise, all the quotations are from Lambin’s 1563/64 edition: Titi Lucretii
Cari De rerum natura libri sex (Paris: in Gulielmi Rouillij et Philippi G. Rouillij Nep. aedibus, 1563).
15 See Sandys, AHistory of Classical Scholarship, 189–190.
16 See Blount, Censura celebriorumauthorum…, 716: Periit enim ex temporum taedio sex tantum et quinquaginta
natos annos paulo post indignamRami Collegae necem, relicto ex Ursina uxore nobili matrona filio, doctrinae
quoque laude praedito …
17 Gordon, A Bibliography of Lucretius, 78–79. For an identification of these figures, see below.
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As for the commentary, by comparing the 1570 edition to the first, one notices a
few changes: Lambin added some examples, commented on a number of new words,
and rethought some readings. For instance, commenting on Lucr. 1.521, in the 1570
edition, instead of corpora caeca, a reading that he himself had accepted seven years
before, Lambin now reads corpora certa, explaining:
If otherwise we accept corpora certa (which is the reading that now I approve
more), in accordance with themanuscripts Vaticanus, Bertinianus andMem-
mianus, we will understand the bodies as finite not in connection with their
number but with their kind.18
This example shows that, between 1563 and 1570, Lambin found time to investigate
Lucretius’ text even further and to refine his interpretation of it.
But, most often, Lambinmade use of his 1570 commentary to criticize Gifanius,
to whom he refers by using the pseudonym “Thraso”, that is, the name of a braggart
soldier in Terence’s Eunuch. Here is an example:
Et cita dissiliunt] … Although I had written these things, three years later, that
famous Thraso, arrogating this emendation to himself, wrote that it has to
be read this way, as I put forth, and that in the published editions is wrongly
read cetera. What could be more faulty? What more shameless?19
2.1. Epistle to Charles ix
In his long epistle dedicated to Charles ix, king of France, Lambin strives to explain
why one should read Lucretius’ poem, even without embracing its contents. This
epistle remains unchanged in the 1570 edition.
In this epistle, Lambin puts forward many arguments to redeem Lucretius, in
the hope of promoting the divulgation of De rerum natura. These his most relevant
arguments:
18 (1570) p. 59: Sin, ut manuscripti Vaticanus, et Bertinianus, etMemmianus corpora certa (quam lectionem nunc
magis probo) dicemus, [interpretabimur] corpora finita non numero sed ratione.
19 (1570) p. 119, Et cita dissiliunt] … Cum haec scripsissem, triennio post Thraso ille hanc emendationem sibi
arrogans, scripsit, ita esse legendum, ut edidi, et in vulgatis mendose legi, cetera. Quid flagitiosius? Quid
impudentius? See Gifanius ad. loc. (p. 39): vulg. cetera.male. sup. lib. i.
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1. Lucretius’ poem has educational value: its reading canmake the reader loftier and
lead to moral improvement.
2. Epicurus is the main culprit for those of Lucretius’ theories that seem ‘mad’.
3. Just like the works of other ancient authors, Lucretius’ poem contains some
impious theories, but not all aspects of his doctrine should be rejected.
4. Lucretius’ reasoning is subtle and his language is evenmore refined than that of
Cicero or Caesar.
Lambin begins by remarking on the utility of ancient poetry.20 Indeed, thanks to
the ancient poets, who were also philosophers, the primeval humans becamemore
educated, refined and civilized.21 Lambin explains that there are different kinds of
poets: some are epic poets, other are tragic, comic, lyric and so forth. The epic poets are
themost ancient and praised among all: they are those who excel above all others for
authority and above all deserve to be read.22 However, among the epic poets, Lambin
does not count only those who in song celebrated wars and deeds, but also those
who “explained in long verses the causes of things hidden and veiled by Nature, like
Empedocles and Lucretius”.23 It is in fact through the cognition of natural things and
the explanation of customs and virtues that one becomes more cultivated. According
to Lambin, the cognition of natural things brings also many other advantages: it
strengthens the mind against the impetus of fate and the weakness of human affairs,
fortifies us against the fear of death, develops sobriety against unrestrained desire,
brings about perseverance against superstition. The poets’ goal is in fact, first, tomake
the reader better and only second to please.24 Since the beginning of the commentary,
20 f. a2r, Si quod est in his paucis scriptorum veterum, tamquam ex naufragio reliquiis, litterarum genus […] unde
multae, magnaeque utilitates ad nos permanarint, poemata sunt.
21 f. a2r, Poetae enim qui iidem philosophi fuerunt, primos illos homines rudeis, impolitos, feros erudierunt,
expoliverunt, a feritate ad hunc humanum, et ciuilem victum, cultumque traduxerunt.
22 f. a2v,Horum igitur omnium cum epici, meo quidem iudicio, plurimum prosint, longeque ceteris auctoritate
antecellant, hi studiosi nobis sunt legendi.
23 f. a2v, In epicis porro non eos tantum numerandos esse duco qui res foriter et preclare gestas bellaque cecinerunt
[…] verum etiammultoque adeo magis eos qui rerum causas occultas atque a natura involutas longis versibus
explicarunt, ut Empedocles et Lucretius. See Cic. Ac. 1,4,15 philosophiam a rebus occultis et ab ipsa natura
involutis avocare.
24 f. a2v,Namcumex rerumnaturalium cognitione,morumque ac virtutum explicatione homines efficiantur nescio
quomodomaiores atque elatiores, et cum ex utraque re animi magnitudo contra fortunae impetus, rerumque
humanarum imbecillitatem, fortitudo contra mortis timorem, temperantia contra libidinem, constantia contra
superstitionem comparetur, poetis autem hoc maxime propositum esse debeat ut lectorem reddant meliorem,
secundo loco ut delectent.
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it becomes clear that Lambinhas a veryprecise agenda, namely showing theusefulness
of De rerum natura: since reading poets like Lucretius has been very useful in the past,
onemay presume that this can still be the case in the present. It is worth pointing out
that Lambin was perhaps the first to value Lucretius’ knowledge of natural things so
explicitly, presenting the poem’s scientific content as one of its most valuable aspects.
Then, Lambin strives to demonstrate the poem’s educational value, suggesting
that in the past, Lucretius’ work could lead human beings tomoral improvement. He
also puts a great deal of effort into making Lucretius acceptable, without however
ignoring the heterodox content of his poem.
But Lucretius attacks the immortality of the souls, denies thegods’ providence,
abolishes all religions, puts the highest good in pleasure. But this is the fault
of Epicurus, whom Lucretius follows, not Lucretius’. The poem itself, because
of its beliefs, is inconsistent with our religion, nonetheless it is a poem.25
Just a poem? On the contrary, it is an elegant poem, a renowned poem, a
poemwhich is noteworthy, remarkable and embellished by all its flashes (i.e.
splendid examples) of genius. But these insane and crazy opinions of Epicurus,
such as those absurdities about the accidental concourse of the atoms, about
the innumerable worlds, and others, are not difficult for us to refute, nor is it
in fact necessary.26
By separating Lucretius from Epicurus, Lambin can condemn atomism by associating
it exclusively with the latter. We have already come across this strategy to blame
Epicurus for all the heterodoxies and to separate Lucretius from his ideas in Beraldus’
introduction to Pius’ commentary (see our chapter 3). As Simone Fraisse has noticed,
in that period, one may detect an attitude of “indulgence croissante” toward Lucretius,
25 The way the text is printed doesn’t make much sense. The adjective alienas should instead be
connected to poema, as if it said alienum (est). Perhaps, Lambin actuallymeant to write alienum, which
was somehow corrupted to alienas. Another option is to assume that a word has been omitted after
alienas, such as reiiciendum or repudiandum.
26 f. a3r, At Lucretius animorum immortalitatem oppugnat, deorum providentiam negat, religiones omneis tollit,
summum bonum in voluptate ponit. Sed haec Epicuri, quem sequitur Lucretius, non Lucretii culpa est. Poema
quidem ipsumpropter sententias a religionenostra alienas, nihilominus poemaest. Tantumne? Immovero poema
venustum, poema praeclarum, poema omnibus ingenii luminibus distinctum, insignitum atque illustratum.
Hasce autem Epicuri rationes insanas ac furiosas ut et illas absurdas de atomorum concursione fortuita, de
mundis innumerabilibus, et ceteras neque difficile nobis est refutare, neque vero necesse est. See Cic. AdQuintum
fratrem, 2.10.3: Lucreti poemata, ut scribis, ita sunt: multis luminibus ingeni,multae tamen artis.
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to the detriment of Epicurus, whowas to be seen by commentators as themain culprit
for those of Lucretius’ theories that seemed ‘mad’.27
But Epicurus and Lucretius were irreligious. Then what? Is it perhaps for this
reason that we, who read them, are also irreligious? First of all, how many
things are there in this poemwhich agree with the sentences and principles
of other philosophers? Howmany are plausible? Howmany are renowned
and almost divine? These we claim, these we seize, these we approve. Those
which are false, which are in contrast with Christian religion, we reject, refuse
and disapprove.28
Lambin, while admitting that Lucretius – together with his master, Epicurus – was
irreligious, strives to redeem his poem and encourages the reader to select those
aspects of his philosophy that are acceptable. Not everything from Lucretius’ poem
has to be rejected, since many aspects of his doctrine actually agree with the teaching
of other philosophers. One can detect the same attitude also in Lambin’s commentary,
which tries to match some of Lucretius’ passages with theories of Aristotle’s, in order
to show that, after all, many ideas contained in the poem actually agree with those of
the most canonical of philosophers.
Lambin furthermore points out that even Christian authors eagerly read Empe-
docles, Democritus, Epicurus and Lucretius and other philosophers and poets, even
when these looked wicked, mendacious and irreligious in the eyes of their readers.
These readers acted like bees which, while preparing honey, go from one flower to
another, feeding on what is useful and proper, ignoring what is useless.29
Indeed, Lambin argues, if we had to reject the theories of all those writers who
deviate from the Christian religion, thenwe should not even follow Plato, or Aristotle,
27 See Fraisse, L’ influence de Lucrèce, 35–36.
28 f. a3r–v, At Epicurus et Lucretius impii fuerunt. Quid tum postea? Num iccirco nos quoque qui eos legimus
impii sumus? Primum quammulta sunt in hoc poemate cum aliorum philosophorum sententiis, ac decretis
consentanea? Quammulta probabilia? Quammulta denique praeclara ac prope divina? Haec sumamus, haec
arripiamus, haec approbemus. Illa quae sunt commentitia, quae cum religione christiana pugnantia, reiiciamus,
aspernemur, improbemus.
29 f. a3v, Quin et Empedoclem et Democritum et Epicurum et Lucretium et ceteros philosophos ac poetas (ut
oratores et historicos taceam) tum Graecos, tum Latinos, quamvis profanos, quamvis mendaceis, quamvis
impios, studiose legebant (i.e. veteres illi christiani). […]Namquemadmodum apes ex singulis floribus, quod
est ad mel conficiendum utilissimum atque aptissimum limare, ac depasci consueverunt, quod est inutile non
attingunt, aut certe non degustant. On this literary topos, see also Lucr. 3.11.
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who claimed that, as the world had never been generated, it would also never perish.
Also concerning the immortality of the soul, Aristotle’s opinionwas inconsistentwith
that of Plato and with ‘ours’, says Lambin, referring to Christian convictions.30 A long
list of examples follows, in which Lambin shows that one can find a great number of
impieties and immoral statements in many works written by ‘canonical’ authors.
Finally Lambin returns to Lucretius, praising him anew:
Then, I return to our Lucretius, an excellent and distinguished poet. Themost
refined, ancient and elegant amongall the other Latinpoets, fromwhomVirgil
and Horace used to borrow not only half, but often entire verses. This (poet),
when discussing the first-beginnings of things or indivisible corpuscles; their
motion and figures; about the void, about images or simulacra, which are sent
from the body of things; about the nature of souls; the birth and death of
stars; the eclipse of sun or moon; the nature of the thunderbolt; about the
heavenly vault; the lowerworld; the causes of diseases; andmany other things,
is subtle, sharp, pure and elegant.31
Lambin first praises Lucretius as a poet, acknowledging that Virgil and Horace were
heavily indebted to him. Then, he moves on to focus on Lucretius’ philosophy: in
De rerum natura, he penned his best verses when dealing with natural philosophical
issues (atoms, void, simulacra, the nature of the soul, stars, thunderbolts …). What
is particularly remarkable is that in the octavo version, published in 1565, Lambin’s
letter to Charles ix begins with this very passage, reinforcing evenmore the image of
Lucretius as the poet who spoke about nature more than anything else.
Lambin then puts forward various arguments to defend Lucretius and his work.
First, he wonders what could have happened if Lucretius had decided to deal with a
more authoritative and acceptable doctrine than Epicureanism, such as Platonism,
30 f. a4r, Si scriptores omneis qui religioni Christianae adversantur, reiiciendos, ac damnandos esse arbitramur, ne
Plato quidem nobis erit attingendus […]. Ne Aristoteles quidem lectione dignus erit, qui mundum, ut numquam
ortus esse, ita numquan interitum putat, qui denique de animorum immortatlitate videtur et a magistro suo
Platone, et a nobis valde dissidere, plurimumque discrepare.
31 f. e1r,AdLucretiumigiturnostrumrevertor poetamegregium,acpraestantem, scriptoremqueomniumLatinorum
politissimum, vetustissimum, elegantissimum, ex quo Virgilius et Horatius non solum dimidiatos, sed integros
saepe versus mutuari solent. Hic ubi de rerum primordiis, seu corpuscolis individuis, de eorummotum, et figuris,
de inani, de imaginibus, sive simulacris, quae e summo rerum corpore mittuntur, de animorum natura, de ortu
obitumque siderum, de solis et lunae defectu, de fulminis natura, de arcu caelesti, de averni, de causis morborum,
et multis aliis rebus disputat, subtilis, argutus, enucleatus, limatus est.
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Aristotelianism or Stoicism. In that case, we would have taken a lot of benefit
and he would have inspired a lot of admiration. Ultimately, even dealing with an
unlucky topic, like Epicureanism, he nevertheless produced such a remarkable and
distinguished poem.32
Another argument goes as follows:we read and learnbyheartHomer, even though
he hides his true understanding of natural and human things under some absurd
and unseemly stories. Lucretius instead – Lambin says – addresses the principle of
things, the world and its parts, the happy life, the heavenly and earthly things neither
truthfully nor religiously, but still straightforwardly, clearly and, as an Epicurean,
ingeniously and learnedly. Therefore, we should not despise him if he does not agree
with Plato, says Lambin, nor if he says many things that are against our religion.33
Lambin could not have expressed his favourable opinion of De rerum natura more
clearly, even though he considered the ideas contained in it to be unorthodox.
Another of Lambin’s arguments proceeds from the assumption that there is no
Latin writer who speaks better than Lucretius, not even Cicero or Caesar. Therefore,
in so far as Lucretius is mad, he follows Epicurus; in so far as he agrees with our own
philosophy, he says it with greater acumen and purity than anyone else. Nonetheless,
Lambin explicitly rejects the philosophy of Leucippus, Democritus, Empedocles and
Aristippus, whom Lucretius follows, while admiring and imitating the elegance
of his language.34 By presenting Lucretius as a mere follower of other erroneous
32 f. e2r, Quem, si quis casus, ad graviorem, et probabiliorem aliquam disciplinam, puta Platonicam, aut
peripateticam, aut Stoicam detulisset, Dii immortales, quantum ex eo fructum, quantam utilitatem caperemus?
Quantam sui admirationem hominibus excitaret? Quanta sui studia commoveret? Nam si tam infelici
argumento sibi proposito, ac suscepto, poema tamen edidit tam praeclarum, tam illustre, tam luculentum: quid
eum censemus fuisse facturum, si vel rerum Platonicarummagnitudinem, acmaiestatem, vel Aristotelis acumen,
atque ubertatem, vel Zenonis gravitatem, ac severitatem versibus materiae consentaneis expressisset? Quantum
nomen, quantam laudem, quantam gloriam consecutus esset?
33 f. e2r, Homerum propterea quod in quibusdam fabularum partim turpium, partim absurdarum involucris
omnium rerumnaturalium, atque humanarumcognitionem inclusam continere existimatur, non solum legimus,
verumetiamediscimus: Lucretium sine fabularum, taliumque nugarum integumentis de pricipiis et causis rerum,
de mundo, de mundi partibus, de vita beata, de rebus caelestibus ac terrenis, non vere illum quidem, neque pie,
sed tamen simpliciter, et aperte, et, ut Epicureum, ingeniose et acute et erudite, et purissimo sermone loquentem
non audiemus? Non enim si multis locis a Platonis disidet, non si multa cum religione nostra pugnantia dicit,
iccirco ea etiam, quae cum illorum, et Christianorum sententia congruunt, spernere debemus.
34 f. e2v, Equidem hoc tibi, Karole, non dubitanter affirmabor, nullum in tota lingua Latina scriptorem Lucretio
Latinemelius esse locutum, nonM. Tullij, non C. Caesaris orationem esse puriorem. Itaque, si ita commodum est,
totam sane Lucretii, hoc est Leucippi, Democriti, Empedoclis, Aristippi quos secutus est Lucretius, philosophiam
improbemus, at incredibilem verborum nitorem, at singularem sermonis elegantiam, at incorruptam Latine
loquendi facilitatem admiremur, amplectamur, aemulemur. One wonders why Lambin did not include
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philosophers, Lambin managed to redeem him and his reputation at least partly.
After all, Lambin says, not being original was better than being blasphemous.35
In his last argument, Lambin reaffirms that, although some of the ancient
writers – amongwhomhe lists Lucretius – were impious and followed a false religion,
still we should read them and literally ‘plunder’ from them the richness and grace of
their language in order to praise and celebrate our religion.36
To sum up, the arguments put forward by Lambin to defend Lucretius’ poetry
and philosophy are many: from the poem’s educational value to the elegance of his
style, from the subtlety of his reasoning to the agreement between his philosophy
and the views of other accepted authors, Aristotle above all.
In the end, Lambin explicitly states that his intention is not to re-establish the
Epicurean philosophy which had already been condemned, nor to divert people from
the Christian religion or corrupt them with a new religion.37 On the contrary, he
declares to follow the philosophy of Aristotle and Plato and to embrace Christianity.
Yet, there are three reasons why he decided to comment on Lucretius:
1. In order to enrich and embellish with ancient wealth the Latin language, which
was impoverished, precisely because Lucretius’ text, spoiled and full of mistakes,
was wearing out.38
Epicurus in the list of atomists (and hedonists, if we consider Aristippus). At the same time, the
name of Empedocles might look out of place in the eyes of the modern reader. But one should
take into account that, in the Renaissance, Empedocles was generally perceived as a forerunner of
Epicureanism and amajor influence on Lucretius.
35 Tatiana Tsakiropoulou-Muller, “Lambin’s Edition of Lucretius: Using Plato and Aristotle in Defense
of De rerum natura”, Classical andModern Literature, 21/2 (2001): 45–70, 67.
36 f. e2v,Nunc autem cum litteras quidemGraecas ex Homero, et ceteris epicis, ex Sophocle, et ceteris tragicis, et
Aristophane […], ex Platone et Xenophonte, et Aristotele et Plutarcho […], Latinas autem ex Plauto, Terentio,
Lucretio […], qui falsam religionem, vel meram impietatem quibusdam locis spirant, ac redolent, discere necesse
habeamus, quid vetat quominus hos scriptores ita tractemus, itaque legamus ut eorum sermonis quidemdivitias,
lepores ornamenta ab ipsis compilemus, talibusque furtis ac spoliis antiquorum illorum Christianorum exemplo
ecclesiamDei opt.Max. locupletemus amplificemus, exornemus religionem autem nostram […] incorruptam,
inviolatam, atque integram conseruemus?
37 f. e2v, Nam neque olim cum me litteris Latinis docendi praefecisti, eo consilio Lucretium meis auditoribus
explicandum suscepi, ut philosophiam Epicuream iam explosam, atque damnatam revocarem, ac restituerem,
neque nunc, postquam eundemme linguamGraecam docere iussisti, magnomeo labore, multisque vigiliis, hunc
eundem poetammendis innumerabilibus maxima ex parte perpurgatum, et brevibus commentariis illustratum,
ea mente edendum curavi, ut homines vel a pietate Christiana avocarem, vel nova relligione inficerem.
38 f. e3r, Primum ut linguam Latinam hoc ipso inopem, atque egentem, quod Lucretius mendosus, laceratus ac
deformatus obsolescebat, bonis eam suis, et opibus avitis augerem, ditarem, atque ornarem.
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2. In order to gain the approval of those who enjoy the Latin language, for having
cleansed such a good author from all the errors.39
3. So that people will thank Charles ix for being such a good protector of culture.
In fact, those – like Lambin himself – whom he had appointed as professors of
Hebrew, Greek and Latin in Paris, in restoring the works of ancient writers, tried
to help and support the studies of those men who like literature.40
Besides these flatteries, Lambin’s letter to Charles ix can be seen as themost overt and
explicit Renaissance defence of Lucretius and his work. To be sure, Lambin does not
claim that everything Lucretius said was right, but still he warmly suggests to read
his poem, presenting him both as a natural philosopher and as a poet. What is also
quite remarkable is that Lambin places all the blame for Lucretius’ insane ideas on
Epicurus: often, the appreciation of Lucretius’ poem from the point of view of style
goes hand in hand with a condemnation of some aspects of his philosophy, which, in
this case, is immediately associated with Epicurus alone. At the same time, however,
Lambin shows an appreciation of the poem’s content, so much so that he himself
does not seem to be sure as to howmuch he should reject of Lucretius’ philosophy.
2.2. Epistles to the Patrons
As mentioned before, Lambin dedicated each of the six books to a different patron, to
whom he wrote individual letters.
The first letter is addressed to Erricus Memmius, or Henri de Mesmes (1532–1596),
a French statesman and friend of Lambin.41 The reasons why Lambin chose him as
39 f. e3r, Deinde ut de omnibus omnium gentium hominibus quos Latini sermonis mundities delectat, optimo
huius linguae auctore tot mendis fere perpurgato, bene mererer.
40 f. e3r, Postremo ut omnes bonarum litterarum studiosi tibi, Rex potentissime […] gratiam habeant, quod ii, quos
in urbe totius Galliae maxima ac celeberrima liberalibus artibus ac disciplinis, litterisque Hebraicis, Graecis, ac
Latinis docendis praeposuisti, non solum iuventutem ex omnibus Europae partibus in hanc urbem, tanquam
ad uberrimum omnium disciplinarummercatum, conuenientem viva voce erudiant, verum etiam scriptoribus
antiquis iniuria temporum deprauatis in integrum restituendis, omniummortalium a litteris non abhorrentium
studia iuvare, ac sublevare conentur.
41 Henri deMesmes, Lord of Roissy andMalassise. He was councillor at the parliament of Paris and
maitre de requêtes at theCouncil of State.Hewas Lambin’s classmate inTolouse.Hewas commissioned
by Henry ii to administer the Republic of Siena (1557), but after the King’s death, he returned to
France. From his father he inherited a precious collection of rare books and objects. Collecting
manuscripts was his passion. See Henri Frère, “Le Memmianus de Lucrèce”,Mélanges d’ archéologie et
d’ histoire 29.1 (1909), 199–211, 200–201.
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the dedicatee of the first book are listed at the beginning of the letter. He explains
that, first of all, the twomen had always been on good terms and, in their youth, had
studied together in Tolouse. Secondly, Lambin’s points out that Henri’s surname is
identical to that of Memmius, to whom Lucretius had dedicated hisDe rerum natura.
Thirdly, Henri had provided Lambin with a very ancient exemplar of Lucretius (unum
T. Lucretii Cari exemplar pervetustum), which came from his rich personal library. As
we will see shortly, this codex has been identified as the Quadratus, one of themost
ancient Lucretian manuscripts.42 In the end of his letter, Lambin boasts that he has
restored Lucretius’ text to its ancient form, with a lot of industry.43
The dedicatory letter to Pierre Ronsard (1524–1585), which introduces Lucretius’
second book is more remarkable from a conceptual point of view. Pierre Ronsard was
a French poet, founder of the school of La Pléiade. The La Pléiade poets had brokenwith
medieval and early Renaissance French traditions, systematically experimentingwith
new forms, which were often borrowed from Antiquity. Some of Ronsard’s poetry in
particular consisted of Lucretian reworkings, which indicate an in-depth knowledge
of De rerum natura.44 Take, for example, the opening of sonnet 37 in the collection Les
Amours (1552), in which Ronsard positively refers to Lucretius’ atomism and the theory
of clinamen:
Les petitz corps, culbutans de travers,
Parmi leur cheute en byaiz vagabonde
Hurtez ensemble, ont composé le monde,
S’ entracrochans d’acrochementz divers.
The little atoms, tumbling topsy-turvy, by their obliquely wandering fall,
clashing together, brought order to the world, hooking up with each other in
diverse patterns.45
42 About the so-called “Memmianus” see in particular H. Frère, “LeMemmianus”, 199–211 andMichael
Reeve, “Lucretius from the 1460s to the 17th Century: Seven Questions of Attribution”, Aevum 80
(2006), 165–184, 175–177. Here, Reeve identifies this Memmianus with q.
43 f. e4v,Nunc T. Lucretii Cari de natura rerum ame summa (quod te non fugit) diligentia, maximoque labore ad
veteres membranas emendati, atque ex carie, situ, et squallore in suam pristinam formam, nativumque habitum
ac nitorem propemodum vindicati librum primum, tibi tuo merito libentissime dono.
44 See Philip Ford, “Lucretius in EarlyModern France”, in The Cambridge Companion to Lucretius, 227–
241, esp. 232. In general, for Lucretius’ influence on the Pléiade poets, see Fraisse, L’ influence de Lucrèce,
71–153.
45 For the French text andmore examples, see Ford, “Lucretius in Early Modern France”, 232–235. The
translation is mine.
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Lambin’s reasons for dedicating this book to Ronsard are, first of all, the latter’s
undoubted status as poetarumGallorum princeps, “the first among the French poets”.
The second reason is that, just as Lucretius had been the first of the Latin poets to
explain philosophy and the nature of things in Latin verse, so Ronsard, after having
drawn fully from the pure sources of ancient poetry, published his poems in French.46
In this context, Lambin distances himself once more from Lucretius’ philosophy,
whichhedescribes as crazy and irreligious inmanyaspects (deliram, et inmultis impiam).
Finally, it was by virtue of their friendship that Lambin decided to dedicate the book
to Ronsard. In this book, Lambin explains, Lucretius deals with the motion of the
first bodies, their figures which are various but still limited, their infinite number,
their very simple nature, which is devoid of any color and any first quality. This
book is also about the innumerable worlds which are born and destroyed by the
fortuitous aggregation of those corpuscles. Here Lambin adds a short note: “let us
laugh at Epicurus’ crazy ideas” (rideamus licet Epicuri deliria).47 Especially the idea of
the randomness of the creation and annihilation of worlds looks unacceptable to this
commentator.
Interestingly, the third book, in which Lucretius refutes the immortality of the
soul, is dedicated to a religious man, Germain Vaillant de Guellis (1516–1587), Abbot
of Paimpont and Bishop of Orléans. First Lambin acknowledges that the ancient
philosophers held quite different opinions about the soul. Again, Lucretius is not
the only one tomaintain that souls weremortal; most of the ancient philosophers
(including Aristotle) did. Only a few, like Plato or Xenophon, tried to set the soul free
from death.48 Of course Lambin condemns the notion of the mortality of the soul,
46 f. n2r (p. 99),Quemadmodumnoster Lucretius Latinorumprimus naturam rerum, et philosophiam (mitto dicere
quam: do etiam deliram, et in multis impiam) Latinis versibus, iisque ornatissimis, ac politissimis illustravit,
ita tu per amoenissima omnium poetarumGraecorum, ac Latinorum nemora diu pervagatus, atque ex eorum
liquidissimis, et purissimis fontibus infinita rerum nostris hominibus inauditarum ubertate, hausta ea poemata
sermoneGallico in vulgus edidisti, quaeHomeri,Hesiodi, Pindari, Anacreontis, Apollonii, Theocriti, Callimachi,
Virgilii, Horatii, Tibulli, Propertii, Ovidii, et ceterorum ληκύθους et μυροθήκια redolerent. Similarities can
be found with Lucr. 1.922 ff. and 4.1–5.
47 f. n2r (p. 99) His igitur causis impulsus hunc secundum librum, in quo de primorum corporum motu, de
figuris eorum variis, et tamen finitis, numero infinito, natura simplicissima, omniumque colorum, atque
adeo omnium primarum qualitatum experte, de mundis innumerabilibus, qui fortuito illorum corpusculorum
concursu (rideamus licet Epicuri deliria) et oriuntur, et intereunt, hunc (inquam) librum amicitiae nostrae testem
futurum sempiternum tibi libens, atque ex animo dono.
48 f. Aa3v (p. 190),Nunc autem cumplerique eorum (quo in numero sunt ii, qui animum vel sanguine, vel cerebrum,
vel aliquam aliam corporis partem, vel flatum ac ventum, vel ignem, vel harmoniam, vel auram tenuissimam
cum vapore, et aere, et quarta quadam nominis experte natura confusam, et permistam esse censent) animos
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reaffirming his own orthodoxy. He claims that Lucretius’ arguments against the
immortality of the soul have no strength and cannot persuade him or any other sane
and pious person.49 Indeed, the power of the truth is so strong that even Lucretius
in the second book maintained that the soul was immortal.50 To this end, Lambin
quotes three verses from Lucretius: 2. 999–1001, Cedit item retro, de terra quod fuit ante
/ in terras; et quod missum est ex aetheris oris / id rursum caeli fulgentia templa receptant.
The same comparison had beenmade by Pius, who had entitled a paragraph of his
commentary Lucretius immortalem animam dixit (f. 99r), there referring to a passage
by Lactantius (inst. 7.12.5) in which the same quotation by Lucretius (2.999–1001) is
reported. According to Lactantius, Lucretius victus veritate est et imprudenti ratio vera
subrepsit. Just as in the case of Pius, Lambin’s source for this passage was probably
Lactantius.
In the end, Lambin asks himself why it is that we do not read the third book
unwillingly, given that here Lucretius opposes the immortality of the soul; and
the same applies to those that remain, in which many things are discussed that
disagree with our customs and religion. Lambin explains that this is so because, first
of all, Lucretius’ verses are excellent and beautiful and his language is refined and
polished.51 Moreover, not everything in Lucretius’ books iii–vi has to be rejected,
as in fact he there also recommends moderation, temperance, contempt of death
and avoidance of love. He also deals withmany interesting topics, such as causes of
diseases, rains, thunderbolts, and magnets, among many other things.52 Precisely
quasi capitis damnatos, mortaleis esse statuant, pauci, in quibus sunt Plato, et Xenophon, a morte, et interitu
vindicare conentur.
49 f. Aa3v (p. 190), quid aut me, aut quemquam sanum ac piummoveant collecta a Lucretio adversus animorum
immortalitatem argumenta, cum ea omnia valeant in parteis, seu potestates animae turbidas, et rationis
experteis, non in eam, quae omni motu a ratione averso vacat, quaeque ex aetheriis illis, et divinis ignibus
decerpta, et quasi delibrata est?
50 f. Aa4r (p. 191),Quid quod tanta vis est veritatis, ut Lucretius ipse libro superiore animos esse immortaleis, iisque
in caelum, unde profecti sunt, reditum patere imprudens atque adeo invitus fateatur?
51 f. Aa4r (p. 191),Cur igitur et hunc tertium librum, inquo immortalitas animorumacerrime oppugnatur, et ceteros,
in quibus multa et a nostris moribus aliena, et cum vera religione pugnantia dicuntur, non inviti legimus? Quia
versus sunt optimi, atque ornatissimi, quia vocabula rerum alia maxime propria, lectissima, significantissima,
alia venustissime facta, aptissime novata, illustrissime translata sunt, quia sermonis genus est purissimum,
nitidissimum, politissimum…
52 f. Aa4r (p. 191), Accedit huc, quod non omnia sunt in Lucretio respuenda ac reiicienda, quin longe plurima
reperiuntur lectione dignissima, qualia sunt ea, quae ab eo de continentia, ac frugalitate, demorte contemnenda,
de amore fugiendo, de speculorum ratione, de morborum causis, de imbribus, grandinibus, fulminibus, et
similibus, de magnete, de dissimilibus et variis fontium naturis, et sexcentis aliis rebus cognitu periucundis
disputantur.
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the fact that Lambin felt the need to justify the reading of books iii–vi, despite their
heterodox contents, might show that these last four books, more than the first two,
which contain the atomist theory, were usually perceived by Renaissance readers as
the most controversial.
In the first part of the fourth letter, which is dedicated to Marc-Antoine de Muret
(1525–1585), a French humanist and classical scholar, Lambin thanks the dedicatee
for supporting his initiative of commenting on Lucretius. During his stay in Rome,
Lambin had apparently been assisted byMuret, who not only incited him, but also
offered his philological ability to decipher some obscure – sometimes almost erased –
passages in Lucretius’ manuscripts.53 In the second part, Lambin explains that he
decided to dedicate this book to Muret because the latter had once told him that this
was his favorite book.54 Finally, Lambin describes the content of the fourth book: the
simulacra, the mirror, the defense of the senses against the New Academics, hunger,
thirst, sleep, dreams, desire, love and many other interesting topics.55 Actually the
relation between Lambin andMuret was quite controversial: apparently, the former,
in 1559, had accused the latter of having published, in his Variae lectiones, some obser-
vations coming from his own research.56 By dedicating the fourth book of De rerum
natura toMuret, Lambinmight actually have tried to improve their troubled relation.
The fifth book is dedicated to Adrien Turnèbe (1512–1565), a French classical
philologist, whom Lambin praises for his admirable knowledge in many fields. In
fact the whole letter consist of effusive praise of Turnèbe’s scholarly merits, especially
in the field of classical philology. As we will see shortly, Turnèbe had also played an
53 f. Mm1r (p. 273), Tu enim mihi cum Romae essem, princeps acerrimos ad hoc negocium suscipiendum ac
perficiendum stimulos admovisti,mihique vulgata Lucretii exempla cumexemplaribus antiquis, acmanuscriptis
conferenti assidua operam dedisti. Neque hoc tantum fecisti, verum etiam cum in scripturam aliquam a vulgata
discrepantem ac diversam incideremus, atque in ea haereremus, tu saepe ex obscuris, et propemodum oblitteratis
veteris scripturae vestigiis veram lectionem (quo ingenio, quoque acumine es) sagacissime odorabaris. On
Lambin andMuret, see Sandys, AHistory of Classical Scholarship, 191.
54 f. Mm1v (p. 274), Tibi autem hoc munusculummeum eo gratius fore confido, quod cum tibi a me optio eligendi
facta fuerit, hunc ipsum librum eligisti neque vero tibi in eligendo, iudicium defuit.
55 f. Mm1v (p. 274), Totam enim hic liber simulacrorum, seu imaginum Epicurearum, quibus ille ad oculos nostros
affluentibus, visum lacessi, ad animum autem accurrentibus, eumque ferientibus, cogitandi vim et διανοητικὰς
φαντασίας excitari putabat, explicationem complectitur, idem speculorum rationem rem varietatis plenam, et
cognitionem dignissimam, idem acerrimam sensuum defensionem adversus novos Academicos, qui sensus esse
incertos ac fallaceis, et nihil sciri posse contendebant, idem plenissimam atque uberrimam de quinque sensibus,
de cogitandi ratione, de ingressu, de fame et siti, et de earum rerum causis, de somno, et somniis, de libidine, et
amore, multaque alia utilissima, ac iucundissima continet.
56 On this topic, see John O’Brien, “Le Lucrèce de Denys Lambin: entre revendication et prudence”, in
La renaissance de Lucrèce (Paris: pups, 2010), 35–46, 39.
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important role in the collation of Lucretius’ text, by providing Lambin with a copy of
one of the most important among the manuscripts that he used (see below).
The last dedicatory letter is addressed to Jean Dorat (1508–1588), another French
scholar and Pléiade poet. Lambin summarizes all the contents of the book (weather
phenomena, an eruption of Aetna, the flooding of the Nile, magnets, the cause of
diseases, the Athenian plague), and says that this book, even if it is the last one, is not
to be neglected or despised, on the contrary, it is the best andmost elaborate.57
These letters show Lambin’s ability in creating a dense network with renowned
patrons and illustrious scholars to whom he recommends reading Lucretius’ poem.
Thanks to this strategy, while promoting his work, Lambin also contributed to a wide
circulation of De rerum natura in sixteenth century France.
2.3. Epistle to the Reader
In the beginning of his epistle to the reader, in order to justify his choice of comment-
ing on Lucretius, Lambin states that those who comment on difficult and obscure
ancient writers, restoring their texts to their pristine splendor, havemoremerits than
those who comment on the writers who were already transmitted by ancient authors
and already pertained to the ‘canon’.58
Then, Lambinmakes it clear that hiswork is unique and completely different from
what has been done before: no less than eight hundred loci have been restored to their
true reading.59 He lists the codices he collated to restore the Latin text of Lucretius: he
57 f. NNn1v (p. 466), Quinque igitur libris consumptis, atque exhaustus, restat sextus non ab aliis derelictus,
aut reiectus, sed, ut omnium pulcherrimus, ornatissimus, accuratissimus tibi uni reservatus. Tota enim de
rebus supernis, et sublimibus, quas μετεώρους appellant Graeci, disputationem continet ad quas accedunt
iucundissimae de Aetna ignibus, de Nili incrementi causis, de avernorum ratione, de variis fontium, et puteorum
naturis, de magnete, de pestilentiae origine quaestiones, et, quae libri clausola est, Atheniensis illius pestilentiae
funestissimae descriptio ex Thucidide paene ad verbum expressa. Hunc igitur librum Aurate, tibi excepi, ac
reservavi.
58 f. i1r, Fuit mea semper haec sententia, lector erudite, eos qui scriptores veteres vel difficiles, atque obscuros
explanant, atque illustrant, vel iniuria temporum depravatos, codicummanuscriptorum auctoritate freti in
antiquum statum, pristinumque ac nativum splendorem restituunt, de bonis litteris, honestisque disciplinis
melius mereri, quam qui aut poemata, aut orationes, aut libros artem aliquam iam ante a veteribus traditam,
atque explicatam complectenteis scribunt et componunt.
59 f. i1v, Sed ad Lucretium tandem, cuius gratia hic sermo ame institutus est, venio. Hunc igitur poetam, lector
humanissime, liquido tibi confirmare, vereque apud te gloriari possum, mea opera plane alium ab eo, qui abs te
antea visus sit, in manus tuas pervenire. Octingentis enim locis (neque hoc ὑπερβολικῶς, sed Latino more dico)
restitutum esse, tibi legendo cognoscere, atque experiri licebit.
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had found three of them in Rome and two in Paris.60He explains that one of these two
pertained toHenri deMesmes – the onehe callsMemmianus – and another came from
the monastery of Saint Bertin, the so-called Bertinianus. The codex that Lambin calls
Bertinianus has been unequivocally identified with the Quadratus, which was sent
to Pierre Galland (1510–1559) in Paris by themonks of St. Bertin in St. Omer. Galland
had subsequently made it available to Turnèbe, whomade a collation of it. Lambin
admits that he did not directly see this manuscript, but only employed Turnèbe’s
collations. At the same time – as I have mentioned before – also theMemmianus has
been identified with q. Therefore the Memmianus and the Bertinianus must have
been the samemanuscript, although Lambin was not aware of that.61
Lambin also examined some recent editions and gathered together many sec-
ondary sources, such as ancient grammarians, who had quoted the verses of older
poets.62 Finally, Lambin claims to have added ‘short’ notes to the text, which sounds
like an understatement considering the length of his commentary.63
While not evenmentioning Pius, Lambin claims that his work is superior to any
other related enterprise, especially from a philological point of view. He somehow
minimizes the importance of his commentary, while boasting of the quality of his
60 According toMichael Reeve, the Vaticanus that Lambinmentions is Vat. Lat. 1569, “the only Lucretius
at the Vatican at that time”, while the manuscripts provided by Gabriele Faerno and Scipione Tetti
are possibly F (Laur. 35.31) and C (Cambridge Univ. Nn ii 40) or maybe some descendant of N after
the correction (Naples Naz. iv e 51). SeeMichael Reeve, “The Italian Tradition of Lucretius”, Italia
medioevale e umanistica 23 (1980), 27–48, 43 n. 4.
61 See Frère, 199–211; Reeve, The Italian Tradition, 43. M. Reeve, “Lucretius from the 1460s to the 17th
century”, 175–177. See Butterfield, The early textual history, 309.
62 f. i1v,Usus autem sum in eo restituendo, Romae quidem tribus libris manuscriptis, uno Vaticano, altero qui fuit
Gulielmi Faerni, tertio quem Scipio Thetius Napolitanus mihi commodatus dedit. Lutetiae vero duobus, uno
Memmiano, altero Bertiniano, qui ex coenobio D. Bertini, (est autem hoc coenobium in oppido D. Odomari
non longe a Morinis) olim ad P. Gallandium ipsius rogatu Lutetiam missus est, deinde Adriano Turnebo a
P. Gallandio eius copia facta est. Atque ego (ne mentiar) Bertinianum codicem, quem in meis scholiis saepe
commemoro, non vidi, sed librum Adriani Turnebi e formis plumbeis expressum, cum illo exemplari manu
scripto diligentissime, et accuratissime usque ad librum sextum duntaxat comparatum habui, quandiu volui;
eumque, quia Bertiniani codicis, scripturas omneis dissimileis, et differenteis a vulgatis summa fide imitatas
continebat, Bertinianum nominavi. Ne vulgatos quidem libros aspernatus sum. Quin omneis, quos potui,
undique conquisivi, et corrogavi, Parisienses, Lugudunenseis, eosque binos, Venetos item binos, unos antiquiores,
alteros recentiores, Florentinos, Vicentinos, Basiliensis. Praeterea grammaticos omneis veteres, et Linguae Latinae
veluti magistros, quos superioris aetatis oratorum, ac poetarum versus protulisse meminissem, studiose relegi.
See Sandys, A history of classical scholarship, 189–190.
63 f. i2r, Scholia praeterea, seu breveis commentarios addidi quibus partim immutatorum ame locorum rationem
reddidi, partim obscuriores quasdam voces declaravi, partim quaedam ad philosophiam, aut historiam
pertinentia, difficiliora atque impeditiora …
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philological work of reconstruction of Lucretius’ text. This is precisely the main
difference between Pius’ and Lambin’s commentaries: the latter is more focused on
the philological reconstruction of Lucretius’ text than the former, which in turn
contains extensive notes and digressions, where the philosophical contents of De
rerum natura are discussed at length.
2.4. The New Epistle to the Reader in 1570 Edition
Asmentioned before, Lambin adds to his 1570 edition some new paratexts, such as a
second epistle to the reader and a biography of Lucretius, among others.
The new letter to the reader begins with a comparison between Lucretius’ poem
and an excellent painting, which had later been ruined and polluted by many inept
painters.64 In Lambin’s own words, the merit of his 1563 edition is to have restored
Lucretius’ text to its ancient dignity.65 The main purpose of this letter is to blame
the person who instead arrogated to himself the merit of having restored Lucretius’
text. It is clear that Lambin is here referring to Gifanius (see above); however, he
never calls him by name, using instead various derogatory expressions, such as thief,
plunderer, sycophant or the nickname Thraso (the braggart soldier in Terence’s
Eunuchus), designating a person who is arrogant and vainglorious.
Only for onemoment does Lambin set this topic aside in order to praise Lucretius,
the most elegant and neat of all extant Latin poets, and to list the codices he collated
to restore the poem’s Latin text. Then, he returns once more to blaming Gifanius’
edition, in which – he says – almost everything that is correct pertains to his own 1563
edition.66
64 (1570) f. c2r, Eam tabulammali pictores longo post tempore vetustate aliquantum obscuratam, et propemodum
obsoletam, nacti, non solum novis et alienis coloribus contaminarant verius, quam illustrarant, verum etaim
caeno et sordibus conspurcarant.
65 (1570) f. c2r, Ego autem eam miserandum in modum contaminatam, ita, ut vix pristina picturae dignitas
et pulchritudo agnosceretur; annos abhinc septem multis similibus tabulis ex illa prima et nativa, quasi ad
vivum expressis atque imitatis adiutus in suam paene formam, atque in antiquam integritatem ac dignitatem
restitueram.
66 (1570) f. c3r,Omnia fere quae in eo Lucretio recta sunt, mea sunt, quae tamen iste, aut silentio praemittit, aut
maligne laudat aut sibi impudenter arrogat. See also f. c4v, quicquid est in eius Lucretiana editione rectum et
laudabile, paucis exceptis, ex mea editione sumpsit.
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2.5. Lucretius’ Biography
One of the major changes in the 1570 edition is the addition of a long biography of
Lucretius.67
After having discussed Lucretius’ patria and family (genus), Lambin deals with
Lucretius’ intellectual interest (studium), making it immediately clear that Lucretius
sympathized with the Epicurean philosophy. He travelled to Athens, where he might
have attended the lectures of Zeno of Sidon, who at that time was the leader of the
Epicureans, and therefore became fully acquainted with the Epicurean philosophy.68
Lambin remarks on the poem’s educational value especially for orators who, by
reading Lucretius, will improve their rhetorical skills.69 He thenmakes it clear that
he does not imply that the reasoning about atoms and their motion is of any use to
improve eloquence: the orator should therefore first get rid of the content of certain
books and retain the sole form of Lucretius’ poem.70 But as we will see shortly, Lambin
does not completely deny the usefulness of De rerum natura’s contents either.
After having questioned the claim that Cicero edited the poem, which would
otherwise not be so full of errors, Lambin examines the circumstances in which
Lucretius died, presenting an overview of the various hypotheses made by different
unnamed authors: he even suggests that Lucilia, allegedly Lucretius’ wife (or close
friend), administered him a potion which was meant to provoke love, not death.71
Lambin also discusses thenumber of books of whichDe rerumnaturawas originally
composed (six vs. twenty-one); finally he claims that Lucretius’ purpose is to assert
67 Since Ada Palmer has already devoted a long section in her book to this topic, I shall just highlight
the main points that are relevant for our purpose. See Palmer, Reading Lucretius, 176–181.
68 (1570) f. d2r,Quod ad studium attinet, credibile est poetam nostrum, cum ad poeticam et philosophiam natus
esset, ingenioque suo indulgens, et naturam suam ducem secutus, philosophiam Epicuream approbasset, ut
solutiore animo et commodious philosophari posset, sese Athenas contulisse, ibique Zenonem illum, Epicureorum
coryphaeum, ut eumM. Tullius lib. i de natura deorum appellat, audivisset, atque hoc pacto totam Epicuri
disciplinam accurate cognovisse ac perdidicisse.
69 f. d3r, Ita arbitror eum oratorem, qui studiose Lucretium legat, multo maiores in dicendo sonitus editurum,
multoque vehementius animos auditorium quasi percussurum, et quocumque velit impulsurum.
70 f. d3r,Neque tamen hoc ita accipi velim, quasi hoc sentiam, disputationem de atomis, et de earum concursione
fortuita, et de earum motu triplici, et similibus rebus ad eloquentiae incrementum, ac pondus acquirendum
oratori profuturam, sed hoc sentio, hoc dico, detracta certorum librorummateria, eius tractandae rationem, ac
figuras oratori magnos et uberes fructus allaturas, magnoque adiumento ad eloquentiam omnibus suis partibus
absolutam, comparandam futuras.
71 f. d4r, … alii furore percitum, in quem Lucilia sive uxor, sive amica, amatorio poculo porrecto, eum imprudens
adegerat, cum ab eo amari, non ei necem inferre, aut bonammentem adimere, vellet.
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the tranquillity of the rational soul and the Epicurean ataraxía.72 At the same time
Lucretius condemned religio – which Lambin defines as the unmotivated fear of the
gods – and the fear of death, by showing that there was no such thing as divine
providence, afterlife and immortality of the soul.73 Lambin hastens to comment:
Without a doubt, in these things, Epicurus is absolutely wrong, and we, as
Christians, strongly disagree with him; however, we reveal the purpose of
our poet, who follows his master. Since Lucretius could not have obtained
either of these tenets easily (i.e., condemnation of religio and fear of death),
without first having observed and examined the nature of things, he therefore
placed all his work in the explanation of the order of Nature. Therefore he
teaches that the world has been made without the decision of the gods, by
the fortuitous combination of atoms, and that there are innumerable worlds,
created in the same fashion, and that all of them are going to perish.74
As one would expect, Lambin condemns Epicurus and tries to redeem Lucretius by
claiming that he merely followed his master. Importantly, he makes it clear that
the knowledge of natural things was also a tool used by Lucretius to free his readers
from the fear of gods – that is religio – and from the fear of death, which is precisely
the poem’s main purpose. In fact, if Lucretius had not first observed and examined
the nature of things and explained the order of Nature (ratio naturae), he would have
never freed human beings from this double fear.75 In keepingwith this interpretation,
atomism is presented as one of the most useful aspects of Lucretius’ philosophy, a
72 f. d4v, Consilium poetae est animi tranquillitatem et ἀταραξία illam, quam crebro habebat in ore Epicurus,
hominibus afferre.
73 f. d4v,Quoniam autem duae res in primis homines sollicitant et conturbant, ut ille putabat, religio hoc est timor
deorum inanis vitaeque beatae inimicus atque infestus, tummortis metus, his duobus animorum quasi pestibus
et crucibus conatur eos liberare, ostendendo primum nullam esse deorum providentiam, deinde nullum sensum
post vitam remanere, animosque esse mortaleis.
74 f. e1r, In quibus vehementer quidem errat Epicurus, et nos Christiani valde ab eo dissentimus, sed nostri poetae,
qui eum ducem sequitur, consilium aperimus. Quoniam igitur neutrum horum facile expedire poterat Lucretius,
nisi natura rerum perspecta et cognita, omnem operam suam in explicanda ratione naturae ponit. Itaque docet
mundum sine consilio deorum, atomorum concursu fortuito esse factum, et mundos esse innumerabileis eodem
modo creatos eosque omneis esse interituros.
75 A similar statement can be also found at the end of the biography: f. e1v, In physicis autem,
quod plurimum prosunt, plurimam operam posuit Epicurus. Omnium enim rerum natura cognita, levamur
superstitione, liberamur mortis metu, non conturbamur ignoratione rerum, e qua ipsa horribiles exsistunt saepe
formidines, denique etiammorati melius erimus cum didicerimus quae natura desideret. […] Nisi autem rerum
natura perspecta erit, nullo modo poterimus sensuum iudicia defendere.
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weapon, used by the poet to demonstrate that the world may have been perfectly
created without the assistance of the gods.76 Yet, we must point out as well that
Lucretius’ natural philosophy, and atomism in particular, is seen by Lambin as a
subordinate tool, without an independent scientific usefulness.
After Lucretius’ biography, Lambin includes a section about Memmius and his
gens (De C.Memmio Gemello, ff. f1v-f2r), which is in competition with that in Gifanius’
edition (De genteMemmia, ff. a1r–a3r), thus confirming the fact that this second edition
is intended to compete with that of the Dutch jurist.
3. Lambin on Lucretius’ Matter Theory
While in the dedicatory letters Lambinmakes several efforts to establish the poem’s
merits, one cannot find the same explicit apologetic attitude in the commentary.
Here, instead, Lambin’s approach toward Lucretius and his poem is more difficult to
determine.77
Nevertheless, reading between the lines, one may notice that Lambin adopts in
the commentary a similar, albeit more covert, strategy to the one he used in the
introductory letters: in commenting on Lucretius’ natural philosophical theories, he
frequently refers to Aristotle, suggesting, whenever possible, that the philosophical
views of this well-accepted philosopher are not really in contrast to those of Lucretius.
On the contrary, when Lucretius’ theory appears to be indefensible, he often blames
Epicurus.
In this section, I will especially focus on some passages in which Lambin explains
Lucretius’ natural philosophy, and in particular atomism, in order to define his
attitude to this issue.
3.1. Atomism as a Tool to Assert the Denial of Divine Providence
As seen before, Lambin considers atomism as a tool, thatwas used by Lucretius to deny
divine providence and the gods’ intervention in human affairs. In fact, if everything
is the result of aggregation and disaggregation of atoms, the world does not need the
divine intervention tomake things happen. A further confirmation of this connection
76 As pointed out by Ada Palmer (Reading Lucretius, 180), “this is our earliest overt editorial suggestion
that the scientific content of the poem is the most useful part”.
77 See also Tsakiropoulou-Muller, “Lambin’s Edition of Lucretius”, 46.
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between atomism and the denial of god’s providence and intervention in human
affairs can be found in the passage in which Lambin comments on Lucr. 1.44–49.
Following Avancius and other editors, Lambin decides to move lines 1.44–49 to after
50–61. This group of lines, which recurs in 2.646–651, had been considered interpolated
by Marullo, Pontanus and the editor of the Juntine edition, where they had been
omitted. The problem with these lines lies in the fact that they were considered
unsuitable to this context. The verses are the following:
Omnis enim per se divum natura necessest
Immortali aevo summa cum pace fruatur
Semota ab nostris rebus seiunctaque longe;
Nam privata dolore omni, privata periclis,
ipsa suis pollens opibus, nil indiga nostri,
nec bene promeritis capitur neque tangitur ira.
For the very nature of divinity must necessarily enjoy immortal life in the
deepest peace, far removed and separated from our affairs; for without any
pain, without danger, itself mighty by its own resources, needing us not at
all, it is neither propitiated with services nor touched by wrath.
In these verses Lucretius describes the condition of eternal peace in which the
divinity dwells and his indifference to the affairs of the world. Without a doubt
these lines, placed just after the proem and the dedication to Memmius, appear to be
rather inappropriate to the context. In the Renaissance, it was been suggested that a
interpolator irrisor placed them after the hymn to Venus to point out the inconsistency
of Lucretius, who first invokes the goddess and then claims that gods do not care
about humans.78These lines, however, placed by Lambin after 50–61 and in connection
with the concept of principia, acquire a very specific and powerful meaning and give
him the opportunity to connect the idea that gods dwell apart and do not care about
humans with atomism.79 He comments:
78 For an overview of the different positions of Renaissance andmodern editors concerning these lines,
see Bailey ad. loc. and the interesting article by Ettore Bignone, “Nuove ricerche sul proemio del
poema di Lucrezio”, Rivista di filologia classica 47 (1919), 423–433, who postulates a lacuna before them.
79 I don’t think Bignone is right when he says that these verses were arbitrarily put by some editors
after l. 61 “ove certo furono cacciati ad arbitrio”, see Bignone,Nuove ricerche, 424.
lucretius in france and in the low countries 151
Omnis enim] that is the occupation.Not at randomdid I say (Lucretius explains)
that everything is composed of first bodies and that everything is reduced to
the same (first bodies), and that nature creates everything from these, and
reduces (everything) to the same (bodies). Indeed, if anybody thought that
the natural things are created by the work and according to the will of the
gods, he is extremely mistaken. [Here ends Lambin’s paraphrase of Lucretius] It
is an impious doctrine. These six verses are repeated in the second book and
are omitted in the earliest Venetian exemplars, in those from Florence and in
some handwritten codices.80
The expression non temere reinforces the idea that these verses must be placed here –
according to Lambin – and not elsewhere, since this passage make perfect sense for
him in connection with atomism. Lucretius is explaining that, since everything
comes about in a mere aggregation and disaggregation of atoms, natural things
cannot have been created by the gods, who dwell apart and do not care about humans.
Importantly, Lucretius’ atomism is here condemned not because it is ridiculous by
itself, but because it leads to the denial of divine intervention in human affairs. Here,
Lambin condemns this doctrine as impious (impia sententia), but this is one of the few
value judgment one can find in his entire commentary. Contrary to what he does in
many other passages – especially in the introduction – here he does not try to redeem
Lucretius nor to adjust his philosophy to that of Aristotle.
3.2. Nothing Comes fromNothing, as Aristotle alsoMaintained
Commenting on Lucretius 1.149–214, Lambin observes that, as attested by Aristotle,
everybody who addressed the topic of Nature – even Democritus and Epicurus –
maintained that nothing has been created out of nothing.81
80 p. 9,Omnis enim]Occupatio est. Non temere dixi (inquit Lucretius) ex corporibus primis omnia constare, et
omnia in eadem resolvi, naturamque omnia ex illis creare, et in eadem perimere. Nam si quis putet Deorum
opera, et consilio res naturaleis creatas esse, vehementer errat. Impia sententia. Iterantur hi sex versus lib. 2
absuntque ab hoc loco, in exemplis Venetis recentioribus, et Florentinis, et codicibus nonnullis scriptis. The
editions in which these verses had been deleted are the second Aldine edition (in exemplis Venetis
recentioribus) and the Florentine Iuntine edition (et Florentinis).
81 p. 20, nullam rem e nihilo gigni] omnium, qui unquam de natura locuti sunt, fuit haec opinio communis, nihil
ex nihilo fieri, quod testatur Arist. I lib.Φυσικ. τὸ γιγνόμενον ἐκ μὴ ὄντων γίγνεσθαι ἀδύνατον. περὶ γὰρ
ταύτης ὁμογνωμονοῦσι τῆς δόξης ἅπαντες οἱ περὶ φύσεως [Arist., Phys., i 4, 187a34–35]. Id est non potest
fieri, ut id quod gignitur, ex iis quae non sunt, gignatur. Nam de hac opinione, omnes qui de natura scripserunt,
consentiunt.
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In discussing this topic, however, Lucretius’ Renaissance commentators hold
quite different opinions: we recall that Francus contrasts Lucretius’ idea with that
of Aristotle and the theologians, according to whom – hemaintains – a creation ex
nihilowould actually be possible (see chapter 2). By contrast, Pius, Lambin, and, later,
Frachetta (see chapter 5) find that Lucretius agrees with Aristotle on this topic: they
bothmaintain that a creation ex nihilo is not possible.82
Most probably the ambiguity lies in Aristotle’s text: in Physics (i 7 189b30–i 8 191b
34) Aristotle maintains that the early philosophers were baffled by the problem of
becoming, because, according to them, that which is either comes from what is,
or fromwhat is not. But neither of these two options is possible. Instead, Aristotle
maintains that things come into being from their privation, which is indeed not-
being per se; however, they come into being from it not simpliciter, but incidentally,
that is, they do not come into being from bare privation, but from privation in
a substratum. In the same way, nothing comes into being simpliciter from being,
but from that which is incidentally; and not from it as being, but as not being the
particular thing that comes to be.83 Lambin resorts to this latter argument in his
commentary on Lucretius: he claims that, according to Aristotle, nothing can come
fromwhat per se does not exist, that is, privation, but frommatter, which is – so to
speak – a being per se. However, he clarifies, things do not come frommatter qua being,
but as not-being the particular thing that is going to be, that is, as deprived of the
form that it is about to assume.84 Lambin asks for permission to paraphrase Aristotle’s
82 See Pius, f. 18v,CeterumAristoteles affirmat nihil ex nihilo fieri posse, et hoc concedunt omnes philosophantes […]
De nihilo nihil. In nihilum nil posse reverti. Aristotelis verba sunt haec in primo physicorum. Secundum omnes
philosophantes ex nihilo nihil fit. Pius also explains Lucretius’ nihil ex nihilo principle in Aristotelian
terms: f. 19r,Unde queat] … sensus hic.Ubi viderimus nihil ex nihilo creari posse statim perspiciemus unde
queat res quaeque creari, et quo quaeque modo fiant, hoc est ex materia et forma sive quattuor elementis.
83 See William David Ross, Aristotle, with a new introduction by John L. Ackrill (London-New York:
Routledge, 1995), 68–69.
84 p. 21,Ne Aristoteles quidem ab hac communi omnium opinione longius discessit. Ita enim longam hac de re
disputationem concludit lib. iΦυσ. ἀκροάσ.Nihil fere ex eo quod non est simpliciter, seu ex eo quod non est per
se, quale est privatio, quamGraeci στέρησις nominant, fieri, sed contra omnia fieri ex materia, quae est ὄν, id
est ens (liceat nobis hoc vocabulo uti) ens (inquam) per se. Non tamen ex materia fiunt omnia ea ratione, qua est
aliquid, sed qua ratione nihil est, seu est non ens, et κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς, id est ex eventu. Hoc dico qua ratione
inest in ea privatio formae eius, quam iam iam est indutura, id est qua ratione est informis, et expers eius formae,
quae materiam illam informatura est. Ex eo autem quod nihil est simpliciter et per se, veluti ex privatione nihil
fit. Ex eo igitur, quod est ens per se, sit ens: veruntamen non sit per se, sed ex eventu, id est quia evenit materiae,
ut ea forma, quam iam iam consecutura est, et ad quam accomodata est, careat. Haec sunt Aristotelis. See Arist.
Phys. i 8 191a23–191b 34.
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concept of matter in these ontological terms.85 Actually, for Aristotle, matter is not
a being per se, as Lambin describes it, but pure potentiality. It is highly interesting
that Lambin here distorts Aristotle’s opinion by explaining the latter’s concept of
matter in ontological terms: by doing so, he implicitly matches (his interpretation of)
Aristotle’s concept of matter, as being per se, with Lucretius’ atoms, which, together
with void, are the only per se entities in the Epicurean view.
Therefore, Lambin offers a parallel between Lucretius’ and Aristotle’s doctrines,
without pointing out the differences between the two andwithoutmentioning atoms
or seeds, even though there are key concepts in Lucretius’ passage. The reason for this
operationmight be simply that, by assimilating Aristotle’s explanation to Lucretius’,
Lambin conveys the idea that their two philosophical views, after all, are actually
quite similar.
3.3. Atoms: The Error of Epicurus andDemocritus
A first clear reference to atoms occurs when Lambin is commenting on the passage
in which Lucretius deals with their invisibility (1.265–328). Commenting on the
beginning of the passage, he explains:
Now he [Lucretius] begins to demonstrate that there are atoms, that is, the
first and indivisible bodies, and that they are not therefore any less important,
just because they are not seen by the eyes, and he proves this by collecting
many other similar instances of things which are bodies no less, even if they
are not perceived by sight.86
Lambin then explains that the supporters of atomism are Leucippus and Democritus
according to (Pseudo-)Plutarch, Diogenes Laertius and Cicero, of whom he reports
the direct testimonies.87 He uses their words to explain the atomistic theory and to
characterize Epicurus as a follower of Democritus and supporter of atoms. Lambin
does not pronounce any personal judgment, letting the ancient authors speak in
his place. But, by ascribing the atomistic theory to Epicurus and Democritus only,
85 p. 21, …materia, quae est ὄν, id est ens (liceat nobis hoc vocabulo uti) ens (inquam) per se …
86 p. 30,Nunc incipit ostendere, esse atomos, id est corpora prima, et individua, neque ea iccirco minus esse, quod
oculis non cernantur, idque probat multis aliis similibus collectis, quae nihilo minus corpora sunt, etiam si
aspectu non sentiantur.
87 Ps-Plutarch, plac, 1.3 [= Aetius i.3.18],Diog. Laert. 9.44; Cic. fin. 1.; Cic.Acad. 55; Cic.nd 1.23. 65; 2.37.93–94.
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Lambin, while not openly defending Lucretius – as he did in the introductory letters –,
reveals his strategy of redeeming him by blaming his predecessors for the impious
theories that one can find in his poem.
3.4. Void: Using Aristotle to Endorse Lucretius’ Claims
Having introduced the first bodies, Lucretius demonstrates that void really does exist
(1.329–397), and the first argument to support this claim is that otherwise there would
be nomotion.88 Commenting on this passage (1.334), Lambin explains:
Quapropter locus est int.] Since body and void are contraries, but anything that
touches and is touched is a body, it follows that void is something that is
intangible, that is, an intangible place, or rather a place without body. Yet,
void is not simply a place, for place is the place of the thing that is placed.
Therefore it [i.e. place] is not free of body. But void, according to Epicurus’
and Democritus’ opinion, has to be devoid of body, just as the first bodies, or
rather the first-beginnings of things do not contain any void, or empty space,
that is, they are very compact. And so Aristotle in the fourth book of the Physics
says that void is a place [locus] in which there is no body, and in the same book
he defines τὸ κενὸν, that is void, as τoῦ σώματος διάστημα, that is, interval
[spatium] of body, and Lucretius in the fourth book [says] “because they are
free from assaults, as the void is, which remains untouched and is not a whit
affected by blows.”89
Here Lambin conceals the fact that Aristotle’s opinion is not compatible with
Lucretius’ and that the passage from the Physics that he is quoting is actually taken
88 p. 36, nec tamen undique] nunc posteaquam docuit esse corpora prima, aggreditur ad ostendendum esse inane.
Et primum amotu e loco ad locum, quemGraeci φορὰν nominant, probabit esse inane. Non tamen (inquit)
omnia constipata, et condensata sunt corporibus.
89 p. 36,Quapropter locus est int.] Cum corpus et inane inter se sint contraria, quicquid autem tangit, et tangitur,
sit corpus, sequitur, ut inane sit intactum quiddam, id est locus intactus, seu locus sine corpore. Inane autem
locus non est simpliciter, nam locus, locati locus est. Ergo corpore non vacat. At inane, ex Epicuri, et Democriti
sententia ita debet esse corporis expers, ut corpora prima, seu primordia rerum nihil in se habent inanis, aut
vacui, hoc est sunt solidissima. Itaque Aristot. lib. 4 φυσ. ἀκροάσ. inane ait esse locum, in quo nullum est
corpus, et eodem lib. τὸ κενὸν, id est inane, dicit esse τoῦ σώματος διάστημα (Arist. Phys. δ7 214a16–21), id
est corporis spatium, et Lucretius lib. 4 Plagarum quia sunt expertia, sicut inane est. Quod manet intactum,
neque ab ictu fungitur hilum. Actually these verses are taken from the fifth book of De rerum natura, see
Lucr. 5. 357–358.
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from a section inwhich Aristotle refutes the arguments of those who believe in a void.
Indeed, judging from the way in which Lambin presents the passage just quoted, it
looks as if Aristotle’s opinion concerning the void is less opposed to that of Democritus,
Epicurus, or Lucretius than it actually is. Aristotle, in fact, maintains that there is no
void separate from the bodies.
The Aristotelian passage quoted by Lambin is taken from the fourth book of the
Physics. In this passage void is defined both as the place (τόπος) in which there is no
body and as the interval (διάστημα) between the body in its place and the other bodies
surrounding it. The passage is the following:
Since we have determined the nature of place, and void (κενόν) must, if it
exists, be place (τόπος) deprived of body, and we have stated both in what
sense place exists and inwhat sense it does not, it is plain that on this showing
void does not exist, either unseparated or separated; for the void (κενόν) is
meant to be not body but rather an interval in body (σώματος διάστημα).
This is why the void is thought to be something, viz. because place is, and for
the same reasons.90
Here, indeed, Aristotle, who is arguing against the early atomists, uses the phrase
σώματος διάστημα to define void. Interestingly, Lambin resorts to this definition
when commenting on Lucr. 1. 426–428. Here is Lucretius’ text:
Tum porro locus ac spatium, quod inane vocamus, si nullum foret, haut
usquam sita corpora possent esse neque omnino quoquam diversa meare.
Then further, if there were no place (locus) and space (spatium) which we call
void (inane), bodies could not be situated anywhere nor could they move
anywhere at all in different directions.
According to Lucretius, the same reality, inane, may be considered at the same time a
locus and a spatium, according to two different points of view: locus is used for the void
90 Transl. by R.P. Hardie and R.K. Gaye. See Arist. Phys. δ7 214a16–21, ἐπεὶ δὲ περὶ τόπου διώρισται, καὶ
τὸ κενὸν ἀνάγκη τόπον εἶναι, εἰ ἔστιν, ἐστερημένον σώματος, τόπος δὲ καὶ πῶς ἔστι καὶ πῶς οὐκ
ἔστιν εἴρηται, φανερὸν ὅτι οὕτω μὲν κενὸν οὐκ ἔστιν, οὔτε κεχωρισμένον οὔτε ἀχώριστον. τὸ γὰρ
κενὸν οὐ σῶμα ἀλλὰ σώματος διάστημα βούλεται εἶναι· διὸ καὶ τὸ κενὸν δοκεῖ τι εἶναι, ὅτι καὶ ὁ
τόπος, καὶ διὰ ταὐτά.
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as a frame in which the atoms are situated, while spatiummeans the void as a place
through which the atoms canmove.91 In explaining this passage, Lambin claims:
Epicurus calls the void χώρα, that is place (locus), and διάστημα, that is, space
(spatium).92
Lambin associates the concept of χώρα ‘room’ with that of locus ‘place’ and that of
διάστημα ‘interval’ with that of spatium ‘space’. It is indeed a strange correspondence,
not only because χώραwould better refer to a void through which atoms canmove,
rather than a void inwhich the atoms are situated, but also because the termδιάστημα
was never used by Epicurus to define the void.
In the Epistle to Herodotus, 39–40, Epicurus speaks about place and void in these
terms:
If place (τόπος), which we call ‘void’ (κενόν), ‘room’ (χώρα) and ‘intangible
substance’ (ἀναφῆς φύσις), did not exist, bodies would not have anywhere to
be or to move through in the way they are observed to move.93
In this passage, Epicurus uses τόπος ‘place’, κενόν ‘void’, and χώρα ‘room’ as variants
to refer to the idea of space: ‘place’ when it is occupied, ‘void’ when it is unoccupied,
‘room’ when bodies move through it. According to Epicurus, the difference between
the three is one of context, not of essence.94 But by explaining void as διάστημα,
Lambin explains Epicurus’ (and therefore Lucretius’) view in Aristotelian terms.
Lambin must have intentionally abstained frommentioning that in the Aris-
totelian passage he is using, the Stagirite is clearly denying the existence of a void.
91 Carlos Lévy, “Roman Philosophy under Construction: the Concept of Spatium from Lucretius to
Cicero”, in Ranocchia, Graziano, Helmig, Christoph andHorn, Christoph (eds.) Space inHellenistic
Philosophy: Critical Studies in Ancient Physics (Berlin/New York: De Gruyter, 2014), 137.
92 p. 44, Epicurus inane appellat χώραν, id est locum, et διάστημα, hoc est spatium.
93 The translation is taken from Long and Sedley, TheHellenistic philosophers 1, 27. Ep.Hdt. 39–40: τόπος
δὲ εἰ μὴ ἦν, ὃν κενὸν καὶ χώραν καὶ ἀναφῆ φύσιν ὀνομάζομεν, οὐκ ἂν εἶχε τὰ σώματα ὅπου ἦν
οὐδὲ δι’οὗ ἐκινεῖτο, καθάπερ φαίνεται κινούμενα.
94 See Long and Sedley, 30. A similar statement can be found in a testimony of Sextus Empiricus (m. 10,2
= Usener 271):Κατὰ τὸν Ἐπίκουρον τῆς ἀναφοῦς καλουμένης φύσεως τὸ μέν τι ὀνομάζεται κενὸν
τὸ δὲ τόπος τὸ δὲ χώρα, μεταλαμβανομένων κατὰ διαφόρους ἐπιβολὰς τῶν ὀνομάτων, ἐπείπερ ἡ
αὐτὴ φύσις ἔρημος μὲν καθεστηκυῖα παντὸς σώματος κενὸν προσαγορεύεται καταλαμβανομένη
δὲ ὑπὸ σώματος τόπος καλεῖται, χωρούντων δε δι, αυτης σωμάτων χώρα γίνεται.Κοινώς μέντοι
φύσις ἀναφὴς εἲρηται παρὰ τῷ Ἐπικούρῳ διὰ τὸ ἐστερῆσθαι τῆς κατὰ ἀντίβασιν ἁφῆς.
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Lambin thereby conveys the idea that the two philosophical views are less opposed
than they actually are. When commenting on the line that follows (1.335), in which
Lucretius uses motion as a motivation for void, Lambin adopts the same strategy.
Quod si non esset, nulla rat.] if there were no void, there would be no motion
(he says). But motion exist, therefore void exists. About this topic, Diogenes
Laertius, In Epic., says so: τὸ δὲ κενὸν οὔτε ποιῆσαι οὔτε παθεῖν δύναται, ἀλλὰ
κίνησιν μόνον δι’ ἑαυτοῦ τοῖς σώμασι παρέχει, that is, void cannot act upon
anything nor can undergo anything, but merely supplies motion through
itself to the bodies. And Aristotle in the fourth book of the Physics: λέγουσιν δ’
ἓν μὲν ὅτι κίνησις ἡ κατὰ τόπον οὐκ ἂν εἴη (αὕτη δ’ ἐστὶ φορὰ καὶ αὔξησις)·
οὐ γὰρ ἂν δοκεῖν εἶναι κίνησιν, εἰ μὴ εἴη κενόν· τὸ γὰρ πλῆρες ἀδύνατον
εἶναι δέξασθαί τι. Εἰ δὲ δέξεται καὶ ἔσται δύο ἐν ταὐτῷ, ἐνδέχοιτ’ ἂν καὶ
ὁποσαοῦν εἶναι ἅμα σώματα, etc. That is, in the first place, they maintain
that there could not be such a thing as motion from a place to another, this is
transference and growth. For there cannot be anymotion, they say, if there
is no void. Indeed, what is full cannot receive anything into itself, because
if it received [anything into itself], two or any number of bodies could be in
the same place simultaneously, etc., which cannot happen. […] From these
[arguments] it is possible to understand that there is nomotion without void,
and if there is motion, then necessarily there is also void. The reason why
without void there could not be any motion is that, if void were removed
from things, anything that is in the nature of things would be body. However,
the body’s function is to obstruct, therefore all things would obstruct one
another, and thus nothing would move, nothing would proceed, nothing
would advance, but everythingwould stay still, because no capacity to proceed
would be given to them, and because there would be nothing from which
the beginning of moving forward could arise. Virgil seems to approve of this
opinion about the void in the Eclogues (in the words of Silenus): “for he sang
how through themighty void the seeds were driven of earth, air, ocean, and of
liquid fire, how all that is from these beginnings grew, and the young world
itself took solid shape.”95
95 The translation of Virgil is by J.B. Greenough, 1895. See Lambin pp. 36–37, Quod si non esset, nulla
rat.] si non esset inane, non esset motus (inquit). At motus est, ergo est inane. Hac de re sic Diog. Laert. In
Epic. τὸ δὲ κενὸν οὔτε ποιῆσαι οὔτε παθεῖν δύναται, ἀλλὰ κίνησιν μόνον δι’ ἑαυτοῦ τοῖς σώμασι
παρέχει (d.l. Epic. 67); id est inane neque facere quicquam, neque pati potest, sed motum duntaxat per
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By suggesting that even Virgil himself agreed with Lucretius’ opinion about the
void, Lambin renders Lucretius’ doctrine more mainstream.96 By the same token, he
could also have legitimately pointed to the opposition between Lucretius (and his
predecessors) andAristotle on this issue, but Lambin preferred to remain silent on this
point. Again hemerely juxtaposed it with Aristotle’s text without giving any context:
the learned reader would probably recognize the passage immediately and think that
Lambin is subtly refuting Lucretius’ theory. Some others, perhaps, would probably
just think that after all Lucretius’ ideas must have had something in commonwith
those of Aristotle andmany other acceptable philosophers.
The same strategy is found later in the commentary, when Lambin comments
on the passage in which Lucretius strives to demonstrate that sensation proves that
bodies exist:
Omnis ut est igitur, etc.] This whole nature of things (he says) consists in two
things from the beginning, bodies and void, in which bodies are placed, and
through which they are carried here and there and are moved. This opinion
on which I previously touched briefly did not pertained to Epicurus only, but
also tomany others. […] Empedocles, however, and Plato, and the others before
Plato, denied that there is void in things, [but] Aristotle, τοσοῦτον εἶναι κενὸν
φησιν ἐκτὸς τοῦ κόσμου,ὥστ’ ἀναπνεῖν οὐρανόν· εἶναι γὰρ αὐτὸν πύρινον,
se corporibus praebet. Et Arist. Lib 4. φυσ. ἀκρ. λέγουσιν δ’ ἓν μὲν ὅτι κίνησις ἡ κατὰ τόπον οὐκ ἂν
εἴη (αὕτη δ’ ἐστὶ φορὰ καὶ αὔξησις)· οὐ γὰρ ἂν δοκεῖν εἶναι κίνησιν, εἰ μὴ εἴη κενόν· τὸ γὰρ πλῆρες
ἀδύνατον εἶναι δέξασθαί τι. Εἰ δὲ δέξεται καὶ ἔσται δύο ἐν ταὐτῷ, ἐνδέχοιτ’ ἂν καὶ ὁποσαοῦν εἶναι
ἅμα σώματα (Arist. Phys. δ7 213b4–8), etc. Id est, Dicunt autem unum, motionem a loco ad locum non
fore: haec autem, translatio, et accretio est. Non enim queat esse motio, inquiunt illi, nisi sit inane. Nam
quod plenum est, nihil in se recipere potest, quod si recipiat, et duo, et quotlibet in eodem corpora simul esse
queant, etc. quod fieri non potest. […] Ex quibus intelligere licet neque motum esse sine inani, et si motus
sit, necessario etiam esse inane. Ratio autem cur sine inani motus esse non possit, haec est, quod sublato de
rebus inani, quicquid est in natura rerum, corpus esset. Atqui corporis officium est obstare, ergo res omnes sibi
inter se obstarent, et ita nihil moveretur, nihil procederet, nihil progrederetur, sed omnia quiescerent, cum eis
nulla progrediendi facultas daretur, cumque nihil esset, unde cedendi principium nasceretur. Hanc de inani
opinionem videtur probare Virgilius in Sileno his versibus: «Nanque canebat uti magnum per inane coacta
Semina terrarumque, animaeque, marisque fuissent, Et liquidi simul ignis, ut his exordia primis omnia, et ipse
tener mundi concreverit orbis» (Verg. Ecl. 6.31–34). Diogenes Laertius’ quotation is part of Epicurus’ Letter
to Herodotus.
96 The passage quoted by Lambin pertains to Silenus’ universal song in Eclogue 6, that begins in
“grandiose Lucretianmanner” (Hardie, p. 32). About the reception of Lucretius in Virgil see Philip
Hardie, Lucretian Receptions. History, the Sublime, Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge up, 2009), 32–33.
Lambin quotes this passage several times in the commentary.
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that is, he admits that there is as much void outside the world as is sufficient
for the heavens to breathe again, for it is made of fire.97
Lambin shows no hesitation about attributing this view to Aristotle, who had never
defended it in his own works: in fact, he rejected the existence of void both inside and
outside the cosmos, as Lambinmust have known.98 Moreover, according to Aristotle,
the heavens are not made of fire, but ether, the fifth element. In fact, the quotation is
not taken from Aristotle, but from Pseudo-Plutarch’s Placita, which was attributed to
Plutarch in Lambin’s time.99 It is very likely that Lambin realised full well that the
quote conflicts with Aristotle’s actual views, but he seems to have chosen to ignore
this fact, because the quote helped him to establish a similarity between Lucretius’
and Aristotle’s views.
3.5. On the Infinite Divisibility ofMatter: When Epicureans and Aristotelians Do not Agree
As we have seen in the previous sections, Lambin often adopts a strategy which
consists in using quotations from Aristotle and other accepted authors in order
to corroborate or justify Lucretius’ theories. At other times, however, he explicitly
states that Epicureans and Aristotelians do not agree on a certain topic. For instance,
commenting on a passage in which Lucretius argues that there is always an extreme
point beyond which a body cannot be diminished further (1.599), Lambin points out –
paraphrasing the poem – that the fact that we cannot see this extreme point is no
surprise, in fact this smallest body is devoid of parts and is minimal, that is, there
cannot be something smaller than it.100 Lambin comments this argument as follows:
97 p. 44,Omnis ut est igitur, etc.] Tota (inquit) haec rerum natura duabus ab initio rebus constat, corporibus, et
inani, in quo corpora sita sunt, et per quod huc et illuc feruntur, ac moventur. Haec opinio (quod supra paucis
attigi) non fuit solius Epicuri, sed et aliorummultorum. […] Empedocles autem, et Plato, et ceteri ante Platonem,
negarunt esse in rebus inane. Aristot. τοσοῦτον εἶναι κενόν φησιν ἐκτὸς τοῦ κόσμου,ὥστ’ ἀναπνεῖν οὐρανόν·
εἶναι γὰρ αὐτὸν πύρινον, (Ps-Plutarch, Plac. 1.18.6) id est tantum esse inanis concedit extra mundum,
quantum caelo satis sit ad respirandum, esse enim igneum. For the wrong attribution to Aristotle, see
Algra, “Posidonius’ Conception of the Extra-cosmic Void”,Mnemosyne 46.4 (1993), 473–505, 483–484.
98 See Edward Grant,Much Ado about Nothing: Theories of Space and Vacuum from theMiddle Ages to the
Scientific Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge up, 1981), 5–8.
99 Nowwe know that Plutarch was not the author, and that Placitawas only an epitome of a larger
work by Aetius. Therefore, the ascription of the quoted view to Aristotle is probably due to a careless
copyist who made the reporter of the view into its author, but this was unknown in Lambin’s
time.
100 pp. 58–59,Tumporro quoniamextr. cuiiusque, etc.]Hocdicit quoniamusque ad eumapicem, seu ad id punctum,
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It is necessary to know that Peripatetics and Epicureans, as in many other
topics that do not pertain to this discussion, disagree over this issue with
particular vehemence. First of all because the formermaintain that each body
can be cut into infinite parts, and that no part of a body can be so small that
it cannot bemade smaller, that is to say, nothing is infinite, in reality, usage
and function, and – as we say commonly – in act, but, τῇ δυνάμει, that is, in
potency; and Empedocles thought likewise.101
Lambin explains that, according to the Aristotelians, everything can potentially be
cut into smaller parts: spatial magnitude is therefore potentially – but not actually –
infinite with respect to division.102 Epicurus on the contrary admitted the existence
of minimal bodies that cannot be divided into smaller parts.103 In this case, Lambin
draws a clear distinction between Aristotelians and Epicureans.
Lambin seems very interested in this topic and devotesmany entries to discussing
it. For instance, later on, he comments on a similar passage in which Lucretius
argues that, even if there is no limit to breaking things, still there must be per-
manent bodies which cannot be endowed with a dissoluble nature, otherwise they
would have not been able to remain everlasting, having been exposed for ages
to any kind of blows.104 Lambin’s here remarks: “this [sc. the fact that there is no
limit to division] is false according to the Epicurean doctrine, but the Peripatetics
think that it is true”.105 He then continues discussing this issue without however
taking a stand in the debate: he simply makes it clear that Epicureans and Peri-
patetics disagree on this point, but does not endorse one or the other of the two
positions.
et cacumen quodvis corpus minui potest, ut id iam cernere nequeamus, nimirum id cacumen, quod iam sub
aspectum non cadit, partibus caret, et minimum est, id est non potest esse minus quam est.
101 pp. 58–59, Sciendumest Peripateticos etEpicureos cum inaliismultis, quae adhancdisputationemnonpertinent,
tum in his maxime inter se dissidere. Primum quod illi volunt omne corpus in parteis infinitas secari posse, neque
ullas corporis parteis usque adeo parvas esse posse, ut non possint fieri minores, id est infinitum quidem nihil
esse re, et usu, seu functione, et (ut vulgo loquimur) actu, sed τῇ δυνάμει, id est potestate, quod item sensit
Empedocles.
102 See Ross, Aristotle, 85.
103 pp. 58–59, Epicurus autem contra cuiusque corporis censet minimas esse parteis, id est eiusmodi, quibus nullae
possint esse minores, ad quas cum deventum sit, divisioni nullus amplius sit relictus locus. See also p. 61,Nam
Epicurus, et eum secutus Lucretius, volunt aliquid esse in rebus minimum.
104 Lucr. 1.577–583, Lambin moves these verses after 1.630, while in modern editions they are usually
placed before.
105 p. 61, Porro si nulla est] quod est falsum Epicureorum sententia, sed Peripatetici volunt esse verum.
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Later in the commentary, when Lucretius criticizes Empedocles because he does
not limit division, Lambin offers a couple of quotations from Cicero, whomaintained
that, according to Aristotle and the Peripatetics, there is nominimum that cannot be
further divided into infinite parts. For Lambin, Aristotle is always an essential point
of reference when commenting on Lucretius. Finally, it is important to remember
that, since the Middle Ages, the doctrine of the infinite divisibility of matter had
become the standard orthodox view, so that the atomwas usually refuted as a silly
absurdity: in this case, Lambin draws a clear distinction between the Peripatetics, who
held this view, and the Epicureans, without however expressing any value judgment
on this matter.106
3.6. AtomicMotion
As mentioned earlier, the first part of Lucretius’ second book is devoted to atomic
motion. Commenting on thepassage inwhich Lucretius begins to discuss thatmotion
(2.62), Lambin immediately explains that, according to Epicurus, there are three kinds
of atomic motions: 1) downwards, due to the atoms’ proper weight; 2) per plagam, that
is, through blows; and 3) the swerve.107
Then, while not stating it clearly, Lambin resorts to an Aristotelian terminology,
in order to explain Lucretius’ theory of motion:
From this passage one can understand that matter is not one packed and
coherentmass, because things are increased anddecreased.αὔξησις andφθίσις
are in fact motions in respect of quantity.108
106 p. 71, nec prorsum in rebusminimum]minimum intellige, quo nihilminus esse potest, et ad quod cumperventum
sit, tum fiat cuiuslibet corporis secandi finis, ut supra diximus. Ad hunc locum pertinent ea, quae a Cicerone
disputantur sub Varronis persona lib i. Acad. Quaest. «Exmateria putant Peripatetici omnia esse expressa atque
efficta quae sint: quae tota omnia accipere possit omnibusque modis mutari atque ex omni parte, eoque etiam
interire non in nihilum, sed in suas parteis, quae infinite secari ac dividi possint, cum sit nihil omnino in rerum
natura minimum quod dividi nequeat» (Cic. Acad. 1.7.27). Idem lib. 1 de Finibus disputans adversus Epic. «Ne
illud quidem physici est, credere aliquid esse minimum» (Cic. Fin. 1. 20 = Arist. Phys. a.4 188a 11–12 οὐκ ἔστιν
ἐλάχιστον μέγεθος), etc. Vult igitur Epicurus aliquid esse in rebus minimum, nempe corpora prima, quae
scilicet iam secari, aut dividi non possunt, eorumque sententiam nunc refellit Lucretius, qui negant quicquam in
rebus esse minimum. Lege, si tibi commodum est, quae hac de re supra diximus.
107 p. 105,Nunc age] nunc aggreditur ad disputationem de motu. Est autemmotus apud Epicurum triplex. Motus
deorsum omnium corporum, et ponderum proprius, ad lineam, seu ad perpendiculum, motus per plagam, motus
per declinationem, de quibus mox plura dicemus.
108 pp. 105–106: materiam autem non cohaerere inter se stipatam ex eo intelligere licet, quod res augentur et
minuuntur. αὔξησις autem et φθίσις sunt motus κτ’ποσόν.
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Indeed, inMetaph. xi 2 1069b14–15 Aristotle explains that change is of four kinds:
in respect either of substance or of quality or of quantity or of place. Increase (αὔξησις)
and decrease (φθίσις) are changes (or motions) in respect of quantity (κατὰ τὸ ποσόν).
Lambinmust have known however that Aristotle’s text is dealing with a completely
different issue from that of Lucretius: the former, in fact, wants to show that matter
always changes into its corresponding contrary state. It changes from that which is
potentially to that which is actually; e.g. frompotentially big to actually big. Lucretius
instead aims to show that atoms are in constant motion: they diminish one thing
and increase another, so that the sum remains unchanged (Lucr. 2.67–79).
3.7. The Swerve
With respect to atomism, themost interesting passage in Lambin’s commentary is
undoubtedly the one dealing with Lucretius’ account of the swerve and voluntary
action. In fact, as we will see shortly, Lambin’s emendations and notes on this topic
exerted a strong influence on later editions. For this reason, we will devote special
attention to the analysis of this issue.
As we have mentioned in our general introduction, Epicurus formulated his
theory of the swerve in order to avoid Democritus’ rigid determinism; Lucretius in
turn defended it on his behalf (2.216–293).109 Since the swerve theory does not feature in
Epicurus’ extant writings, not even in the Letter to Herodotus, in which he explains the
other causes of atomic motion, the only source available on this topic is Lucretius’De
rerum natura.110 According to Lucretius’ account, apart fromweight and blows, there
is a third cause of atomic motion, viz. the swerve (clinamen). Atoms have a natural
motiondownwards due to theirweight, but then, at unpredictable times, they swerve,
and as a consequence of deviating from their parallel descent, they collide and hook
up. If there were no swerve, there would be no such collisions between atoms, since
they would fall at the same speed through the void; moreover, any atomic motion
would be determined by an infinitely extended and unbreakable chain of causes.
109 See Sedley, “Epicurus’ Refutation of Determinism”, in suzhthsis: Studi sull’ epicureismo greco e romano
offerti aMarcelloGigante (Naples: Biblioteca della Parola del Passato, 1983), 11–51, 11 and see Furley inThe
Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy, ed. by Algra, Barnes, Mansfeld and Schofield (Cambridge:
Cambridge up, 1999), 423. Furley argues that Diogenes of Oenoanda (fr. 54 Smith, ii.3–iii.9) contrasts
Epicurus with Democritus, precisely because the latter failed to “discover” the swerve. A similar
statement can be found in Cic.De nat. deor. 1.25.69.
110 Sedley argues that an account of this theory was probably introduced in a later book ofOn nature.
See Sedley, Lucretius, 127 and 147.
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The swerve is therefore needed “so that cause should not follow cause from infinity”
(Lucr. 2.255). According to Lucretius, without the swerve, also our motions would be
determined by an infinite chain of causes and there would be no room for free action.
However, the Lucretian passages dealing with the swerve, especially in connection
with the voluntary action and the mind, are quite problematic, and their current
interpretation partly relies on a pair of emendations, both of them usually attributed
to Lambin.
In the first of these passages, Lucretius proves that the atomic swerve actually
exists on the basis of the existence of the will (voluntas). The argument goes as follows:
if there were no atomic swerve, there would be no acts of will; but there are such acts,
therefore there must be an atomic swerve.111
Denique si semper motus conectitur omnis
et vetere exoritur semper novus ordine certo,
nec declinando faciunt primordia motus
principium quoddam, quod fati foedera rumpat,
255 ex infinito ne causam causa sequatur,
libera per terras unde haec animantibus exstat,
unde est haec, inquam, fatis avolsa voluntas,
per quam progredimur, quo ducit quemque voluptas,
declinamus itemmotus nec tempore certo
260 nec regione loci certa, sed ubi ipsa tulit mens?
Nam dubio procul his rebus sua cuique voluntas
principium dat et hinc motus per membra rigantur.
Again, if all motion is always one long chain, and new motion arises out
of the old in order invariable, and if the first-beginnings do not make by
swerving a beginning of motion such as to break the decrees of fate, that
causemay not follow cause from infinity, whence comes this free will in living
creatures all over the earth, whence I say is this will wrested from the fates
by which we proceed whither pleasure leads each, swerving also our motions
not at fixed times and fixed places, but just where our mind has taken us? For
undoubtedly it is his own will in each that begins these things, and from the
will movements go rippling through the limbs.
111 For a detailed analysis of this passage see Don Fowler, Lucretius on AtomicMotion. A Commentary on De
RerumNatura, Book Two, Lines 1–332 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 324–326 and 411–413.
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From a philological perspective, in lines 257–258, themost authoritative among
all of Lucretius’ manuscripts (oqu) have voluptas ending line 257 and voluntas ending
the following verse. However, the majority of modern scholars prefer to follow
Lambin’s suggestion of interchanging voluptas and voluntas. In the appendix to this
dissertation, I argue that actually the reading voluntas in line 257 had circulated as
a correctionmuch earlier than Lambin’s editions (1563, 1570), since it is already found
in Pius’ commentary (1511); Pius, in turn, had probably accepted the reading from
Marullo. Furthermore, Pius’ commentary already implied swapping voluptas and
voluntas.
It goeswithout saying that interchanging voluptas and voluntasmakes a significant
difference: is it pleasure or rather the will that is free, wrested from the dictates of fate
and tightly connected with the clinamen? Lambin has no doubts on this matter: it is
voluntas, the will, that originates from the swerve. Onemust therefore read voluntas
in 257 and voluptas in 258:
Fatis avolsa voluntas] that is ‘not bound to the fates’. One should read thus
in this passage, not, as in the (published) editions, ‘wrested pleasure’ (avolsa
voluptas), just as on the contrary the correct way of writing the following verse
is: by which we proceed whither pleasure leads each. For, of such a kind is that verse
by Virgil in the Eclogues (in the words of Corydon to Alexis):His own pleasure
drags each one along.112
Lambin does not really explain why in 257 voluntas is preferable to voluptas; he merely
provides a comparison with a passage in Virgil (ecl. 2.63), which suggests that voluptas
should be the correct reading in 258.113 Then, since in view of per quam different words
are needed in the two lines, one should read voluntas in 257. From a conceptual point
of view, by swapping voluptas and voluntas, Lambin stresses the relation between the
atomic swerve, which is the cause, and the will, which is its effect – a connection that
is made clear in this passage by the preposition unde, ‘whence’: precisely because there
is voluntas, the clinamen also exists.
112 p. 122, Fatis avolsa voluntas] id est fatis non alligata. Sic autem legendum hoc loco, non, ut in vulgatis, avolsa
voluptas, ut contra proximi versus scriptura recta est. “Per quam progredimur, quo ducit quenque voluptas”.
Tale enim est illud Virgilianum in Alex. “Trahit sua quenque voluptas”.
113 As I have noticed elsewhere (see Appendix) the parallel with the passage in Virgil is common to Pius’
and Lambin’s commentaries. Theymight have noticed this similarity separately, but onemight at
least suspect that Lambin read and drew inspiration from Pius in commenting on this passage.
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Then, in lines 261–262, Lucretius explains that motion begins in the will which
performs the task of activating the body parts. Interestingly, Lambin comments:
Nam dubio proc. his r. s. cuique vol.] the will is the origin of motion (principium
motus) in us. Likewise Aristotle in Physics.114
And, similarly, a few lines later:
As if Lucretius said that themotion in us proceeds and arises from the will.
And this means the same as what we have said shortly before, and Aristotle
likewise taught, that the will is the beginning and origin of motion in us.115
Lambin draws a parallel between Aristotle’s and Lucretius’ account of motion, as
originating in the will, and refers to the former’s doctrine of voluntary action,
whose interpretation is unfortunately quite controversial. I shall try to explain it
briefly.
In Physics (viii 4), Aristotle distinguishes betweenmotion derived from something
other than the thing itself, which is non-voluntary, and that in which the principle
is internal to the body in motion, which is voluntary (254b 15, ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτοῖς τῆς
κινήσεως).116 Again, in hisNicomachean Ethics, Aristotle states, for example, that the
cause of those parts of the body that are instrumental in voluntary actions lies in
the agent (καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἀρχὴ τοῦ κινεῖν τὰ ὀργανικὰ μέρη ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις πράξεσιν
ἐν αὐτῷ ἐστίν, ne iii 1 1110a 35). Thus, an action is considered voluntary when its
cause (ἀρχή) resides in the agent that performed it.117 Essentially, what Lambin is
114 p. 122,Nam dubio proc. his r. s. cuique vol.] voluntas est principiummotus in nobis. Sic Arist. Physic.
115 p. 122,Quasi diceret Lucretius, in nobis a voluntate motus proficisci, atque oriri. Quod quidem idem valet, atque
id, quod et paullo ante dictum a nobis est, et Aristoteles item tradidit, voluntatem esse principium et originem
motus in nobis. The expression principiummotusmatches the Greek ἀρχὴ κινήσεως. See Arist. Phys.
iii 1 200b 12: ἡ φύσις μέν ἐστιν ἀρχὴ κινήσεως καὶ μεταβολῆς, in which, however, Aristotle speaks
of Nature not the will.
116 Similarly in Physics viii 2 252b19–20 Aristotle would say that “the origin of the motion comes about
in us from ourselves” (ἐγγίγνεται ἐν ἡμῖν ἐξ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἀρχὴ κινήσεως).
117 Again, in book three ofNicomacheanEthics, Aristotle claims that “a voluntary act (τὸ ἑκούσιον) would
seem to be an act of which the origin lies in the agent” (τὸ ἑκούσιον δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι οὗ ἡ ἀρχὴ
ἐν αὐτῷ, ne iii 1 1111a 23). Then, in his Eudemian Ethics, Aristotle explains that a human being is a
first principle of a certain motion (ὁ δ’ ἄνθρωπος ἀρχὴ κινήσεως τινός ee ii 1222b 28). Later on, one
can also find an echo of this Aristotelian theory inmany Scholastic authors, among them Aquinas
and Albert the Great: Albertus Magnus, In lib. i Sent., dist. 36 a, art. 1, In omni motu voluntario et opere
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trying to explain here is that Lucretius’ theory of motion, as something originating
from someone’s own will, is perfectly compatible with the Aristotelian account of
voluntary action, as something that has its beginning, ἀρχὴ, in the agent. But, when
Aristotle refers to the beginning of a motion (ἀρχὴ κινήσεως), what exactly does he
have inmind?
The answer to this question can be found in book 3 of De anima, in which
Aristotle claims that both ὄρεξις, appetency, and νοῦς, practical mind (i.e., that which
deliberates), partake in voluntary motion.118 In fact, appetency (ὄρεξις) is the faculty
in the soul that initiates the movement, a function that in Lucretius is performed
by voluntas.119 Lambin knew this passage from De anima, since he refers to it when
commenting on Lucretius, book 4 (877–906):
He believes that the cause of motion to a place consists in certain simulacra,
apt tomove, impelling themind, or the animus, and producing the will of a
body tomove from a one place to another. Similarly, in the second book, he
states more simply and clearly that the will is the origin of motion, and that
the beginning of a motion emerges from the heart. In fact, in that passage he
says: for undoubtedly it is his own will in each that begins these things, and from the
will movements go rippling through the limbs. And in the same passage: you may
see that the beginning of motion is made by the heart, etc.120 Aristotle, inDe anima
book 3, maintains that the causes of this motion [i.e., voluntary motion] are
two: ὄρεξις καὶ νοῦς, that is, appetency and (practical) mind.121
principium est voluntas. See also Aquinas,Demalo, quaest. 3, art. 11, respons. 3motus autem voluntatis est
principium intrinsecum.
118 See Aristot. An. iii 10 433a 13:Ἄμφω ἄρα ταῦτα κινητικὰ κατὰ τόπον, νοῦς καὶ ὄρεξις. Aristotle
makes clear that here νοῦς refers to the practical mind or reason, which differs from the speculative
mind (νοῦς δὲ ὁ ἕνεκά του λογιζόμενος καὶ ὁ πρακτικός· διαφέρει δὲ τοῦ θεωρητικοῦ τῷ τέλει).
119 See An. iii 10 433a 15,Καὶ ἡ ὄρεξις ⟨δ’⟩ ἕνεκά του πᾶσα· οὗ γὰρ ἡ ὄρεξις, αὕτη ἀρχὴ τοῦ πρακτικοῦ
νοῦ, τὸ δ’ ἔσχατον ἀρχὴ τῆς πράξεως. And iii 10 433a31–b1,Ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἡ τοιαύτη δύναμις κινεῖ
τῆς ψυχῆς, ἡ καλουμένη ὄρεξις, φανερόν. Even amongmodern scholars, some establish a strict
correspondence between Lucretian voluntas and Aristotelian ὄρεξις. See Walter G. Englert, Epicurus
on the Swerve and Voluntary Action (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1987), 122.
120 According to Epicurus and Lucretius, the heart is the seat of intelligence and emotions. See Lucr.
3.140.
121 Causammotus ad locum vult esse simulacra quedam admeandum apta, mentem, seu animum pulsantia, et
voluntatemmovendi e loco ad locum corporis efficentia. Idem lib. secundo simplicius et planius voluntatem vult
esse principiummotus, et a corde initiummotus existere. Sic enim eo loco.Namdubio procul his rebus sua cuique
voluntas principium dat et hinc motus per membra rigantur. Ibid.Ut videas initummotus a corde creari, etc.
Aristoteles duas huius motus causas esse vult lib. 3De animo. ὄρεξιν καὶ νοῦν, id est appetitum etmentem.
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Again Lambin draws a parallel between Aristotle’s and Lucretius’ account of
voluntary motion, in which voluntas corresponds to the Aristotelian ὄρεξις andmens
to νοῦς. Lambin suggests that, as Lucretian simulacra hit the mind (mens) and produce
the will to move, in Aristotle it is the object of appetency (ὀρεκτόν) that impels the
practical mind or intellect, νοῦς, and sets it in motion.
In lines 272–283, Lucretius also argues that, although there may be an external
force that compels all humanbeings tomove against theirwishes, there is also another
one, which is internal to them and strong enough to resist and fight against it; this
force is our will. Once more, Lambinmatches Lucretius’ text with Aristotle’s.
Nec simile est, etc.] since this one arises from involuntary forces; that one
spontaneously and according to our will. See Aristot. Lib. 3. Ἠθικ. Νικομ.
In which he discussesπερὶ ἑκουσίου καὶ ἀκουσίου (about voluntary and non-
voluntary actions). Viribus alterius] refers towhat Aristotle, in the passage that I
just mentioned, calls βίαιον, that is compulsory, which he defines in this way:
βίαιον οὗ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἔξωθεν μηδὲν συμβαλλομένου τοῦ πράττοντος. Compulsory
is that [act] whose origin is fromwithout, while the agent contributes nothing
to it.122
According to Aristotle, while voluntary action has its beginning (ἀρχὴ) in the agent
that performs it, non-voluntary action originates from without. Again Lambin’s goal
in this passage is to match the Aristotelian account with Lucretius’ text. But then
Lucretius adds a third element to this picture, the swerve, which could hardly find its
counterpart in Aristotle.123
Oncemore, a correction to the text attributed to Lambin profoundly affects the
interpretation of the entire passage.124
122 p. 124,Nec simile est, etc.] quia hoc fit ab invitis: illud sponte et voluntate nostra. Vide Aristot. Lib. 3.Ἠθικ.
Νικομ.Ubi disputat περὶ ἑκουσίου καὶ ἀκουσίου. Viribus alterius] significant id quod Aristoteles eo quem
modo dixi loco βίαιον, id est violentum, nominat, quod sic definit ille. βίαιον οὗ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἔξωθεν μηδὲν συμ-
βαλλομένου τοῦ πράττοντος. Violentum est id cuius principium est extrinsecus nihil adiuvante eo, quod agit.
123 p. 124, Esse aliam praet. pl. et pond. caus.] nempe declinationem. Praecipue igitur hoc loco Lucretius ex Epicuri
sententia tertium genus motus, qui fit per declinationem ponit. Unde haec est nobis] a qua declinatione nata
est in nobis libertas agendi, fati necessitate soluta. M. Tull. Lib. i de nat. deor. Epicurus, cum videret, si
atomi ferrentur in locum inferiorem suo pondere, nihil fore in nostra potestate, quod esset earummotus certus et
necessarius, invenit quomodo necessitatem effugeret.
124 On this passage see in particular Fowler, Lucretius on AtomicMotion, 326–339 and appendix a, pp. 414–
427.
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Quare in seminibus quoque idem fateare necessest,
285 esse aliam praeter plagas et pondera causam
motibus, unde haec est nobis innata potestas,
de nilo quoniam fieri nil posse videmus.
Pondus enim prohibet ne plagis omnia fiant,
externa quasi vi. Sed nemens ipsa necessum
290 intestinum habeat cunctis in rebus agendis
et devicta quasi cogatur ferre patique,
id facit exiguum clinamen principiorum
nec regione loci certa nec tempore certo.
Wherefore youmust admit that the same exists in the seeds also, thatmotions
have some cause other than blows and weights, from which this power is
born in us, since we see that nothing can be produced from nothing. For it is
weight that prevents all things from being caused through blows by a sort of
external force; but what keeps the mind itself from having necessity within it
in all actions, and from being as it were mastered and forced to endure and to
suffer, is the minute swerving of the first-beginnings at no fixed place and at
no fixed time.
In line 289,mens is an emendation by Lambin, while all extant manuscripts have res.
The only thing that res ipsa could refer to in this passage is the atom itself. Although
some scholars have pointed out the oddity of this phrase, those who defended the
transmitted reading have argued that res ipsa should refer to the main topic of the
section, which is in fact the atom.125
125 See David J. Furley, Two Studies in the Greek Atomists (Princeton: Princeton up, 1967), 179, who explains,
on the ground of many arguments, why he preferred the readingmens to the detriment of res, but
very honestly admits that he himself is not sure “that these objections are wholly convincing”.
Also Fowler (Lucretius on AtomicMotion, 326–327) defends Lambin’s correction, while Sedley admits
that he cannot make up his mind between res andmens, but recognizes that res, with the meaning
of atom, “makes poor Latin”, see Sedley, “Epicurus’ Refutation of Determinism”, 47. On the other
hand, Avotins had defended the transmitted reading, which has been supported also by Purinton,
who claimed that it should refer to our power of volition (like quiddam of line 280). See Ivars Avotins,
“The Question of Mens in Lucretius 2.289”, The Classical Quarterly 29.1 (1979), 95–100, esp. 98 and
Jeffrey S. Purinton, “Epicurus on ‘Free Volition’ and the Atomic Swerve”, Phronesis 44.4 (1999), 253–
299, esp. 274. Finally, Bailey, in his edition (1.420), argues that in Lucretius, res seems to be usedmost
often in the sense of (compound) object, but can sometimes also refer to ‘matter’ and ‘space’.
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As seen before, in the lines that precede these (2.272–283), Lucretius argues that,
although there is an external force (vis extera) that compels all human beings to move
against their wishes, yet there is also another force, which is internal to them, and
strong enough to resist and fight against the former: our will. Lucretius then draws a
parallel between this section and the paragraph that follows (the one just quoted),
which indeed begins with an expression of comparison: “Therefore youmust admit
that the same exists in the seeds also …” (Quare in seminibus quoque idem fateare necessest
…). Lucretius is explaining that, besides blows and weight, there is a third cause of
atomicmotion, that is, the swerve. As happens in the case of living beings, an internal
force, weight, prevents the atoms to be moved only by the external force of blows.
But then Lucretius goes further (2.284–287): there must also be something else that
prevents themotion of atoms from being producedmerely by their internal necessity
of moving downwards, due to their weight, namely the swerve. Without the swerve,
atoms would be bound to fall straight downwards, infinitely.
In defense of the reading res, Avotins has persuasively suggested that blows and
weights (pondera et plagas) in line 285,which refer to atoms (semina),mustbeof the same
kind as those in lines 288–289 and therefore refer to res ipsa, meaning atoms.126 In addi-
tion, right at thebeginningof this passage (2.285–286), Lucretiushadmade it clear that,
apart from blows and weight, there must be another cause of atomic motion (i.e., the
swerve). In the lines that follow,he shouldpresumably explainwhat this third cause is.
If, conversely, one corrects res intomens, connecting the ‘swerve’ in this passage to the
‘mind’, thepassagewould suffer of a lackof clarity and coherence.127Therefore,my sug-
gestion would be to keep the transmitted reading, instead of changing res intomens.
Leaving aside this problem, it is highly relevant to determine why Lambin
suggested to correct res into mens, and to what extent his suggestion changed the
interpretation of the passage.
Let us start with the latter problem: as we have seen before, in this passage,
Lucretius explains that, just as weight prevents atoms to bemoved by the external
126 See Gifanius who, while being aware of Lambin’s correction, defended the reading res with the
meaning of “everything that has been discussed”: Res. Generaliter utitur hac voce interdum, pro toto eo de
quo agit, vel instituta est oratio (p. 396).
127 Commenting on this passage, Fowler, (Lucretius on Atomic Motion, 327), defends the reading mens
arguing, for example, that “the language of 290–1 cunctis in rebus agendis | … devicta quasi cogatur ferre
patique fitsmenswell but is not apt for a personified atom”. Suffice it to say that it would not be the
first time that Lucretius speaks about atoms as somethingmore than simple inanimate chunks of
matter, especially when he refers to them as semina (see chapter 2 on Ficino). Besides, for agere used of
objects (presumably including inanimate ones), see Lucr. 1.441, and of atoms (corpora materiai) 2.1067.
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force of the blows, so the swerve prevents the atom (if one accepts the reading res),
or themind (if one readsmenswith Lambin) from becoming subject to an internal
necessity. In either case, whether it is the mind or instead the atom that the swerve
frees from some ‘inner necessity’ (necessus intestinus), what does the passage mean
exactly? In the case of atoms, internal necessity would simply mean their tendency of
moving downwards, due to their weight. Therefore, the swerve would ‘save’ the atom
itself from its own necessity of falling infinitely downwards. Contrary to what many
scholars might think, I believe that this interpretationmakes perfect sense.
But, conversely, if one assumed that Lambin’s correction is right, what would
‘inner necessity’ mean exactly? Let us give the floor to Lambin himself:
Necessum intestinum] internal necessity, whose efficient cause is themotion of
atoms, natural, determined and necessary, which is downwards.128
His explanation could not be anymore ambiguous. Lambin explains in Aristotelian
terms that the efficient cause (causa efficiens) of this inner necessity is the natural
motion (motus naturalis) of atoms, which is downwards. An efficient cause can be
defined as the primary source of change or rest, which can either be internal or
external to the entity moved; therefore, depending on which reading one accepts, it
could either be internal to the atom itself – that is, the entity moved – or external to
the atom but internal to the mind which is composed by atoms. Having corrected
the reading res intomens in line 289, one presumes that Lambin implies that necessus
intestinus is something internal to themind. However, onemight also observe that,
if mens consists of atoms, then the blows of the atoms which composemenswill also
be internal to the mind, though external to the individual atoms. Yet, Lambin seems
to reduce the internal necessity of the mind to downward motion alone. Anyhow,
according to Lambin, the swerve acts upon themind, saving it froman inner necessity,
whose efficient cause is the atoms’ natural tendency of moving downward. But
how could this happen? Unfortunately, Lambin does not provide any answer to the
problem.
In contrast to Lambin himself, all modern scholars who accepted his reading
have taken great pains to solve the dilemma. Some of them have explained that, by
“internal necessity of the mind”, Lucretius refers to the necessity imposed by the
peculiar constitution of the psyche, which, being composed by atoms that possess
128 p. 124,Necessum intestinum] necessitatem intestinam, cuius causa efficiens esset motus atomorum
naturalis certus et necessarius, qui fit deorsum.
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weight and are therefore bound to fall downwards, it would be always forced to
act under constraint, if there were no swerve. The swerve causes an alteration in
the natural motion downwards of themind’s atoms, whichmight eventually lead
to a specific voluntary action. This explanation sounds very attractive. However,
my impression is that many scholars have first accepted Lambin’s correctionmens,
rejecting res as unacceptable, and then tried to make sense of it, while, one presumes,
it should be just the other way round.
But why did Lambin put forward this correction? His extremely short motivation
is the following:
Sed ne mens ipsa] I have restored [the text] thus in contradiction with all the
books, since the reasoning requires this writing.129
Lambin explains his choice simply on the basis of some inner logic of Lucretius text,
in which it is quite straightforward that the swerve somehow acts upon themind to
produce a voluntary action. As in the works of many other ancient atomists, there is
therefore an explanatory gap between themicroscopic (atomic) and themacroscopic
levels. In other words, in Lucretius, the problem of how the swerve acts upon themind
and is transformed into will simply remain open. But it might as well be that the
precise mechanismwas a problem that neither Epicurus, nor Lucretius, nor indeed
Lambin, had aimed to solve.
4. Obertus Gifanius’ Annotated Edition (1565–1566)
As seen above, Lambin 1570 commented edition contained many cutting remarks
on Gifanius, whom he considered guilty of having stolen many of Lambin’s own
corrections. These criticisms were not unjustified: Gifanius, who published his
Lucretius in Antwerp in 1565–1566, did not produce an original Latin text. What he
did instead was to add to his edition of Lucretius several printed marginal notes
and various paratexts, such as a lengthy biography of the poet, a section devoted to
Memmius’ family, a quotation list (testimonia), the Greek text of Epicurus’ letter to
Herodotus (τα φυσικα) and letter to Pythocles (τα μετεωρα), many extracts
from Cicero on Epicurean natural philosophy (a section entitled capita quaedam
129 p. 124, Sed ne mens ipsa] sic restitui reclamantibus libris omnibus, ratione hanc scripturam efflagitante.
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naturalis philosophiae Epicuri), an explanatory index (collectanea), and Thucydides’
account of the Athenian plague, also in Greek.130
In his introductory letter to Iohannes Sambucus, Gifanius states that he expects
some people to criticize him for having put so much effort in commenting on
an impious poet such as Lucretius. He therefore makes a list of their possible
objections: 1) Lucretius teaches that the soul is mortal and therefore removes any
kind of hope for salvation; 2) he denies divine providence, which is one of the
cornerstones (lit. prora ac puppis, ‘prow and stern’) of the Christian religion; 3)
he presents Democritus’ and Epicurus’ absurd theory according to which there
are indivisible corpuscles.131 Interestingly, Gifanius is the first commentator who
explicitly lists atomism as such among the most controversial theories contained
in Lucretius’ poem. Before him, Lucretius’ matter theory had been criticized mainly
because of its theological consequences, and especially the denial of the divine
providence and of the immortality of the soul. Indeed, atomismwas often perceived
as the necessary premise of the other two: the idea that everything – including the
soul – is made up of void space and corporeal atoms led to the rejection of the soul’s
immortality, while the view that everything arises from the random collisions of
these atoms led to the denial of divine providence.
Importantly, Gifanius, in order to defend himself and Lucretius from these accu-
sations, argues that one might apply the same reasoning to many works of the
unimpeachable Cicero, who in that case should also be condemned, given that, in his
works, he deals with the same issues discussed by Lucretius inDe rerumnatura, namely
the divine providence, the nature of the soul, and especially the atoms.Of course, Gifa-
nius must have known that Cicero’s point of view was very different from Lucretius’
with respect to these themes; however, it is possible that he intentionally abstains
from clarifying this point, conveying the idea that their two philosophical positions
point in the same direction. Then, he remarks on the fact that, if Lucretius needs to
be condemned, one should also reject the works of almost all ancient authors, as one
can find there many impious, scandalous, infamous, false and ridiculous doctrines.132
130 See Palmer, Reading Lucretius, 165–175, esp. 165. On Gifanius’ notes, see M. Reeve, “Lucretius from the
1460s to the 17th Century”, 177–178.
131 f. *3v, Ecce autem et hoc erunt qui maxime sint reprehensuri, meque qui in poeta impio tantam posuerim operam
imprimis accusabunt. Is est enim Lucretius (inquient) qui et animos esse mortales omnino docere nititur, atque
item omne salutis nostrae beatae vitae spem tollit, et dei providentiam esse negat, in qua nostrae et Christianae
pietatis est prora ac puppis constituta, qui denique absurdissimam ille Democ. et Epic. de corpusculis individuis
rationem suis vers. expressit.
132 f. *3v,Quae accusatio ut est gravissima, ita me sane magnopere primum commovit. Verum re omni diligentius
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In his explanatory index, Gifanius devotes a long entry to ‘atoms’: here, he remarks
upon the fact that Lucretius never uses this word, but calls them by other names
(corpuscula, elementa, prima principia, corpora prima, primordia, semina rerum, etc.). Then,
he observes that atoms are commonly (vulgo) believed to be those specks of dust that
can be seen in a sunbeam (Arist.,De anima i 2 404a2–3 and Lucr. 2.114–124), even though
assuming that all things are composed of this kind of matter is a belief that should be
rejected. The atoms only resemble those corpuscles, explain Gifanius, but are not the
same thing. Instead atoms are invisible, simple, and indivisible corpuscles of which all
things consist and into which everything resolves; according to other philosophers,
the same role is performed by the four elements. Atoms are rubbed off and flow from
the surface of bodies, they begin to move and fly in the void space until, again, they
hook up and form other compound things.133
Differently from other commentators – like Pius, for instance – Gifanius here
presents the four element theory as alternative to atomism and he does not try
to harmonize or conflate the two. The fact that he takes great pains to disprove
the false but very common idea that, according to Lucretius, atoms are indeed the
specks of dust that one can see in a sunbeam probably means 1) that some Epicurean
theories regarding atomismwere ridiculed at that time; 2) that Gifanius tried anyhow
to defend Lucretius’ point of view, by showing that he did not believe that those
perspecta, deprehendi eam etsi maximi momenti orationem, eo tamen valere non debere, ut praestantiss. poetae
opus ac labores intereant vel contemnantur. Nam eadem rationeM. Tullii scripta compluria condemnes oportet,
ut in quibus eadem quae in hoc poemate de providentia et animi natura maxime vero de atomis illis ambigitur,
ac saepe acerrime propugnatur. Immo necesse erit omnes fere antiquos scriptores reiciamus, in quibus impia
multa, crudelia, turpia, et flagitiosa non pauciora, falsa ridicula, et inepta extent in promptu innumerabilia.
133 f. x2 (p. 307), atomi. Miror tam studiose vitasse nostrum Titum hoc uti vocabulo, credo quia versus leges
non admitterent facile. Vocat corpuscula, elementa, prima, principia, corpora prima, primordia, semina rerum,
figuras, corpora caeca, materiem, materiai corpora, principiorum corpora, etc. Cicero tamen atomorum voce
interdum utitur. Usus est et Lucilius suo more Graecissans lib. 27. Idola atque atomos Epicuri vincere volim (sic).
Ita leg. ex v.c. Putant vulgo atomos abEpicuro ac philosophis dici pulvisculos illos quos in sole volitantes videmus.
Error est hic gravissimus, quasi ex tali materia res omnes concreatae essent. Nimis absurde. Quin potius certa
quaedamcorpuscula caeca,ἀόρατα, quae sub adspectumnon cadunt, numquamvideantur, simplicia, individua,
ex quibus omnis rerum natura consistat, et in quae resolvatur? Ut alii aquam, ignem etc. Haec, inquam, ii
atomos vocant, easque censent et rerum ex atomis compositarum summo corpore seu extremitate, aut superficie
quasi detergeri, defluere: ac postea in inani passim moveri ac volitare, tandemque assiduo motu coherescere,
atque ita rursus ex se corpora, resque alias creare. Atomi ergo sunt prima rerum corpora, quae numquam sint
visa, sunt tamen, et instar minutissimorum pulivisculorum in sole vagantium in inani iactantur; non vero
sunt ramenta illa. Haec ut a vulgo intelligerentur tandem, latius persecuti sumus. For a parallel passage in
which the verb cohaeresco is used to describe the movement of the atoms, see Cic. n.d. 1.54, in hac
igitur inmensitate latitudinum longitudinum altitudinum infinita vis innumerabilium volitat atomorum,
quae interiecto inani cohaerescunt tamen inter se et aliae alias adprehendentes continuantur.
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corpuscles actually were the first principles of things, but only resembled these. Of
course, we cannot know for sure who is Gifanius’ target here, but Pius, the Bolognese
commentator of Lucretius (Chapter 3), might perhaps be a good candidate.134 In
his commentary, Pius provides in fact a confusing interpretation of this Lucretian
passage: at times it looks as if he firmly believes that Lucretius’ aim was merely to
provide a comparison between the atoms and the specks of dust, whereas, in other
passages, he seems to identify the particles that are visible in a sunbeam with the
atoms themselves.135Asmentioned before, we cannot be surewhether Pius is Gifanius’
target here, but, in any case, it looks as if this Lucretian passage was amatter of debate
among Renaissance scholars.
To conclude, even though Gifanius’ notes to the text do not focus on natural
philosophical issues, it is clear that by adding a great number of paratexts, he aimed
to provide the reader with a complete overview of Epicurean natural philosophy, by
collecting all the available sources on the topic: not only Lucretius’ poem, but also
Epicurus’ letters to Herodotus and Pythocles, andmany passages in Cicero.
Conclusions
Lambin’s commentary represents an important step in the story of the Renais-
sance reception ofDe rerum natura. First of all, because it provided the readers with
user-friendly tool to read and interpret Lucretius’ poem. Secondly, thewidespreadpop-
ularity that his commentary enjoyed among his contemporaries and in later periods,
134 That Gifanius was familiar with Pius’ commentary becomes clear when, in his letter to the reader,
he refers to Pius’ attempt at editing Lucretius’ text as not quite successful. See the letter to the reader
in Gifanius’ annotated edition (unnumbered page),Mox Iohannes Baptista Pius idem tentavit, nonmulto
sane felicius, additis etiam commentariis copiosis.
135 f. 50v, (Title of the paragraph: Error Servii de atomis. Atomis non sunt qui videntur in sole) Perperam sentit
Servius inane dici ubi sunt atomi, nec atomi videtur in sole quod cum dicitur servitur comparationi non veritati.
And compare to f. 54v, … cum solis lumina se infundunt per opaca loca domorum, tunc in his radiis apparent
atomis. Francus (Chapter 2) instead had pointed out that these particles are not invisible atoms, but
visible composites of atoms and void. f. 15r, Atque ideo singula magnum per inane vagantur cuius quidem
species atque imago in his corpusculis quae per radios solares visuntur apparet. Verum id scios lectores hoc loco
volumus huiuscemodi corpora athomosminime existere, sed athomis vacuoque composita, nam athomi invisiles,
haec vero visilia habentur. Lambin in his 1563 hadmerely explained the meaning of the passage and
referred to Aristotle; see p. 109, cum solis lumina cunque] idest quandocumque solis lumina, etc. Sic Aristot.
Lib. 2 de Anima οἷον ἐν τῷ ἀέρι τὰ καλούμενα ξύσματα, ἃ φαίνεται ἐν ταῖς διὰ τῶν θυρίδων ἀκτῖσιν, id
est ut quae appellantur in aere ramenta, quae cernuntur in iis, qui per fenestras transeunt, radiis.
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makes Lambin the most influential amongst Lucretius’ Renaissance commentators.
Thirdly, Lambin’s commentary guaranteedDe rerum natura a wide European circula-
tion, while no further commented editions of the poemwere published in Italy in
that period.
Even though sometimes in the paratexts Lambin does value the poem’s scientific
contents and chooses to present Lucretius primarily as a natural philosopher, his
commentary is undoubtedly less focused on philosophical issues than those of his
predecessors. One of Lambin’s main goals was in fact to reconstruct the original
form of Lucretius’ Latin text and to correct the errors and distortions caused by its
transmission; for these reasons, in his commentary, the philological and grammatical
notes surpass the philosophical observations.
Yet, it is still possible to discern Lambin’s attitude toward Lucretius’ philosophy
in the paratexts and some passages of his commentary. In the introductory letters,
Lambin’s main goal is clearly to redeem Lucretius and to encourage the reading of his
poem. To this end, he insists on the educational value of Lucretius’ poem, appreciates
its style, blames Epicurus for those of Lucretius’ theories that seem ‘mad’, and remarks
on the fact that Lucretius’ poem contains some impious theories, but not all aspects
of his doctrine should be rejected.
In the commentary itself, Lambin maintains a fairly equidistant attitude, hardly
expressing any value judgment on the text. Yet, reading between the lines, one can
detect Lambin’s attitude toward Lucretius’ (natural) philosophy. In commenting on
Lucretius’ physical theories, he adopts a two-fold strategy: 1) he repeatedly highlights
the differences between Lucretius and Epicurus (or is predecessors), blaming the latter
for the most controversial ideas contained in the poem; 2) when it is possible, he tries
to harmonize Lucretius’ arguments within the Aristotelian tradition, in order to
make themmore acceptable.
As for Lucretius’ atomism, Lambin, on the one hand, considers it to be the
consequence of one of the errors of Democritus andEpicurus,whomLucretius follows.
On the other, especially in his 1570 biography, he presents it as the main tool used by
Lucretius to deny the divine intervention in human affairs. It is certainly remarkable
that, in this same passage, Lambin chooses to present Lucretius primarily as an
empirical observer of nature, who, only through the observation of the nature of
things and the explanation of the ratio naturae, could free human beings from the fear
of gods and death.
All in all, Lambin’s attitude toward Lucretius’ poem is not easy to determine. At
times, it looks as if he made a clear-cut distinction between the poem’s content and
its form: in these passages, the appreciation of Lucretius’ poetry seems to go hand in
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hand with a disapproval of many aspects of his philosophy. At other times, he puts
the emphasis on the poem’s educational value, insisting especially on the usefulness
of its scientific content.
A similar interest in Lucretius’ Epicurean natural philosophy can also be found
in Gifanius’ annotated edition. Even though Gifanius’ marginal notes exclusively
concern linguistic andphilological issues,most of theparatexts of this edition focus on
Epicurean natural philosophy and on atomism, a theory that, despite themainstream
disapproval of it, Gifanius does not condemn.
To sum up, comparing Lambin’s and Gifanius’ annotated editions on the one
hand, to Francus’ paraphrase and Pius’ commentary on the other, it turns out that the
first two are muchmore concerned with the philological reconstruction of Lucretius’
Latin text rather than with its philosophical contents. On the contrary, Francus and
Pius devote more attention to Lucretius’ philosophy and in general to its contents.
This will also be a distinguishing feature of the last sixteenth century Italian exegete
of Lucretius, Girolamo Frachetta, to whom the next chapter will be devoted.
chapter 5
Girolamo Frachetta’s Breve spositione
di tutta l’opera di Lucretio (1589)
Introduction
The Breve spositione di tutta l’opera di Lucretio (Venice, 1589), written by the Italian scholar
and political writer Girolamo Frachetta (1558–1619), is remarkable because it is the first
printed text that aimed to explain the content of De rerum natura in the vernacular.1
After all, there is no extant evidence of the very first Italian translation of Lucretius’
poem attributed to GianfrancescoMuscettola (1530), which was never published.2 As
for the translation of the celebrated Alessandro Marchetti (completed in 1669), it was
to be printed posthumously onlymuch later, in 1718, after a long period duringwhich
ecclesiastic authorities successfully prevented it from being published.
Frachetta’s work is not a translation, nor a proper commentary – like those by
Pius and Lambin –, but rather a paraphrase, whose goal is to explain the contents of
De rerum natura in Italian to an audience that might have found Lucretius’ Latin text
too difficult to understand and for whom it may therefore have been inaccessible.
What is also remarkable about Frachetta’s work is that it was the first publication
of Lucretius aftermore than seventy years duringwhich no other edition or commen-
tary onDe rerum natura had been published in Italy. Most probably, the reason for this
lack of publications was the fact that Lucretius’ poem had become quite unwelcome
1 Frachetta’s Spositione has been rather overlooked by scholars. The few studies devoted to this work
are the following: Susanna Gambino Longo, “La spositione de Lucrèce par Girolamo Frachetta et
les théories poétiques de la fin du xvie siècle en Italie”, in Renaissance de Lucrèce, Cahiers du Centre
V.L. Saulnier 27 (Paris: Presses universitaires de Paris Sorbonne, 2010), 185–200 and James K. Coleman,
“Translating Impiety: Girolamo Frachetta and the First Vernacular Commentary on Lucretius”,
Quaderni d’Italianistica 35.1 (2014), 55–71. Short references to Frachetta’s work can also be found in
Gambino Longo, Savoir de la nature, 42–45, and Ada Palmer, Reading Lucretius, 227–229. Finally, Andrea
Ceccarelli has devoted to Frachetta’s Spositione one chapter of his Ph.D dissertation, which however
has remained unpublished, see La fortuna di Lucrezio a Padova nel secondo Cinquecento, unpublished
diss., (Rome, 2011/2012), 169–219 (available on-line).
2 See Gordon, A Bibliography, 193 and recently David Butterfield, “Lucretius in the Early Modern
Period”, in Lucretius and the EarlyModern, edited by David Norbrook, Stephen Harrison and Philip
Hardie (Oxford: Oxford up, 2016), 45–68, 55.
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to the authorities due to its heterodox content. As we have mentioned in the general
introduction, already in 1517, De rerum natura had been officially banned from the
secondary schools by the Florentine synod, the reason being that it was “a lascivious
and impious work” in which “every effort is used to demonstrate the mortality of
the soul”.3 Later, in 1559, after the institutionalization of the Index of Prohibited Books,
Lucretius initially escaped the list in its original Latin form.What censors success-
fully prevented, however, was the publication of translations into the vernacular
languages: they probably thought that if the poem was only available in Latin, its
audience would remain limited. In this hostile context, Frachetta’s Spositione stands
out as a remarkable work, not only because it is the only attempt in this period to
publish an explanation of Lucretius’ poem, but also because of the choice of the ver-
nacular, which of course madeDe rerum natura accessible to a larger audience. Besides,
the very fact that Frachetta wrote his Spositione in vernacular shows that there was a
lively interest in Lucretius’ text, not only on the part of the intellectual élite.
But towhat extent did the choice of the vernacularmakeFrachetta’sworkdifferent
from those of his predecessors? I shall suggest that this choice may have forced
Frachetta to be extra cautious about commenting on Lucretius’ philosophy. This
might explain why his Spositione hinges entirely on a comparison between Lucretius’
doctrine andAristotle’s, the latter serving as his philosophical benchmark throughout
the whole paraphrase. As the full title of the Spositionemakes clear, Frachetta’s aim
is in fact to show in which respects Lucretius’ Epicurean doctrine agreed with the
truth and with Aristotle’s philosophy, and in which respects it did not.4 This direct
comparison between Lucretius and Aristotle, which can already be found in the earlier
commentaries onDe rerumnatura, definitely plays amajor role in Frachetta’s Spositione,
and it might be considered a strategy to render his attempt to explain the content of
Lucretius’ poemmore acceptable to the eyes of the Renaissance readers.
As we will hear shortly in more detail, Frachetta wrote his Spositione during his
sojourn in Rome (1582–1589), but his interest in Lucretius is most probably to be dated
back to his university years (1570s–1581), when he was a student in Padua. There is
in fact much evidence that, during the second half of the sixteenth century, both
Lucretius’ work and atomistic ideas more generally were already widely circulating
3 Ut nullus de caetero ludi magister audeat in scholis suis exponere adolescentibus poemata, aut quaecumque alia
opera lascivia & impia, quale est Lucretii poema, ubi animae mortalitatem totis viribus ostendere nititur … See
Mansi, Sacrorum conciliorum nova et amplissima collectio, 35 (Paris, 1902), col. 270.
4 The original title is Breve Spositione di tutta l’opera di Lucretio, nella quale si disamina la dottrina di Epicuro,
e si mostra in che sia conforme col vero e con gl’insegnamenti di Aristotile, e in che differente.
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among Paduan scholars.5 A good example of this interest in Lucretius are Gian
Vincenzo Pinelli’s extensive notes onDe rerum natura, which were written between
1559 and 1560 and were probably intended for a new edition of the poem.6 In addition,
a few years later, the chair of practical medicine in Padua, GirolamoMercuriale, in his
Variae Lectiones (1570) and inDe pestilentia (1577), resorted to Lucretius, among other
authorities, in order to elucidate various scientific doctrines, and especially his theory
of contagion.7 These and other illustrious examples might have drawn Frachetta’s
attention to Lucretius’ controversial text and persuaded him to comment on it.
The first section of the present chapter contains a brief biography of Frachetta.
In the second part, I shall present the general structure of his work and examine
the paratexts which precede the Spositione. The third section focuses on Frachetta’s
analysis and interpretation of a number of passages, taken from book i and ii of De
rerum natura, which concern Lucretius’ atoms andmatter theory.
1. Life and Circumstances
Girolamo Frachetta was born in 1558 in Rovigo, in the Veneto region, as the son
of Stefano and Marta Castelli.8 His family must have been rather well-off, since
Girolamo and his brother, Lodovico, could complete their university studies despite
their father’s premature death.
Frachetta spent his youth in Rovigo, where he studied humanities (lettere umane)
at the public school under the supervision of Antonio Riccoboni. When he was still
young, after the death of his father, he moved to Padua where he begun to study
5 For an in-depth analysis of Lucretius’ reception in Padua in the second half of the sixteenth century,
see Ceccarelli’s unpublished dissertation, La fortuna di Lucrezio.
6 These notes are now stored at the Ambrosiana Library inMilan, Inc. 699. A transcription of these
notes can be found in Ceccarelli’s dissertation (pp. 221–269). About Gian Vincenzo Pinelli and the
interest he took in Lucretius, see again Ceccarelli, La fortuna di Lucrezio, 11–96 and id., “Un inedito
commento rinascimentale a Lucrezio: Gian Vincenzo Pinelli, Pedro Núñez Vela e Andreas Dudith
lettori delDe rerum natura a Padova”, Giornale critico della filosofia italiana, 13.2 (2015), 233–263.
7 Ceccarelli, La fortuna di Lucrezio, 117–157.
8 A very detailed account of Frachetta’s life can be found in Artemio Enzo Baldini, “Per la biografia
di Girolamo Frachetta. La famiglia e gli anni di Rovigo e di Padova (1558–1581)”, in Atti e memorie
dell’Accademia Patavina di scienze, lettere ed arti 92.3 (1979–1980), 17–45; id., “Girolamo Frachetta:
vicissitudini e percorsi culturali di un pensatore politico nell’Italia della Controriforma”, Annali di
storia moderna e contemporanea 2 (1996), 241–264, and id., “Frachetta, Girolamo” inDizionario biografico
degli italiani 49 (Rome: Ist. Enciclopedia Italiana, 1997), 567–573.
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philosophy at the Studio, although his family was against this decision and would
have preferred a different kind of career for him.9
In Padua, Frachetta came into contact with the famous Aristotelian philosopher
Francesco Piccolomini, but he might not have been one of his closest pupils, who
were usually chosen from the descendants of the most prestigious families.10 Even so,
Piccolomini’s influenceonFrachetta’s earlyworks is rather evident. Frachetta’sDialogo
del furore poetico (1581), for instance, echoes some passages from Piccolomini’sUniversa
philosophiademoribus,whichwas tobepublishedonly twoyears later.11 In thisdialogue,
Frachetta aims to define the poetic furor, comparing Plato’s and Aristotle’s opinions
on this issue. To this end, he describes himself discussing with three schoolmates:
Giovan Battista da Pona,who supports the Platonic theories, Luigi Prato, a law student
interested in philosophy, and Prospero Bernardo da Montagnana, who supports
Aristotle. In this work, Piccolomini’s influence on Frachetta is evident, especially
in the pronounced tendency to embrace both Plato’s and Aristotle’s doctrines, which
despite their substantial difference, were not considered to be mutually exclusive.12
In 1581, Frachetta defended his doctoral thesis in artibus tantum; among his
promoters there were some of the most illustrious professors who used to teach
in Padua at that time: Francesco Piccolomini, Sperone Speroni and Iacopo Zabarella,
among others.13 Then, in 1582, Frachetta moved to Rome, where he placed himself
9 Girolamo Frachetta,Dialogo del furore poetico (Padua: L. Pasquati, 1581), 5: Il che con quel picciol lume
d’ingegno che mi fu concesso dalla Natura considerando anch’io fin ne’ primi miei anni, & conoscendo quanto la
tenera età comportava, esser vero, dispuosi del tutto & fermai (benche ciò fosse contro al piacer di mio padre & de
miei parenti) di voler inviarmi per questo piacevolissimo campo [sc. Quello della philosophia d’Aristotile e di
Platone], & far prova se mi potesse venir fatto quando che sia di corci per entro alcun fiore. Et pertanto essendo
mandato allo studio di Padova, morto già mio padre, quasi ancora fanciullo, tutto mi ci diedi.
10 Francesco Piccolomini (1520–1604) was an Aristotelian philosopher, who taught in Siena, Macerata,
Perugia and finally Padua, where he obtained a prominent role at the Studio. In Padua, Piccolomini
was involved in a bitter controversy with his colleague Iacopo Zabarella concerning the distinction
between themethod of inquiry and the order of teaching. While being a convinced Aristotelian,
Piccolomini also sympathized with Plato’s philosophy. See Artemio Enzo Baldini, “Per la biografia
di Francesco Piccolomini”, Rinascimento 20 (1980), 389–420, esp. 400 and 403. On the dispute between
Piccolomini and Zabarella, see especially Nicholas Jardine, “Keeping Order in the School of Padua:
Jacopo Zabarella and Francesco Piccolomini on the Offices of Philosophy”, in D. DiLiscia, E. Kessler
and C. Methuen (eds.),Method andOrder in Renaissance Philosophy of Nature. The Aristotle Commentary
Tradition (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1997), 183–209, and David A. Lines, Aristotle’s Ethics in the Italian
Renaissance the Universities and the Problem ofMoral Education (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 254–263.
11 See Baldini, “Per la biografia di Girolamo Frachetta …”, 41 and id., “Per la biografia di Francesco
Piccolomini”, 403 n. 2.
12 Baldini, “Per la biografia di Girolamo Frachetta …”, 37–38 and 41.
13 See Acta graduum academicorum gymnasii patavini. iv: ab anno 1556 ad annum 1600, 3 (1576–1590), ed. by
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at the service of Cardinal Luigi d’Este. One year later, in 1583, Frachetta dedicated to
this cardinal hisDe universo assertiones octigentae, an encyclopaedic collection of theses
concerning the corporeal and incorporeal universe. He defended these theses the same
year in June during a public dispute in S. Maria sopra Minerva. However, Frachetta’s
enthusiasm for controversial ancient doctrines, including Lucretius’, provoked the
hostile reaction of the ecclesiastic censorship, which forbade the publication of 112 of
the 800 theses, especially those concerning the intellective soul, the cabala, the names
of God and the cabalistic concept of the divine Sephiroth.14
During these first years in Rome (1582–1586), Frachetta founded, together with
other intellectuals gathered around the cardinal Luigi d’Este, the Accademia degli
Incitati.15 This Academy had a mostly literary focus and ended very soon, after the
death of its patron, Luigi d’Este, in 1586. It was in this period, however, and most
probably under the influence of the other members of the Academy, that Frachetta
decided to start writing commentaries on literary works in vernacular. The first one
was Spositione sopra la canzone di Guido Cavalcanti “Donnami prega etc.”, published in
Venice in 1586. In the dedicatory epistle, Frachetta explains the reason why he decided
to comment on Cavalcanti’s Canzone. As he explains, it was, first of all, because it was
“hard and difficult to understand”, in fact “it contained more philosophical than
poetical material, more than is appropriate for a canzone”.16 Rendering a difficult text
accessible to a broader audience was therefore Frachetta’s aim, both when he took the
Elda Martellozzo Forin (Padua: Antenore, 2008), 1022–1023 and Baldini, “Per la biografia di Girolamo
Frachetta …”, 44–45.
14 See Baldini, “Girolamo Frachetta”, 241–264 and Ceccarelli, La fortuna di Lucrezio, 169–174. The fact that
De universo underwent preliminary censorship in Rome, where it was published, suggests that the
Master of the Sacred Palace was in charge of it, since he was responsible for the books published in
the so-called ‘district of Rome’. Unfortunately, his archive has disappeared, so we could not retrieve
any further information on this issue. I would like to thank Leen Spruit for this observation.
15 For Frachetta as the co-founder of the Accademia degli Incitati, see the epistle to the reader in his
Spositione di tutta l’opera di Lucretio: spetialmente istituimmo certa Academia, ove di molti nobili ingegni del
continuo concorrevano. For the group of scholars gathered around the Cardinal Luigi d’Este, see the
dedication of Spositione sopra la canzone di Guido Cavalcanti, in which Frachetta explains:Ma venuto
in questa città [i.e., Roma] e preso domestichezza conmolti huomini letterati, de’ quali non picciol numero si
ritengono nelle splendide case del magnanimo Principe & Cardinale il signor Don Luigi d’Este, ne’ cui servigi al
presente io vivo etc.
16 p. iir–v, … parendomi dura & malagevol da intendere; forse per contenere innanzi materia philosophica che
poetica; troppo più cheCanzone non conviene essere. Indeed, Cavalcanti’s CanzoneDonnameprega is packed
with philosophical references, and its interpretation is highly complex and controversial. On this
topic, see, among others, James Eustace Shaw, Guido Cavalcanti’s Theory of Love. The Canzone d’Amore
andOther Related Problems (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1949).
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decision to comment on Cavalcanti’s Canzone and, a few years later, when he decided
to do likewise with Lucretius’ poem.
In 1589, then, Frachetta published in Venice Spositione di tutta l’opera di Lucretio,
which is dedicated to the bishop Scipione Gonzaga, who had become Frachetta’s
protector after the death of Luigi d’Este, in 1586.
But Frachetta’s status was to change very soon: in the last decade of the century,
he tookminor orders, even though the precise date of this event is uncertain. At the
same time, his field of interest changed, as he started dedicating himself to politics,
giving up his literary and philosophical activity.
In that period, Frachetta aimed to make his way as a political informer by means
of reports which he regularly composed and which contained important political
matters and he had delivered to his protectors and friends. These reports were
circulating inmany copies, and about a hundred of these are still extant. After in 1592
ScipioneGonzaga had left Rome for SanMartino dall’Argine, his hometown, Frachetta
began to inform the cardinal about events at the Roman Curia and in France.
In France, the political situationwas very critical: theHuguenotHenry of Navarre
had succeeded to the throne in 1589. Frachetta clearly took the side of his enemies, the
Catholic League, whichwas led by theDuke of Mayenne. This waswhen his turbulent
political career began, first as Mayenne’s informer, then on the payroll of the Spanish
court. In these years, Frachetta also finished his first political work, L’idea del libro de’
governi di Stato e diGuerra, published in 1592, and followed two years later byCommentari
delle cose successe nel regno di Francia, which however remained unpublished.17
In 1596, the Spanish ambassador commissioned him to write a new political work,
which Frachetta wrote in only sevenmonths and whose title was Il prencipe, clearly
written in opposition to Machiavelli’s famous homonymous treatise. Frachetta’s
work in fact promoted a new idea of prince cautious, who was led by the notion of
the common good. This book endeared Frachetta to the Spanish government, from
which, since 1597, he received an annual pension of 200 ducats.
In 1603, Frachetta was involved in a scandal for having incautiously disseminated
a report which contained private information about several cardinals. This episode
forced him to seek refuge inNaples, having being banished by the Roman Curia. After
a short stay inMadrid he returned to Naples and stared working on a new treatise,
Seminario de’ governi di Stato e di Guerra, which was published in Venice in 1613. This
treatise included 8000 aphorisms, which were mostly taken from classical authors
17 See Baldini, “Frachetta, Girolamo”, 567–573.
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concerning politics. Later in 1617, while stuck in Naples, he started to revise some of
his juvenile works, such as the Spositione on Cavalcanti’s canzone and De universo.18
However, these revised versions have never been printed, most probably because, the
year after, Frachetta was imprisoned in the Castel dell’Ovo, for reasons that remain
obscure. He remained in prison until August 1619, and died few months after his
release, because of his bad health, at the age of 61.
2. The Spositione: General Structure and Paratexts
Frachetta’s Spositione is divided into two parts, both of them consisting of six lettioni,
‘lectures’. The first six lettioni correspond to the six books of De rerum natura; here,
Frachetta summarizes and paraphrases the most important passages of the poem
and comments on them. The second part (from lettione settima to lettione duodecima)
consists of a detailed commentary on the hymn to Venus, which opens Lucretius’
work. In the first part, Frachetta focuses primarily on the philosophical content of the
poem, while not paying the least attention to literary and stylistic matters. But also
in the second part, which is devoted to one of themost appreciated poetical sections
of De rerum natura, Frachetta is more interested in elucidating the content and in
clarifying the (natural) philosophical problems posed by this section (i.e., why did
Lucretius invoke Venus given that he did not believe in divine providence? And why
do strong winds not blow in Spring? Etc.).
Frachetta introduces his work with a dedicatory epistle to cardinal Scipione
Gonzaga and a letter to the reader. These paratexts are followed by a detailed table of
contents inwhich the author lists all themost notable themes, including an extensive
entry on atoms and one on Lucretius’ errors, which is the longest. All these entries
refer to specific passages in the Spositione.
There is no separate introduction to the Spositione, but right at the beginning
of the first lesson (lettione prima), Frachetta deals with some key issues: he explains
why he decided to comment on Lucretius, presents the main topics of the poem,
addresses the question of whether Lucretius was a poet or not and finally gives some
information about Lucretius’ biography (see below).
18 See Luigi Ramello (ed.),Dodici lettere di illustri rodigini (Rovigo: Imperial-regio stabilimento, 1845),
25–26.
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2.1. Dedicatory Letter: WhyDid Frachetta Comment on Lucretius?
The dedicatory letter is addressed to Cardinal Scipione Gonzagawho, as we have heard
above, had become Frachetta’s protector after the death of Luigi d’Este in 1586. In this
epistle, Frachetta explains the two reasons why he decided to comment on Lucretius:
to thank the cardinal for his favours (render grazie di ricevuti servigi) and to establish
his own reputation (apportare a se stesso nome). Then Frachetta presents his work on
Lucretius in the following terms:
And this [i.e., the Spositione], if it were not dear to the world for anything
else, it should be so because it is the only [exposition], or nearly the only one,
concerning this verily great author, who should by nomeans have remained
without an explanation. Because [Lucretius’ work], besides being obscure and
containingmany good features that have beenmisunderstood, contains also
many impious doctrines, which it is necessary to refute, so that nobody will
be deceived by mistaking them. And [Lucretius] is a reviver of the almost
forgotten doctrine of the great Epicurus, to whom many lies are wrongly
attributed.19
Frachetta is open in his admiration for Lucretius, whosework, while containingmany
impiousdoctrines, includes alsomanygood features thathavebeenmisunderstood, so
that his philosophy is not to be rejected entirely. The same goes for the great Epicurus,
who is – he says – undeservedly maligned. Frachetta’s goal is to set the record straight
and clarify in which aspects Lucretius’ and Epicurus’ doctrines agree with Aristotle’s
philosophy, and therefore the truth, and in which they do not.
We have heard that Frachetta presents his work as nearly the only commentary on
Lucretius’De rerum natura. Considering the great success that Lambin’s editions had
already achieved, this statement certainly sounds like an exaggeration. One should
however take into account at least three aspects: 1) for more than seventy years, no
other commentary or edition ofDe rerum natura had been published in Italy, where
Frachetta’s Spositione stands out as nearly the only work of its kind in that period; 2)
19 f. a2v, La quale se non dovesse esser cara al mondo per altro, si dovrebbe per esser sola, o presso che sola intorno
così grande scrittore, il quale non doveva a partito niuno rimanere senza spositione; imperoche oltre l’essere
oscuro, e contenere molte cose buone, che sono state frantese, ne contiene anco molte di ree, le quali fa di mestiero,
accioche altri non vi s’inganni in iscambio togliendole, rifiutare. Et è uno ravvivatore della dottrina di già per
poco dimenticata, del grande Epicuro, a cui sono apposte a torto molte bugie.
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Frachetta most probably considered his work to be considerably different from that
of Lambin or Pius. In a sense, his Spositione is more similar to Francus’ Paraphrasis. Just
like Francus, Frachetta’s aim, especially in the first section of his Spositione, was in
fact to explain the philosophical content of Lucretius’s poem, without any attention
to philological and grammatical features; 3) the Spositione is written in vernacular
and therefore aims to make the contents of Lucretius’ poem available to a broader
audience of people who do not read Latin. For this combination of reasons, Frachetta’s
workmay certainly be considered the only one of its kind.
2.2. Epistle to the Reader: The Choice of the Vernacular
In this epistle, Frachetta explains the genesis of the Spositione and the reason why he
decided towrite in vernacular. First, he explains, he hadwritten the Spositione in Rome
while hewas amember of a literary academy gathered around the Cardinal d’Este, the
Accademia degli Incitati.20 As was fashionable at that time, many of Frachetta’s fellows
at the academy were reading vernacular authors, such as Dante or Petrarch.21 He had
therefore also decided to comment on Lucretius in the vernacular, because he wanted
to include references to these vernacular authors (scrittori volgari).22 He explains that
nobody should blame him for this decision, since many other scholars had already
commented in vernacular on Greek authors and especially on Aristotle, who had
written about philosophy, just like Lucretius (Aristotile, che scrisse di philosophia, come ha
fatto altresì Lucretio).23 Lucretius is here presented as a philosopher, just like Aristotle,
rather than as a poet; Frachetta would return to this point later on.
20 p. a3v [n.n.], La commodità prestataci dal grande Cardinale d’Este, di pregiata memoria, mentre noi siamo
vissuti ne suoi servigi, il che è stato per ispatio di anni quattro fino allo stremo della sua vita, ci invitò già ad
essercitarci in varie maniere, intorno à studi di lettere. La qual cosa con molti altri prendemmo à fare.
21 p. a3v [n.n.], Et vi fu chi prese à leggereMuseo, chi Dante, chi Petrarca, et chi altro Scrittore di grido. Et ciascuno
in volgare favella; come pare, che si costumi hoggidì di fare in tutti e ridotti, dove si tengono ragionamenti di
belle, et polite lettere. On Frachetta’s choice of explaining Lucretius in the vernacular, see Coleman,
“Translating Impiety”, 62.
22 p. a3v [n.n.], … dalla quale usanza non volendo ne anco noi dipartirci, si come quegli, che pensammo di volerci
valere bene spesso delle autorità di Scrittori volgari, havendo tolto per impresa di legger Lucretio, ci demmo a
fare ciò in lingua volgare.
23 p. a3v [n.n.], di che non pensiamo di pensiamo di esserne per dovere riportare biasimo, quando non ci sono
mancati di quegli, li quali tuttavia sono lodati, & tenuti per di soprano giudicio, che hanno commentato in
quella favella etiandio Greci Scrittori, & in ispetiale Aristotile, che scrisse di philosophia come ha fatto altresì
Lucretio. According to Susanna Gambino Longo (Savoir de la nature, 42) Frachetta is probably here
referring to Alessandro Piccolomini’s vernacular works on Aristotle (such as Annotazioni nel libro
della Poetica d’Aristotele, published in 1575).
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Onemay reasonably suppose that there were further reasons why Frachetta chose
to comment on Lucretius in the vernacular: first, his lettioni, of which the Spositione
is composed, were not to be delivered in front of a university classroom, where the
official teaching language would have been Latin, but were rather meant to be read,
especially by his fellows academicians and by a broader audience of non-Latinate
readers.
Frachetta further states that he expects some readers to criticize him because he
decided to comment only on aminimal part of the poem. In fact, contrary towhat Pius
and Lambin had done, Frachetta does not analyse Lucretius’ poemword by word, but,
especially in the first six lettioni, he rather focuses on its main conceptual problems,
leaving aside all the most poetical sections. But – he replies – the same had been
done by other scholars, who are still no less appreciated.24 Besides, if the Spositione
has to turn out to be useful, Frachetta promised to write a proper, more extended,
commentary on Lucretius’ poem.25 As we have seen before, later in his life, Frachetta
indeed started revising his early works. Did he, at that time, also intend to transform
his Spositione into a commentary? Unfortunately, this is something that we will never
know.
2.3. Was Lucretius a Poet or Rather a Philosopher?
As has beenmentioned before, there is no actual introduction to Frachetta’s work,
but right at the beginning of the first lettione, he wishes to clarify some important
issues. First, he gives an explanation of why he has decided to explain Lucretius’ work;
first of all, because he finds it appropriate to someone who had studied philosophy –
like himself – to comment on a philosopher such as Lucretius. At the same time,
Frachetta points out, a common practice in the Academies, at that time, was precisely
to translate the works of poets and of those who wrote in verses, such as Lucretius.26
24 p. a3v [n.n.],Ma ci seranno forse di quegli, che ci vorranno biasimare, per haver noi pubblicata questa Opera,
non compita; conciosia cosa che ella non contenga, che la spositione di unamenoma parte delle parole Lucretiane,
a quali giova di rispondere, che essi si dovrebbono raccordare, de gli altri haver cosi fatto d’altri Autori, che hanno
preso à commentare, liquali non per tanto sono letti, & riletti volentieri, & senza esser biasimati punto.
25 p. a4r [n.n.], à cui [i.e., the reader] se conosceremo, che la presente fatica non paia del tutto inutile, non ci
rimarremo di stendere à prò comune tutto il commento …
26 p. ar,Ho deliberato di dichiarare l’opera di Lucretio a che m’hanno mosso alcune ragioni; et specialmente il
considerare, che egli è assai convenevole l’impiegarsi intorno a un scrittor latino, in Roma, ove la latina lingua
fiorì; et che ame è dicevolissimo, siccome a colui, che per lo più ha dato opera a studi di filosofia, il commentare un
filosofo, quale è Lucretio: & che egli è costume nelle Academie, di versare intorno, o a poeta, o a scrittore in versi;
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Frachetta then explains once more his choice of writing in the vernacular: both
because it was custom in the Academies, and because he wanted to include the quotes
of some scrittori Thoscani, which would not be appropriate if the work were written in
Latin.27 Here then addresses three main issues: 1) the topic of the work, 2) whether
Lucretius was a poet or not, and 3) who Lucretius was. He first points out that the
topic of Lucretius’ work, namely the nature of things or rather of natural things (la
natura delle cose, ò cose naturali), is the same as that of Aristotle’s natural philosophy.28
Shortly thereafter, Frachetta makes it clear that Lucretius was not a poet.29 He
explains that, as shown by Aristotle, what makes a poem a poem is not the verse, but
rather the topic, which in the case of poetry cannot be natural things. Just as Aristotle
had regarded Empedocles not as a poet, but rather as a “physiologist” or “someone
who talks about nature” ( fisiologo o favellator di natura), so Lucretius, too, should be
considered that way, that is, as someone who wrote “about natural philosophy in
verses” (uno scrittore di filosofia natural in versi).30
del cui numero è esso Lucretio. The meaning of the verb versare in this context cannot be ‘to pour’, like
in modern Italian. The verb must be a Latinism (from the Latin verto), whose only possible meaning
is that of ‘turn to another language’, ‘translate’.
27 p. ar, Et ho stabilito ciò fare in volgar favella, si per nonmi discostar dall’usanza di quegli, che sogliono in così
fatti luoghi [i.e., the Academies] discorrere, et si per potere allegar scrittori Thoscani; il che non mi par che
convenga a chi parla latinamente.
28 p. av, io credo il soggetto di quest’opera esser la natura delle cose, o le cose naturali, cioè (come apparirà
manifestamente) lo stesso che è soggetto della filosofia natural d’Aristotile; il che esser vero mi pare a bastanza
comprendersi & dal titolo, & dall’invocazione.
29 On the Renaissance debate on whether Lucretius was a poet or a philosopher, see Prosperi,Di soavi
licor, 117–120.
30 p. av, Parlando Lucretio in questa sua opera di cotali cose, avengadio che favelli in versi, non è tuttavia poeta,
inperoche non è il verso che constituisca il poema, ma la materia; la quale non può a partito niuno del mondo,
essere di cose naturali, come è stato chiaramente dimostrato da alcuni, & perciò a buona argione Aristotile nel suo
libro della poetica [Poet. 1447b17–20] rimosse del numero e della schiera de poeti Empedocle& lo chiamò fisiologo
o favellator di natura […] è adunque Lucretio più tosto scrittore di filosofia natural in versi che poeta. Frachetta
had already tackled this topic in the Spositione on Cavalcanti’s Canzone, where again he claimed
that it is perfectly possible to write in verses while addressing a non-poetical topic, as Lucretius
did: see Frachetta, Spositione sopra la canzone, 4–5, Aristotile nel libro suo della Poetica non biasima mai
Empedocle perche scrivesse delle cose naturali in versi, né niun altro perché prendesse a descrivere materie non
poetiche in versi, adunque l’arte del verseggiare, secondo l’aviso suo, può haver luogo senza l’arte poetica. Appresso
l’arte del verso è una facoltà istromentale, cioé che non ha essere da per se, ma per appoggio ad altra materia,
il che è manifesto […] Ne dica alcuno che quantunque la versificatoria sia facoltà stromentale è nondimeno
appropriata allematerie poetiche, percioche niuno stomento si ristringe auna sola opera, come che principalmente
ad uno ci serva. & del verso parlando, niuno lo appropriò mai alle poesie, anzi l’uso l’ha rallargato a varie
materie …
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At the end, Frachetta provides a short summary of Lucretius’ life and addresses
the problem of whether the books, of whichDe rerum naturawas originally composed,
were six ormore.31He explains that the goal of his paraphrase is to provide an overview
of the topics treated by Lucretius, so that the readers canmake up their mind about
whether the poem is complete as it is, or whether the six books were rather just a
small part of a larger oeuvre.32
It is certainly remarkable that Frachetta, relying on Aristotle’s authority, presents
Lucretius primarily as a natural philosopher, and definitely not as a poet. Just as in
the case of Francus (see chapter 2), who had decided to comment only on the poem’s
philosophical passages, Frachetta explicitly considers Lucretius as “someone who
talks about nature”, a natural philosopher.
3. Frachetta on Lucretius’ Matter Theory
3.1. Creatio ex nihilo
As stated before, Frachetta’s goal is to examine the tenets of Lucretius’ philosophy and
compare themwith Aristotle’s doctrine. As for the ex nihilo debate, Frachetta observes
that Lucretius shares the same viewwith all other natural philosophers, including
Aristotle; they all maintained that nothing comes from nothing.33 We recall that a
similar observation – which stems from Aristotle’s Physics [i 4, 187a34–35] – can also be
found in the commentaries of Pius and Lambin (see chapter 4).
But Frachetta points out that Lucretius is completely wrong when trying to prove
that absolutely nothing can arise out of nothing. In fact, although everything requires
determined and pre-existent matter, in the beginning, when God created heaven
and earth, He actually made them from nothing, producing their matter and form
all at once.34 Even though he does not state it explicitly, Frachetta, by condemning
31 On Lucretius’ biography according to Frachetta, see Palmer, Reading Lucretius, 228–229.
32 p. a2r, … il che non sarà per ventura fatica discara a niuno, fare a vedere se vi si favelli pienamente, in guisa che
si possa stimare questi libri esser cosa compita, o se diminutamente, in maniera che noi siamo costretti a credere
l’opinione antidetta esser vera, che essi siano parte dell’opera che Lucretio delle cose naturali dettò.
33 p. 6,Ma come ottimamente & a tempo & luogo Lucretio propone di provare questo principio, che di niente niuna
cosa si generi, per stabilire la cagione materiale, che è fondamento di tutte le opere della natura, & come in ciò si
conforma, & con tutti gli altri filosofi naturali, & Aristotile istesso. See Lucr. 1.149–158.
34 p. 6, …& inmaggiore errore è, stimando di provare che assolutamente di niente niuna cosa si possa fare. Percioche
quantunque tutte le cose, che si generano daDio, per lo mezzo della natura richieggianomateria, &materia
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Lucretius’ position on the ex nihilo debate, must have dismissed Aristotle’s doctrine as
equally wrong, given that they both do not acknowledge God’s creation.
But then Lucretius is also mistaken – claims Frachetta – when hemaintains that
God does not take part in the generation of things, contrary to Aristotle, who believes
that God andNature do nothing in vain and “therefore cooperate in the production of
natural works” (significando perciò l’uno e l’altra concorrere alla fattura delle opere naturali).35
Here Frachetta refutes Lucretius’ idea, while harmonizing Aristotle’s position
with the Christian beliefs, claiming that, according to the Stagirite, God and Nature
partake in the production of natural creatures. In keeping with his Christian view, he
also strives to show that everything is indeed created from something that already
existed, but only after God, in the beginning, had created matter and form, which
were actually made from nothing.
The problems of primematter and creatio ex nihilomust have been burning issues
for Frachetta, who was to deal with them also later in the paraphrase. Immedi-
ately after the section in which Lucretius criticizes the Presocratics, and especially
Anaxagoras’ homoiomeries (1.830–920), Frachetta surprisingly takes a stand in favour
of Anaxagoras, even though the latter’s matter theory had been heavily criticized
by Aristotle. Frachetta defends Anaxagoras’ view that matter is eternal, and shows
that primematter can be identified with chaos, because it is formless and therefore
can potentially acquire any form. Surprisingly, Frachetta claims that this chaotic
prime matter is eternal and existed even before the world had been created.36 He
determinata, tuttavia nel primo producimiento, nel quale Dio operò da per se, di niente fu creato il cielo & la
terra; essendo ad un tempo stesso prodotte, & la forma & lamateria di esso. See also August., gen. c. Manich.
1.6.1–3, Et ideo deus rectissime creditur omnia de nihilo fecisse, quia, etiamsi omnia formata de ista materia
facta sunt, haec ipsa tamenmateria de omnino nihilo facta est.
35 p. 6, Così è in errore, credendo manifestare per cotal prova, Dio non haver mano nella generatione delle cose, &
in ciò discorda anco da Aristotile, il quale afferma che Dio & la Natura non adoperano cosa veruna indarno,
significando perciò l’uno e l’altra concorrere alla fattura delle opere naturali. See Arist., Cael. i 4 271a 33,Ὁ δὲ
θεὸς καὶ ἡ φύσις οὐδὲν μάτην ποιοῦσιν.
36 p. 17, La cui opinione, tutto che sia rifiutata anco da Aristot. & nel primo libro della Phisica, dalla 33 fino alla 41
particola. Et nel primo libro dellaMetaphisica alla 16 & in altri luoghi, stimo però, pur che sanamente si voglia
intendere, essere verissima & primieramente vero che il chaos, cioè la materia prima, la quale si può appellar
chaos, si perché daper se è diforme,& si perché è in potenza indistintamente a qualunque forma, è eterna&precesse
la fattura del mondo, come afferma ancoHesiodo ἐν θεογονία &Ovidio nel principio delle Trasformazioni. A
similar comparison between primematter and chaos can be also found in Augustine, where however
this chaos is not eternal, since it does not precede God’s creation:De Genesi contraManichaeos, 1.5.13–
15, … prima ergo materia facta est confusa et informis, unde omnia fierent quae distincta et formata sunt, quod
credo a Graecis chaos appellari.
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refers to Hesiod and Ovid, who held the same opinion on this topic.37 In a nutshell,
Frachetta here maintains that chaos, conceived as formless primematter, is eternal
and preceded the creation of the world – that is, the cosmos, opposed to the chaos
itself. In claiming that matter is eternal, however, it looks as if he is arguing against
his previous statement that Godmust have created primematter from nothing and
at a certain point in time.
Frachetta might have noticed this contradiction, as in fact he hastens to explain
that this view, on the contrary, is perfectly compatible with the Bible: God, who
before creationwas the only entity separate from the primal chaos, created everything
after infinite time. God is the only one who is uncreated and who created everything
when he thought it was appropriate.38 Even after this explanation, it is still unclear
how Frachetta could reconcile the statement that primematter is eternal with the
Bible and his own affirmation of the ex nihilo principle. Was the chaotic primematter
eternal, and coexistedwithGod from an infinitely remote point in the past? Or rather,
was it created by Him out of nothing at a certain point in time? Frachetta simply
leaves the question open.
3.2. Atoms Cannot Account for the Substantial Variety of Things
Frachetta proceeds systematically in commenting on the philosophical contents of
Lucretius’ poem, passing over the most poetical sections. When he reaches the point
where Lucretius argues that everything grows from fixed seeds and is nourished from
a determined kind of matter, Frachetta explains that Aristotle, in De caelo and De
generatione et corruptione, claims exactly the same.39 InDe caelo, Aristotle argues that
37 Hes. Th.116,Ἦ τοι μὲν πρώτιστα χάος γένετ’, αὐτὰρ ἔπειτα Γαῖ’ εὐρύστερνος, and Ov.Met. 1.5–
7, … ante mare et terras et quod tegit omnia caelum/ unus erat toto naturae vultus in orbe,/ quem dixere
chaos: rudis indigestaque moles. The reference to Hesiod, in connection with the theory of chaos,
was very common at that time. See, for instance, the book by the Spanish Jesuit Benito Perera,
De communibus omnium rerum naturalium principiis & affectionibus, libri quindecim (Roma: impensis
Venturino Tramezzino apud Francesco Zanetti, 1576), 150: primum enim vacuum esse quasi locum et sedem
corporum, multis veterum placuit, ut Hesiodo, qui ante omnia extitisse chaos veluti receptaculum omnium
corporum.
38 p. 17, Intendendosi ciò, quanto alla dispositione divina, appresso è vero & conforme alla Sacra Scrittura il dire
che la mente divina sola fosse fuori da tal chaos, & creasse il mondo dopo infinito tempo, percioche Dio solo è
increato e creò il tutto quando a lui piacque.
39 pp. 6–7, … per la quale si viene pur etiandio a confermare ogni cosa che si produce di determinata materia
prodursi, conciosia cosa che dal medesimo si nutrichi, & si cresca, di che si genera, come afferma anco Arist. & nel
primo libro del Cielo alla particella 21 & nel secondo della generatione & corottione alla 50. See Lucr. 1.188–
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everything that increases and perishes does so from a kindred body and, again, is
resolved into its matter, while, inDe generatione et corruptione, it is said that all beings
are nourished by elements that are identical to their constituents.40 If one isolates
these statements, Lucretius’ and Aristotle’s doctrines might certainly appear quite
similar, but, looking at the broad context in which these passages are found, one can
easily notice that there is a significant difference between the two texts.
According to Lucretius, matter essentially coincides with primary particles, that
is, atoms, from the combination of which all beings are generated, and to which all
bodies return when they perish. Quite differently, the passage in De generatione et
corruptione revolves around Aristotle’s doctrine of the four elements. In it, Aristotle
suggests that all compoundsmust contain all four ‘simple’ bodies, namely the four
elements, as their constituents. This is confirmed by the fact that all living things –
including plants – require at least two elements as their food, that is Earth, which is
cold and dry, andWater, which is cold andmoist. In fact, from the food one can also
infer the constituents of all the compound bodies: since foodmust be assimilated, all
beings must be nourished by elements identical to their constituents, namely Earth
and Water. But Earth and Water are contrary respectively to Air, which is hot and
moist, and Fire, which is hot and dry. Now, since all compounds presuppose, in their
coming-to-be, constituents that are contrary to one another, and in all compounds
there is contained one set of these contrasting extremes, namely cold-dry (Earth) and
cold-moist (Water), it follows that every compound bodymust contain the opposite
extremes as well, i.e., hot-moist (Air) and hot-dry (Fire). This is the reason why all
compounds must contain, as their constituents, all four elements which not remain
intact, but are mixed and blended.
Frachetta returns to this point when, later on, he comments on the passage
in which Lucretius rejects Empedocles’ doctrine.41 There, Lucretius imagines that
an opponent would argue, in defence of Empedocles, that the four elements are
needed for the growth and nourishment of plants and animals, and therefore that
they can be called their primordia. Lucretius accepts the idea of the necessity of
191, quorum nil fieri manifestum est, omnia quando / paulatim crescunt, ut par est, semine certo,/ crescentesque
genus servant; ut noscere possis/ quidque sua de materie grandescere alique.
40 See Aristotelis De coelo, de generatione et corruptione, meteorologicorum, de plantis libri, cum Auerrois
Cordubensis variis in eosdem commentariis (Venice: ed. apud Junctas, 1550), 15v, which refers to Arist.,
Cael., i 3 270a23–25,Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὸ αὐξανόμενον ἅπαν αὐξάνεται [⟨καὶ τὸ φθῖνον φθίνει⟩] ὑπὸ
συγγενοῦς προσιόντος καὶ ἀναλυομένου εἰς τὴν ὕλην. And id., 383r, which refers to Arist. gc ii 8
335a10–11, ἅπαντα μὲν γὰρ τρέφεται τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἐξ ὧνπέρ ἐστιν.
41 See Lucr. 1.803–829.
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the four elements for growth, and he points out that, indeed, everything needs
its appropriate nourishment. He does not admit, however, that the four elements
are the primordia. Rather it is the atoms which, by their different combinations,
orders and motions, can provide the nourishment for all the different things in
existence.
In commenting on this passage, Frachetta refers once more to Aristotle’s argu-
ments in De caelo and De generatione et corruptione, which show that all beings are
nourished by elements that are identical to their constituents.42 He points out how-
ever that these constituents should not be all of a same kind, but must be different.
He therefore concludes that “it does not seem possible to claim that atoms, which are
all of a same kind, are thematter of all thingswhich come into being. On the contrary,
it seems rather that the elements, which are different from each other, constitute this
(kind of) matter”.43
Later on, Frachetta further clarifies this point, arguing that it is wrong to assume
that the atoms’ shapes are enough to explain the variety of things. And the same
applies to their order, position and combination: their variation can only account for
the accidental – not substantial – diversity of things (non bastano dette cose a costituire
differenza sostanziale, ma solamente accidentale).44 In other words, according to Frachetta,
given that atoms are intrinsically all of a same kind, their orders, combinations,
positions and shapes are not enough to explain how things can differ in their essence,
but can only explain the accidental properties of compound bodies.
As we will see shortly, however, Frachetta does not deny the existence of atoms
altogether, but he equates themwith the Aristotelian primematter, conceived as a
42 p. 15, le quali ragioni poste, risponde a certa obiettione, che altri potrebbero fare contro i suoi principii, & è,
percioche si vede, che non tutti vivono di un istesso nutrimento;madiversi di diversi, per lo che si può argomentare,
che ne anco tutte le cose che si generano si faccino d’un’istessa materia, ma diverse di diverse, conciosiacosa che
dell’istesso altri si nutrica, di che si genera. Si come afferma anco Aristotile nel primo libro del Cielo alla parte 21
& nel secondo della Generatione & corrottione alla cinquantesima, & altrove.
43 p. 15,…non par che si possa dire che gli atomi, li quali sono corpi di unamedesima specie, sieno la materia di
tutte le cose che si generano, anzi par che più tosto si possa dire gli elementi, li quali sono tra loro diversi, esser
detta materia.
44 p. 40, … né ha meno errato credendo che le differenti figure de gli atomi & il disugual numero sieno cagione
della differenza sostanziale de corpi che d’essi si generano, si come errò similmente nel primo libro ove attribuì
cotal differenza al diverso accompagnamento & alla diversa postura di essi atomi, percioche se gli atomi
sono d’una stessa natura, come par che tenga manifestamente Lucretio nel primo libro, non bastano dette
cose a costituire differenza sostanziale, ma solamente accidentale. See p. 15, A che risponde che gli atomi
constituiscono varie cose anchora che siano d’una stessa spetie, per lo vario ordine, per la varia postura, & per
lo vario accompagnamento.
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bare substratum. At the same time, according to Frachetta, the Empedoclean four
elements cannot be regarded as primematter, but must rather be the matter out of
which the mixed bodies are composed.45
To sum up, Frachetta considers the four elements as the constituents of all
compound bodies. Contrary to the atoms, which all possess the same substantial
nature, the four elements, which are different in their natures, can account for the
variety of things. Frachetta, however, does not outright reject the existence of atoms,
but believes that they have a lot in commonwith the Aristotelian primematter, as
we shall see in the next section.
3.3. Lucretius’ Atoms and Aristotle’s PrimeMatter
Going back to the passage inDe rerum natura in which it is shown that nothing can
arise out of nothing, Frachetta claims that both Aristotle and Lucretiusmaintain that
what is corrupted does not dissolve into nothing, but is resolved into the matter out
of which has first been generated. Elaborating on this concept, Frachetta goes as far
as to assert that both Aristotle and Lucretius conceived primematter as eternal and
capable of acquiring any form; having been deprived of one, it can be endowed with
another one.46 One can certainly recognize Aristotle’s theory in this statement, but
not Lucretius’, who did not reason in terms of forms.
Frachetta finally introduces the concept of atoms, that is, “according to Dem-
ocritus’ opinion, which Epicurus followed, eternal bodies, because of their smallness
indivisible and invisible”.47 Frachetta does not deny the existence of atoms, instead, he
engages in an explicit defence of Lucretius’ atomism; the title of the following section
states “the opinion about the atoms is defended” (opinione de gli atomi si difende). Here,
Frachetta refers to a passage inDe caelo in which Aristotle had criticized Leucippus
and Democritus for being supporters of the atomistic theory.48 But Frachetta surpris-
45 p. 16,Hora intorno all’opinion d’Empedocle non è da lasciar di avvertire che se egli volle significare i quattro
elementi esser la materia prima, errò di soverchio, & è giustamente ripreso, ma se volle significare detti quattro
elementi esser materia de corpi misti disse vero.
46 p. 7, … ciò fatto dà a provare Lucretio con quattro ragioni che le cose che si corrompono non si risolvono in niente,
ma nella materia medesima, onde si generano. La quale propositione è altresì tenuta comunemente per vera da
naturali filosofi e da Aristot. Il quale pone per ciò la materia eterna, & con potestà di ricevere tutte le forme, come
fa anco Lucretio: acciò che spogliandosi d’una possa riceverne un’altra.
47 pp. 7–8, … gli atomi, che sono, per opinion di Democrito, la quale seguitò Epicuro, corpi eterni per picciolezza,
non divisibili & non vedevoli.
48 See Arist. Cael. iii 4 303a.
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ingly defends them by showing that, after all, their opinion about atoms is not much
different from Aristotle’s primematter.
I will just say that, if we want to understand this in-depth, we will find that
this opinion concerning the atoms, that is, that they are matter, out of which
are created and into which are dissolved the things that are generated and
corrupted and that they are corporeal, indivisible, invisible and eternal, is
not much different from that of Aristotle about primematter. Because also
prime matter, according to Aristotle, is eternal [1], and, if we trust Simplicius,
is corporeal [2] by its very nature. And as it has no form, therefore it is invisible
[3] and it can also be said to be indivisible [4], because none of its parts can be
distinguished from any other, since it is all of the same kind, unless various
forms are introduced; for the reason of which, or to the degree that it has
[forms], may be said to be not only one, but many.49
Frachetta, in this passage, strives to demonstrate that Aristotle’s primematter pos-
sesses a series of attributes that are similar to those employed by Lucretius to describe
his atoms, that is, [1] eternity, [2] corporeality, [3] invisibility, and [4] indivisibility.
While these attributes suit Lucretius’ atoms very well, it should be clear that not all
of them can be unquestionably employed to describe Aristotle’s primematter.50
49 pp. 8–9,Dirò solo che, se noi vogliamo penetrar ben entro, troveremo cotale opinione de gli atomi, cio è, che siano
materia, di cui si compongono,& in cui si disciolgono le cose che si generano,& che si corrompono,& sieno corporei,
indivisibili, non vedevoli, & sempiterni esser poco differente dall’opinione di Aristotile dellamateria prima, perché
etiandio la materia prima, secondo Aristotile, è eterna, & se noi crediamo a Simplicio, è di sua natura corporea;
come che non habbia forma niuna, per la qual cosa è invisibile, & si può dire anco indivisibile, imperoche non si
distingue alcuna sua parte da altra, essendo tutta d’unamedesima guisa, se non con l’introducimento di varie
forme; per cagion dele quali, o per lo riguardo che v’ha si può dire non essere una, mamolte.
50 Not only is it difficult to provide a univocal definition of Aristotle’s prime matter, but the very
concept of primematter has often been called into question by scholars who wondered whether
Aristotle actually even postulated such a thing. Ancient and early-modern commentators, on the
other hand, seemed to have no doubts that Aristotle believed in a primematter. One possibility was
also to view primematter as a logical precondition for the analysis of anything in terms of matter
and form. All in all, there is a substantial disagreement among scholars over what Aristotle’s prime
matter really is and whether it existed at all. See Howard M. Robinson, “PrimeMatter in Aristotle”,
Phronesis 19.2 (1974), 168–188. On this debate, see, among others, William Charlton, “PrimeMatter: A
Rejoinder”, Phronesis 28.2 (1983), 197–211; DanielW. Graham, “The Paradox of PrimeMatter”, Journal of
theHistory of Philosophy 25.4 (1987), 475–490; Christopher Byrne, “PrimeMatter and Actuality”, Journal
of the History of Philosophy 33.2 (1995), 197–224. Richard Sorabji, The Philosophy of the Commentators
200–600ad. A Sourcebook. Vol. 2: Physics (London: Duckworth, 2004), 253.
girolamo frachetta’s breve spositione di tutta l’opera di lucretio (1589) 195
From an Aristotelian perspective, proving the eternity of primematter should not
be complicated. Since Aristotle believed that all things must come into existence
from an underlying substratum and that prime matter is the substratum of all
things, it must have either created itself, or be eternal.51 Obviously, from Aristotle’s
perspective, a substratum cannot create itself, and therefore, primematter must be
eternal. This statement could have been perhaps more problematic for Frachetta,
who – as we recall – at first had defended the ex nihilo nihil principle, even though
later, contradicting his previous statement, he claimed that primematter was eternal.
As for corporeality, it is questionable whether this characteristic may be applied
to Aristotle’s primematter. In fact, inMetaphysics (vii 3 1029a20–23), Aristotle claims:
“by matter I mean that which is not in itself said to be a given anything, nor of
a given quantity, nor characterized by any of the other categories which define
being. For there is something of which each of these is predicated, and its being
is different from that of each of the predicates”.52 From this passage, it appears that
primematter lacks all positive determinations; for this reason, some commentators
have assumed that it must have been incorporeal. However, in another passage,
Aristotle stated that “when length, breadth and depth are taken away, we see nothing
left, unless there is somethingmade definite by these”.53 This statement encouraged
other commentators, including Simplicius, to maintain that primematter is three-
dimensional extension (διάστημα), separate from determinate dimensions, which
would give it a particular magnitude. It is Simplicius’ interpretation that Frachetta
relies on, and further expands, when he defines Aristotle’s prime matter not only
as extended, but as corporeal as well. He declares that “prime matter … if we trust
Simplicius, is corporeal by its very nature”. This specific interpretation allows him to
pair Aristotle’s prime matter with Lucretius’ atoms. Importantly, Frachetta also adds
that, according to Simplicius, Aristotle’s prime matter is corporeal by its very nature,
even though it has no form. This means that, according to Frachetta’s interpretation
of Simplicius, being corporeal must be an essential disposition of primematter: it does
not become so only by virtue of some superimposed form.
51 Phys. i 7 190b1–10, 25.
52 Λέγω δ’ ὕλην ἣ καθ’ αὑτὴν μήτε τὶ μήτε ποσὸν μήτε ἄλλο μηδὲν λέγεται οἷς ὥρισται τὸ ὄν.Ἔστι
γάρ τι καθ’ οὗ κατηγορεῖται τούτων ἕκαστον, ᾧ τὸ εἶναι ἕτερον καὶ τῶν κατηγοριῶν ἑκάστῃ.
Transl. by Sorabji, The Philosophy of the Commentators, 253.
53 SeeMet. vii 3 1029a16–19,Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀφαιρουμένου μήκους καὶ πλάτους καὶ βάθους οὐδὲν ὁρῶμεν
ὑπολειπόμενον, πλὴν εἴ τί ἐστι τὸ ὁριζόμενον ὑπὸ τούτων. Transl. by Sorabji, The Philosophy of the
Commentators, 253.
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Interestingly enough, Francesco Piccolomini, Frachetta’s teacher in Padua, made
a similar comparison between the atomists’ and Simplicius’ theory of matter in his
treatise Libri ad scientiam de natura attinentes, which was published in 1596, seven years
after Frachetta’s Spositione. In his work, Piccolomini devotes several chapters to the
topic of primematter. In particular, in book 3, chapter 5 (Anmateriae competat forma
corporis), he introduces four opinions concerning the extension and dimensions of
prime matter.54 The first opinion is of those who conceived matter as being, in its
essence, an uncompounded body. Among these, Piccolomini counts the atomists,
Democritus, Leucippus and Epicurus, who identified primematter with atoms, that
is indivisible bodies, but also Anaximander, the Stoics, the Cynics, the Cyrenaics,
Pericles of Lydia and, finally, Philoponus and Simplicius, whomaintained that prime
matter is body in its essence.55
It is of course possible that Frachetta andPiccolomini independently cameupwith
the same comparison, or that they drew from the same source. But given the fact that
the former was a student of the latter in Padua, it is more reasonable to suspect
that, despite the chronological order of publications, Frachetta took inspiration
from Piccolomini, and later on included, in his Spositione, the idea of an essential
compatibility between Lucretius’ atoms and Aristotle’s concept of prime matter –
via Simplicius –, both being conceived as corporeal. After all, this would not be the
only documented case in which Frachetta included in his work theories that were to
appear in Piccolomini’s later publications.56
A few pages later, Frachetta returns to this topic. When commenting on Lucr.
1.565–576, he clarifies that, besides the abovementioned characteristics, Lucretius’
atoms and Aristotle’s primematter share another characteristic still connected with
corporeality, that is, solidity (sodezza), which is proper of a body.57 In fact, he says:
54 Francisci Piccolominei Senensis Librorum ad scientiam de natura attinentium partes quinque, pars tertia
(Francofurti: apud Andreae Wecheli heredes, Claudium Marnium, & Ioan. Aubrium, 1597), 676–
677. On this passage see Guy Claessens, “Francesco Piccolomini on PrimeMatter and Extension”,
Vivarium 50 (2012), 225–244, esp. 228–231.
55 Francisci Piccolominei Senensis Librorum ad scientiam de natura attinentium partes quinque, pars tertia
(Francofurti: apud Andreae Wecheli heredes, Claudium Marnium, & Ioan. Aubrium, 1597), 676–
677. Existimarunt veterum plurimi materiam sui essentia esse simplex corpus, ex quorum numero fuerunt
Democritus, Leucippus, & Epicurus, qui eam dixere atomos sive indivisibile corpus […] Simplicius quoque
existimavit materiam sui essentia corpus esse.
56 See Baldini, “Per la biografia di Girolamo Frachetta”, 41.
57 p. 12, Come Lucretio non è discorde da Aristotile nella positione dell’eternità de gli atomi, in quanto sonomateria,
così si può dire che concordi in un certo modo con esso nella sodezza attribuita a detti atomi …
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… even Aristotle thinks that prime matter is impenetrable, although it is
corporeal, either because of its own nature (di sua natura), as Simplicius
maintains, or for possessing quantity since eternity (per haver la quantità
congiunta ab eterno), as other people claim.58
To whom is Frachetta referring here? Once again, the answer to this question may be
sought in Piccolomini’s Libri ad scientiam de natura attinentes. As has beenmentioned
earlier, in chapters v–ix, Piccolomini discusses four opinions concerning the extension
and dimensions of primematter. We have alreadymentioned the opinion of those
who conceived that matter is in its essence an uncompounded body; we recall that
among these, Piccolomini includes the atomists and Simplicius. Then, in chapter vii,
he discusses a theory according to which matter is provided with a substantial
form of a body (Opinio putantium materiae competere formam coevam, qua substantia
sit, & corpus constituat quam appellant formam corporietatis). This corporeal form is not
identical with dimensionality, which is an accident in the category of quantity,
but corresponds to the disposition to receive dimensions. This disposition inheres
in prime matter, but is prior to its dimensions. The most important proponents
of this doctrine were Avicenna, Albert the Great, Agostino Nifo and Marcantonio
Genua.59
Subsequently, in chapter viii, Piccolomini presents Averroes’ theory, according
to whichmatter is provided with coeval indeterminate dimensions (De dimensionibus
terminorum expertibus coaevis materiae), which only become determinate after the
imposition of substantial forms. Matter is never deprived of these indeterminate
dimensions, and therefore is not affected by substantial change.60
Finally, in chapter ix, he introduces Aquinas and Plotinus, who maintained
that primematter is not endowed with coeval extension, neither substantially, nor
accidentally (Opinio putantiummateriam nulla sibi coeva mole esse praeditam). The former
maintained that primematter is mere potentiality, the second that, in the generation
of things, form brings along its extension.61
58 p. 12, … conciosiacosa che anco Aristotile pensi la prima materia, ancora che sia corporea, o di sua natura,
secondo che crede Simplicio, o per haver la quantità congiunta ab eterno, come altri credono, essere impenetra-
bile.
59 Piccolomini, Ad scient. de nat., 679–681, and Claessens, “Francesco Piccolomini”, 231–232.
60 Piccolomini, Ad scient. de nat., 681–682, and Claessens, “Francesco Piccolomini”, 232–233.
61 Piccolomini, Ad scient. de nat., 682–683, and Claessens, “Francesco Piccolomini”, 233–234.
198 chapter 5
In chapter x, Piccolomini finally presents his own view, which is very similar to
Simplicius’ idea of prime matter as sheer dimensionality.62 Interestingly enough,
Piccolomini earlier in chapter v had opposed this view to that of Averroes.
Therefore, according to Simplicius, matter is a material body just like some
kind of effusion and extension, capable of receiving a formal body, and his
opinion differs very much from that of Averroes who denied that matter is a
body, but [held] that is endowed with coeval dimensions, which are accidents
and forms. From this, first, it is evident that not a few people erred when they
said that Simplicius’ opinion is the same as that of Averroes.63
Most probably, Piccolomini is here polemically referring to Iacopo Zabarella – among
other people – who, inDe rebus naturalibus libri xxx (1590), had opposed Averroes’ view
to that of Aquinas, but (inaccurately) identified it with that of Simplicius.64 According
to Zabarella, Averroes held that prime matter is quantitatively determined by having
as a perpetual accident (tamquam accidens perpetuum) indeterminate dimensions, which
only become determinate after the imposition of substantial forms.65 In other words,
according to Averroes, quantity is an eternal, or more accurately coeval, property of
primematter.
62 Dico materiam sequi duas principales affectiones, quarum una est potentia ad materiatas formas, altera autem
est effusio essentialis, materiata dimensio, sive indefinita extensio. And later, … ut nec detur forma corporis
coaeva materiae, nec dimensiones formales & indefinitae, quae accidentia sint eidem coaeva, nec materia sit
formale corpus sed essentiales (sic) effusio, materiata dimensio, & indefinita moles, tamquam Chaos, inane
et sedes formarum. Piccolomini, Ad scient. de nat., 683–684, and Claessens, “Francesco Piccolomini”,
234–238.
63 Piccolomini, ad scient. de nat., 677, Ex sententia itaque Simplicii materia est corpus materiale tanquam effusio
& extensio quaedam, capax corporis formalis, & valde eius opinio differt ab ea Averrois qui negavit materiam
esse corpus, praeditam tamen esse dimensionibus ei coaevis, quae accidentia sint et formae. Ex quo constat primo
errare nonnullos dicentes, opinionem Simplicii esse eandem cum opinione Averrois.
64 Zabarella,De reb. nat., 191, Sunt hac in re duae contrariae opiniones: una Averrois, ad quam accedere videtur
Simplicius in contextu primi Physicorum, et Ioannes Grammaticus in libro undecimo Contra Proclum; altera
Thomae, illi penitus contraria. Claessens, “Francesco Piccolomini”, 239.
65 Zabarella,De reb. nat., 191, Averroes […] asserit primammateriam secundum se et ante receptionem formae
esse quantam, et habere tres dimensiones, longitudinem, latitudinem, et profunditatem, tamquam accidens
perpetuum et inseparabile, eas tamen nullis certis terminis circumscriptas, sed interminatas, quae postea a
diversisi formis varios terminos recipiunt. Aquinas, on the contrary, held that there is no eternal quantity
in primematter, because it follows upon form. See Zabarella,De reb. nat., 191, Contrariam sententiam
tuetur Thomas, qui pluribus in locis, praesertim vero in opuscolo 32 nititur ostendere nullam esse in prima
materia quantitatem aeternam, sed omnes naturalium corporum quantitates insequi formas.
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Frachetta ismost probably referring to Averroes’ ideawhen he opposes Simplicius’
view, according to which prime matter is corporeal because of its own nature (di
sua natura), to those who maintained that it is corporeal, for possessing quantity
since eternity. By opposing these two views, Frachetta was also possibly siding with
Piccolominiwho, contrary to Zabarella, considered Simplicius’ andAverroes’ positions
to have been very different. Even though the Spositionewas published earlier than
the works of either Zabarella and Piccolomini, Frachetta might be echoing a broader
debate, which was presumably taking place in Padua at that time.
Another quality that, according to Frachetta, both Lucretius’ atoms and Aristotle’s
prime matter have in common is indivisibility. There is however a substantial
difference between the two: Lucretius’ atoms consist of smallest parts inseparably
cohering, and therefore are certainly indivisible. On the other hand, according to
Frachetta’s interpretation of Aristotle, primematter is indivisible because none of its
parts can be distinguished from the others before the introduction of various forms
(non si distingue alcuna sua parte da altra, essendo tutta d’una medesima guisa, se non con
l’introducimento di varie forme).66 Later on, in the Spositione, Frachetta again tackles this
topic of the indivisibility of primematter, but from a different perspective:
Even though Aristotle would not agree with Lucretius when the latter says
that matter consists in minimal bodies or that there are bodies absolutely
(assolutamente) indivisible, nevertheless he would grant indivisibility to prime
matter, in the way we said before. Moreover, he would admit that this kind
of matter is in itself most simple, and he would not deny that minimal
natural bodies are given, which, albeit not absolutely (assolutamente), because
as quantity they can be divided into infinity, at least as natural bodies (come
naturali) are indivisible; that it is so is clear fromwhat he says in the first book
of Physics in the 36th part and elsewhere.67
66 See Arist.,Met., i 8 989b6–7 and Aquinas, InMetaphys., i, lect. 12, n. 198, and Auctoritates Aristotelis, 117:
In fundamento naturae, id est in materia prima, nihil est distinctum.
67 p. 13, … se ben Aristotile non converrebbe con Lucretio in dire che la materia sia corpi minimi o in dire che ci sieno
corpi assolutamente indivisibili, non pertanto concederebbe la indivisibilità alla materia prima, nel modo che
davanti dicemmo. & ammetterebbe detta materia essere da per sé semplicissima, né negherebbe che non si dieno
corpi naturali minimi, li quali sieno, se non assolutamente, conciosiacosa che come quantità possino dividersi
in infinito, almeno come naturali, non divisibili, la qual cosa stare in questa maniera, appare per quello che
egli dice nel primo libro della Phisica alla parte 36 e altrove. See Averrois Cordubensis Aristotelis de Physico
audito in Aristotelis Opera cum Averrois Commentariis, vol. iv (Venice: ed. apud Junctas, 1562–1574; rept.
Frankfurt amMain, 1962), 24r.
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Frachetta here maintains that, according to Aristotle, first, prime matter is
indivisible; and second there are minimal natural bodies, which in principle can
be divided to infinity, but, as natural bodies, are indivisible, just as Lucretius’ atoms.
The passage in Aristotle used by Frachetta to endorse this theory is Physics i 4 187b28–
34, where it is said that the repeated subtraction of parts from a finite natural body
has to come to an end; the minimum is in fact the limit below which a substantial
form cannot be sustained.
For let flesh be extracted fromwater and again more flesh be produced from
the remainder by repeating the process of separation: then, even though the
quantity separated out will continually decrease, still it will not fall below a
certain magnitude. […] [if] further extraction is always possible, there will be
an infinite multitude of finite equal particles in a finite quantity – which is
impossible.68
This Aristotelian passage is interpreted by Frachetta – who is here interested in
harmonizing it with Lucretius’ atomism – as evidence for the fact that Aristotle
endorsed the existence ofminimal physical parts,which cannot be further divided and
are therefore similar to Lucretius’ atoms. In keeping with this idea, few years earlier,
inDe universo (1583), Frachetta had gone as far as to pose the following question: “What
if I say in accordance with Aristotle that atoms and indivisible bodies are given?”69
In the passage quoted above, Frachetta also put the emphasis on the fact that,
according to Aristotle, there cannot be bodies absolutely indivisible, but, if we con-
sider them as natural bodies, these are indeed indivisible. Here, Frachetta might be
interpreting the problem of the divisibility/indivisibility of matter in the light of
the Aristotelian distinction between potency and actuality: no extended body can
in actuality be divided infinitely. It is however indefinitely divisible, that is, it could
potentially be divided ad infinitum, but this potentiality is not one that will ever
completely actualized. This means that ultimately, in the natural world, there are
magnitudes which cannot be further divided, just as Lucretius’ atoms. We recall that
a similarly observation has also been put forward by Francus (see chapter 2).
68 Arist. Phys. i 4 187b28–34 (transl. by R.P. Hardie and R.K. Gaye). On the theory of minima naturalia,
which stems from this passage in Aristotle, see especially John E. Murdoch, The Medieval and
Renaissance Tradition of Minima Naturalia, in Late Medieval and Early Modern Corpuscular Matter
Theories, ed. by C.H. Lüthy, J.E. Murdoch, andW.R. Newman (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 91–131.
69 Frachetta,De universo, p. 25, assert. nº112,Quid si dicam cum Aristotele atomos et indivisibilia corpora dari?
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3.4. Lucretius’ Void and Aristotle’s Interpretation of Plato’s chôra asMatter
By contrast, Frachetta’s interpretation of Lucretius’ theory of void space appears to
be quite self-contradictory. At first, commenting on 1.329–397, he explicitly claims
that Lucretius’ opinion about the void is quite different from Aristotle’s. Lucretius
is furthermore wrong, because – he explains – there is nothing that Nature eschews
more than void, since where there is void there is no nature, “given that nature is
material and corporeal form”.70 Clearly, this criticism relies mostly on Aristotle, who,
in the fourth book of Physics (iv 6 213a12–9 217b 28), had put forward many arguments
to discredit those who believed in a void.
Interestingly, later on, Frachetta seems to reconsider his opinion about the void,
or at least tries to look at it from another perspective. Commenting on the passage in
which Lucretius argues in favour of the infinity of space andmatter, that is atoms
(Lucr. 1.958–1051), Frachetta reaffirms that nature does not admit any kind of infinite, if
not in potency (la natura non ammette infinito d’alcuna guisa, se non in potenza). Moreover,
he argues, as Aristotle had shown in the third book of the Physics and in De caelo,
Lucretius is wrong when he claims that beyond the universe there is an infinite
space.71 In the end, however, Frachetta tries once more to find a compromise and
adapt Lucretius’ opinion to the Platonic and Aristotelian views:
But, again, on this passage, I do not want to omit to mention that to prime
matter correspond not only the atoms, as we have shown earlier, but also
to the void, because matter is bare and can accommodate forms, and can be
defined as the place of the latter – as Plato defined it – in the same way as the
void is bare, can accommodate bodies, and is the place of these. [Therefore,
this matter] is infinite by its nature, that is to say that it has no boundary or
end, given that the limit depends on the forms.72
70 p. 9, … percioché non v’è cosa che più schifi la natura che il vacuo, conciosia cosa che dove è vacuo non sia natura,
essendo la natura formamateriale & corporea. For a similar criticism, see p. 11.
71 For this passage Frachetta relies on Averroes’ commentary on Aristotle’sDe caelo (book 1 part. 99):
Aristotelis De coelo, de generatione et corruptione, meteorologicorum, de plantis libri, cum Auerrois Cordubensis
variis in eosdem commentariis (Venice: ed. apud Junctas, 1550), f. 286r.
72 p. 19, …manon voglio restar di dire etiandio sopra cotal passo che lamateria prima con cui hanno corrispondenza
non solamente gli atomi come avanti mostrammo, ma anco il vacuo, in quanto la materia è nuda e capace di
forme e può dirsi luogo di esse, come da Platone è detta, nella guisa che il vacuo è nudo e capevol de corpi e luogo
di essi, è di sua natura infinita, cioè a dire che non ha termine o fine alcuno, conciosiacosa che la terminazione
dipende dalle forme.
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In other words, Frachetta here identifies Lucretius’ concepts of atoms and void
(space) both with Aristotle’s primematter. Frachetta was not the only one who held
this opinion, which must have been quite popular, given that it can be also found
in the handbook of natural philosophy written by the Jesuit Benedict Pereira, De
communibus omnium rerum naturalium principiis (1576).73
Frachetta had already extensively demonstrated that Lucretius’ atoms are basically
the same thing as Aristotle’s prime matter. Now he claims that not only atoms,
but also the void is equivalent to it. In fact, both matter and void possess the same
characteristics: they are bare, capable of receiving any form, in the case of matter,
or bodies, in the case of void; they can all be considered place of forms and bodies
respectively. What is more, primematter, being both atoms and void, can, before the
imposition of forms, be considered to be infinite; it is in fact the superimposed form
that provides matter with boundaries. One must point out, however, that Frachetta,
in this context, illegitimately takes the contrary of finite to be infinite, rather than
indefinite.
In discussing this, Frachetta refers to Plato’s alleged notion of matter as the
recipient of forms and as their place. Actually, his description would have beenmore
appropriate for Plato’s idea of the ‘receptacle of all coming-to-be’ (πάσης γενέσεως
ὑποδοχή), which by ancient andmodern scholars has been interpreted differently
each time, either as matter or as space (χώρα).74 The first who explicitly identified
Plato’s space (χώρα) in Timaeuswithmatter (ὕλη) was Aristotle, who, in his Physics,
states: “hence Plato in the Timaeus identifies space andmatter”.75 This interpretation
was later accepted by Simplicius, and, in the Renaissance, by Ficino. In fact, when
73 Benedicti PereriiDe communibus omnium rerumnaturaliumprincipijs & affectionibus, libri quindecim, (Rome:
Impensis Venturini Tramezini, apud Franciscum Zanettum, & BartholomæmTosium Socios, 1576),
p. 142, ergo apud hos philosophos [sc. Democritus, Leucippus, Epicurus] inane & atomi locum tenent
materiae.
74 The debate over whether Plato’s receptacle has to be interpreted as space or matter has divided
scholarship ever since the days of Aristotle. See Keimpe Algra, Concepts of Space in Greek Thought
(Leiden: Brill, 1994), 72–118, who argues for a theory of “the receptacle-as-both-space-and-matter”.
75 Transl. by W.D. Ross. Arist. Phys. iv 2 209b11–12: Διὸ καὶ Πλάτων τὴν ὕλην καὶ τὴν χώραν ταὐτό
φησιν εἶναι ἐν τῷ Τιμαίῳ. A.E. Taylor in his commentary on Timaeus 52b4makes clear that this view
does not pertain to Plato at all: “matter really plays no part in his [sc. Plato’s] cosmology at all. The
‘permanent implied in change’ is not thought of by him as a ‘stuff ’ or a ‘substrate’ in being the
permanent implied in change, it discharges the same function which ὕλη or ‘matter’ does in the
Physics of Aristotle, but there the resemblance of the two notions stops […]. Aristotle is himself so
imbued with the view that the permanent implied in change can only be thought of as ‘stuff ’ or
‘substrate’, that he was probably unconscious that he was falsifying the theory of the Timaeus by
forcing his own technical terminology into it” (p. 347).
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commenting on the passage in Physicswhere Aristotle identifies Plato’s space with
matter, Simplicius declares:
Having said that in so far as it is an attribute of place to be an extension,
we shall be led back to matter in our enquiry into the nature of place. He
[Aristotle] commented on Plato having calledmatter the space and place of
embodied forms in the Timaeus. For, in the Timaeus, he says that matter is the
receptacle of all becoming like a wet-nurse.76
Simplicius’ discussion continues with a long quotation from Plato, in which space
(χώρα) is described as everlasting and capable of providing a location for all things
that come into being.77 In the Renaissance, Ficino, in his translation of Plato’s Timaeus,
provided the following marginal title for this passage: “that matter is place” (quod
materia est locus), essentially attributing Aristotle’s interpretation directly to Plato.78
Therefore, as we have seen before, Frachetta first establishes a connection between
Lucretius’ atoms andAristotle’s concept ofmatter. And, on the basis of the Aristotelian
reinterpretation of Plato’s concept of space (χώρα), which he also holds to be identical
to matter, he also identifies Lucretius’ void space with primematter. Ultimately, his
aim is to show that Lucretius’ atoms and void can all be assimilated to Aristotle’s
concept of prime matter, conceived as a permanent substrate capable of receiving
forms and bodies. It must be obvious, however, that this interpretation is quite
implausible: it would, if taken seriously, lead to a kind of Parmenideanmonism, in
which the totality of all things is just one single chunk of extended matter. Frachetta
76 Translated by J.O. Urmson (slightly modified). See Simplicius, In Phys. 539, 10–11, Εἰπὼν ὅτι καθόσον
ὑπάρχει τῷ τόπῳ τὸ διαστήματι εἶναι εἰς τὴν ὕλην ἀπαχθησόμεθα ζητοῦντες τί ἐστιν ὁ τόπος,
ὑπεμνήσθη καὶ τοῦΠλάτωνος ἐνΤιμαίῳ τὴν ὕλην χώραν καὶ τόπον τῶν ἐνύλων εἰδῶν καλέσαντος.
ἐν γὰρΤιμαίῳ τὴν ὕλην πάσης εἶναι γενέσεως ὑποδοχὴν οἷον τιθήνην. See also Sorabji,ThePhilosophy
of the Commentators, 259.
77 52a8–b 1: τρίτον δὲ αὖ γένος ὂν τὸ τῆς χώρας ἀεί, φθορὰν οὐ προσδεχόμενον, ἕδραν δὲ παρέχον
ὅσα ἔχει γένεσιν πᾶσιν. See also Ficino’s translation of this passage: Tertium genus locus est, qui interit
quidem numquam, sed omnibus quae gignuntur, sedem exhibet. In Divini Platonis Opera omnia Marsilio
Ficino interprete (Lyon: Apud Antonium Vicentium, 1557), 484.
78 In the sameAristotelian fashion, Ficino, inhis commentary to theTimaeus, haddefinedPlato’smatter
as eternal and receptacle of forms. Ex mutua frequenti perpetua elementorum elementaliumque rerum
commutationemduo probantur, unum scilicetmateriamhis unam subesse informem sempiternamque formarum
fluentium susceptaculum, alterum formas eiusmodi non esse versa substantias, sed substantiarum verarum
imagines, scilicet idearum. SeeMarsilii Ficini Florentini OperaOmnia (Basel: ex officina Henricpetrina,
1576), 1474.
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seems to forsake the advantage of atomism vis-a-vis Parmenides’ monism, which had
precisely been its dualism, which allows for multiplicity as well as change.
3.5. Arguments against AtomicMotion
Having compared atoms to Aristotle’s prime matter, conceived as a bare substratum,
Frachetta cannot help but raise objections to Lucretius’ theory of atomic motion.
Once again, his criticisms is often are grounded in Aristotle’s works and especially in
those passages in which the Stagirite condemns the atomists’ theories.
Atoms never stop moving, claims Lucretius, not even when they form atomic
aggregates; instead, they are in constant motion, increasing one thing and diminish-
ing another (Lucr. 2. 67–79). The sum of things however remains unchanged, because
the same atoms that leave one body and diminish it increase another one, and thus,
as one body grows old, another one flourishes (2.72–75, propterea quia, quae decedunt
corpora cuique,/ unde abeunt minuunt, quo venere augmine donant,/ illa senescere, at haec
contra florescere cogunt,/ nec remorantur ibi). Frachetta criticizes Lucretius on this point
on the grounds that, if generation and corruption really did happen this way, that is,
through the coming together and separation of atoms, things that have been dimin-
ished should also be able to increase again. Because, in principle, the same atoms
which have been separated from one body should be able to attach themselves to any
other thing that has been previously diminished.79 Frachetta does not give us any
reference with regard to the source of his criticism, and one may therefore conjecture
that, at least in this case, this is his own opinion on the topic.
Aristotle’s criticism of the Atomists’ theory of motion revolved around twomain
points: considering that any movement must take place in a void, they could not
explain either the speed or the direction of such a motion.80 In the fourth book of
Physics, Aristotle had treatedmovement not as the covering of a certain distance in
a certain time, but rather as the overcoming of a certain resistance. According to him,
the speed of a body through different media must be inversely proportional to the
resistance of themedia.81 But if we assume a constant medium and different bodies,
then those that have a greater force of weight (ῥοπή) will cleave the mediummore
79 p. 24, … percioche dove ciò fosse, le cose che si diminuiscono dovrebbono poter crescere di nuovo, non essendo men
ragionevole che gli atomi da una cosa staccati possino attaccarsi ad alcuna che si diminuisce che ad alcun’altra.
80 Phys. iv 8 215a1–20.
81 See Aristotle’s Physics. A revised text with introduction and commentary byW. D. Ross (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1936), 590.
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quickly. On this basis, Aristotle criticizes the Atomists’ theory of motion because,
since void offers no resistance, all bodies would move with equal, infinite speed
through it, which is not possible. This is precisely the argument put forward by
Frachetta:
If bodies of the same size, such as the atoms, moved through the void, even
if they had different weight, they would move anyhow at the same speed,
because they would not feel the resistance of themedium, which is the reason
whymotion is different.82
Indeed, both Epicurus and Lucretius asserted that all atoms move in the void at
equal speed, which is faster than any other.83 At the level of compounds, however,
the Epicureans would say that the speed of motion “may vary from nil” – as Furley
pointed out – “when all the component atoms are simply colliding with each other
within the same volume, to atomic speed, when all the component atoms are moving
in the same direction and not collidingwith anything”.84 But this higher-level variety
is something that Frachetta does not take into account.
Another objection raised by Frachetta against Lucretius’ theory of atomic motion
concerns his assumption that atoms, which are simple bodies, havemore than one
principle ofmotion in themselves, i.e., first, their tendency tomove downwards, due to
their proper weight, and second, the swerve.85 Frachetta’s criticism follows Aristotle’s
De caelowhich states that simple bodies, such as fire and earth, possess a principle
of movement in their own nature which is also simple, that is, upwards in the case of
fire, downwards in the case of earth.86 Precisely for this reason, Frachetta comments:
82 p. 28, … se i corpi d’ugual grandezza quali sono gli atomi si movessero per lo vacuo, ancorche fossero di inegual
peso, si moverieno tuttavia con eguale velocità. Percioche non sentirebbero la resistenza delmmezzo, che è cagione
della disugualità nel moto …
83 Epicurus, Letter to Herodotus, 1.61–62; Lucr. 2.225–239. See also David Furley, Cosmic Problems: Essays on
Greek and Roman Philosophy of Nature (Cambridge: Cambridge up, 1966), 83–84.
84 Furley, Cosmic Problems, 84.
85 p. 28, … così è falso e ripugna ad Aristotile che i corpi gravi, movendosi in giù (se non sono animali) declinino o
possino declinar punto dalla ritta linea per alcun principio che habbino in se. Impero che i corpi disanimati, o
semplici, o composti che sieno non hanno in loro più di un principio di moto […] & spetialmente i corpi semplici,
quail sono gli atomi, non hanno che unmoto semplice naturale, come dice Aristotile nel primo libro del Cielo
alla parte 9.
86 Frachetta probably refers to Averroes’ commentary on Aristotle’sDe caelo (book 1 part. 9): Aristotelis
De coelo …, f. 6v, corporis simplicis est motus simplex, et motus simplex habet corpus simplex. See Arist., Cael.
268b21–269a 2, λέγω δ’ ἁπλᾶ μὲν ὅσα κινήσεως ἀρχὴν ἔχει κατὰ φύσιν, οἷον πῦρ καὶ γῆν καὶ τὰ
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It is false and clashes with Aristotle’s opinion that heavy bodies, moving
downwards (if they are not animals), swerve or could swerve a little from the
straight line, because of somekindof principle theyhave in themselves. In fact,
non-living bodies, whether simple or composite, do not have in themselves
more than one principle of motion […], and especially the simple bodies,
such as the atoms, do not have more than one simple and natural motion, as
Aristotle states in the first book of De caelo, part. 9.87
It goes without saying that Aristotle inDe caelo did not refer to atoms when speaking
about the natural motion of simple bodies. It is interesting, however, to notice how
Frachetta, who had first identified Lucretius’ atoms with Aristotle’s primematter,
now changes his view and compares them to the elements, such as fire and earth, each
time adapting his interpretation to make Lucretius’ doctrine seem comprehensible
within an Aristotelian framework.
3.6. The Shapes of Atoms
Other objections raised by Frachetta to Lucretius’ atomic theory concern the shapes
of atoms. Not only does Frachetta put forward ontological reasons to refute atomic
shapes and their variety, but he also criticizes the supposed consequences that this
variety of shapes would have, especially on sensation.
First of all, Frachetta rejects the very idea that atomsmight have different shapes;
in order to do so, he resorts to Aristotle’s refutation of the notion of an extended
indivisible. Indeed, he observes that, atoms beingminimal indivisible bodies, they
cannot be endowed with shape, because the latter always possesses quantity and
therefore is always divisible.88 Frachetta seems to ignore Epicurus’ (and Lucretius’)
possible answer to this problem, according to which atoms should be conceived of as
consisting of even smaller indivisible units, the ἐλάχιστα, which provide the atom
with extension and shape.
τούτων εἴδη καὶ τὰ συγγενῆ τούτοις, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὰς κινήσεις εἶναι τὰς μὲν ἁπλᾶς τὰς δὲ μικτάς
πως, καὶ τῶν μὲν ἁπλῶν ἁπλᾶς, μικτὰς δὲ τῶν συνθέτων, κινεῖσθαι δὲ κατὰ τὸ ἐπικρατοῦν.
87 p. 28, … così è falso & ripugna ad Aristotile che i corpi gravi movendosi in giù (se non sono animali) declinino o
possino declinar punto dalla linea retta per alcun principio che habbino in sé. Imperoche i corpi disanimati, o sem-
plici o composti che sieno, nonhanno in loro più che un principio dimoto […],& spetialmente i corpi semplici quali
sono gli atomi non hanno che unmoto semplice naturale, come dice Aristotile nel primo libro del Cielo alla part. 9.
88 p. 30,Ma erra apponendo a corpi minimi indivisibili diverse figure perioche le figure non sono senza quantità &
ogni quantità è divisibile.
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Secondly, Frachetta refutes the idea that the diversity of atomic shapes can account
for the great variety of things. Aswehaveheard before, this is not the case, according to
Frachetta,who claims that the shapes of atoms, evenwhen their various combinations
and positions are added, are not sufficient to explain the substantial – but only
accidental – difference between things but only their accidental difference.
The third point of criticism concerns Lucretius’ idea that different atomic shapes
havedifferent effects on sensation: thepleasant sensationof honey, for instance,would
be due to the round and smooth atoms that compose it. By contrast, the hooked
and rough atoms of wormwood would produce its unpleasant taste (2.398–407).
Lucretius adduces many other examples to demonstrate this theory, but Frachetta
systematically criticizes all of them, mostly relying once again on Aristotle.
For instance, commenting on the passage just mentioned (2.398–407), Frachetta
points out that, rather than a difference in terms of atomic shapes, pleasant or
unpleasant sensations depend on the proportion or disproportion of the sensible
object with the senses.89 He here refers to Aristotle’s account of sensation inDe anima,
which states that what is duly proportioned produces pleasant sensations, while
everything that is in excess provokes pain.90 According to Aristotle, and therefore to
Frachetta, sensation cannot be just a matter of round or hooked atoms, otherwise a
certain food, for instance, would be equally pleasant or unpleasant for every animal.91
Following Aristotle, Frachetta concludes that the pleasantness or unpleasantness of a
certain sensation depends on the conformity or difference between the sense object
(e.g., a certain food or smell) with the temperament of the animal.
Later on, however, in the fourth book (4.633–672), Lucretius argues that sensations
are determined by the perceived object as well as its perceiver. Moreover, different
things please different animals, because the pores and the passages differ in themouth
and palate, just as in the limbs, both in size and shapes. But Frachetta, once again,
dismisses Lucretius’ idea, pointing out that the different sensations must depend on
89 p. 32,Ma erra percioche senza ricorrere a gli atomi potiamo & dobbiamo dire con Aristotile nel secondo libro
dell’Anima, la cagione di ciò essere la proportione, & sproportione de sensibili coi sentimenti.
90 Arist. An. iii 2 426b2–7, ὡς λόγου τινὸς ὄντος τῆς αἰσθήσεως. διὸ καὶ ἡδέα μέν, ὅταν εἰλικρινῆ καὶ
ἄμικτα ὄντα ἄγηται εἰς τὸν λόγον, οἷον τὸ ὀξὺ ἢ γλυκὺ ἢ ἁλμυρόν, ἡδέα γὰρ τότε […] ἡ δ’ αἴσθησις
ὁ λόγος· ὑπερβάλλοντα δὲ λύει ἢ φθείρει.
91 p. 32, Oltreche favellando del gusto in particolare, se un cibo fosse dilettevole ad esso, & un’altro noioiso,
per cagion di figure liscie, o aspre, ne seguiria, che il medesimo cibo saria dilettevole o spiacevole a tutti gli
animali ugualmente. Il che si vede essere falso. Per la qualcosa è da dire che ciò dipende da altro; cioè dalla
conformità, o differenza del cibo col temperamento dell’animale, dalla quale conformità o differenza deriva anco
la piacevolezza, o spiacevolezza de gli odori, non trapassanti l’odorato in proportione.
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the conformity or difference between the temperament of the animal and the food in
question, not on the physiological traits of each animal or on the shapes of atoms.92
3.7. The Colour of Atoms
Discussing the passage in which Lucretius claims that atoms have no colour (2.730–
841), Frachetta finds that he substantially agrees with Aristotle, whomaintained that
“neither primematter nor the four elements have colour”.93 We find here a further
confirmation of the fact that Frachetta associates Lucretius’ atoms primarily with
Aristotle’s primematter, but occasionally also with the four elements.
In the passage in question (2.739–747), Lucretius intends to prove that, although
atoms have no colour and therefore cannot be seen, even so they can be imagined
and grasped by animi iniectus “a projection of themind” (which translates the Greek
ἐπιβολὴ τῆς διανοίας). He uses the comparison of those who are born blind, but
nevertheless know bodies by touch without any association of colour. He therefore
draws the conclusion that ourmind, too, can forma concept (notitia) of a bodywithout
ever having experienced the colour of it. Lucretius’ animi iniectus, however, should not
be conceived as a mere process of abstraction – as many have suggested: more than
a simple “a projection of themind”, it seems to refer to a process of ‘extrapolation’.
According to this procedure, themind receives impressions through the senses, forms
a general idea of a class, to which it refers other examples. Only later, it projects itself
and forms an idea of abstract things, or things of which it has no experience, such as
the atoms. Therefore, the idea of atoms derives from sensible impressions through a
process of abstraction.
Commenting on this passage, Frachetta claims that, on this point, Lucretius
agrees with Aristotle, who, in the first book of Physics, has shown that primematter,
which corresponds to the atoms, despite being imperceptible, can nonetheless be
intelligible.94 Indeed, in Physics, Aristotle claims that primematter can be known only
by analogy, that is, by comparison with sensible things, such as the bronze which
comes before the statue, the wood before the bed, or the formless matter before the
92 p. 97,Ma travia dal vero Lucretio, & dobbiamo noi con Aristotile addurre per cagione di ciò la convenenza &
disconvenenza de’ temperamenti de gli animali, & de’ cibi.
93 pp. 40–41, Pone adunque per ferma conclusione che gli atomi di niun colore sono forniti, in che conviene con
Aristotile, il quale non vuole, ne che la materia prima, ne che i quattro elementi habbino colore veruno.
94 p. 41, … in che pur conviene conAristotile, il qualemostra, nel I lib. della Phisica, che lamateria prima rispondente
agli atomi, tutto che sia insensibile, è nondimeno intelligibile.
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‘in-formed’ body.95 This is indeed a reasoning which is not entirely different from the
mental procedure described by Lucretius, as Frachetta points out.
Conclusions
To conclude, Frachetta’s Spositione constitutes an important step in the history of
the reception of Lucretius’ poem and doctrine. First of all, it is the first text that
aimed to explain the content ofDe rerum natura in the vernacular, in a period in which
translating Lucretius’ text was seen as a risky undertaking. Secondly, Frachetta’s work
was the first Italian publication of Lucretius after more than seventy years during
which no other edition or commentary on De rerum natura had been published in
Italy. Thirdly, most probably the choice of the vernacular made Frachetta’s work
different from those of the other commentators of Lucretius. As mentioned before, I
believe that Frachetta’s awareness that the Roman censors might have been averse
to Lucretius in general, and to the diffusion of his doctrine in particular, made him
emphasize Aristotle’s philosophy as a counterpart to Lucretius’ Epicureanism even
more strongly than if his work had been in Latin.
As for Frachetta’s approach to Lucretius’ matter theory, a number of salient
features must be mentioned. In principle Frachetta does not reject the idea of atoms:
he in fact compares them to Aristotle’s primematter (only occasionally to the four
elements). What encouraged Frachetta to harmonize Lucretius’ atomistic theory
with Aristotle’s idea of primematter is the interpretation of the latter as something
corporeal and extended, as suggested by Simplicius; interestingly, this idea was also
endorsed by Francesco Piccolomini, Frachetta’s teacher in Padua.
However, Frachetta’s attempt to harmonize Lucretius’ atomismwithin Aristotle’s
matter theory, in some cases, led to a clearly erroneous interpretation of both
doctrines: Frachetta, for instance, accepts the idea of atoms is at the most abstract
level of defining them as a substratum. As a consequence, all the activities that
atoms are supposed to perform (i.e., composing bodies and defining sensations) are
rejected. What is more, by assimilating both atoms and void with Aristotle’s prime
95 See Arist, Phys. i 7 191a7–11, Ἡ δὲ ὑποκειμένη φύσις ἐπιστητὴ κατ’ ἀναλογίαν. Ὡς γὰρ πρὸς
ἀνδριάντα χαλκὸς ἢ πρὸς κλίνην ξύλον ἢ πρὸς τῶν ἄλλων τι τῶν ἐχόντων μορφὴν [ἡ ὕλη καὶ] τὸ
ἄμορφον ἔχει πρὶν λαβεῖν τὴν μορφήν, οὕτως αὕτη πρὸς οὐσίαν ἔχει καὶ τὸ τόδε τι καὶ τὸ ὄν. The
Greek text has ὑποκειμένηwhich literally means substratrum, but the majority of the Aristotelian
commentators have interpreted it as primematter.
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matter, Frachetta implicitly denies Lucretius’ physical dualism and with it the very
foundation of atomism, and turns his Epicurean universe into a sort of single whole
made of one extendedmatter.
Finally, it is certainly remarkable that Frachetta presents Lucretius primarily as a
natural philosopher, definitely not as a poet, and, consequently, focusesmainly on the
philosophical themes discussed inDe rerum natura, rather than on its poetical allure.
This is a further confirmation of the fact that Lucretius’ Renaissance commentators
were definitely not only concerned with the poetical and philological aspects of his
poem.
As for the fortune of Frachetta’s Spositione, GuidoMilanese has noticed that this
work enjoyed a great fortune, given that Italian libraries still host around forty copies
and that the book was even admitted into the libraries of monasteries.96 But did later
scholars take Frachetta’s “Aristotelized” interpretation of Lucretius’ matter theory
seriously? Even though it appears that the Spositione enjoyed a great success, there
is no clear evidence that Frachetta’s interpretation of Lucretius’ atomism exerted a
significant influence on later thinkers. After all, his attempt to harmonize Lucretius’
doctrine with Aristotle’s, more than as a serious attempt to provide a plausible
interpretation, shouldprobably be regarded as part of a strategy tomakehis Epicurean
philosophy more acceptable and possibly counteract the danger of incurring the
ecclesiastic censorship, while makingDe rerum natura available to a broader audience.
96 Milanese, “Italian Commentaries”, 202.
General Conclusions
As stated in the general introduction, the aim of this thesis was to trace the reception
of Lucretius’ matter theory in the Renaissance. To this end, I have focused on the
fifteenth- and sixteenth-century commentaries onDe rerum natura, in order to find
out why the Renaissance exegetes of Lucretius chose to comment on his poem, and
how they tackled his atomistic matter theory. In order to answer these questions,
in the previous chapters, I have examined a selection of passages taken from all the
extant exegetical works on Lucretius, written after his rediscovery in 1417 up to the
end of the sixteenth century.
1. Why Commenting on Lucretius?
As for the first researchquestion, in our five chapters, it has been shown that there are a
number of reasons why some Renaissance scholars decided to comment on Lucretius;
some of them are explicitly stated in the prefaces to their exegetical works on De
rerum natura, others can be inferred from external sources. As for Ficino (chapter 1), I
have argued that his early interest in Plato’s Timaeus and his positive attitude toward
atomism could explain why he soon engaged with Lucretius’ philosophy, an activity
that eventually led him to write commentariola – most probably short explanatory
notes in the form of letters – onDe rerum natura.
In his Paraphrasis in Lucretium, Raphael Francus (chapter 2) explicitly declares that
the idea that even erroneous ancient theories contained a kernel of truth led him to
read in his spare time Lucretius’ poem and to compose a paraphrase of the first three
books of it. According to his own narrative, only later on, some of his friends urged
him to publish this paraphrase, arguing that it would be useful for those whowanted
to understand Lucretius’ difficult poem. Apart from these explicit motivations, the
fact that Francus added to his paraphrase an appendixDe animi immortalitate, make
us wonder whether, by publishing his work, he also aimed to create himself an
opportunity to discuss the nature of the human soul, whose status and nature stood
in those days at the center of a major controversy.
As seen in chapter 3, the reason that led Johannes Baptista Pius to compose
his 1511 voluminous commentary on Lucretius is not explicitly stated anywhere in
the paratexts of his edition. In the dedicatory letter that precedes his commentary,
however, Pius underscores the novelty of his enterprise, which no one before him
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could have accomplished. Moreover, he puts the emphasis on the difficulty of the
text he is commenting on, which according to him could not be fully understood
unless supplemented by an explanation. In advertising his work in this manner,
Pius therefore attempts to convince the reader that Lucretius’ work is very difficult,
but worth reading, although it is only suitable for fine minds. At the same time,
from other external sources, we may infer that probably the ambitious project of
commenting on Lucretius was ameans throughwhich Pius tried to regain credibility
and the consensus eruditorum, after his edition of Plautus had been systematically and
ruthlessly criticized by the grammarian Giovan Francesco Boccardo. Finally, Leonardo
Marso, the author of Pius’ funeral oration, explicitly claimed that during his life, Pius
was very sympathetic to Epicureanism, whatever this may have implied precisely
in this instance. If this can be accepted for a fact, it is also plausible to suppose that
Pius wrote his commentary onDe rerum natura out of a genuine interest in Lucretius’
philosophy.
The reasons put forward by Denys Lambin (chapter 4) to support his decision to
comment on Lucretius concernmainly on philological issues. Lambin in fact explains
that one of his main goals is to reconstruct the original form of Lucretius’ Latin text
and to correct the errors and distortions caused by its transmission. Even though
Lambin’s main purpose appears to be the philological reconstruction of the text, he
puts forwardmany other arguments to promote the divulgation of the contents ofDe
rerum natura; for instance, he insists on the poem’s educational value, on the subtlety
of Lucretius’ reasoning, and on the fact that – despite many impious theories – not all
aspects of his doctrine should be rejected.
Lastly, Girolamo Frachetta (chapter 5), in his dedicatory epistle, explains the two
reasons why he decided to comment on Lucretius: to thank his patron for his favours
and to establishhis own reputation, by rendering adifficult text accessible to a broader
vernacular audience. Even though Frachetta wrote his Spositione during his sojourn
in Rome, while he was member of the Accademia degli Incitati, his interest in Lucretius
is most probably to be dated back to his university years, when he was a student in
Padua. There is in fact much evidence that, during the second half of the sixteenth
century, both Lucretius’ work and his doctrinewere alreadywidely circulating among
Paduan scholars, such as Gian Vincenzo Pinelli and GirolamoMercuriale. These and
other illustrious examples might have drawn Frachetta’s attention to Lucretius’
controversial text and persuaded him to comment on it.
More in general, the most commonmotives put forward by Renaissance exegetes
of De rerum natura to justify their choice of commenting on Lucretius are connected 1)
to the difficulty of Lucretius’ Latin and to his philosophical concepts, which needed
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to be explained in order to be fully understood; and 2) to the novelty of the text,
which offered exegetes the opportunity to embark on an enterprise that had not been
undertaken before and therefore could make them acquire prestige.
Even though some historical documents and external sources might suggest that
some Renaissance exegetes of Lucretius – such as Ficino, Francus, or Pius – at a certain
stage of their lives engaged with Epicureanism, we have seen that no one of these
commentators seemparticularly committed to spreading Lucretius’ philosophy. Even
so, by publishing and commenting on De rerum natura, these scholars, while not
necessarily endorsing all of Lucretius’ ideas or intending to spread them, willy-nilly
made them circulating and eventually reintroduced them into the philosophical
debate.
2. Atoms, Elements, Seeds: Eclectic Interpretations of Lucretius’ Matter Theory
As for the second research question, which concerns the reception of Lucretius’
atomism in the Renaissance, our dissertation has shown that the exegetes of De rerum
natura oftenput forward very diverse and eclectic interpretations of his first principles.
These interpretations were often the result of the conflation of Epicurean atomism
with other matter theories that belonged to different philosophical traditions, such
as Platonism or scholastic-Aristotelianism.
In Ficino, one can clearly notice this early tendency to harmonize Lucretius’
Epicurean atomismwith both Aristotle’s and Plato’s doctrines. In his commentary
on Plato’s Philebus, for instance, Ficino resorted to Lucretius’ concept of semina rerum,
which he found compatible with his own vitalistic view of nature and seeds; he
therefore strengthened its procreative implications, and re-contextualized it, in
accordance with both Aristotle’s hylomorphism and Christian-Platonic finalism.
Later on, however, in his Theologia Platonica, Ficino recognized the substantial
incompatibility between Lucretius’ matter theory and his own concept of seeds.
He realized that Lucretius’ ontology – based on atoms and void – was ‘incomplete’,
and, precisely for this reason, he felt the necessity to add some incorporeal principle,
an active quality or power, in order to explain adequately the nature of things. As for
many other Renaissance scholars, for Ficino the problemwas not atomism as such,
but specifically Lucretius’ Epicurean atomism, with all its implications, first of all
the denial of finalism, Divine Providence and the immortality of the soul. Having
become acquainted with atomism through Platonic sources, namely the medieval
commentaries on the Timaeus, Ficino must initially have thought that Lucretius’
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matter theory was after all compatible with his own view of natural agency. Only
when he fully realized that, in fact, the implications hidden in Lucretius’ Epicurean
atomismwere incompatible with his own philosophy, did he decide to commit his
“commentariola” onDe rerum natura to the flames, actually or symbolically.
As shown in the second chapter, in Francus’ Pharaphrasis in Lucretium, one cannot
detect any personal re-elaboration or explicit approval of Lucretius’ atomism, but it
is possible to encounter some themes that are recurrent in the exegesis of Lucretius’
matter theory in the Renaissance, such as 1) the Aristotelian denial of the actual
divisibility of spatialmagnitudes ad infinitum, which is here used to endorse Lucretius’
atomism, as well as 2) the criticism, already found in Ficino, to the effect that atomic
particles, given that they lack some kind of active quality or power, are not capable by
themselves of performing any activity, least of all of creating things.
As for Pius’ interpretation, he sometimes identifies Lucretius’ atoms with the
four Empedoclean elements, even though Lucretius had explicitly rejected the idea
that air, fire, water and earth can be conceived as the ultimate constituents of matter
(1.705–829). In order to face this explicit rejection and harmonize these two doctrines,
Pius endows the four elements with almost atomic properties, describing them as
simple, very subtle, and ‘pure’, that is, not combined with the properties of the other
elements. This interpretation of the four elements as ‘pure’, simple and minimal
particles, can be traced back to Plato’s Timaeus and to its medieval tradition, while
a similar explanation can also be found in Aristotle and in some scholastic texts.
At the same time, mixing the Aristotelian tradition withMarsilio Ficino’s vitalistic
concept of seeds, Pius also describes Lucretius’ semina rerum as endowed with a power
of generation (gignendi potentia) and as bearers of the substantial form of things. Pius
therefore re-contextualizes Lucretius’ concept of seeds in an Aristotelian framework,
thereby taking the first step towards the conception of atoms as living and ensouled
entities.
When Lambin comments upon Lucretius’ matter theory, he tends to consider his
atomism to be the consequence of the ‘errors’ of Democritus and Epicurus, whom the
poet follows. This tendency is coherent with his strategy of blaming Epicurus for the
most controversial ideas contained inDe rerum natura, in order to redeem Lucretius
and promote the reading of his poem (an therefore his own editions). To the same end,
when it is possible, Lambin tries to harmonize Lucretius’ arguments with Aristotle’s,
or those of other established authors, so as to render themmore acceptable to the eye
of the Renaissance reader. Furthermore, in his 1570 edition, Lambin presents atomism
as the main tool used by Lucretius to deny the divine intervention in human affairs.
It is certainly remarkable that, in this same passage, Lambin chooses to positively
general conclusions 215
present Lucretius as an empirical observer of nature, and not only as a poet, putting
the emphasis on the fact that only through the observation of the nature of things
and the explanation of the ratio naturae could he free human beings from the fear of
gods and death.
More than any other commentator, Frachetta in turn tries to integrate Lucretius’
atomismwithin Aristotle’s matter theory; this attempt, however, leads in some cases
to a clearly erroneous interpretation of both doctrines. In principle, Frachetta does
not reject the idea of atoms, but he compares them to Aristotle’s primematter (and
occasionally also to the four elements). However, he accepts the idea of atoms only at
the most abstract level by defining them as a substratum, and therefore rejects all
the activities these minimal particles are supposed to perform, like composing bodies
or defining sensations. What is more, Frachetta assimilates both atoms and void to
Aristotle’s prime matter, therefore implicitly denying Lucretius’ physical dualism
and with it the very foundation of atomism.
To sum up, all the interpretations put forward by the fifteenth- and sixteenth-
century commentators ofDe rerum natura examined in this dissertation clearly show
that, in order to provide a complete account of the impact that Epicurean atomism
had on Renaissance thinkers, one cannot look at Lucretius and his matter theory as
an isolated and unmediated source of reception; on the contrary, it is highly relevant
to examine its interaction with other philosophical traditions, developed in antiquity
and theMiddle Ages.
In order to place these sources in their proper context, one should look at other
texts, written in the same period, so as to detect traces of endorsement or re-
elaboration of Lucretius’ atomism. Even though one has to wait until the seventeenth
century in order to see a more systematic revival and re-elaboration of ancient
atomism,we have seen that, already in the sixteenth century, therewere scholarswho,
while not endorsing Lucretius’ atomist doctrine wholesale, adopted certain aspects of
hismatter theory in order to explain a range of natural phenomena.Marcello Adriani,
for instance, in his commentary on Dioscorides’Demateria medica (1518), resorts to
Lucretius’ theory to account for the variety of tastes which, in his view, is produced
by different atomic shapes.1 Another famous example of a partial endorsement of
1 See Adriani, PedaciiDioscoridis AnazarbeiDemedicamateria libri sex (Florence: per haeredes Philippi Iun-
tae Florentini, 1518), i 20,Qui ex Epicuri placitis rerumnaturam suavissimo carmine cives suos Romanus poeta
quondam docuit, & qui multo ante in eadem primus instituerat Abderites Democritus in tammultis tamquam
diversis quoshabet sapores naturaunamcertamque exAtomorumsuarumfiguris causam invenisse credentes: dul-
cem saporem et qualis in melle et lacte sentitur rotunditate et laevore earum fieri ratiocinabantur. Amarum vero
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Lucretius’ atomism is Girolamo Fracastoro’sDemorbo Gallico (1530), which notably
provides an account of contagious diseases by resorting to his concept of semina rerum.2
As for the interpretation of Lucretius’ atomism as vitalist, based on his concept
of semina rerum, one can find an echo of this interpretation in the philosophy of
Giordano Bruno, who, in his voluminous Frankfurt Trilogy (1591), presents a cosmos
made up of expansive and animated atoms. In choosing a Lucretian poetical style
for his doctrines and embracing atomism, Bruno proved himself to be profoundly
indebted to Lucretius fromboth a poetical and a philosophical point of view.However,
while embracing Lucretius’ atoms, Bruno conceived of them as living, dynamic, and
monadic entities which constituted, as a sort of divine nuclei, the seeds of an endless
cosmosmadeupof infiniteworlds. This doctrine seems very far from that presented in
De rerum natura. Still, by conceiving of atoms as the ensouled bearers of living proper-
ties, Brunomay also be said to have strengthened the procreative implications hidden
in Lucretius’ concept of semina rerum, just as Ficino and Pius had done previously.3
Finally, as we have shown in our general introduction, according to Renaissance
scholars, atomism as such was not to be rejected altogether, but could possibly be
reconciledwith Aristotelian or Platonicmatter theories, andmaybe even embedded in
a teleological account of natural agency, in accordance with the Christian orthodoxy.
This integration of atomistic principles within the tenets of the Christian religion
was to be one of the main features of Pierre Gassendi’s (1592–1655) philosophy, who, in
the seventeenth century, carried out his grandiose project of reconstructing Epicurus’
philosophy and was engaged in demonstrating the compatibility of atomismwith
the biblical account of creation.4
et qualis in absynthio et Centaurio sit inflexis angulosisque et hamatis iisdemprincipiis, et ne longiores in caeteris
simus multiplicem hanc saporum varietatem: tenuitati, crassitudini, brevitati, magnitudini, obliquitati, recti-
tudini, conisque et globis eorum tribuentes, iidem in constituendis secernendisque aliis atque aliis naturae formis
magni referre dicebant praeter principiorum huiuscemodi figuras illas, quos nam in immenso inani volitantia
motus inter se darent et acciperent, quoque concursu, nexu, et positura simul haererent. See Lucr. 2.398–407. On
Adriani and Lucretius, see Alison Brown, “Reinterpreting Renaissance Humanism:Marcello Adriani
and theRecovery of Lucretius”, in Interpretations ofRenaissanceHumanism, (Leiden: Brill, 2006), 267–291.
2 On Fracastoro’s theory of contagion, see Marco Beretta, “The Revival of Lucretian Atomism and
Contagious Diseases during the Renaissance”,Medicina nei Secoli. Arte e Scienza, 15/2 (2003), 129–154.
3 On Bruno and Lucretius, see Amalia Perfetti, “Motivi lucreziani in Bruno: la Terra come ‘madre delle
cose’ e la teoria dei semina”, in Letture bruniane 1–2 del lessico intellettuale europeo 1996–1997 (Pisa: Istituti
editoriali e poligrafici internazionali, 2002), 189–209 and Elisa Fantechi, “Tra Aristotele e Lucrezio. La
concezione dello spazio nella teoria cosmologica di Giordano Bruno”, Rinascimento 46 (2006), 557–583.
4 On Gassendi’s natural philosophy, seeMarcoMesseri, Causa e spiegazione. La fisica di Pierre Gassendi
(Milan: Franco Angeli, 1985).
general conclusions 217
3. Explaining Lucretius is the Renaissance
To conclude, tracking down how Lucretius’De rerum naturawas read and understood
is fundamental to assessing the impact of hiswork and philosophy in the Renaissance.
An important step in this direction was taken by Ada Palmer, who in her Reading
Lucretius in the Renaissance, after analysing themarginalia of fifteenth- and sixteenth-
centurymanuscripts and printed editions, distinguished two stages in the reception
of De rerum natura: a first stage in which scholars put more effort into repairing and
explaining the text, and a second stage in which, after the poem had been edited and
explicated, they could start “digesting” its contents.5 The commentaries analysed in
this thesis pertain to the first stage of this process, when Lucretius still needed to
be explained in order to be properly understood and his theories fully or partially
endorsed. The patient work of the Renaissance exegetes of De rerum natura enabled
later scholars to understand its contents and, in some cases, it may have played a role
in shaping their judgements on Lucretius and his philosophy.6
As for the interpretation of Lucretius’ matter theory, we have encountered two
main features in these exegetical works:
1. the absence of an explicit condemnation of Lucretius’ atomismas such; instead,we
encountered a tendency to adapt and re-contextualize itwithin other frameworks;
2. a highly complex and eclectic panoramaof interpretations,which often originated
from the conflation of Epicurean atomism with other doctrines, such as the
Empedoclean four-element theory, Plato’s geometrical atomism, or Aristotle’s
hylomorphism.
Given this complex wattle of influences, it is certainly incorrect to regard Lucretius’
doctrine, and especially his atomism, as the sole philosophicalmodel that contributed
to overturning Aristotle’s natural philosophy and paved the way for the development
of modern scientific thought. If at some point, after the rediscovery of Lucretius’
De rerum natura, an atomistic model of nature managed to spread successfully
and to replace Aristotle’s natural philosophical system, it is only because some
atomistic explanations were harmonized with more vitalistic theories of matter,
and with Aristotelian hylomorphism – think for instance of Bruno’s ensouled atoms
5 See especially Palmer, Reading Lucretius, 233.
6 See for instance Hine, William L., “Inertia and Scientific Law in Sixteenth-Century Commentaries
on Lucretius”, Renaissance Quarterly 48 (1995) 728–741.
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or Sennert’s atomi-cum-forma – and embedded in a teleological account of nature. The
interpretations put forward by the Renaissance commentators of De rerum natura
attest to this process of harmonization, rather than opposition, between these two
philosophical systems.
More in general, this set of case studies provides us with an insight into how,
when dealing with classical reception, one should not think of a linear and univocal
correspondence between an ancient text and its modern responses. On the contrary,
it is always necessary to take into account various intermediate stages of reception,
possible ‘contaminations’, and subjective interpretations. These details are often
lost in the grand narratives, especially those concerning the reception of Lucretius
in the Renaissance and early-modern period, which sometimes tend to look at the
rediscovery ofDererumnatura as a revolutionary event that, according to some scholars,
even triggered the Renaissance or modernity tout court.7 This interpretation is too
linear and unsophisticated, and therefore gives us only a partial view. By giving due
attention to a number of so-called minor figures, in this dissertation I have tried to
show that the story of the reception of Lucretius’ philosophy in the Renaissance can
be – and should be – muchmore complex, rich and interesting than how it is usually
told.
7 This is, for instance, the picture sketched by Stephen Greenblatt in The Swerve.
appendix
Fatis avolsa voluntas: Johannes
Baptista Pius (1511) on Lucr. 2.257–258
Libera per terras unde haec animantibus extat,
Unde est haec, inquam, fatis avolsa voluptas
per quam progredimur quo ducit quenque voluntas,
Declinamus itemmotus nec tempore certo
Nec regione loci certa sed ubi ipsa tulit mens?
Nam dubio procul his rebus sua cuique voluntas
Principium dat et hinc motus per membra rigantur
Lucr. 2.256–262
Whence is this free pleasure in living beings all over the earth, whence – I
say – is this pleasure wrested from the fates by which we proceed where the
will leads everyone and likewise swerve our motions, not at fixed times nor
at fixed places, but where themind itself has taken us? For without a doubt
everyone’s own will initiates these things, and hence movements are diffused
through the limbs.1
In 257–258, theninth-centurymanuscripts of Lucretius, that isO (LeidenVoss. Lat. f 30,
s. ix), Q (Leiden Voss. Lat. q 94, s. ix) and U (Vienna Lat 107 ff. 15–18, s. ix), have voluptas
ending line 257 and voluntas the following verse.2 Only a few copies read voluptas also
at the end of line 258.3 Martin in the Teubner edition kept the transmitted reading,
1 This translation from Latin into English is mine.
2 I should point out that these two lines belong to a longer passage (2.257–263) that inOhas been added
by the so-called “corrector Saxonicus”, who was later identified as Dungal, in place of four lines that
had previously been erased. See Michael Reeve, “The Italian Tradition of Lucretius Revisited”, Aevum
79.1 (2005), 115–164 esp. 157–159 and David Butterfield, The Early Textual History, 296 in Appendix iii. A
fuller version of Dungal’s corrections is available at www.cambridge.org/butterfield. I have also
checked Chatelain’s facsimile.
3 A (Vat. Lat. 3276), B (Vat. Barb. Lat. 154), F (Laur. 35.31), P (Paris b. n. Lat 10306), C (Cambridge u. l. 2
40), j (Vat. Ottob. Lat. 1954). See Enrico Flores, Edizione critica con introduzione e versione delDe rerum
natura di Lucrezio, (Naples: Bibliopolis, 2002), 152.
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and some scholars, among themMacKay, Barra, andMayotte Bollack, have tried to
defend it.4 Some other editors, such as Munro, Diels, and Ernout follow Lachmann’s
suggestion of replacing voluptas in 257 with potestas, whilemaintaining voluntas in the
following verse. As is well known, however, the majority of modern scholars prefer to
follow Lambin’s suggestion of interchanging voluptas and voluntas.5 It goes without
saying that interchanging these two words makes a significant difference, since the
passage undergoes a major change of meaning if one opts for one or the other of the
two readings. Is it pleasure or rather the will that is free, wrested from the dictates of
fate and tightly connected with the clinamen?
In this Appendix, I shall not to take a stand on the conceptual debate, but rather
draw attention to another source of Lucretian reception that sheds light on the
tradition of this passage but which has so far been ignored, namely Johannes Baptista
Pius’ commentary on Lucretius of 1511. First of all, it will be shown that the reading
voluntas in line 257 had been circulating as a correction in a number of manuscripts
and editions at least since the last decades of the fifteenth century, that the first to
suggest it was most probablyMichele Marullo. His correction was accepted in Pius’
commentary, which was publishedmore than fifty years before Lambin’s.
Secondly, I will suggest that the idea of interchanging voluptas and voluntasmay
already have been implied in Pius’ commentary, which Lambin is likely to have
consulted and fromwhichhemayhavedrawn inspiration. I shall finally propose anew
and improved apparatus criticus to Lucr. 2.257–258 that acknowledges the paternity
of the correction voluntas in line 257 toMichael Marullo and takes into account the
role of Pius’ commented edition.
To begin with, I shall discuss the paternity of the correction voluntas, in place
of voluptas, in line 257. As one can read in Flores’ apparatus, the reading voluntas in
line 257was already contained as a correction in themanuscriptMonac. 816a (Munich,
Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, ms Clm. 816a), which is also called codex Victorianus, since
4 See also Louis Alexander MacKay, “Notes on Lucretius”, Classical Philology 56.2 (1961), 103–105, esp. 104;
Giovanni Barra, “Fatis Avolsa Voluptas (De rer. nat. ii, 257)”, Rendiconti dell’Accademia di Archeologia,
Lettere e Belle Arti di Napoli 39 (1964), 149–165, esp. 160–162 andMayotte Bollack, “Momenmutatum, la
deviation et le plaisir (Lucrèce, 11, 184–293)”, in Études sur l’ épicurisme antique (Lille: Publ. de l’univ. de
Lille iii, 1976), 175–180.
5 This is for instance what Bailey does in his edition (ad loc.). Also Furley, Büchner and Avotins defend
Lambin’s suggestion. See Furley, Two Studies, 174; Karl Büchner, “Präludien zu einer Lukrezaus-
gabe”, Hermes 84 (1956), 227–229 and id., Lukrez und Vorklassik (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1964), 152–155;
Ivars Avotins, “Two Observations on Lucretius 2.251–2.257”, RheinischesMuseum 126 (1983), 282–291,
esp. 285.
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it belonged to Petrus Victorius (1499–1585).6 Therefore Monac. 816a, after correction,
reads voluntas both in 2.257 and 258. The same reading voluntas in line 257 is also
found, as Flores observes, in the Anonymus in ed. Veneta; in his conspectus librorum, he
explains that the 1495 Venice edition at issue here is the copy preserved in Naples
(Biblioteca Nazionale, viii-c-46), which is heavily annotated bymore than one hand.7
Interestingly, the 1495 Venice edition preserved in Paris (Bibliotèque Nationale, Rés.
m yc 397, v95) also has voluptas in 257 corrected to voluntas. More precisely, this copy,
which prints voluptas in both verses, has both of them corrected to voluntas, so that,
after the correction, it reads voluntas … voluntas, just like Monac. 816a. Indeed, Alison
Brown has recently noticed that this edition closely followsMonac. 816a and contains
marginalia in at least three hands, one of them possibly the hand of Marullo.8
Without a doubt, it is difficult to determine who was the first to put forward
this correction. It might have been the corrector of Monac. 816a himself, but scholars
struggle to identify him. Reeve, followed by Flores and recently Brown, has noticed
that the hand of the corrections inMonac. 816a bears a resemblance to that of Laur.
35.25.9 Munro suggested Marullo as a possible corrector; Reeve in his 1980 article
hinted at Poliziano, but then retracted his suggestion; Flores prefers to abstain
from expressing a judgment on this matter.10 Marullo could definitely be the prime
suspect, but unfortunately determining the role that he played in the transmission
of Lucretius’ text and identifying his corrections are both very complex issues.11
6 See Flores, Edizione critica, 152.
7 See Flores, Edizione critica, 37.
8 See Brown, The return, 2010, 118. On this topic see especially Michael Reeve, “The Italian Tradition of
Lucretius”, 27–48, esp. 44–48 andMichael Reeve, “Lucretius from the 1460s to the 17th Century”, 169–
171. Reeve was the first to analyze the complex relations betweenMonac. 816a, Paris b. n., Rés. m
yc 397 (ed. Ven. 1495), and other manuscripts and editions such as Laur. 35.25 andMunich Bayer.
Staatsbibl. 4° a lat. a 317 (ed. Ven. 1495), all of which are somehow connected toMarullo. Finally see
Marcus Deufert, “Lukrez undMarullus: ein kurzer Blick in die Werkstatt eines humanistischen
Interpolators”,RheinischesMuseum 142 (1999), 210–223, esp. 216–217 and Palmer,Reading Lucretius, 88–91.
9 See Reeve, “The Italian Tradition”, 27–48, esp. 40; “The Italian Tradition Revisited”, 115–164 esp. 132;
“Lucretius”, 165–184, esp. 169; Flores, Edizione critica, 11; Brown, The Return, 2010, 117. Laur. 35.25 reads
voluptas in both verses. Surprisingly, voluptas in line 258 was first corrected with a superscript stroke
to voluntas. It looks like it was a changemistakenly made to uoluptas closing 258 instead of uoluptas
closing 261: when the error was spotted, the correction to 258 was removed.
10 See Munro 18864, 12; Reeve, “The Italian Tradition”, 27–48, esp. 45 and “Lucretius”, 165–184, esp. 169;
Flores, Edizione critica, 11.
11 OnMarullo and his role in Lucretius’ textual tradition, see Hugh Andrew JohnstoneMunro, Lucreti
Cari De rerum natura libri sex (London-Cambridge, 18864), 6–14; John Masson, “Marullus’s Text of
Lucretius”, Classical Review 11.6 (1897), 307; Reeve, “The Italian Tradition”, 27–48, esp. 44–48; “The
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Marullo never published an own edition of the De rerum natura, but it seems
that his emendations to Lucretius’ text were well known in Italian humanist circles.
After publishing hisHymni naturales – in which familiarity with theDe rerum natura
is quite evident – he died in 1500, leaving his notes and emendations to Candidus,
who used them for the Juntine edition of 1512.12 The correction voluntas in line 257,
though it appears in Monac. 816a, was not accepted by Petrus Candidus, who, at least
in the text, preferred to maintain the transmitted reading. He however included
voluntas, as an alternative reading in 2.257, in his notes at the end of the edition
(f. r1r).13 That Marullo should be the one who actually suggested this correction is
confirmed by Gifanius’ 1565 edition. While accepting the manuscript reading voluptas
in line 2.257, Gifanius comments: leg.Marull. voluntas male, that is “Marullo wrongly
read voluntas”.14
What is relevant to our purpose, however, is that the correction of voluptas to
voluntas in line 257 was certainly circulating much earlier than Lambin’s edition. In
fact, as Reeve has pointed out, the corrections of Monac. 816a were accepted also in
some latemanuscripts, such asVat. Ross. 884,which is the one copiedbyMachiavelli in
1497, who corrects voluptas of line 257 to voluntas, but surprisingly leaves out line 258.15
The second important issue that has been quite overlooked by scholars – with
the exception of Lachmann – is the fact that the very solution suggested by Lambin
of interchanging voluptaswith voluntas had already been put forward by Franciscus
Medices, a friend of Petrus Victorius.16 Victorius, in his commentary on Varro’s Res
rusticae (1.17.6), quotes Lucretius’ passage:Unde est haec, inquam, fatis avulsa voluntas/
Italian Tradition Revisited”, 115–164, esp. 145; “Lucretius”, 165–184, esp. 169–171; Deufert, “Lukrez und
Marullus”, 210–223; André Deisser, “Le Lucrèce deMarulle”, in Présence de Lucrèce: actes du colloque tenu
à Tours (3–5 décembre 1998) (Tours: Centre de recherches A. Piganiol, 1999), 281–297; Flores, Edizione
critica, 260–263.
12 Lachmann, commenting on 2.257, reports the reading of the codices: Unde est haec, inquam, fatis
avolsa voluptas/ per quam progredimur quo ducit quenque voluntas and comments: “In his Marullum non
haesisse mirum est”. He must have thought that Marullo should have rejected the transmitted
reading of oqu, accepting the correction of voluptas in 257 to voluntas instead.
13 I thankMichael Reeve for pointing this out to me.
14 That Gifanius usedMarullo’s corrections is explicitly stated in his epistle to the reader, in which
he actually criticizes Marullo, because cum nimis ingenio suo indulgeret, plurima quae corrigere voluit,
depravavit, that is, “since he indulged his own ingenuity toomuch, he corruptedmost of the things
that he wanted to correct”.
15 Reeve 1980, 27–48, esp. 45. Besides Vat. Ross. 884, the other late manuscripts in which the corrections
of Monac. 816a were accepted are Ambros. p 19 sup and Abbey j.r. 3236, which unfortunately I was
not able to check.
16 See Lachmann 18532, ad loc.
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per quam progredimur quo ducit quenque voluptas, in which the two words voluptas and
voluntas are interchanged. Then he remarks:
Franciscus Medices alerted me to this emendation, a youngman remarkable
for genius, erudition and honesty, who has added to the knowledge of
important matters and skills an acquaintance with this most elegant poet. In
fact, he read him carefully, and he is the only of all who perfectly grasped all
his notions.17
This Franciscus Medices cannot be the later Grand Duke of Tuscany, as Mayotte
Bollack has suggested, because Victorius’ commentary was published in 1542, while
the Grand Duke was born in 1541.18 Victorius must have been referring to another
Franciscus Medices, who was a member of the Accademia Fiorentina.19
Therefore, the same Victorius who ownedMonac. 816a, where voluptas in line 257
was corrected to voluntas, also put forward, on the basis of Franciscus Medices’
suggestion, the replacement of voluptaswith voluntas. The question is whether the
interchange between voluntas and voluptaswas an original idea of FranciscusMedices,
or rather something he read somewhere and just pointed out to Victorius. I believe
that the latter is the correct answer.
What scholars have overlooked is that the suggestion of changing voluptas (in
line 257) to voluntas and vice versa might be implied in Johannes Baptista Pius’
commentary (1511), which preceded Lambin’s first edition (1563) by fifty-two years. I
hereby suggest that Medices most probably did not come up with the suggestion of
interchanging voluntas and voluptas independently but drew it from Pius.
Generally speaking, scholars have been quite reluctant to examine Pius’ com-
mentary, the reason probably being that the text consists of an immense exegetical
17 Huius emendationis me admonuit FranciscusMedices, iuvenis ingenio, doctrina, probitate, insignis, et qui ad
magnarum rerum atque artium scientiam, adiunxit hanc quoque elegantissimi poetae cognitionem. Nam eum
accurate legit, et unus omnium omnes ipsius sensus optime percepit.
18 See Mayotte Bollack, “Momenmutatum”, 163–189, esp. 177.
19 See Jacopo Dionisio Rilli-Orsini,Notizie letterarie, ed istoriche intorno agli uomini illustri dell’Accademia
fiorentina, (Firenze: Per Pietro Matini Stampatore Arcivescovale, 1700), 83, in which there is mention
of a Francesco de’ Medici ‘nobilissimo accademico’, who was indeed a friend of Petrus Victorius:
“coltivò […] e mantenne una stretta amicizia col nostro dottissimo Pier Vettori”. On Francesco de’
Medici, see also Claudio Scarpati, “Con Giovanni Della Casa dalDe officiis al Galateo”, imu 24 (1981),
317–350, esp. 322 – also in connectionwith Lucretius’ text – and Antonietta Porro, “Pier Vettori editore
di testi greci: la Poetica di Aristotele”, imu 26 (1983), 307–358, esp. 316.
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apparatus packedwith information, which sometimes fills entire pages. Reading Pius’
commentary is indeed not an easy task, andwhat renders it evenmore difficult is that
there are several discrepancies between the re-established Lucretian text, the words
used as lemmata, and the readings that he puts forward in the commentary itself.
Therefore, in some cases, checking the text or the lemmata is not enough to get an idea
of what reading or conjecture Pius prefers. He often discusses and sometimes rejects
the reading he has put in the text, while he prefers others taken from other sources.
For this reason, it is misleading to speak in general terms of ‘Pius’ reading’. Rather,
it has to be specified for each instance whether the reading pertains to the text, the
lemmata or the comment, and, in this case, if it is Pius’ conjecture or a reading that
he gathered from other sources.
Let us now focus on our specific example. The Lucretian text in Pius’ edition is the
following:
Unde est haec, inquam, fatis avolsa voluptas?
per quam progredimur quo ducit quenque voluntas. (Pius 1511, f. 58v)
This reading is identical to that given in the majority of the manuscripts andmany
late fifteenth- and early sixteenth-century editions.20However, commenting on v. 257,
Pius writes:
Voluptas. Voluntas should be read in accordance with the ancient copies. Per
quam, through this (will), by its (= this will’s) guidance, by the impulse of this
will, we are led to that place where it (illa) drags us. In like manner: Their own
pleasure drags each one along.21
As we have seen before, voluntas was indeed already circulating as a correction of
voluptas in line 257, but what ancient copies (prisca exemplaria) is Pius referring to?
20 I have looked at the 1486 Verona edition now in Utrecht, emended by Pomponius Laetus and the
1495 Venice edition now inMunich, both of which have voluptas … voluptas, with the latter corrected
to voluntas. Then I checked the 1500 first Aldine edition and the 1512 Juntine edition, both of which
have the transmitted reading voluptas … voluntas.
21 Pius 1511, f. 58, Voluptas. Legatur cum priscis exemplaribus voluntas. Per quam, aurigante qua, impulsu cuius
voluntatis illuc ducimur quo nos illa trahit. Iuxta illud. Trahit sua quemque voluptas. That Pius reads voluntas
is also confirmed by his comment on the previous line, 256: Libera per terras.Utitur exemplo coniecturali,
nam voluntas non semper rectum petit, exorbitat aliquando, perinde motus consuevit.
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At the beginning of his commentary, in the last paragraph of his Interpretatio, Pius
gives us an account of how he reconstructed Lucretius’ Latin text:
I collated, not without hard work and long vigils, the codex of the Venetian
Hermolaus, that of the Roman Pomponius and another, not entirely despica-
ble, which is stored inMantua in a suburban library and belonged to a learned
manof the distinguished Strozzi family. I have also taken into account another
copy – a printed one, but still thoroughly examined – of Philippus Beroal-
dus, once my tutor, nowmy colleague. Nor did I neglect the specimen owned
by the Bolognese scholar Codrus, which was copied for me by Bartolomeus
Blanchinus, a man of refined eloquence, and that of the poet Marullo, which
he corrected with miraculous industry: Severus, a monk from Piacenza, a
great connoisseur of Greek and Latin, a true champion of theMuses, willingly
offered it to me.22 From these [codices], just as Zeuxis did from four different
bodies, I furnished Lucretius with a shape unique and, inmy opinion, beyond
reproach: [codices] which, without a poet of the first rank in wisdom, would
certainly not have turned out to be full of erudition.23
Munro, in his 1886 critical edition, recognized the heavy dependence of Pius’ text
on the first Aldine edition published in 1500 and edited by Hieronymus Avancius,
to whom, however, Pius does not give any credit.24 But the Aldine edition has the
transmitted reading with voluptas in 257 and voluntas only in 258. So where did Pius
read voluntas in line 257?
Among the texts that Pius quotes, the only one which has been identified (and
probably the only one that has survived) is the one owned by Pomponius Laetus,
22 This is the Cistercianmonk Severo Varino from Piacenza; see Sergio Bertelli, “Noterelle machiavel-
liane”, 774–790, esp. 780 and n. 22.
23 Pius 1511, fol. Aiv.
24 SeeMunro 18864, 5. The problem of the relation between Pius’ commentary and the Aldine edition
has been addressed by Maria Carmela Tagliente in her article G.B. Pio e il testo di Lucrezio. After
having noticed that there are several discrepancies between the re-established Lucretian text,
the words used as lemmata and sometimes the readings that Pius discusses in the commentary
itself, Tagliente concludes that Pius did not use only one copy of the first Aldine edition, but
two: one for the text and the other for the lemmata, both containing distinct errors due to
incorrect transcription. Only at a later stage was the text added to the commentary without
Pius being able to examine it one last time. See Tagliente, “G. B. Pio e il testo di Lucrezio”, 337–
345.
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which is now preserved in Basel (Universitätsbibliothek, f viii 14), but this too agrees
with oqu in reading voluptas in 257 and voluntas in 258.25
There is also another interesting source that I have taken into account, namely
the copy of the 1495 Venice edition, which is kept at Harvard (Houghton Inc. 5271).
This copy is packed with marginal notes, some of which are usually attributed to
the hands of Avancius and some others to Pius himself.26 Unfortunately, in this copy,
there is no note on 2.257–258, but, after all, we encounter a similar silence also in the
case of other Marullo’s corrections which, while being accepted in Pius’ 1511 edition,
are not present as emendations in this copy: for example, Lucr. 4.357 ventique calore –
which we know from Victorius to be an emendation byMarullo – is accepted by Pius
in 1511 but is not present as a correction in the Harvard exemplar.27 It is therefore
possible that, if Pius was indeed one of the two correctors of the Harvard copy, he
did not incorporate Marullo’s corrections into it: he might, in that case, have become
aware of them only later on, after having annotated this specific copy.
Pius himself however declares in his Interpretatio that he has used a codex that
containedMarullo’s corrections. In connection with what I said at the beginning of
this article, in my opinion, it is highly probable that Pius had in his hands a close
relative of Monac. 816a that read voluntas both in 257 and 258.
But, given that Pius accepts voluntas in line 257, did he also realize that in view of
per quam different words are needed in the two lines? In other words, did Pius suggest
to switch the two terms, as Lambin did, or did he assume voluntas in both verses, as
didMonac. 816a or a close relative of it? Although the pronoun illa in his commentary
is a little inelegant – since ea or haecwould bemore normally deployed – andmight
25 See Bertelli, “Noterelle macchiavelliane”, 774–790, esp. 781. On this manuscript see Elisabeth
Pellegrin, “Le Codex Pomponii Romani de Lucrèce”, Latomus 7 (1948), 77–82 and Reeve “Lucretius”,
165–184, esp. 167–169.
26 Some years ago, Reeve (“Lucretius from the 1460s to the 17th century”, 165–184, esp. 171–174) argued
that the identification of one annotator as Avancius was highly unlikely and that inadequate
evidence was given for identifying the other as Pius. At the same time, however, he pointed out
resemblances between the annotations in this copy and the known work of Pius. Now that I have
seen themicrofilm of the Harvard exemplar (I thankMarcus Deufert for lendingme his microfilm
copy), I cannothelpbutnotice thatmanyof the corrections are indeed accepted inAvancius’ andPius’
edition. Moreover, given that one of the correctors refers in one note (at 4.1127) to nostra collectanea
and Pius did indeed publish Collectanea (Venice 1502), even Reeve is now much more inclined to
accept the identification of this corrector with Pius (personal communication, November 2015).
However, only a thorough comparison of these notes with Pius’ 1511 editionwill allowus to establish
with certainty that the corrector of the Harvard copy is indeed Pius.
27 See Reeve, “The Italian Tradition”, 27–48, esp. 46.
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refer either to voluntas or voluptas, it seems very unnatural that it should refer to the
three instances of voluntas in the first part of the sentence. This suggestion is then
strengthened by the quotation from Virgil (Eclogues 2.65: Trahit sua quemque voluptas),
where Pius’ illa is matched by voluptas. For these reasons, I suggest that, in line 258,
Pius had inmind the reading voluptas. If this is correct, Pius might have been the first
to suggest the reading voluntas … voluptas, normally attributed to Lambin.
Even if Pius did not accept voluptas in 258, his explanationmight still have inspired
Franciscus Medices’ solution of interchanging voluptas and voluntas, and later even
Lambinmight have drawn inspiration from him. Let us read Lambin’s commentary:
Fatis avolsa voluntas] that is ‘not bound to the fates’. One should read thus in
this passage, not, as in the (published) editions, avolsa voluptas, just as on the
contrary the correct way of writing the following verse is: Per quamprogredimur,
quo ducit quenque voluptas. For, of such a kind is that verse by Virgil in the
Eclogues (in the words of Corydon to Alexis): Their own pleasure drags each one
along.28
The parallel with the passage in Virgil is thus common to Pius’ and Lambin’s
commentary. To be sure, they might have noticed this similarity separately, but
one might at least suspect that Lambin read and drew inspiration from Pius in
commenting on this passage.
To conclude, I shall propose a new and improved apparatus criticus to Lucr. 2.257–
258 that takes into account Pius’ commentary and creditsMarullo with the correction
voluntas in line 257.
Unde est haec, inquam, fatis avolsa voluntas
per quam progredimur quo ducit quenque voluptas
257 voluntas] forte Marullus, Pius in not.: voluptas oqu: potestas Lachmann
258 voluptas] φAB, F. Medices (fortasse iam Pius in not.), Lambinus: voluntas
oqu
28 Lambin 1563, p. 122, Fatis avolsa voluntas] id est fatis non alligata. Sic autem legendum hoc loco, non,
ut in vulgatis, avolsa voluptas, ut contra proximi versus scriptura recta est Per quam progredimur, quo
ducit quenque voluptas. Tale enim est illud Virgilianum in Alex. Trahit sua quenque voluptas (Verg. ecl.
2.63). I have also checked the 1570 edition, where the commentary is the same.
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The analysis of some Renaissancemanuscripts and editions of Lucretius hasmade
it evident that the reading voluntas in 2.257, usually attributed to Lambin, had already
been circulating as a correction since the last quarter of the fifteenth century and that
most probably it had been put forward byMarullo. Subsequently, the correction was
accepted by Pius, in his 1511 commentary, and only fifty-two years later by Lambin.
Secondly, it has been shown that the idea of interchanging voluptas and voluntas –
a correction that has also been attributed to Lambin – was already implied in Pius’
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Summary
In the past few decades, a lot has been written about the reception of Lucretius
(ca. 94–50bce) in the Renaissance, and yet, it is still not quite straightforward to
what extent Lucretius’ doctrine, and his natural philosophy in particular, had an
impact on Renaissance and early-modern thought, and especially on the so-called
revival of atomism in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In order to address
this issue, in this dissertation, I have looked at the earliest Renaissance commentators
on the poemDe rerum natura, considered why they chose to comment on Lucretius’
poem, and how they responded to his matter theory.
Each of the five chapters of this dissertation is devoted to a different exegetical
work on Lucretius, written after his rediscovery in 1417 up to the end of the sixteenth
century: Ficino’s ‘lost’ commentariola (1457?), Raphael Francus’ Paraphrasis (1504),
Johannes Baptista Pius’ commentary (1511), Denis Lambin’s annotated editions (1563/64
and 1570), and Girolamo Frachetta’s Spositione (1589). In order to evaluate how these
exegetes tackled the issue of atomism, I have analysed some passages – often dealing
with the first and the second book of De rerum natura – in which they commented on
Lucretius’ matter theory.
Twomain features have emerged from this analysis: 1) the absence of an explicit
condemnation of Lucretius’ atomism as such, but, instead, a tendency to adapt
and re-contextualize it within other philosophical frameworks; 2) the presence of
a highly complex and eclectic panorama of interpretations, which often originated
from the conflation of Lucretius’ Epicurean atomismwith other doctrines, such as
the Empedoclean four-element theory, Plato’s geometrical atomism, and Aristotle’s
hylomorphism.
Given this complex wattle of influences, I came to the conclusion that it is
certainly incorrect to regard Lucretius’ doctrine, and especially his atomism, as the sole
philosophical model that contributed to overturning Aristotle’s natural philosophy
and paved the way for the development of modern scientific thought. If at some
point, after the rediscovery of Lucretius’ De rerum natura, an atomistic model of
naturemanaged to spread successfully and to replace Aristotle’s natural philosophical
system, it is only because some atomistic explanations were harmonized with more
vitalistic theories of matter, such as the Aristotelian hylomorphism, and embedded in
a teleological account of nature. The interpretations put forward by the Renaissance
commentators of De rerum natura attest to this process of harmonization, rather than
opposition, between these two philosophical systems.
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By following the intricate network of references, citations and interpretations
put forward by the Renaissance commentators onDe rerum natura, this dissertation
aims to show how Lucretius’ scientific theories, and especially atomism, were read,
interpreted, and injected back into the philosophical discourse after the rediscovery
of his poem.
Samenvatting
De afgelopen decennia is er veel geschreven over de receptie van Lucretius (ca. 94–
50bce) in de Renaissance. Toch is het nog niet duidelijk in welkemate Lucretius’ leer,
met name zijn natuurfilosofie, invloed heeft gehad op het denken van de Renaissance
en de vroegmoderne periode, in het bijzonder op de zogenoemde heropleving van het
atomisme in de late zestiende en zeventiende eeuw. Om dit probleem aan de orde
te stellen heb ik in dit proefschrift de vroegste commentaren op Lucretius’De rerum
natura bestudeerd, en onderzochtwaaromLucretius’ gedicht becommentarieerdwerd
en hoe de auteurs reageerden op zijn materietheorie.
Elk vande vijf hoofdstukkenvandit proefschrift is gewijd aan eenander exegetisch
werk over Lucretius, geschreven vanaf de herontdekking van zijn werk in 1417 tot
het einde van de zestiende eeuw: Ficino’s ‘verloren’ Commentariola (1457?), Raphael
Francus’ Paraphrasis (1504), Johannes Baptista Pius’ commentaar (1511), Denis Lambins
geannoteerde edities (1563/4 en 1570), en Girolamo Frachetta’s Spositione (1589). Om te
bepalen hoe deze exegeten de kwestie van het atomisme te lijf gingen heb ik enkele
passages geanalyseerd – die vaak betrekking hebben op het eerste en tweede boek van
deDe rerum natura – waarin zij Lucretius’ materietheorie becommentariëren.
Twee zaken vielen hierbij op: 1) het ontbreken van een expliciete afwijzing van
Lucretius’ atomisme als zodanig, en de neiging om, in plaats daarvan, Lucretius’
atomisme aan te passen aan en onder te brengen binnen andere filosofische kaders;
2) de complexiteit en de eclectische benadering van de interpretaties, die vaak hun
oorsprong hadden in de samensmelting van Lucretius’ Epicureïsch atomismemet
andere doctrines, zoals Empedocles’ theorie vande vier elementen, Plato’s geometrisch
atomisme, en Aristoteles’ hylemorfisme.
Gezien deze complexe verbinding van invloeden is het incorrect om Lucretius’
leer, en in het bijzonder zijn atomisme, te interpreteren als het enige filosofische
model dat heeft bijgedragen aan de omverwerping van Aristoteles’ natuurfiloso-
fie. Ook zou het onjuist zijn te suggereren dat Lucretius’ atomisme de weg heeft
bereid voor de ontwikkeling van het modern-wetenschappelijke denken. Als op
enig moment na de herontdekking van Lucretius’De rerum natura een atomistisch
model van de natuur zich met succes kon verbreiden en Aristoteles’ natuurfilo-
sofische systeem kon vervangen, dan is dat alleen omdat sommige atomistische
verklaringenmet meer vitalistische materietheorieën, zoals het Aristotelische hyle-
morfisme, geharmoniseerd en in een teleologische interpretatie van de natuur inge-
bedwerden.De interpretaties van deRenaissance-commentatoren vanDe rerumnatura
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bevestigen dit proces van harmonisatie, in plaats van oppositie, van deze twee filo-
sofische systemen.
Door het ingewikkelde netwerk van verwijzingen, citaten en interpretaties
in de commentaren op De rerum natura te volgen, laat dit proefschrift zien hoe
Lucretius’ wetenschappelijke theorieën, en in het bijzonder zijn atomisme, werden
gelezen, geïnterpreteerd, en weer geïnjecteerd in het filosofische discourse van na de
herontdekking van dit gedicht.
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